Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005772
UI-2025-005773
First-tier Tribunal No:
EU/54110/2024
EU/54111/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16 June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

ROCKSON DENKYI
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

VICTORIA FOSUA
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Malik of counsel, instructed by RBN Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellants in these linked appeals are siblings and citizen of Ghana born on 24 December 1998 and 7 February 2002 respectively, who sought to enter the UK under the EUSS as dependants of their Dutch father on 8 March 2024. Those applications were refused by the Respondent on 22 May 2024.
2. The relevant law operative in relation to the Appellants’ applications is Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules. The core question was as to whether the Appellants depend on their sponsors for their essential living needs.
3. The Appellants’ appeals against refusal came before First tier Tribunal Judge A B Caskie KC (“the Judge”) on 16 September 2025. The appeals were dismissed in a determination promulgated on 4 October 2025.
4. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted by UTJ Neville on 27 March 2026. The applications come before me today to determine whether there is a material error of law.
5. The sole issue before the First-tier Tribunal was dependency. The family relationship was not disputed. It is the Judge’s approach to the issue of dependence which is challenged by the Appellants.
6. The grounds of appeal, as amplified by Mr Malik in his written and oral argument, argue that the Judge:
(a) Misstated and misapplied the test for dependency at [8] by asking whether the Appellants “require support from the sponsor in order to live a reasonable life. For example, if an individual has an income of their own that is not enough to live a reasonable life but that is topped up to the required level by their sponsor then they are dependent on their sponsor to live a reasonable life”; and
(b) Having accepted that there was evidence as to the Appellants’ needs in their witness statements, and having accepted that money was being remitted by the sponsor [8] the Judge is said to have erred in stating that the Appellants were not able to establish financial dependency on their sponsor because each had their own bank account, the contents of which had not been put into evidence [8].
(c) Mr Malik made the further point that the Judge referred to the Appellants’ mother as their stepmother, which was incorrect. He accepted that this did not give rise to any material error of law.
Relevant law
7. The term ‘dependent’ is defined in Annex 1 of Appendix EU (FP) as follows:
(a) having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the applicant cannot meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, of the qualifying British citizen) or of their spouse or civil partner; and
(b) such support is being provided to the applicant by the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, by the qualifying British citizen) or by their spouse or civil partner; and
(c) there is no need to determine the reasons for that dependence or for the recourse to that support.
8. The Secretary of State relies upon the case of Lim v Entry Clearance Officer [2015] EWCA Civ 1383 at para. 25 in particular, which states that:
In my judgment, this makes it unambiguously clear that it is not enough simply to show that financial support is in fact provided by the EU citizen to the family member. There are numerous references in these paragraphs which are only consistent with a notion that the family member must need this support from his or her relatives in order to meet his or her basic needs. For example, paragraph 20 refers to the existence of "a situation of real dependence" which must be established; paragraph 22 is even more striking and refers to the need for material support in the state of origin of the descendant "who is not in a position to support himself"; and paragraph 24 requires that financial support must be "necessary" for the putative dependant to support himself in the state of origin.
Discussion
9. The Appellants’ first area of complaint is that the Judge misstated the test for dependency at para.8. It is important to look at what the Judge said in context. Para.8 needs to be looked at in its entirety. It states that:
I accept that the test in this case is not a particularly onerous one. It is not necessary for the Appellants to prove that they are wholly or mainly dependent upon their sponsor. It is necessary for them to establish that they require support from the sponsor in order to live a reasonable life. For example, if an individual has an income of their own that is not enough to live a reasonable life but that is topped up to the required level by their sponsor then they are dependent on their sponsor to live a reasonable life. In the present case I have seen some evidence both of the financial support provided by the sponsor and his wife and also there is evidence of the needs of the Appellants contained in their respective witness statements. Even if I were to accept all of that evidence in relation to their financial positions the Appellants would not have established financial dependency on their sponsor. The reason for that is that for the first time during oral evidence it was disclosed both Appellants have their own bank accounts but neither has produced any evidence as to how much is held in either of those accounts or what the intermissions on them were.
10. At para.9 the Judge stated that:
The test of dependency should not be reduced to the bare calculation of financial dependency but should be construed broadly to involve a holistic examination of a number of factors including financial, physical and social conditions, so as to establish whether that dependence is genuine. In the present case the Appellants have shown they receive some financial support from the sponsor and his wife but it has not been established on the balance of probabilities that the financial support provided is essential for the Appellants. The Appellants are in a position to have rented accommodation provided to them it is said, but it is not established the sponsor and his wife are the source of that. I am not provided with a great deal of detail in relation to the social situation of the Appellants apart from the older Appellant being close to completing his university degree and of the younger Appellant having left school some years ago. I note that there is very limited physical contact between the Appellants and sponsor and his wife. That is not particularly unusual because it would not be unusual for a parent supporting two almost adult children overseas not to be able to travel to visit them frequently. Nonetheless in the present case looking at the matter in the round I am not satisfied that it is the sponsor’s support that enables the Appellants to live at a minimum level of subsistence in Ghana. The absence of documentary evidence regarding payments made to the Appellant’s e.g. by friends taking them money, or paying them in advance of that money being returned by the sponsor and his wife, or receipts in respect of the amounts shown in the schedule in the witness statements, or any evidence of attempts to obtain receipts in respect of rent, or evidence that the appellant at university has paid more than 3 termly payment for tuition fees all lead me to conclude I just do not know what the position of these Appellants is and that means they have not discharged the burden of proof to establish dependency on the balance of probabilities. [emphases added]
11. The Judge states the test correctly, and has not over stated it as alleged, as is made clear in particular by the Judge noting that the test is not particularly onerous, and that it does not require an Appellant to be wholly or mainly dependent upon a sponsor. The Judge may have put a “gloss” on the wording of the definition in Annex 1 of Appendix EU (FP) by referring to the ability to live a “reasonable life”, whereas the wording of the Annex is “essential living needs”. I do not consider a “reasonable life” to be a higher threshold than “essential living needs” and in any event, the determination read overall shows that the Judge accepted and applied the essential living needs criteria. The Judge’s example of “topping up” by a sponsor recognises that the inability to meet essential living needs can be in part. I do not consider that the Judge’s approach evidenced by para.8 and 9 amounts to a material error of law. Lim makes clear that dependency requires more than financial support being provided: it must also be needed.
12. Mr Malik accepted in the course of argument that the burden was upon the Appellants to establish dependency to the balance of probabilities standard. The Judge noted the absence of their bank statements and the limited information about their rent payments. Mr Malik is right to state that there was accepted evidence of financial support being provided, and evidence from the Appellants in their witness statements as to their needs: the witness statement of each Appellant dated 7 November 2024 addresses outgoings, but does not provide detailed information addressing whether the remittances from the sponsor are essential or merely beneficial. The missing link, as identified by the Judge, was the information that would be contained in a bank statement as to sources of income and/ or savings (i.e. ability to meet essential needs other than the support of the sponsor).
13. The Judge in my view did not make an error in concluding that there was insufficient evidence of dependency to satisfy the burden of proof because the bank statements had not been produced, as these would have established the “missing link” i.e. whether the support from the sponsor was necessary (in whole or in part) by showing whether the Appellants were able to meet their essential needs from other sources.
14. Mr Malik is right that there was no adverse credibility finding. The above is not, however, a matter of the Judge disbelieving the Appellants, but of needing to be satisfied that the Immigration Rules criteria were met, including as to whether the support was for essential needs that could not (in whole or in part) be met from another source. Identification of an absence of relevant information does not amount to disbelief, and merely acknowledges the limitations of the available material.
15. The Judge in my view properly conducted a holistic analysis [9] by looking at matters other than financial dependency.
16. I find no material error of law in relation to the Judge’s consideration of the issue in the appeal.

Notice of decision
1. There is no material error of law.
2. The appeals are dismissed.

Sian Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 May 2026