Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No.: UI-2025-005771

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00102/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6th March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

FH (ALBANIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of state for the home department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms T Heybroek, Counsel instructed by Malik & Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Scullion promulgated on 8 July 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Scullion dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent to refuse his further submissions.

Relevant Background

2. The appellant is a national of Albania, whose date of birth is 8 June 1985. On 17 July 2020 he was encountered in the UK in a routine stop. He was identified as a person who had entered the UK without leave, and he was notified of his liability to removal as an illegal entrant. On 24 September 2020 the appellant attended the Asylum Intake Unit where he lodged an application for protection. On 16 October 2020 the appellant was given a screening interview, and on 8 July 2021 the appellant was given a substantive asylum interview. According to the subsequent reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 27 February 2023, the appellant’s initial protection claim was based upon his fear of his former neighbours, who had targeted the family home to force him and his family to leave, so that they could take over their land. On 22 September 2021 his asylum claim was refused and certified as being clearly unfounded.

3. On 11 February 2022 the appellant made further submissions, supported by a Medico-Legal Report prepared by Dr Hameed on 28 January 2022.

4. In the RFRL dated 27 February 2023 giving reasons for refusing the further submissions, the respondent asserted that there was an inconsistency between his initial claim and his renewed claim. Whereas previously he claimed to fear his former neighbours, he had told Dr Hameed that he was fearful of “the local gangster community” with whom there was a dispute over his father’s farmland, even though his father had bought the land legally. This discrepancy undermined the credibility of his claim, and he had failed to provide any new evidence that would warrant a departure from the previous findings on his initial claim.

The Hearing Before, and the Decision of, the First-tier Tribunal

5. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Scullion sitting at Hatton Cross on 3 July 2025. Both parties were legally represented. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant and he was cross-examined.

6. In his witness statement endorsed with a Statement of Truth dated 26 June 2025, the appellant maintained that he had a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to Albania as he would be harmed, tortured and killed by the local community in his home village in Albania, who had an ongoing feud with him and his family.

7. The appellant went on to describe how his father’s family had moved, before he was born, to a village called Shumice in Northern Albania. His father’s family was not welcome in the village. They were treated like outsiders. As the majority of the family did not feel welcome, they moved out of the village when they got the chance. His parents lived in the house that his father built after they got married. He and his siblings were all born in Shumice, and they all lived in this house, as his father did to have anywhere else to go. The local villagers were not welcoming at all. They tried to pressure his parents into moving out of the village. He and his family were always treated like outsiders. They were mistreated and constantly harassed by the locals. They were constantly threatened, and the locals tried to make their life a misery.

8. The village of Shumice also had a group of people who protected the village. This group was known as the local gangster community. This group despised him and his family and showed hatred and disgust towards them. They joined in with the other local villagers trying to get them out of the village, but his family held their ground. The group also had connections in high places, “such as another group similar to them, and then also police officers and connections within the state.”

9. In his summary of the background to the appeal, the Judge summarised the appellant’s claim as follows at para [3]:

“As they were not originally from that village the appellant claims that they were treated badly by the villagers and that they were effectively part of an organised gang.”

10. In his findings, the Judge held at para [18] that Section 8 of the 2004 Act applied, as the appellant conceded that he had travelled through the safe countries of Belgium, Italy and France, and had entered the UK illegally in 2014, and that he had then delayed making a protection claim for approximately 6 years thereafter. The appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation for that delay.

11. He could not find any significant inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. He held at para [20] that the appellant had provided an account which was broadly consistent and credible. He found that the appellant had displayed some subjective fear of the community in his home village. He found that it was reasonably likely that the appellant and his family was subjected to a sustained campaign of hostility and threats from some of the villagers, including having their dog killed, having stones thrown at them, having their utilities interfered with and having received threats.

12. However, he found at para [21] that the appellant had not shown substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if he was returned to Albania. His reasoning was that the Upper Tribunal had previously found there to be a Horvath standard of sufficiency of protection in general in Albania; and that under cross-examination, the appellant conceded that neither he nor his family had ever sought the protection of the police from the abuse of the villagers in their community. He claimed in cross-examination that he had not sought police protection because “three people from families in the village were in the police at the time.” But there was no credible evidence presented that those families were involved in the campaign of abuse against the appellant and his family. Even if they had been, there was no credible evidence presented that, despite being from families in the village, those three police officers would not have undertaken their professional responsibilities as police officers, should they have received a complaint from the appellant or his family: para [23].

13. The Judge said at [24] that, even if he was wrong on this point in relation to the police in his local area, the appellant could have sought protection from the police in another area who had no connection with the villagers, or from higher authorities. No credible evidence had been presented that any of the villagers had power or influence over the state or criminal organisations nationally across Albania. No credible evidence had been presented that the appellant and his family had attempted to seek the protection of any authorities in Albania at local, regional or national levels.

14. The Judge found at [25] that safely relocating to another area in Albania was also an option open to the appellant to escape the campaign of abuse from the villagers. The appellant conceded that his brother and his family, and their mother, both now lived safely in Durres. No credible explanation was given for why the appellant could not do likewise and live in Durres or a similarly large urban conurbation in a different part of Albania away from his home village. The evidence presented was that the villagers wanted possession and/or free access to the appellant’s family house. Now that the appellant and his family had abandoned it, the evidence suggested that the villagers no longer retained an interest in the appellant or his family. No credible evidence had been presented that the villagers (or anyone connected to them) had shown any adverse interest in the appellant, his family in Durres, or his other family members, since they abandoned the house in the village.

15. The Judge’s conclusion was that the appellant could either seek the protection of the Albanian authorities upon return or safely relocate to an urban conurbation such as Durres, as several members of his family had done.

16. The Judge went on at paras [29]-[31] to give reasons for dismissing the alternative claim that removal of the appellant would violate his rights under Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds, applying AM (Zimbabwe).

The Grounds of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

17. Mr Sadeghi of Counsel, who appeared on behalf of the appellant before Judge Scullion, settled the application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

18. Ground 1 was that the Judge had misapplied the principle in para 339K of the Immigration Rules, and had misdirected himself at para [21] that the burden of proof rested with the appellant.

19. Ground 2 was that the Judge had conducted an irrational and/or inadequately reasoned assessment on the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, as he had made a highly selective assessment of the objective evidence, and he had made no finding with respect to the power and impunity of the organised criminal gang that controlled the area where the appellant lived. Nor had the Judge taken account of the limitations that the appellant’s mental health would place on his ability to relocate successfully as his remaining family had done.

20. Ground 3 was that the Judge had made an inadequately reasoned and/or irrational finding with respect to the expert evidence of the Consultant Psychiatrist, Dr Hameed, that he had cited at para [30] of the Decision.

The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal

21. On 4 December 2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Pickering granted permission to appeal on all grounds. His reasoning was that, whilst the Judge referenced the medical evidence at para [30] of the Decision, this appeared to have been in the context of Article 3 ECHR. It was arguable that the Judge did not grapple with the impact of the appellant’s mental health on securing protection, or on the reasonableness of internal relocation.

The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal

22. At the hearing before me to determine whether an error of law was made out, Ms Heybroek developed the grounds of appeal. She submitted that there were two principal errors as identified in Grounds 2 and 3. The first was that the Judge had failed to engage with the objective evidence in the CPIN on Albania: Agents of Protection Version 3.0, February 2025, as to the extensive power and influence of organised crime groups in Albania, and the pervasiveness of corruption. The second was that the Judge had failed to consider the impact of the expert medical evidence on the issue of whether internal relocation was reasonable.

23. In reply, Mr Simpson submitted that the evidence of the appellant did not go as far as asserting that the gang in the village had influence throughout Albania. As to Ground 2, he submitted that the ASA before the First-tier Tribunal did not rely upon the expert report of Dr Hameed in support of the proposition that the appellant could not access sufficiency of protection, or that internal relocation was not a reasonable option. As to Ground 3, while it was accepted that the appellant had established a subjective fear in his former home area, it was not irrational for the Judge to find that he could live with his family outside the home area, for instance in Durres, notwithstanding his mental health issues.

Discussion and Conclusions

24. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:

“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

25. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:

“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”

Ground 1

26. Ground 1 is that the Judge was bound to treat the positive credibility finding which he made at para [20] as a serious indication of the appellant’s real risk of suffering serious harm upon return, unless there were good reasons to consider that such serious harm would not be repeated, applying para 339K of the Immigration Rules. However, instead of asking himself whether there were good reasons to consider that such persecution would not be repeated, the Judge misdirected himself, it is submitted, that the burden of proof rested upon the appellant.

27. I consider that Ground 1 is an example of a judgment being inappropriately picked over as though it were a piece of legislation or a contract. While the Judge did not overtly direct himself to the principle set out in para 339K which was invoked in the Appeal Skeleton Argument (ASA) settled by Mr Sadeghi, the Judge went on to supply cogent reasons as to why the previous campaign of hostility and threats from some of the villagers was unlikely to be repeated.

28. The Judge did not misdirect himself in stating, at para [21], that the burden of proof rested with the appellant. Given that the appellant was not proposing to return to the house in the village which he and the rest of his family had abandoned over 10 years ago, and which was now a ruin, and given that the appellant’s case had always been that the motivation for the campaign was to drive the family away, the burden of proof clearly rested with the appellant to show that there was a real risk of the campaign being waged elsewhere in Albania and/or that he would be of ongoing adverse interest to the local community in his former home area if he returned to live somewhere else in Albania apart from the village.

Ground 2

29. The genesis of the principal error of law challenge in Ground 2 is the submission in the ASA at paras 29 and 32 that (a) the fact that the risk to the appellant originates from an organised criminal gang which protected or controlled the area in which he and his family lived, as well as from the local population in that area of northern Albania [my emphasis]; (b) the fact that the appellant attests to the influence that the gang has, both with similar criminal gangs and with law enforcement; and (c) the pervasive nature of organised crime and corruption in Albania, as shown inter alia in the extracts cited from the CPIN on Albania: Agents of Protection Version 3.0, February 2025 cited at paras 30-31, have the cumulative effect that there does not exist a sufficiency of protection for the appellant anywhere in Albania – and also, as submitted in the ASA at paras 34-36, that the appellant cannot safely relocate internally, as wherever he goes, he can be traced by “the aggressor clan” (i.e. the aggressor gang).

30. The premise of the error of law challenge appears to be that in making the positive credibility finding at para [20] the Judge accepted propositions (a) and (b), and it was therefore incumbent on him to have express regard to the extracts in the CPIN which were relied on as supporting proposition (c).

31. However, it is apparent that the Judge did not find the appellant credible in all respects, as firstly he found that his credibility was damaged by his delay in making his protection claim; and secondly, he held that it was reasonably likely that the appellant and his family were subjected to threats from some of the villagers, rather than from an organised criminal gang. Moreover, as was highlighted by Mr Simpson in submissions, the appellant did not actually give evidence to the effect that the local gang he claimed to fear had any power or influence beyond the immediate locality.

32. In his appeal statement, the appellant introduced for the first time the concept of there being a local gang operating independently of the villagers, with the consequence that, whereas before his case was that the persecution was meted out by some villagers operating like an organised gang, now his case was that the persecution came from two sources, and now it was being alleged for the first time that the gang in the village had connections with another gang elsewhere, and with the police and the state.

33. Even if this was evidence was taken at its face value, it did not establish that the gang in question had power and influence throughout Albania.

34. It is not suggested that the Judge has not fairly recorded what the appellant said in cross-examination on this topic. When asked why he did not seek police protection, he did not say it was because he was being persecuted by a gang which had connections to the police. It is tolerably clear that the Judge understood from the appellant’s oral evidence that the appellant surmised that his persecutors might enjoy police protection as three people from families in the village were in the police at the time.

35. It was clearly open to the Judge to find that the appellant had not reliably attested to the existence of an organised criminal gang, still less to a gang which enjoyed the protection of the local police or the local authorities.

36. It is not true that the Judge did not make a clear finding on this aspect of the evidence. On the contrary, the wording of para [20] presents as being carefully calibrated. The Judge found that it was reasonably likely that the appellant and his family were subjected to a sustained campaign of hostility and threats from “some of the villagers” – not from an organised criminal gang.

37. It was clearly open to the Judge to find that the appellant’s persecutors in the village had no reach or influence outside the village, and that they had neither the inclination nor the ability to trace him to another part of Albania, for the reasons which he gave in paras [24] and [25] of the Decision. The fact that there may be some organised crime groups which have power and influence throughout Albania does not mean that it was an error of law on the part of the Judge not to find that the local gangster community feared by the appellant fell into this category.

38. The other point taken under Ground 2 in respect of the appellant’s mental health overlaps with the point taken in Ground 3 in respect of the appellant’s mental health, and so I will deal with them both together under Ground 3.

Ground 3

39. The arguable error of law identified by the Judge who granted permission to appeal was not foreshadowed in the ASA. It was not the appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal that his ability to seek protection or to relocate successfully was likely to be inhibited by his adjustment disorder. Dr Hameed’s evidence was solely relied on in the ASA to support the case that the appellant’s removal met the criteria set out by the Upper Tribunal in AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC).

40. In para [30], the Judge accepted that the appellant suffered from mental health problems and accepted the diagnosis made by Dr Hameed. The Judge noted from his report that the appellant denied any suicidal plans at present but also noted Dr Hameed’s opinion at para 9.4 of the report as follows: “… It would be worth bearing in mind that his mental health is likely to deteriorate significantly which may in turn put his safety at risk. Separating him from his social networks in the UK were he to be deported to Albania, is likely to have a significant impact on his mental health with the associating increasing isolation and risk.”

41. The Judge found that the appellant was unlikely to be socially isolated on return, as (a) he accepted that he remained in contact with his family, principally his mother and his brother and his family who lived in Durres and (b) he spoke the local language and was familiar with the culture and society there.

42. The Judge found in the alternative that at the very least he would not be any more isolated in Albania than he was in the UK.

43. The Judge further found (a) that the appellant was likely to have the support of his family to help in the difficult few months readjusting on return and ensuring he accessed the health care treatment and medication that he needed, and (b) that there was no credible evidence that the appellant feared accessing medical treatment in Tirana, Durres or at other locations in Albania (apart from his home village).

44. The Judge’s reasoning is said to be legally erroneous in two respects. Firstly, it is said that Dr Hameed was fully aware that the appellant had family ties in Albania, but nonetheless was of the opinion that the appellant would be more isolated in Albania than he was in the UK. Therefore, it is implied, it was perverse for the Judge to reject Dr Hameed’s opinion on this issue and/or that the Judge has not given adequate reasons for rejecting it.

45. This criticism has no merit. While it is true that the appellant told Dr Hameed that all his family lived in Albania, apart from his father who had passed way, he also told Dr Hameed that he had no contact with anyone in Albania and that there would be no support for him in Albania. So, it is unreasonable to suggest that Dr Hameed had factored into his opinion at para 9.4 of the report the probability that familial support would be available to the appellant on his return. Equally, it cannot be said that the Judge was clearly wrong to reject Dr Hameed’s opinion for the reasons which he gave.

46. The other criticism is that, due to his subjective fear of return as found by the Judge at para [20], it is axiomatic that the appellant will be more isolated in Albania than he is in the UK.

47. The relevant finding of fact made by the Judge at para [20] was that the appellant had displayed “some subjective fear of the community in his home village”. It is not correct that the Judge found that the appellant had a subjective fear of return or that the Judge impliedly accepted that the appellant’s fear of the community in his home village might cause him to isolate himself socially in Durres where his family has been residing for many years without any problems.

48. The Judge gave cogent reasons for finding that the appellant’s removal would not breach Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds, and there is no discernible error of law in his treatment of the medical evidence, either as suggested in the grant of the permission to appeal, or as advanced under Grounds 2 and 3.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain an error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Anonymity

The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
3 March 2026