Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-005779
UI-2025-005780
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/01639/2024
EA/02300/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

TOMASZ ROBERT SKWARCZYNSKI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Moriarty of counsel, instructed by Turpin & Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals under s.82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) against the respondent’s decision dated 6 September 2024 refusing his human rights claim and deciding to deport him to Poland.
2. Parasitic on the outcome of the human rights appeal is the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 9 September 2024 refusing his application for leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) on the basis that a deportation order had been made against him.
3. The appellant’s appeals were originally allowed by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) in a decision promulgated on 21 October 2025. However, for the reasons set out in my error of law decision dated 16 April 2026, I concluded that the First-tier Tribunal had made a material error of law. I therefore set aside its decision, with specified findings preserved. A copy of my error of law decision is appended to this determination. The appeal came before me for the resumed hearing to remake the decision on 25 June 2026.
4. For the reasons given below, I dismiss the appellant’s human rights and EUSS appeals.
Background
5. The appellant was born in Poland in 1973. In March 2004, he entered the United Kingdom and, on 21 October 2004, he was granted a residence permit as an EEA national.
6. According to the appellant, he began working in construction, doing painting, plumbing and other jobs, for a year. He was then employed as a plumber but also worked on a self-employed basis. In 2006, he started a scrap metal company and also ran a Polish nursery with his then wife. He also continued working in construction on a self-employed basis. He owned his own house. The appellant says that he was targeted by competing scrap metal companies who made threats against him. Towards the end of 2006 or early 2007, his house was raided by eight men who caused damage to his property and cars. On another occasion, he had £35,000 worth of copper stolen from his garage. There were other burglaries of his properties. As a result of the stress, the appellant turned to alcohol and stopped working. This, he says, destroyed his life. He and his wife divorced in 2009. His house was repossessed around 2009-2010 and he became street homeless. A charity provided him with accommodation in 2013 and he was able to find work; however, he lost his job as a result of his drinking. This, he says, happened multiple times over the years.
7. Meanwhile, on 27 April 2009, the appellant was sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, having been convicted of assault and causing actual bodily harm. He was also given a supervision order and ordered to undergo alcohol treatment for six months.
8. On 1 July 2010, he was convicted of drink driving and offending during a suspended sentence. He was sentenced to 20 weeks’ imprisonment and disqualified from driving. In response, on 13 July 2010, the respondent issued the appellant with a letter warning him that he may face deportation if he continued to offend.
9. On 12 June 2012, the appellant was convicted of possession/control of ID document with intent, and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.
10. On 22 April 2021, the appellant applied for leave to remain under the EUSS.
11. On 14 February 2024, the appellant was convicted of grievous bodily harm and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment. As a consequence, the respondent served a Stage 1 deportation notice on him on 1 March 2024; the appellant made representations in response to this on 8 April 2024. The Stage 2 decision refusing the appellant’s human rights claim was made on 6 September 2024 and a deportation order was signed the same day. Three days later, the respondent refused the appellant’s EUSS application. Both decisions attracted a separate right of appeal.
The hearing
12. The resumed remaking hearing took place on 25 June 2026.
13. The appellant gave evidence through an interpreter. Mr Nathanael Ponsonby, a support worker for the Spitalfields Crypt Trust (SCT), also gave evidence on the appellant’s behalf. Both were cross-examined by Ms Clewley. Their evidence is set out in their respective written statements and in the record of proceedings and is not therefore rehearsed here except where necessary to do so.
14. I had the following materials before me:
a. the remaking bundle;
b. the appellant’s skeleton argument dated 12 June 2026; and
c. a copy of an email sent by Emilia Lyczba, a welfare benefits caseworker for the Hackney Community Law Centre, to the appellant at 12:54 on 17 June 2026, summarising the outcome of a hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) earlier that day regarding his entitlement to personal independence payments (PIP) commencing July 2024.
15. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Issues
16. In the error of law decision dated 16 April 2026, I preserved the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) at [27]-[31] that the appellant did not meet either the private or family life exceptions to deportation set out under s.117C(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act. Therefore, the only issues left for me to determine were:
a. whether there were any very compelling circumstances to the appellant’s case capable of outweighing the public interest in his deportation under s.117C(6); and
b. whether the appellant is entitled to leave to remain under the EUSS.
17. However, following the error of law decision, the appellant has produced evidence to show the following:
a. His mother in Poland has been living in a care home since March 2026 after she had a stroke in February 2026.
b. On 20 March 2026, the appellant’s brother in Poland died after suffering a cerebral haemorrhage.
c. On 15 May 2026, a panel of the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) found that the appellant is unable to carry out any work related activity due to his mental health problems and alcohol dependency.
18. I therefore asked the parties whether I would need to resile from the preserved findings in relation to the private life exception (“Exception 1”) given that the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) had previously found at [30] that the appellant’s “mother and brother still in Poland, he has a good relationship with them and that he would be able to find work there”. Mr Moriarty, however, submitted that the change in circumstance was, in any event, a matter to be considered as part of the very compelling circumstances test. However, I am satisfied that the correct approach would first be to consider whether the appellant now meets Exception 1 given the change in circumstances.
The legal framework
19. The deportation of foreign national offenders is governed by the UK Borders Act 2007 Act (“the 2007 Act”). Section 32 provides for the automatic deportation of foreign criminals sentenced to at least 12 months' imprisonment. Section 33 sets out the exceptions to automatic deportation. For the purposes of the present appeal, this includes where the person’s deportation would breach their rights under the ECHR: see s.33(2)(a).
20. Section 117C of the 2002 Act sets out considerations that a court or tribunal must take into account when considering the Article 8 ECHR rights of a foreign criminal appealing against a decision to deport them from the UK:
117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4)  Exception 1 applies where—
(a)  C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b)  C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c)  there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5)  Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6)  In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7)  The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.
21. The burden of proof is on the appellant to prove the facts of his case applying the civil standard of balance of probabilities. The relevant date is the date of the hearing.
Findings
22. There is no dispute that the appellant meets the definition of a “foreign criminal” under s.32 of the 2007 Act: he is not a British citizen; he has been convicted in the UK of an offence; and he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding 12 months. Under s.32 of the 2007 Act and s.117C(1) of the 2002 Act, Parliament has made it clear that the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good and in the public interest. Furthermore, under s.117C(2), the more serious the offence committed, the greater the public interest is in their deportation.
23. Under s.117C(3), in the case of a foreign criminal who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires their deportation unless they can demonstrate that they meet Exception 1 (private life) or Exception 2 (family life with a qualifying partner or child). If the person cannot meet either exception, their Article 8 appeal can only succeed if there are any very compelling circumstances to the case pursuant to subsection (6).
Exception 1
Length of residence
24. There is a preserved finding that the appellant is unable to satisfy the requirement that he has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. Nothing before me suggests that that position has changed. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2004, when he was 31 years old. By the date of the hearing before me, he was 53 years old. He has therefore not lived in the United Kingdom for most of his life. Moreover, it is difficult to determine with any precision the extent of his lawful residence. The evidence suggests that he was exercising Treaty rights between 2004 and approximately 2009, but thereafter he experienced periods of homelessness and only intermittent employment. In those circumstances, quite apart from the preserved finding, I am not satisfied that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. He therefore cannot meet that requirement.
Social and cultural integration
25. There is a preserved finding from the First-tier Tribunal decision that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated.
Very significant obstacles to reintegration
26. Even with the change of circumstances since the First-tier Tribunal hearing, I am not satisfied that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Poland.
27. The appellant spent the first 31 years of his life living in Poland. He was educated and worked there. He is familiar with the culture and still speaks the language. Although in ill health, his mother still lives there and he also has a cousin that he is still in contact with; he therefore retains ties to the country.
28. I accept that his brother sadly passed away in March. I also accept that, since March, his mother has been living in a care home. However, the appellant stated during cross-examination that his mother’s house is currently empty and he could live there.
29. Furthermore, I acknowledge that the Social Entitlement Chamber has recently found that the appellant is unable to work on account of his mental health (he suffers from depression) and alcohol dependency. According to the panel’s short decision, “There would be substantial risk to his mental or physical health if he were required to carry out work related activity”. I attach weight to the panel’s finding.
30. The appellant also relies upon an email from Ms Lyczba dated 17 June 2026 summarising the outcome of another hearing before the Social Entitlement Chamber to determine his entitlement to PIP on account of a slipped disc. The email states:
“As discussed, please see below the Tribunal's findings from today's hearing.

You were awarded the enhanced rate for both components of PIP. The award was set for 3 years,
commencing in July 2024.

The points:
1d - Needs prompting to be able to either prepare or cook a simple meal.
4c - Needs supervision or prompting to be able to wash or bathe.
6c - Needs either - (i) prompting to be able to dress, undress or determine appropriate circumstances for remaining clothed; or (ii) prompting or assistance to be able to select appropriate clothing.
9c - Needs social support to be able to engage with other people.
10b - Needs prompting or assistance to be able to make complex budgeting decisions
Mob 1d - Cannot follow the route of an unfamiliar journey without another person, assistance dog or orientation aid.
Mob 2b - Can stand and then move more than 50 metres but no more than 200 metres, either aided or unaided

It gives you a total of 12 points for the daily living and 14 for the mobility component.

You should receive the decision in post in the next few days, and the DWP's letter outlining the arrears owed in the next 4-8 weeks. Please let me know as soon as the latter is received.”
31. I attach limited weight to Ms Lyczba’s email. This is not because the appellant has been unable to produce a copy of the First-tier Tribunal’s written decision; I accept that there may be a delay before the parties receive it. Rather, it is because the appellant’s oral evidence was not entirely consistent with the level of impairment described in the email. He explained that, notwithstanding his spinal condition, he is able to travel independently (including to the Upper Tribunal for his appeal hearing), dress himself, prepare simple meals, undertake shopping, manage his finances with only limited assistance, and attend appointments unaccompanied. He did not suggest that he requires the degree of prompting, supervision or social support reflected in the descriptors recorded in the email. It may be that the Social Entitlement Chamber was considering the appellant’s circumstances over an earlier period, particularly given the reference to an award commencing in July 2024 and the payment of arrears. However, even if that is not the position, the evidence I heard at the hearing satisfied me that the appellant is presently capable of functioning with a significantly greater degree of independence than the email might otherwise suggest. Accordingly, I place greater weight on the appellant’s oral evidence concerning his current abilities than on the brief summary contained in the email.
32. However, while I accept that the appellant is presently unable to work (although he did explain during evidence that he hopes to return to work in the future, ideally as a plumber), in oral evidence the appellant accepted that, if returned to Poland, he would be entitled to approximately 1,100 złoty per month in financial assistance from the local council. He also accepted that he could reside in his mother's unoccupied property rent-free. However, he maintained that the available financial support would be insufficient to meet his living expenses, as it would largely be consumed by utility bills and other household costs. He was unaware of any other state benefits to which he would be entitled given his long absence from the country.
33. Given that the appellant would be able to live rent free in his mother’s house and would be entitled to a payment from the local council that would appear to cover essential utility and household costs, I am satisfied that there is little risk of the appellant being homeless or destitute on return.
34. The appellant expressed a desire to return to work in the future, in particular as a plumber. If his mental and physical health improves, there is no reason to believe that, with his qualifications and experience, he will be unable to do so in Poland.
35. While I accept that the appellant may need access to medical treatment for his depression and slipped disc, he gave little evidence suggesting that medical treatment would be unavailable to him in Poland. Indeed, when asked about access to medication for his mental health and spinal conditions, he stated that he believed medication could be obtained there in the same way as elsewhere. His concerns focused less on the availability of treatment and more on the loss of the support and stability provided by his current rehabilitation programme and support network in the United Kingdom.
36. The appellant's evidence is that he currently resides at Acorn House, a hostel offering a rehabilitation programme to homeless men. This has played a central role in his recovery from alcohol and drug addiction. He described the programme as providing him with structure, stability, regular monitoring, therapeutic support and practical assistance. He attended AA meetings, underwent regular testing, volunteered in a charity shop and participated in ongoing support reviews. He regarded the staff, including his support worker Mr Ponsonby, as akin to family and stated that they had "saved my life". His evidence was that the support and relationships provided through Acorn House remained important to maintaining his recovery and would be lost upon removal to Poland.
37. Mr Ponsonby, who works for SCT, which operates Acorn House, confirmed that he has provided support to the appellant throughout his rehabilitation, and explained that the appellant is currently engaged in Acorn’s “Move On” programme following the successful completion of the initial seven-month residential rehabilitation programme. He described the appellant as having shown a strong commitment to his recovery, engaging positively with support, and had participated in training and volunteering opportunities, including work in a charity shop. Mr Ponsonby considered the appellant’s addiction to be stable and said that he was on an “extremely positive trajectory” towards independent living. Nevertheless, he emphasised that the support currently provided remained both comprehensive and necessary. He meets with the appellant every three months to review a support plan covering matters such as self-care, finances, mental health and physical health, and also provides ongoing therapeutic support and regular welfare checks. While he was optimistic that the appellant would eventually be capable of living independently and returning to employment, subject to his physical health and continued recovery, he considered that the appellant presently remained unable to work and would continue to require support. Mr Ponsonby’s view was that, if that support were withdrawn at this stage, he would be concerned about the impact on the appellant’s recovery from drug and alcohol addiction.
38. I attach significant weight to Mr Ponsonby’s evidence. I have also had regard to the other letters of support and statements written by employees of SCT who have worked with the appellant.
39. I take into account that the appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom is now closely bound up with his rehabilitation programme and the support he receives from the staff at Acorn House. I accept that his removal from that environment, and from the support workers with whom he has developed strong relationships, would be likely to have a destabilising effect upon him. However, in my error of law decision, I expressly invited both parties to consider adducing evidence regarding the availability, or otherwise, of alcohol treatment programmes in Poland. Neither party did so. Ms Clewley apologised for that omission and explained that she was unable to say why the Home Office had failed to comply with the direction, having only been allocated the case the day before the hearing.
40. The absence of evidence from either side on this issue is regrettable and unhelpful. Nevertheless, I bear in mind that Poland is a Member State of the European Union, a signatory to the ECHR, and it has an established public healthcare system. It is also well known that Poland faces significant problems associated with alcohol misuse. In those circumstances, it would be surprising if alcohol treatment and rehabilitation services, whether provided by the state, local authorities or non-governmental organisations, were not available there. Although Mr Moriarty submitted that it was difficult for the appellant to prove a negative, this Tribunal frequently encounters cases in which appellants adduce country evidence demonstrating the absence of adequate medical treatment or support services in their country of origin. Ultimately, the burden rests upon the appellant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, the facts upon which he relies. Despite being given the opportunity to do so, he has produced no evidence capable of demonstrating that alcohol treatment or rehabilitation programmes would be unavailable to him in Poland. Moreover, at no point has it been expressly asserted on his behalf that no such programmes exist there. With that in mind, I accept that there will be a level of disruption to the appellant’s treatment as he transitions from his established programme in the United Kingdom to a new one in Poland; however, there is insufficient evidence before me to suggest that he would be unable to handle that transition given the skills that he has developed to date.
41. For these reasons, I am satisfied that there are no very significant obstacles to the appellant re-establishing his private life in Poland.
Conclusion on Exception 1
42. The appellant fails to meet the first and third limbs of s.117C(4) of the 2002 Act. He does not, therefore, satisfy the requirements of Exception 1.
Exception 2
43. There is a preserved finding from the First-tier Tribunal decision that the appellant does not have a qualifying partner in the United Kingdom and that he does not have a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying child.
Very compelling circumstances
44. As the appellant is unable to meet the requirements of Exceptions 1 or 2, he must demonstrate very compelling circumstances in his case over and above them. I remind myself that a failure to satisfy the requirements of Exceptions 1 and/or 2 does not preclude a finding that very compelling circumstances exist, although cases in which that threshold is met will be rare: see NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662 at [30]–[33].
45. In considering the test under s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act, I have had regard to the guidance given by the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, in particular at [51], and to OH (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1763 at [63], where Irwin LJ observed that, “[a]s a matter of language and logic”, the very compelling circumstances test sets a “very high bar indeed”.
The seriousness of the offence
46. I have read the sentencing remarks of HHJ Tregilgas-Davey KC relating to the index offence for which the appellant was sentenced on 14 February 2024. It states that the appellant and his then partner had been drinking together and that an argument ensued, which resulted in the appellant stabbing his partner in the leg with a pair of scissors, and then slapped her as she fell onto the bed. The appellant told the police that she had provoked him by calling him names. The judge was satisfied that the offence was so serious that only an immediate custodial sentence was justified. As the judge noted, when a person under the influence of alcohol attacks someone with a bladed weapon, it is a matter of luck how serious the injury will be.
47. I am accordingly satisfied that the appellant has been convicted of a serious offence involving violence and injury.
The time elapsed since the offence was committed
48. The index offence was committed on 12 August 2023. It was, therefore, less than three years ago, which is not a significant period of time.
Rehabilitation
49. The appellant contends that, since committing the index offence, he has taken significant steps to address his alcohol dependency with the support of Acorn House. Through that support, he has attended weekly classes in English language and literacy, gardening, and painting. He wishes to remain in the United Kingdom so that he can rebuild his life, continue working, and re-establish contact with his two daughters.
50. However, although the appellant has not committed any further offences since August 2023, that period is not particularly lengthy. I also bear in mind that he spent part of the intervening period in custody. In addition, the existence of the ongoing deportation proceedings is likely to have acted as a powerful disincentive to any return to his previous lifestyle.
51. In relation to the index offence, I accept Ms Clewley’s submission that the appellant sought to minimise his responsibility during cross-examination. In his oral evidence, he stated that he had been shown a photograph of his partner having sex with another man in a park. He said that he confronted her with the photograph and called her a “whore”, whereupon she attacked him with a pair of scissors. The appellant claimed that, while attempting to disarm her, she was accidentally stabbed in the leg. He further maintained that he pleaded guilty only on the advice of his lawyer in order to minimise the length of his custodial sentence. As Ms Clewley submitted, that account fails to engage with the sentencing judge’s finding that the appellant had also slapped his partner.
52. I have before me an OASys report dated 13 August 2024. The report records an allegation that the appellant “has taken a knife to [his former partner’s] neck and then pushed her to the bed where he stabbed her in the leg, causing a bleeding wound”. The report also states that the appellant “accepts full responsibility for his offence. He did not attempt to minimise his actions. He tells me that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time and recognises that he has an issue with alcohol.”
53. Ultimately, whilst there may be some truth in the appellant’s account of the argument that preceded the offence, having considered both the sentencing remarks and the OASys report, I am not satisfied that the stabbing occurred accidentally. I therefore accept Ms Clewley’s submission that the appellant sought to downplay his culpability before the Tribunal.
54. I also take into account that, following the onset of his addiction problems, the appellant became a persistent offender. According to the sentencing judge’s remarks, he had accumulated seven relevant convictions dating back to 2009.
55. The OASys report assesses the appellant as presenting a low risk of reoffending against members of the public and against children, but a medium risk in relation to a known adult, namely his former partner.
56. I accept that the appellant’s offending is closely linked to his alcohol dependency. If he is able to maintain his abstinence, I find that the risk of further offending is likely to be low, although I do not discount the possibility that he may continue to present a medium risk to his former partner. The appellant has plainly struggled to remain sober in the past. Nevertheless, I found him generally to be a credible witness, and I accept the evidence of both the appellant and Mr Ponsonby that, with the assistance of SCT, he has made significant progress in addressing his addiction. Accordingly, whilst I am satisfied that, as at the date of the hearing, the overall risk of reoffending is likely to be low, that assessment is contingent upon his continued sobriety.
57. I bear in mind the guidance of the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 at [58] (per Lord Hamblen, with whom the other Justices agreed), that where “the only evidence of rehabilitation is that no further offences have been committed then, in general, that is likely to be of little or no material weight in the proportionality balance.” In the present case, there is limited evidence of any positive contribution made by the appellant to society beyond his volunteering work in a charity shop.
58. I therefore conclude that only limited weight can properly be attached to his claimed rehabilitation.
The appellant’s family life in the UK
59. The appellant is not in a relationship and has been estranged from his daughters for several years. He does not therefore enjoy any family life for the purposes of Article 8.
The length of the appellant’s stay in the UK
60. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in March 2004 at the age of 31. He has therefore lived here for more than 22 years, although he has spent most of his life, including his formative years, in Poland.
The appellant’s ties to Poland
61. The appellant has not lived in Poland for some time. However, he was born, educated and worked in that country until he was 31 years old. He is still in contact with his mother and cousin there, and Polish is still his first language. I adopt my earlier findings that there are no very significant obstacles to his re-establishing a private life there.

Are there any very compelling circumstances?
62. Having undertaken a holistic assessment of the evidence, I am not satisfied that there are very compelling circumstances in the appellant’s case.
63. The starting point is the strong public interest in deportation, given both the seriousness of the index offence and the appellant’s extensive criminal history, which dates back to 2009 and has included offences involving violence. Furthermore, the appellant’s ability to abstain from offending appears to be closely linked to his ability to remain sober.
64. I also take into account that the appellant is currently unable to work because of his health difficulties and is in receipt of Universal Credit and PIP. He is therefore not financially independent. Until such time as he is able to return to work and support himself, he is likely to remain a burden on the public purse: see s.117B(3) of the 2002 Act.
65. I accept that the appellant has some knowledge of English and is seeking to improve his proficiency by attending classes. This is, however, a neutral factor.
66. On the appellant’s side of the balance, I attach weight to the following matters:
a. The appellant has lived in the United Kingdom for approximately 22 years. However, there is limited evidence of substantive private life ties. Since around 2008/2009, he has struggled with alcohol dependency, during which period he has worked only intermittently and made little positive contribution to society. As at the date of the hearing, his private life is largely centred on the support and treatment provided by Acorn House, including the assistance of his support worker, Mr Ponsonby. As a consequence of his alcoholism, it appears that he has not exercised Treaty rights for a number of years. His immigration status has therefore been either precarious or unlawful for a significant period. In those circumstances, I find that his private life attracts little weight: see s.117B(4)-(5).
b. The appellant has not lived in Poland since 2004 and, because of his health difficulties, he would be unable to work immediately upon return. The essence of his case is that he would also lose the support presently provided by Acorn House. Whilst I attach some weight to these considerations, I have already found that there would not be very significant obstacles to his reintegration. In particular, he would be able to re-establish contact with his mother and cousin, reside in his mother’s property, obtain financial assistance from the local authorities, and access appropriate medical treatment. Moreover, the appellant has produced no evidence to demonstrate that he would be unable to access support services for those suffering from alcohol dependency in Poland. He could therefore re-establish his private life on return.
67. Considering these matters cumulatively, I find that they fall well short of establishing very compelling circumstances capable of outweighing the strong public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
Conclusion on Article 8 ECHR
68. Having weighed all the relevant considerations, I am satisfied that the interference with the appellant’s private life consequent upon his deportation to Poland would be proportionate. The strong public interest in his removal, given the seriousness and persistence of his offending, and his current lack of financial independence, outweighs his ties to the United Kingdom, even when the significant progress that he has made with Acorn House is taken into account.
The EUSS application
69. In light of my findings above, it necessarily follows that the appellant’s EUSS appeal also fails.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on EUSS grounds.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8th July 2026

Annex: The error of law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-005779
UI-2025-005780
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/01639/2024
EA/02300/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

TOMASZ ROBERT SKWARCZYNSKI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr M Moriarty of Counsel, instructed by Turpin & Miller LLP

Heard at Field House on 2 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Moon (“the judge”) promulgated on 21 October 2025. In that decision, the judge allowed Mr Skwarczynski’s appeals against the decision to refuse his human rights claim in the context of his deportation to Poland and the refusal of his application for leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS).
2. For continuity, I will continue to refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal, although it is the Secretary of State who is the appellant in the appeal before the Upper Tribunal. Therefore, Mr Skwarczynski will be referred to as the appellant and the Secretary of State as the respondent.
Background
3. The appellant is a citizen of Poland born on 25 January 1973. He arrived in the UK in March 2004 at the age of 31. He was issued with an EEA residence card on 21 October 2004. On 22 April 2021, the appellant made an application for leave to remain under the EUSS.
4. From April 2009 onwards, the appellant received nine convictions for 14 offences, including assault, driving a vehicle with excess alcohol, driving while disqualified, theft, possession of identity documents with intent, destroying or damaging property, using threatening or abusive words and displaying disorderly behaviour. On 14 February 2024, the appellant was convicted at Kingston-upon-Thames Crown Court of wounding/inflicting grievous bodily harm without intent, for which he was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment. This triggered the respondent to commence deportation action against him. A Stage 1 deportation decision was served on the appellant on 1 March 2024; in response, the appellant served submissions on the respondent on 7 March 2024 explaining why he should not be deported. However, in a Stage 2 decision dated 20 November 2024, the respondent rejected the appellant’s human rights claim and confirmed her intention to deport him. Meanwhile, the appellant’s EUSS application was refused on 9 September 2024 on the basis that a deportation order had been made against him on 6 September 2024. The appellant was entitled to rights of appeal against both the human rights and EUSS decisions.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant’s appeals were heard on 13 June 2025. In a decision promulgated on 21 October 2025, the judge considered whether the appellant met any of the statutory exceptions to the public interest in deportation set out in s.117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). She found that the appellant met neither the private life exception (Exception 1) nor the family life exception (Exception 2). She therefore went on to consider whether there were any very compelling circumstances in the appellant’s case over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, pursuant to s.117C(6). For the reasons given at [49]–[56], the judge concluded that there were very compelling circumstances. In reaching that conclusion, the judge relied on the appellant’s long history of alcoholism, finding that he had “lost absolutely everything” as a result, and placed weight on the fact that he was making good progress on a sobriety programme operated by a trust. She considered that the significant steps the appellant had taken towards recovery outweighed the public interest in his deportation and accordingly allowed both the human rights and EUSS appeals.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The respondent was granted permission to appeal by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on 4 February 2026.
7. The respondent’s single ground of appeal is that the judge had made a material misdirection of law, or had otherwise provided inadequate reasoning, when finding that there were very compelling circumstances in the appellant’s case.
The hearing
8. I had before me: the 410-page consolidated bundle prepared by the respondent; and the appellant’s Rule 24 response dated 2 March 2026.
9. For the respondent, Mr Sheikh submitted that the judge materially erred in law by failing to give adequate reasons for concluding that the appellant met the very compelling circumstances test. He submitted that the judge had correctly found that the appellant could not meet Exceptions 1 or 2 under s.117C of the 2002 Act and that there were no very significant obstacles to his integration in Poland, given that he had spent most of his life there, spoke the language, and retained family ties, including a mother and brother. Against that background, it was submitted that the judge had impermissibly “put all her eggs in one basket” by treating the appellant’s alcoholism and current engagement with rehabilitation services in the United Kingdom as decisive. The judge had failed to consider what support and treatment might be available to the appellant in Poland, an EU country, and had not adequately assessed the public interest, including the deterrent effect of deportation. Although neither party had adduced evidence about rehabilitation facilities in Poland, Mr Sheikh submitted that the judge ought to have had regard to matters in the public domain, as discussed in Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537, and that the failure to do so rendered the reasoning insufficient. On that basis, the respondent contended that a material error of law was established and invited the Upper Tribunal to allow the appeal and remake the decision.
10. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Moriarty argued that the appeal disclosed no error of law and amounted, in substance, to a disagreement with the judge’s evaluative conclusions. Mr Moriarty relied on the Rule 24 response and emphasised that there was only a single ground of appeal. He submitted that the judge had correctly identified and applied the relevant legal tests, expressly acknowledging the high threshold applicable to the very compelling circumstances test, and had reached findings that were open to her on the evidence before her. The judge was entitled to confine herself to the evidence adduced, which included consistent and detailed evidence from those involved in the appellant’s rehabilitation in the United Kingdom. It was argued that Ackom was factually distinct, not least because it concerned Germany rather than Poland, and because in the present case no argument had been advanced before the First-tier Tribunal that suitable rehabilitation programmes would be available in Poland. The assessment of proportionality was fact‑specific, and the judge had taken the public interest into account when considering the appellant’s circumstances as a whole. The respondent’s challenge was said to be a thinly disguised perversity argument, which did not establish that the judge had misdirected herself in law. Accordingly, the appellant submitted that the decision disclosed no material error and should be upheld.
11. Having heard submissions from both parties, I reserved my decision.
Legal framework
12. Section 117C of the 2002 Act governs the deportation of foreign criminals and sets out the public interest considerations. The general principle is that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest (s.117C(1)) and where a person has been sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment, the public interest requires deportation unless one of the statutory exceptions applies (s.117C(3)).
13. Where a person has been sentenced to at least four years’ imprisonment, deportation is required unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 (s.117C(6)). Exception 1, which relates to private life, is set out under s.117C(4). It applies where the person has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of their life, is socially and culturally integrated, and there would be very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return. Exception 2, which relates to family life, is set out under s.117C(5). It applies where the person has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or child, and the effect of deportation on that partner or child would be unduly harsh.
14. The burden is on the appellant to prove the facts of their case applying the civil standard of balance of probabilities. The relevant date is the date of the hearing.
Discussion – Error of Law
15. I am mindful that this Tribunal should not interfere with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts. The role of this Tribunal is not to re-try the case but to determine whether the decision under challenge involved the making of a material error of law. As emphasised in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] to [3], findings of fact are entitled to respect and should only be disturbed where they are vitiated by legal error, such as a failure to apply the correct test, a misdirection, or inadequate reasoning that prevents the losing party from understanding why they lost. It is against that standard that I have assessed the merits of the respondent’s appeal.
16. As already explained at [5] above, in the present case, the judge accepted at [27] that neither Exception 1 nor Exception 2 under s.117C of the 2002 Act applied to the appellant. Exception 1 did not apply because while the judge was satisfied that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, he had not been lawfully resident in the country for most of his life and, furthermore, there were no very significant obstacles to him re-establishing his private life in Poland: see [29]-[30]. With regards to the absence of very significant obstacles, the judge found that on “the appellant’s evidence…his mother and brother still live in Poland, he has a good relationship with them and…he would be able to find work there.”
17. With regards to Exception 2, the judge found that the appellant was not in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner and that while he had a teenage daughter in the United Kingdom, he did not have a genuine and subsisting relationship with her: see [27].
18. Having found that the appellant met neither of those statutory exceptions, the judge went on to consider whether there were nevertheless any very compelling circumstances capable of outweighing the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. Section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act requires an appellant relying on very compelling circumstances to demonstrate factors “over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. This does not require an appellant to satisfy the requirements of Exceptions 1 and 2 themselves, but it does call for something exceptional: see Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987 at [42]. As the Court of Appeal explained in OH (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1763 at [63] (per Irwin LJ, with whom the other members of the court agreed), “[a]s a matter of language and logic” the very compelling circumstances test sets “a very high bar indeed”.
19. The respondent’s case is that it is difficult to tell from the judge’s brief reasoning in respect of very compelling circumstances what factors met that high threshold. As Mr Sheikh submitted, the judge had accepted at [30] that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant re‑establishing his private life in Poland. In particular, the appellant could return to his family in Poland and find work for himself. Furthermore, the appellant had no notable family ties to the United Kingdom: see [27]. Having reached those findings, the only factor the judge identified as weighing positively in the appellant’s favour when applying the very compelling circumstances test was his alcoholism, and in particular the fact that his addiction had ruined his life and that he was currently making progress on a treatment programme. On the judge’s reasoning, it is difficult to understand how the appellant’s act of destroying his life in the United Kingdom through his addiction could, at the same time, render what little private life he retained sufficiently weighty to overcome the strong public interest in his deportation. The judge explains at [52] that “some of the things he lost may be regained if he stays sober”, but that observation merely underscores the limited and precarious nature of the appellant’s private life at the date of the hearing, which were matters the judge failed to take into account. At [53]–[55], the judge considers the rehabilitation course the appellant was undertaking and concludes that, if he remains sober, “he can contribute to society”. She further reasons that, because “significant resources must have been directed at the appellant’s recovery”, this “weakens the public interest argument” on the basis that those resources have been invested in enabling the appellant to become a useful member of society in the United Kingdom. However, both strands of reasoning implicitly acknowledge that, as at the date of the hearing, the appellant was not making such a contribution. The purpose of s.117C is to provide a framework for assessing whether the private or family life actually enjoyed by an appellant at the date of the hearing is capable of outweighing the strong public interest in deportation. In the present case, however, the judge’s reasoning appears to rest on the private life the appellant might go on to develop in the future if his recovery were successful. While a person’s rehabilitation may be a relevant factor in the proportionality balance – albeit one that is rarely likely to attract significant weight: see HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 at [58] – it is, on the judge’s brief reasoning at least, difficult to see how the mere potential for rehabilitation could compensate for the absence of any significant private life.
20. Moreover, I am satisfied that the judge’s consideration of the very compelling circumstances test is inadequately reasoned in its treatment of the public interest. Mr Moriarty submitted that the judge did take the public interest into account, relying on [31]. That paragraph, however, merely records that, having failed to meet Exceptions 1 and 2, it was necessary to go on to consider s.117C(6). He also relied on [35]–[36] and [40], but those passages amount to little more than a summary of the appellant’s evidence concerning his offending. Further reliance was placed on [49]–[50], which contain citations of authority, and on [55]–[56], where the judge addresses the appellant’s treatment programme. Nowhere, however, in the judge’s assessment under s.117C(6) does she engage with the appellant’s offending history - namely, nine convictions for 14 offences committed over a period of 15 years – the nature and seriousness of that offending, the relatively short period since the most recent offence, the risk of reoffending, or the deterrent effect of deportation in relation to foreign national offenders. That in itself constitutes a material error of law.
21. That error is further compounded by the fact that it is difficult, on a fair reading of the decision, to understand how the judge concluded that the expenditure of resources by the trust (rather than the public purse) responsible for the appellant’s alcohol treatment programme could conceivably undermine to any material extent the strong public interest in his deportation so as to tip the proportionality balance in the appellant’s favour. That is particularly the case where the evidence before the judge demonstrated that the appellant had, at best, only limited private life ties to the United Kingdom and she had found that there were no very significant obstacles to him re-establishing his private life in Poland. (I would also note that the judge appears to have double‑counted the rehabilitation programme, treating it both as a factor weighing in the appellant’s favour and as one which diminishes the public interest in deportation.)
22. Finally, I address the question of whether, in placing reliance on the alcohol treatment programme the appellant is benefiting from in the United Kingdom, the judge erred in her reasoning by failing to consider whether the appellant could access something similar in Poland. Mr Sheikh accepted that the respondent had not adduced evidence before the First-tier Tribunal to demonstrate that alcohol treatment programmes were available in Poland (and that, equally, the appellant had not provided evidence that such programmes would be unavailable to him). He nevertheless submitted that the judge ought to have taken into account that, as an EU member state, it was more likely than not that Poland would have such provision. In support of that submission, Mr Sheikh relied on Ackom at [46]. I am not persuaded that this authority is directly in point. What the Court of Appeal was addressing at [46] was the fact that Germany was not so culturally distinct from the United Kingdom that, even for an appellant with no ties to that country, it would necessarily be very difficult for them to re‑establish a private life there. While I accept that it might be surprising if Poland did not have treatment centres or programmes for alcohol addiction, this was not a matter of which the judge could reasonably be expected to take judicial notice and, ultimately, it was a matter for legal argument and evidence. It was not addressed in the decision letter or in the respondent’s review, and I cannot be satisfied, on the materials before me, that this issue was advanced before the judge.
23. Nonetheless, for the other reasons given above, I am satisfied that the judge’s decision is insufficiently reasoned in key aspects and is accordingly vitiated by a material error of law. In reaching that conclusion, I necessarily reject Mr Moriarty’s submission that the respondent’s challenge amounts, in substance, to an allegation of perversity.
Disposal
24. Mr Sheikh submitted that, if a material error of law were found, the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking. Mr Moriarty, by contrast, contended that the extent of the fact‑finding required meant that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
25. I remind myself that there is a presumption that an appeal should be retained by the Upper Tribunal unless the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal were tainted by procedural unfairness, or the nature or extent of the fact‑finding required to remake the decision would be extensive. In the present case, there was no procedural unfairness before the First-tier Tribunal. Further, I am satisfied that no extensive fact‑finding will be required. It is common ground that the appellant meets neither Exception 1 nor Exception 2 and, accordingly, the sole issue for determination is whether there are very compelling circumstances within the meaning of s.117C(6). Applying paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, I am satisfied that the appeal should be retained by the Upper Tribunal for rehearing, with the First‑tier Tribunal’s findings in respect of Exceptions 1 and 2 preserved.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated by a material error of law and is set aside, save that the findings at [27]-[31] are preserved.
The appeal is to be reheard by the Upper Tribunal.
Directions:
1. The remaking of this appeal is to be listed for the first available date after 10 June 2026 at Field House with a time estimate of 3 hours.
2. Any updating evidence either party wishes to rely upon must be electronically filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party no later than 21 days prior to the remaking hearing. In particular, each party should consider filing evidence relating to the availability or otherwise of alcohol treatment programmes in Poland.
3. Mr Skwarczynski is to file and serve a skeleton argument no later than 14 days before the resumed hearing.
4. The Secretary of State is to file and serve a skeleton argument no later than 7 days before the resumed hearing.
5. Mr Skwarczynski shall be provided with a Polish interpreter.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10th April 2026