Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-005778

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60315/2024
LH/07435/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

ELIJAH FINGALL
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Lam, Counsel instructed by WS Legal Ltd

Heard at Field House on 17 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. For ease of reference and to avoid confusion, I refer to the appellant and respondent as they were before the First-Tier Tribunal.
2. The heading of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal judge (“the FTJ”) anonymises the appellant and the front page sets out the wording of the anonymity direction, but there is nothing in the body of the decision to explain why an anonymity order was made and indeed at the end of the decision the FTJ said that no anonymity direction was made. Having canvassed the matter with the representatives, and noting that the myHMCTS digital case file does not bear an anonymity flag, the issue of anonymity was not mentioned at the hearing in the First-Tier Tribunal and that the appellant is referred to in the anonymity direction as “her” I consider it most likely that the granting of anonymity was an error by the FTJ. I do not make an anonymity order. This is a matter which concerns the appellant’s deportation and the public interest in open justice outweighs the appellant and his family’s interest in keeping his identity confidential.
3. The respondent appeals, with the permission of the First-Tier Tribunal, from the decision of the FTJ promulgated on 23 September 2025 allowing the appellant’s appeal from the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim made following a decision to deport him.
4. The appellant is a citizen of France, born in Guyana, who came to the UK from France at the age of 11. He was 25 years’ old at the date of the hearing before the FTJ. Although he received a sentence for the index offence of 36 months’ imprisonment and so could in principle come within the private or family life exceptions, the judge found that he could not come within the private life exception because he had not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life, as he had not ever applied to regularise his status under the EUSS. She found however that he was socially and culturally integrated into the UK and that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into France and that there were very compelling circumstances over and above those described in the exceptions which meant that the public interest did not require the appellant’s deportation. Those very compelling circumstances were that the appellant mostly met the terms of the private life exception except for the totality of his lawful residence and that the appellant had established a powerful private life claim as he had spent a significant period of his childhood in the UK and only about 6 years in France. The FTJ also took account of the findings of his genuine relationship with his partner and daughter, although she found that it would not be unduly harsh for them to remain in the UK without him, so that the terms of the family life exception were not met.
5. Mr Lam conceded the respondent’s challenge on the first ground, namely that the FTJ misdirected herself or failed to give adequate reasons why she found that there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into France. This was I consider, a realistic concession on Mr Lam’s part. There is a clear error made by the FTJ in not following the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537, that is to consider and explain why a healthy young man who had work experience and some skills would be precluded from integration in France by the lack of friends and family there and that he apparently no longer spoke French. Whilst the appellant might have no specific cultural links to France, Ackom is a reminder that judges should take into account that life in member states of the EU is not so different from life in the UK, in terms of a shared culture of democracy, and shared core values in the sense of respect for the rule of law and human rights and civil liberties.
6. I consider that ground 1 reveals a material error of law such that the decision of the FTJ must be set aside. The conclusion of the FTJ on the appellant’s inability to integrate into France obviously affects her conclusions as to very compelling circumstances and the inability of the partner and child to relocate. In those circumstances I do not consider I need to say anything more about the “near miss” argument raised by ground 2.
7. Having announced my conclusion that the decision had to be set aside, the representatives informed me that they were both agreed that the appeal should be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal to be heard de novo.
8. I was surprised because as I expressed to the representatives, I had initially considered that the appeal could be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking given that there were many findings which could be preserved. However having considered what the representatives said about the findings of fact which could be preserved and agreeing that they were perhaps not as extensive as I had first thought and having considered the case of Begum (remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 and its discussion of case-law and the Practice Direction and Practice Statement, I did not dissent from the representatives’ agreement that the nature and extent of any fact-finding meant that the appeal needed to be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal. I am aware that the appellant proposed to adduce further evidence which had not been available at the time of the hearing before the First-Tier Tribunal.
9. Having considered the matter in the light of Mr Lam’s agreement with Ms McKenzie that ground 1 challenged the factors the FTJ took into account when considering social and cultural integration into the UK (see for example paragraph 10 grounds), and that the FTJ’s finding that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated into the UK could not be preserved, I do not preserve that finding.
10. I do however preserve the FTJ’s finding that the appellant’s partner is British and their child is British. Whilst there was no documentary evidence of the same, the FTJ recognised that but explained why she was satisfied of their nationality on the evidence before her. There is no specific challenge to that finding in the grounds, let alone a sustainable challenge that the FTJ’s findings in that respect are inadequately reasoned.
11. Having discussed and agreed the other facts which should be preserved with the representatives the preserved facts are in total the following:
(i) The appellant lived in France from the ages of 5 to 11 and then entered the UK in 2011 [3], [27];
(ii) The appellant’s partner and daughter are British citizens [31], [37];
(iii) The appellant and his partner and the appellant and his daughter were in a genuine and subsisting relationship as at the date of the hearing before the First-Tier Tribunal [32], [35], [38];
(iv) The appellant was living with his partner and their daughter in his partner’s mother’s home from about August 2024 up to the date of the hearing before the First-Tier Tribunal [35], [36], [45].
12. Any other directions in particular as to the expedition of the hearing, which I understand the appellant desires, will have to be for the First-Tier Tribunal to make if and insofar as they consider it appropriate.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal at Hatton Cross to be decided by another judge.
The judge’s findings set out at paragraph 11 above are preserved.
A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 February 2026