UI-2025-005781

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 07 Jul 2026
• Promulgation date: 09 Oct 2026
• Publication date: 29 Oct 2026
• Last updated on: 29 Oct 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005781
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65738/2024
LP/10536/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of October 2026

Before

The Hon. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

AX
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Benfield of Counsel, instructed by Islington Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any other member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

(1) Introduction
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of the First tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) dated 23 September 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent's decision dated 15 May 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claims, made in the context of an application for the revocation of a deportation order made on 29 June 2007.
(2) Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iran born in or around December 1972. He entered the United Kingdom on 7 December 2000 and claimed asylum. His brother, NX, had arrived in the United Kingdom in August 1999 and also claimed asylum. The appellant claimed that another brother, T, had been executed in Iran in about 1993 for anti-revolutionary activities.
(2)(a) The Earlier Decisions
3. In order to determine this appeal, it is necessary to refer to three earlier decisions:
(1) In a decision dated 9 July 2004 (“the first AX decision”) an adjudicator, Mr CH Bennett, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his asylum claim.
(2) In a decision dated 4 May 2004 (“the NX decision”) another adjudicator, Ms S Henderson, allowed NX’s appeal against the refusal of his asylum claim.
(3) In a decision dated 1 May 2007 Immigration Judge Dickson and Mr R Baines JP dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the deportation order. It is unnecessary to say any more about this decision, since it was based on, and did not add anything to, the first AX decision.
(2)(b) The 2022 Claims
4. The appellant made protection and human rights claims in submissions made on 2 March 2022 and 13 June 2022. As summarised by the respondent in her decision of 15 May 2024, the nature of the protection claim was that the appellant would be at risk on return to Iran because of his own political opinion and his family’s political profile. In any event, the appellant would be at risk of persecution as an individual living with mental heath difficulties. His mental health would deteriorate and he would be destitute if removed to Iran. The appellant’s removal would also be a breach of Articles 2, 3 and/or 8 ECHR.
5. In her decision of 15 May 2024, the respondent did not accept any of the facts on which the appellant claimed to fear political persecution and so concluded that he was not entitled to asylum or humanitarian protection. Similarly, she did not accept that he was at risk of a breach of Articles 2 or 3, that his state of health would give rise to a breach of Article 3 on medical grounds or that he would be destitute on return. The respondent did not accept that the appellant’s return would be disproportionate under Article 8.
6. The appellant submitted a statement on 20 September 2023, whilst the decision on his earlier submissions was pending, raising a protection claim on the basis of his conversion to Christianity. That was not considered by the respondent in her decision of 15 May 2024, but when the appellant appealed against that decision, and although the FtT considered it not to be a ‘new matter’ as defined in section 85 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the respondent consented to the FtT dealing with that issue. However, in its decision of 23 September 2025, the FtT dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
(2)(c) The Grounds of Appeal
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on seven grounds, namely that:
(1) the FtT had failed to take into account relevant factors when finding that there was no reason to depart from the previous determinations;
(2) the FtT had erred in its assessment of the alleged risk arising due to the grant of refugee status to NX;
(3) the FtT had failed to make findings on relevant matters, including the alleged risk arising from the appellant’s illegal exit from Iran, from his extended absence from Iran and from his criminal activities in the United Kingdom;
(4) the FtT had failed to give adequate reasons in relation to the absence of confirmation of completion of national service leading to risk;
(5) the FtT had failed to give adequate reasons when assessing the alleged risk to the appellant as a member of a particular social group and had erred in its assessment of the expert evidence in that regard;
(6) the FtT had failed to take account of relevant factors when assessing Article 3 (i.e. medical/suicide risk); and
(7) the FtT had failed to take account of relevant matters in the assessment of Article 8.
8. Permission to appeal was refused by the FtT, but granted on renewal by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt, primarily on the first two grounds, but without limitation.
(2)(d) The Error of Law Decision
9. In a decision dated 20 April 2026, Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede found that the decision of the FtT had involved the making of an error on a matter of law and set the decision aside, with certain facts preserved. That error of law decision is annexed below.
10. Specifically, Judge Kebede agreed that the FtT had erred as alleged in grounds 1 and 2, requiring that the FtT’s decision in relation to the appellant’s brothers’ activities, the execution of T, the grant of asylum to NX and the impact of those matters on the appellant’s own protection claim be set aside and redecided. She found there to be little merit to the remaining grounds, save to the extent that they were impacted by the errors identified in grounds 1 and 2. Consequently, she stated the following at [37]:
“There are findings which are to be preserved. The judge’s adverse findings on the appellant’s claim as to his conversion to Christianity and the risk arising from his Christian faith have not been challenged. The judge gave cogent reasons for finding the appellant’s claim in that regard to be lacking in credibility and unreliable and was entitled to conclude as he did. The judge’s findings in that regard are therefore preserved. The judge’s findings on the risks arising from the absence of confirmation of completion of national service and from the appellant’s mental health condition, as well as his findings on Article 3 and Article 8 are also preserved, although that is subject to any impact arising from a renewed assessment of risk on return on the basis of his brothers’ activities and NX’s recognition as a refugee.”
11. Judge Kebede retained the appeal for remaking in the Upper Tribunal on the above basis. That is the task to which we turn below.
(3) The Remaking Hearing
12. It was agreed that the appellant would be treated as a vulnerable witness on the basis of his complex mental health difficulties. The appellant’s brother, NX, gave evidence first, with the appellant out of the room, so that he could then support the appellant when the latter gave evidence. In addition to ensuring that questions were put slowly, clearly and sensitively and that the appellant was given breaks where necessary, we also kept in mind that the appellant’s diagnoses might bear on his ability to recount traumatic events and on his recall in general.
13. The appellant and NX each gave evidence on the basis of written witness statements and were cross-examined by Mr Tufan. In addition to the consolidated bundle totalling 755 pages provided for the error of law hearing, we also had regard to Judge Kebede’s error of law decision, a 47-page supplementary bundle of evidence from the appellant and a skeleton argument from Ms Benfield. No objection was made to the admission of the supplementary bundle and so we grant the appellant’s application under rule 15(2A) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 for permission to rely on that bundle.
14. Whilst we refer below only to such matters as are necessary to understand our decision, we confirm that we have taken account of the submissions, oral evidence and documentary evidence to which we were referred in their entirety.
(4) Consideration
(4)(a) The Law
15. The FtT’s findings on the appellant’s alleged risk arising from conversion to Christianity are preserved. That is the only element of the claim which post-dates the entry into force on 28 June 2022 of sections 30 to 35 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Consequently, those aspects of the appellant’s protection claim which fall to us to consider are to be assessed on the basis that it is for the appellant to establish that it is reasonably likely to be the case that he has a well-founded fear of persecution.
16. Given the extent of the preserved findings, the appellant’s claims under Articles 2, 3 and 8 stand or fall with our conclusions on his protection claim.
17. In the light of the earlier decisions, the following principles are engaged.
18. In the starred case of Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKAIT 000702; [2003] Imm AR 1, a Deputy Presidential Panel of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (“the IAT”) set the following guidelines for adjudicators hearing ‘second appeals’ (i.e. appeals by individuals who had been the subject of previous appeal decisions):
“37. We consider that the proper approach lies between that advocated by Mr Lewis and that advocated by Miss Giovanetti, but considerably nearer to the latter. The first Adjudicator's determination stands (unchallenged, or not successfully challenged) as an assessment of the claim the Appellant was then making, at the time of that determination. It is not binding on the second Adjudicator; but, on the other hand, the second Adjudicator is not hearing an appeal against it. As an assessment of the matters that were before the first Adjudicator it should simply be regarded as unquestioned. It may be built upon, and, as a result, the outcome of the hearing before the second Adjudicator may be quite different from what might have been expected from a reading of the first determination only. But it is not the second Adjudicator's role to consider arguments intended to undermine the first Adjudicator's determination.
38. The second Adjudicator must, however be careful to recognise that the issue before him is not the issue that was before the first Adjudicator. In particular, time has passed; and the situation at the time of the second Adjudicator's determination may be shown to be different from that which obtained previously. Appellants may want to ask the second Adjudicator to consider arguments on issues that were not - or could not be - raised before the first Adjudicator; or evidence that was not - or could not have been - presented to the first Adjudicator.
39. In our view the second Adjudicator should treat such matters in the following way.
(1) The first Adjudicator's determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant's status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the Appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.
(2) Facts happening since the first Adjudicator's determination can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. If those facts lead the second Adjudicator to the conclusion that, at the date of his determination and on the material before him, the appellant makes his case, so be it. The previous decision, on the material before the first Adjudicator and at that date, is not inconsistent.
(3) Facts happening before the first Adjudicator's determination but having no relevance to the issues before him can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. The first Adjudicator will not have been concerned with such facts, and his determination is not an assessment of them.
40. We now pass to matters that could have been before the first Adjudicator but were not.
(4) Facts personal to the Appellant that were not brought to the attention of the first Adjudicator, although they were relevant to the issues before him, should be treated by the second Adjudicator with the greatest circumspection. An Appellant who seeks, in a later appeal, to add to the available facts in an effort to obtain a more favourable outcome is properly regarded with suspicion from the point of view of credibility. (Although considerations of credibility will not be relevant in cases where the existence of the additional fact is beyond dispute.) It must also be borne in mind that the first Adjudicator's determination was made at a time closer to the events alleged and in terms of both fact-finding and general credibility assessment would tend to have the advantage. For this reason, the adduction of such facts should not usually lead to any reconsideration of the conclusions reached by the first Adjudicator.
(5) Evidence of other facts - for example country evidence may not suffer from the same concerns as to credibility, but should be treated with caution. The reason is different from that in (4). Evidence dating from before the determination of the first Adjudicator might well have been relevant if it had been tendered to him: but it was not, and he made his determination without it. The situation in the Appellant's own country at the time of that determination is very unlikely to be relevant in deciding whether the Appellant's removal at the time of the second Adjudicator's determination would breach his human rights. Those representing the Appellant would be better advised to assemble up-to-date evidence than to rely on material that is (ex hypothesi) now rather dated.
41. The final major category of case is where the Appellant claims that his removal would breach Article 3 for the same reason that he claimed to be a refugee.
(6) If before the second Adjudicator the Appellant relies on facts that are not materially different from those put to the first Adjudicator, and proposes to support the claim by what is in essence the same evidence as that available to the Appellant at that time, the second Adjudicator should regard the issues as settled by the first Adjudicator's determination and make his findings in line with that determination rather than allowing the matter to be re-litigated. We draw attention to the phrase 'the same evidence as that available to the Appellant' at the time of the first determination. We have chosen this phrase not only in order to accommodate guidelines (4) and (5) above, but also because, in respect of evidence that was available to the Appellant, he must be taken to have made his choices about how it should be presented. An Appellant cannot be expected to present evidence of which he has no knowledge: but if (for example) he chooses not to give oral evidence in his first appeal, that does not mean that the issues or the available evidence in the second appeal are rendered any different by his proposal to give oral evidence (of the same facts) on this occasion.
42. We offer two further comments, which are not less important than what precedes then.
(7) The force of the reasoning underlying guidelines (4) and (6) is greatly reduced if there is some very good reason why the Appellant's failure to adduce relevant evidence before the first Adjudicator should not be, as it were, held against him. We think such reasons will be rare. There is an increasing tendency to suggest that unfavourable decisions by Adjudicators are brought about by error or incompetence on the part of representatives. New representatives blame old representatives; sometimes representatives blame themselves for prolonging the litigation by their inadequacy (without, of course, offering the public any compensation for the wrong from which they have profited by fees). Immigration practitioners come within the supervision of the Immigration Services Commissioner under part V of the 1999 Act. He has power to register, investigate and cancel the registration of any practitioner, and solicitors and counsel are, in addition, subject to their own professional bodies. An Adjudicator should be very slow to conclude that an appeal before another Adjudicator has been materially affected by a representative's error or incompetence; and such a finding should always be reported (through arrangements made by the Chief Adjudicator) to the Immigration Services Commissioner.
Having said that, we do accept that there will be occasional cases where the circumstances of the first appeal were such that it would be right for the second Adjudicator to look at the matter as if the first determination had never been made. (We think it unlikely that the second Adjudicator would, in such a case, be able to build very meaningfully on the first Adjudicator's determination; but we emphasise that, even in such a case, the first determination stands as the determination of the first appeal.)
(8) We do not suggest that, in the foregoing, we have covered every possibility. By covering the major categories into which second appeals fall, we intend to indicate the principles for dealing with such appeals. It will be for the second Adjudicator to decide which of them is or are appropriate in any given case.”
19. These guidelines were approved, in the context of ‘second appeals’ by the same appellant, in the Court of Appeal in Djebbar v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 804; [2004] INLR 466 (also known as LD (Algeria)). The court rejected the appellant’s submission, in challenging the adjudicator’s departure from earlier findings, that the guidelines were derived from the principle of estoppel. The court held, at [29]-[30], that they were instead a proper exercise of the IAT’s role as a specialist body, in order to secure consistency, while respecting the ‘fundamental obligation’ of each adjudicator to decide each case on its own merits. The Court of Appeal emphasised at [40] the need for the guidelines to be applied flexibly:
“The great value of the guidance is that it invests the decision making process in each individual fresh application with the necessary degree of sensible flexibility and desirable consistency of approach, without imposing any unacceptable restrictions on the second adjudicator’s ability to make the findings which he conscientiously believes to be right.”
20. The guidelines set out in Devaseelan have been extended, albeit with some modification, to appeals by connected parties. In Ocampo v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1276; [2007] INLR 49, approving TK (Consideration of Prior Determinations – Directions) Georgia [2004] UKIAT 00149, the Court of Appeal said at [25] (per Auld LJ):
“In my view, the Devaseelan guidelines are as relevant to cases like the present where the parties involved are not the same but there is a material overlap of evidence, as the Immigration Appeal Tribunal observed in TK Georgia, at paragraph 21 of their determination. Clearly, the guidance may need adaptation according to the nature of the new evidence, the circumstances in which it was given or not given in the earlier proceeding and its materiality to securing a just outcome in the second appeal along with consistency in the maintenance of firm immigration control. It should also be borne in mind, as Hooper LJ pointed out in the course of counsel’s submissions, that admission of new evidence may, as a matter of fairness, operate for, as well as against, a claimant for asylum. In immigration matters, as in other areas of public law affecting individuals, public policy interests of firmness, consistency and due process may have to be tempered with considerations of fairness in particular circumstances.”
21. Ocampo was approved in AA (Somalia) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 1040; [2008] INLR 1, where the following clarification was given at [69]-[70] (per Carnwath LJ, with whom Ward LJ agreed):
“[69] While I do not think it is open to us to depart from Ocampo, I would suggest two qualifications, which seem to me consistent with it. First, Auld LJ said that the guidelines are relevant to ‘cases like the present’ where the parties are not the same, but ‘there is a material overlap of evidence’. The term ‘material’ in my view requires some elaboration. It recognises I think that exceptions to the ordinary principle that factual decisions do not set precedents (see above) should be closely defined. To extend the principle to cases where there is no more than an ‘overlap of evidence’ would be too wide, and could introduce undesirable uncertainty. In all the cases in which the principle has been applied so far, including Ocampo, the claims have not merely involved overlapping evidence, but have arisen out of the same factual matrix, such as the same relationship or the same event or series of events. I would respectfully read Auld LJ’s reference to ‘cases such as the present’ as limiting the principle to such cases.
[70] Secondly, in applying the guidelines to cases involving different claimants, there may be a valid distinction depending on whether the previous decision was in favour of or against the Secretary of State. The difference is that the Secretary of State was a direct party to the first decision, whereas the claimant was not. It is one thing to restrict a party from re-litigating the same issue, but another to impose the same restriction on someone who, although involved in the previous case, perhaps as a witness, was not formally a party. This is particularly relevant to the tribunal’s comments, in Devaseelan, on what might be ‘good reasons’ for reopening the first decision. It suggested that such cases would be rare. It referred, for example, to the ‘increasing tendency’ to blame representatives for unfavourable decisions by adjudicators, commenting:
‘An Adjudicator should be very slow to conclude that an appeal before another Adjudicator has been materially affected by a representative’s error or incompetence.’
I understand the force of those comments where the second appeal is by the same claimant, but less so where it is by a different party, even if closely connected. Although I would not exclude the Devaseelan principles in such cases (for example, the hypothetical series of cases involving the same family cited in TK Georgia), the second tribunal may be more readily persuaded that there is ‘good reason’ to revisit the earlier decision.”
22. Each of the Court of Appeal judges in AA (Somalia) cited with approval Djebbar. Consequently, it can properly be understood that the Devaseelan guidelines, as extended to third party cases and as modified by Ocampo and AA (Somalia), must also be applied with the flexibility identified in Djebbar and subject to an individual judge’s obligation to decide each case on its own merits and in a way which they conscientiously consider to be right.
(4)(b) The Appellant’s Case
23. The main elements of the appellant’s protection claim which we have to consider are based on the risks alleged to arise from the following contentions:
(1) The appellant’s brother, T, was arrested and executed for political activity.
(2) Another brother, NX, was granted asylum in the United Kingdom on political grounds and has engaged in sur place political activities against the Iranian regime.
(3) The appellant was encountered smuggling anti-regime political materials and was arrested, detained and tortured, but escaped after around 2 years.
(4) The appellant will in any event be imprisoned on return, having escaped from custody, even if the reason for his arrest and detention is not accepted.
(5) The appellant’s time spent in the United Kingdom and/or his state of health will exacerbate any of the aforementioned risks which are found to be established, such as to reach the threshold for persecution and/or breach of Article 3, if not already met.
(4)(b)(i) The Appellant’s Smuggling and Detention
24. We note that the risks alleged to arise from the appellant being caught smuggling political materials and having escaped detention were not expressly identified by Judge Kebede as issues to be reconsidered, nor said to be preserved findings. However, Ms Benfield submitted that they fell to be reconsidered under ground 1.
25. We agree. At [33], Judge Kebede held, “For all these reasons I accept that the judge made errors of law in his decision, as articulated in the first two grounds of appeal.” Ground 1 included, at [15], a challenge to the FtT’s finding about smuggling and, at [18]-[23], a challenge to the FtT’s finding about the appellant’s subsequent detention.
26. The appellant’s alleged risk arising from his smuggling activities was considered and rejected by the adjudicator, Mr Bennett, in the first AX decision, at [16(a)] and [16(b)]. Mr Bennett considered it incredible that anyone would smuggle prohibited literature on a boat without a prior plan for disposing of the literature in the case of interception. He found it incredible in any event that anyone would choose to try to burn the literature rather than simply putting the literature over the side.
27. Mr Bennett similarly did not accept that it was reasonably likely that the appellant would have been held without trial for two years, in particular in circumstances where he accepted that the incriminating material had not been fully destroyed (see [16(c)]). He rejected as entirely unbelievable the appellant’s claimed escape, being unable to believe that any of the escorts would willingly accept the significant risk of serious injury involved in the staged crash as described (or that those arranging the escape on the appellant’s behalf would put him at that risk) (see [16(d)] to [16(f)]). Mr Bennett noted in any event inconsistencies in the appellant’s explanation for the journey during which he escaped (see [16(g)] and [16(h)]).
28. Mr Bennett’s findings are our starting point. However, Ms Benfield argues in her grounds of appeal that there are proper grounds for us to depart from those findings. She submits that the appellant’s claim to have been arrested and detained for possession of political materials was confirmed by NX in his own claim. The relevant passage is found at [4] in the NX decision:
“In the mid 1990's the appellant's brother [AX] was imprisoned for four years after being found in possession of UFIN or MEK publications. That brother is now in the UK as are two further brothers, … who departed Iran in 1997 and who were both involved with UFIN.”
29. Ms Henderson accepted at [14] that NX was “a sincere witness who has attempted to give a truthful account of past events.”
30. NX arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum on 18 August 1999. It appears therefore that NX gave that account of events before the appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom. NX explains in his witness statement that he had guessed at the length of the appellant’s detention. That points away from the pair having colluded over the story.
31. We do not consider that it offends the Devaseelan principles to take into account Ms Henderson’s determination and reasons in NX’s case. It would have been open to the appellant, no doubt, to rely on it in 2004; however, he appeared in person. In any event, it is a reliable document produced independently of his case. It lends some support to his claim to have been arrested and detained for political reasons. First, it records that NX independently asserted that that was the case. Secondly, the adjudicator in NX’s case accepted that NX had given an honest account of his and his family’s problems in Iran.
32. Ms Benfield submits that the country and medical evidence also support the appellant’s claim to have been detained. In particular, Dr Kakhki confirmed in his report of 19 April 2022 that the name given by the appellant for the place where he claimed to have been detained for some of the time – Shahid Rajae – was the correct name of a prison near Bandar Abbas (the place to where he claimed to have been sailing when arrested). Both Dr Kakhki (at [31] to [39]) and Dr Hafidh (at [17] to [19]) report that the appellant’s account of being tortured in detention is plausible and consistent with the background country evidence. Dr Galappathie (at [129] to [131]) and Dr Preston (at [8.2.2] of her 4 December 2024 report) both report that the appellant’s mental health presentation is consistent with his account of events in Iran. Neither medical expert believed that the appellant was feigning or exaggerating his symptoms.
33. Having accepted that there is fresh evidence entitling us to revisit Mr Bennett’s findings, we are content that it is appropriate also to take into account what is said by the experts, albeit treating their evidence with some caution. It is of some significance that the appellant was able correctly to name a prison near Bandar Abbas. Of course, he may well have learned the name by means other than being detained there. However, that was not put to him in cross-examination. It also tells in the appellant’s favour that the medical experts consider his presentation to be consistent with having been tortured in detention.
34. Mr Bennett rejected the appellant’s claim to have been detained, principally because he did not believe the appellant’s account of his arrest or his escape, considering the account of the escape to be materially inconsistent. He found those accounts to be so implausible as to be unbelievable, as noted above. However, the fact that the appellant was found to have lied in certain aspects of his claim does not mean that he lied about everything.
35. Applying the lower standard of proof, we are satisfied, by reason of the fresh evidence to which we have referred, that it is reasonably likely that the appellant was in fact arrested and detained for being in possession of prohibited political materials.
36. The position is different, however, in relation to the appellant’s account of the circumstances of his arrest. Whilst we might not necessarily have taken the same view as Mr Bennett of the appellant’s account of the circumstances of his arrest, we are unpersuaded that there is satisfactory evidence to justify departing from his rejection of that account. The appellant meets each criticism of that account with an explanation in the witness statement dated 24 February 2022. However, such explanations could have been given in the hearing before Mr Bennett. As it is, the circumstances of the arrest matter less than the fact of it. That said, also of relevance is the likelihood that the appellant would have been viewed as an accomplice rather than an organiser (as appears to be the opinion of the country experts).
37. None of the fresh evidence goes properly to the appellant’s claimed escape and so we feel unable to depart from Mr Bennett’s rejection of that element of his account. We are, in short, unable in the circumstances to find that the appellant left custody save upon lawful release. Again, that perhaps matters little given our further findings below.
(4)(b)(ii) Association with T
38. The risk claimed by the appellant through his association with T was also considered and rejected by Mr Bennett in the first AX decision in 2004. However, it is clear that the sole reason for its rejection was Mr Bennett’s disbelief of the claimed events involving the appellant personally. No separate, reasoned consideration was given to this claimed risk. In any event, we have the benefit now of the NX decision.
39. We find it entirely appropriate to take into account Ms Henderson’s findings in the NX decision when assessing this aspect of the appellant’s claim. Indeed, applying the extended Devaseelan principles outlined above, it is appropriate to take those findings (and not the first AX decision) as our starting point. The risk arising to NX from his association with T was a key part of his claim and a part which was expressly accepted by Ms Henderson. In short, it was accepted that the family had been subjected to scrutiny and harassment because of T’s political activities, including in particular NX and his father. The appellant and NX maintained in evidence before us their account of T’s arrest and subsequent execution.
40. The appellant does not claim to have been harassed personally whilst still a child. Indeed, he is not able to say with certainty that the mistreatment claimed during national service was a result of his association with T, rather than his admitted non-compliance. Nevertheless, we accept that it is reasonably likely that the appellant’s elder brother, T, was arrested and executed for political activities, which gave rise to subsequent harassment of NX and their father.
(4)(b)(iii) Association with NX
41. The appellant does not appear to have advanced his case before Mr Bennett on the basis of his association with NX. However, that does not mean that he is estopped from doing so now. It simply means that we must approach such a claim with circumspection. As it is, the NX decision is, as we have said, a reliable document produced independently of the appellant’s case.
42. As noted above, Ms Henderson found, at [14], that NX was a sincere witness who had attempted to give a truthful account of past events. She was satisfied, at [17], that NX’s account of being detained and tortured in 1994 because of T’s connection with MEK occurred and that his father and he had been detained and mistreated in 1997. She found, at [18], that it was likely that NX would be suspected of participating in demonstrations against the regime in 1999 and that the regime would have in its possession details of NX’s and his family’s history of detention and actual and perceived opposition to the regime. She found, at [20], that NX’s political activities in the United Kingdom would increase the risk to him on return if they were discovered on questioning.
43. None of the above was challenged in the hearing before us, nor could it properly have been. It is not suggested that NX and the appellant are not brothers as claimed. We find therefore that the appellant has a brother in the United Kingdom with whom he is now in regular contact and who is at least suspected by the Iranian regime of political activities against the regime.
(4)(b)(iv) Time Outside the United Kingdom
44. It is not in issue that the appellant has been in the United Kingdom since 7 December 2002. It was not challenged that he left the country illegally and we accept that it is reasonably likely that he did.
(4)(c) Consequential Risk
45. Dr Kakhki considers it likely (at [31]) that the appellant will be detained on return because of his past involvement in smuggling political materials, his illegal departure from Iran, his prolonged absence from the country, his family background and his return on an emergency travel document. He opines that the appellant’s family history is likely to be revealed if the appellant is arrested. Dr Hafidh agrees and so do we. The authorities would be likely to investigate whether the appellant shares the views of T and/or NX. The fact that the appellant has been detained previously for smuggling political materials would make arrest more likely and the authorities more likely, we find, to presume that the appellant does indeed share their anti-regime views.
46. Dr Hafidh reports torture being a routine method of interrogation in Iran and that accords with extant country guidance. The situation has not improved in recent times. Indeed, Dr Hafidh opines in his most recent report that the risks have only intensified. The recent conflict with Israel and the United States has only increased the regime’s paranoia.
47. In line with our findings above, we consider it to be reasonably likely that the appellant would be detained and questioned on return. In light of his previous encounter in possession of illicit political materials and his familial connection with T and NX, both believed by the authorities to be politically active against the regime, he is likely to be interrogated and subjected to treatment crossing the Article 3 threshold and amounting to persecution on the grounds of actual or imputed political opinion.
48. For these reasons, the appeal succeeds on Refugee Convention grounds, human rights grounds (Article 3 and, consequently, Article 8).

(5) Notice of Decision
49. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
50. The decision is remade and allowed on Refugee Convention grounds and on human rights grounds.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


5 October 2026


Annex


IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005781
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65738/2024


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE


Between

AX
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Benfield, instructed by Islington Law Centre
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 April 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse to revoke a deportation order previously made against him and to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The appellant, born on 2 December 1972, is a national of Iran. He claims to have arrived in the UK on 7 December 2000 and claimed asylum that day. On 16 June 2003 he was convicted of burglary and theft – dwelling and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. His asylum claim was refused on 24 February 2004 and his appeal against that decision was dismissed on 9 July 2004. He became appeal rights exhausted on 27 July 2004.
3. Following a series of further convictions in 2005 and 2006, the latter of which was a conviction on 19 December 2006 for interfering with a vehicle and breach of a suspended sentence for which he was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, the appellant was made the subject of a Stage 1 deportation decision on 15 January 2007. His appeal against the deportation decision was dismissed on 1 May 2007 and he became appeal rights exhausted on 29 June 2007. A deportation order was signed against him on 29 June 2007.
4. On 19 August 2008 the appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled drug class A crack cocaine for which he was sentenced to 1 day imprisonment. He failed to comply with his reporting restrictions and on 25 July 2009 he was classed as an absconder.
5. On 3 September 2010 the appellant made further protection submissions which were treated as an application to revoke the deportation order previously made against him. His request to revoke the deportation order was refused without a right of appeal on 1 July 2014.
6. On 4 November 2015 the appellant received a caution from the police for possession of a controlled drug class A heroin and possession of a controlled drug class A crack cocaine, and on 11 December 2016 he was cautioned by the police for theft-shoplifting.
7. The appellant then made further submissions on 2 March 2022 and 13 June 2022 which were again treated as a request to make a deportation order.
8. On 12 January 2024 the appellant was cautioned by the police for common assault.
9. In the submissions made on 2 March 2022 it was explained that the appellant was born in the Azerbaijani region in Iran but his family moved to Tehran. He was involved in a serious road accident in Iran as a child and had suffered injuries to his head which had had a profound effect on him. He failed to complete primary school as a result and worked as a car mechanic as a teenager. Whilst he was in his late teens his brother T was arrested and executed as a result of his political activities, and that led to him and members of his family being persecuted. His father was arrested and required to report until close to his death and his brother NX was also arrested and tortured, and fled the country and was granted refugee status in the UK in 2004. At age 18 the appellant started compulsory military service but experienced problems due to his family’s political profile and suffered penalties including a refusal to issue him with paperwork to confirm that he had completed his service. It was stated that that would lead to problems for him if he returned to Iran. He then left Tehran and started working. In one of his jobs he got to know a man who was involved in smuggling banned, politically sensitive materials into Iran and he became involved himself, but was arrested on his first trip. He was detained for two years by the Iranian authorities and imprisoned at Shahid Rajae prison in Bandar Abbas, during which time he was tortured. He still suffered from mental health problems as a result. The appellant managed to escape from prison with the assistance of family members who bribed prison officers and he fled Iran and travelled across Europe to the UK.
10. The submissions stated further that since coming to the UK both of the appellant’s parents had died, his father from a heart attack and his mother from being run over by a car. He also had a partner in Iran who had died in a car accident after he left Iran. Some of his siblings remained in Tehran. It was stated that he had spent periods of time in the UK being homeless and destitute and became dependent on illicit substances leading to his arrest and conviction. He received assistance from some people, two of whom involved him in criminal offences leading to his arrest and 18 month sentence for theft and burglary, and to drug use. He also received some support from his brother NX who was living in the UK. It was stated further that the appellant had long-standing mental health problems and had been diagnosed with first episode psychosis in March 2021, since which time he had been under the care of Islington Early Intervention Service (IEIS). He also suffered from memory loss and end-stage osteoarthritis. It was submitted that the appellant could not be deported from the UK because he qualified for international protection, because he had been living in the UK for over 21 years and qualified for leave on long residence grounds and because there were very significant obstacles to his integration in Iran. He feared being arrested, detained and ill-treated in Iran as a result of his previous arrest and his family’s profile and due to having left Iran illegally. He was also at risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group (PSG) on account of his mental ill-health and was at Article 3 risk of deterioration in his ill-health and of destitution. It was asserted further that his deportation would breach his Article 8 rights.
11. With those submissions the appellant produced a witness statement dated 24 February 2022, medical reports relating to his mental health problems and to his physical health, evidence regarding support in the UK, and the First-tier Tribunal decision in his brother NX’s appeal and the grant of refugee status.
12. In the submissions of 13 June 2022 the appellant produced a further psychiatric assessment report from Dr Galappathie and a country expert report from Dr Kakhi. The submissions responded to the findings of the First-tier Tribunal in the appellant’s two previous appeals, in 2004 and 2007, asserting that the findings could not be relied upon as the appellant was unrepresented and his case was not put properly at the hearings, and submitting that both tribunals had focussed on the appellant’s history of arrest, detention and ill-treatment but had not considered his family’s political background and the targeting of his brothers. The submissions relied upon the psychiatric report and country expert report in supporting the appellant’s credibility and the plausibility of his claim. It was submitted that the appellant would be at risk on return to Iran on the basis of his perceived political opinion and discrimination due to his mental health issues, that his removal would be in breach of Article 3 on the basis of his ill-health and likely destitution, and that his removal to Iran would be disproportionate under Article 8.
13. In a further updating statement of 13 September 2023, the appellant emphasised the impact upon his mental health of his uncertain immigration status and explaining the steps he had taken to obtain proof of his Iranian citizenship following the request made by the respondent. He also added further strands to his case, namely a relationship with a partner D and his involvement in the Christian faith and his baptism into the faith in April 2023.
14. In a decision made on 15 May 2024, the respondent accepted that the appellant’s further submissions amounted to a fresh protection and human rights claim but refused to revoke the deportation order and refused the protection and human rights claim. In so doing, the respondent relied upon the adverse findings of the two previous tribunals in 2004 and 2007 in which the appellant’s account of his brother’s arrest and execution, his ill-treatment during military service, his involvement with smuggling political literature and his arrest and detention for 27 months were all rejected. The respondent did not accept that the appellant fell within the convention reason of member of a PSG due to his mental health issues and did not accept that the credibility and plausibility concerns in his account could be attributed to his mental health. The respondent gave little weight to the psychiatric and country expert reports and did not accept that the appellant was at risk on return to Iran due to his political opinion, that his brother T was arrested and executed, that he smuggled ani-government newspapers into Iran or that he was detained and tortured due to such activities. The respondent considered, with regard to the appellant’s Article 3 claim, that he would be able obtain medical treatment in Iran for his mental health issues and his physical health problems and that he would not suffer detriment to his health in Iran, and further that he would not be at risk of destitution, so that his removal would not breach Article 3. As for Article 8, the respondent considered that the appellant did not meet the exceptions to deportation on family and private life grounds, that he was not socially and culturally integrated in the UK and would not experience very significant obstacles to integration in Iran, and that there were no very compelling circumstances outweighing the public interest in his deportation.
15. The appellant appealed against that decision. For the appeal he produced an appeal bundle which included a statement dated 27 March 2025, a statement from his brother NX, supporting letters, further medical evidence and a decision from the mental health tribunal, a forensic psychological assessment report from Dr Anna Preston, and two further country expert reports. He also produced a supplementary appeal bundle containing an addendum report from Dr Anna Preston and Home Office guidance on country returns.
16. The appellant’s appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Lewis on 6 June 2025. The appellant did not give oral evidence before the tribunal, owing to his mental health condition and vulnerability, but his brother NX did. In his statement of 27 March 2025, the appellant explained how he was hospitalised at Highgate Mental Health Clinic for around six weeks from the end of December 2024 as a result of his mental health problems. He now received depot injections and had a care coordinator. The appellant referred to his evidence in his earlier statement of 13 September 2023 and stated that he was not as close to D any more and had been attending church a bit less, but that he was still a Christian and would want to continue attending church. He responded to the refusal decision and stated that he would not have family support in Iran as he was not close to his siblings there. He also sought to explain a caution for common assault in January 2024 involving his girlfriend.
17. The judge summarised the decisions of the tribunals in the appellant’s previous appeals, noting that the decision in the second appeal adopted the findings and reasoning of the first tribunal. The judge referred to the decision in the appeal of the appellant’s brother NX and observed that the basis of that decision was not connected to the substance of the appellant’s protection claim as advanced in his two previous appeals. The judge noted that the appellant was advancing his protection claim under the Refugee Convention on three bases: the risk arising from his previous detention in Iran, family association and illegal exit; the risk arising from his conversion to Christianity; and the risk arising as a member of a PSG in relation to his mental health. He also noted that the appellant was arguing Article 3 on the basis of his mental health and suicide risk, as well as the risk of destitution. The judge noted that the appellant had not previously pursued a claim by reference to his family association and in particular his association with his executed brother T, despite having been in contact with his brother NX, or by reference to his illegal exit from Iran, and that the basis upon which he had pursued his claim, namely his detention, had been rejected by the previous tribunals. In the circumstances, with reference to Devaseelan, the judge could see no reason to depart from the findings made by the previous tribunals and did not accept that the appellant had ever personally held any fear or concern in regard to being associated with his brother T. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim to be at risk as a result of having no documentation proving his completion of national service, since that would be a matter of record. The judge noted that the respondent had failed to consider, in the refusal decision, the appellant’s claim based on becoming a Christian, and went on to consider the claim, rejecting it on the grounds of a lack of reliable supporting evidence and concluding that any activities he had undertaken in that regard were not due to any genuine conversion of faith. With regard to the appellant’s mental health, the judge accepted that he was to be considered as a member of a PSG by reason of his mental health diagnosis, but did not accept that he was likely to face persecutory treatment on that basis. The judge accordingly rejected the appellant’s claim under the Refugee Convention.
18. The judge found, with regard to the appellant’s Article 3 claim, that he could regain contact with his siblings in Iran and that he could access similar treatment in Iran to that he received in the UK, so that he had failed to demonstrate that he would be destitute in Iran or that he could not have access to appropriate medical treatment. As for Article 8, the judge considered that there were no very significant obstacles to integration in Iran as the appellant could access family support there. The judge accepted that the appellant posed a low risk of reoffending but did not accept that there were very compelling circumstances justifying the revocation of the deportation order. The judge accordingly dismissed the appellant’s appeal, in a decision promulgated on 22 September 2025.
19. The appellant then sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision, on seven grounds: that the judge had failed to take into account relevant factors when finding no reason to depart from the previous determinations; that the judge had erred in his assessment of risk arising due to the grant of refugee status to NX; that the judge had failed to make findings on relevant matters including the risk arising from the appellant’s illegal exit from Iran, from his extended absence from Iran and his UK criminal activities; that the judge had failed to give adequate reasons in relation to the evidence of completion of national service leading to risk; that the judge had failed to give adequate reasons when assessing risk as a member of a PSG and erred in his assessment of the expert evidence in that regard; that the judge had failed to take account of relevant factors when assessing Article 3 (medical/ suicide risk); and that the judge had failed to take account of relevant matters in the assessment of Article 8.
20. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal, but was subsequently granted in the Upper Tribunal on a renewed application, primarily on the first two grounds relating to the appellant’s family association with his brothers T and NX, although the grant of permission was not limited. The respondent did not produce a rule 24 response.
21. The matter then came before me for a hearing. Ms Benfield produced a skeleton argument for the appellant which was almost as long as the judge’s decision.
22. Both parties made submissions.
23. Ms Benfield submitted that the overall challenge to the judge’s decision was that there was a repeated failure to take into account relevant matters and to exercise anxious scrutiny. She referred to the delay by the judge in writing his decision and submitted that, whilst the judge stated that he was satisfied that the passage had time had not affected his ability to recall the evidence and arguments, the delay had resulted in the judge failing to grapple with what was a complex claim. With regard to ground one, Ms Benfield submitted that the judge’s approach to the previous tribunal decisions on Devaseelan principles was flawed, in five respects. Firstly, the judge had erred by focussing on the appellant’s failure to advance his claim previously in 2004 and 2007 on what had happened to T and NX, when he had raised those matters and could not be expected to have done so in a legal argument when he was a vulnerable unrepresented appellant. Secondly, the judge was wrong to say that the basis upon which NX’s appeal succeeded was not connected to the substance of the appellant’s claim, when AX’s claim had been advanced on the same factual basis. It was relevant that the tribunal in 2004 had not seen the decision in NX’s appeal. Thirdly, the judge had erred by relying upon the fact that the appellant, although not legally represented previously in 2004, was assisted by a report from Professor Baluchi, when Professor Baluchi had been convicted and sentenced for passing himself off as a medical expert when he had no such qualification. Fourthly, the judge failed to consider how the medical expert reports now available to him bore upon the sustainability of the previous Tribunal’s findings, where no such expert evidence was available. Fifthly, the judge failed to take into account the country expert evidence now before him in addressing the plausibility of the appellant’s account, and considering whether to depart from the findings of the previous tribunals.
24. Ms Benfield submitted, with regard to the second ground, that the judge erred in his finding of no risk to the appellant as a result of NX’s grant of refugee status, by wrongly stating that it had never been NX’s case that he was personally actively involved in any anti-regime politics, when in fact it was accepted that he had been involved in such activities in the UK. With regard to the third ground, Ms Benfield submitted that the judge had erred by failing to consider the risk to the appellant as a result of his illegal exit from Iran, his lengthy absence from Iran and his criminal convictions in the UK. For the fourth ground she submitted that the judge gave no proper reasons for rejecting the expert’s opinion on the risk arising from the appellant’s lack of documentation confirming completion of his military service. Ms Benfield submitted, with regard to the fifth ground, that the judge had failed to consider the expert’s conclusions on the risk to the appellant arising from his mental ill-health. She submitted, for ground six, that the judge had failed to consider Dr Preston’s conclusions on the destabilisation of the appellant’s mental health on return to Iran, in his Article 3 assessment. With regard to ground seven, Ms Benfield submitted that the judge’s lack of engagement with relevant matters adversely impacted upon his Article 8 assessment, which she submitted was cursory and flawed.
25. Ms Keerthy submitted that the judge had not erred in his decision. She submitted that the judge had summarised the previous tribunal decisions and that he took account not only of the case advanced and relied upon by the appellant before the tribunal in 2004 but also the factual background, as set out at [2(a)] to [2(l)]. The judge took account of the appellant’s vulnerability and lack of representation at the time. He considered the decision in NX’s appeal, noting that NX had succeeded on matters relating to himself which were nothing to do with the appellant, whereas the appellant’s claim had been rejected because it was not credible. Ms Keerthy submitted that it was not open to a claimant to resurrect an abandoned element of a claim and criticise the judge for not considering it when it had not been not pursued. As the judge said, the appellant could have called NX to give evidence before the tribunal if he was relying upon the same factual background. It was not irrational to hold the appellant to his previous litigation conduct. The judge’s decision was in accordance with the Devaseelan principles. The judge was entitled to find that NX’s grant of asylum was not relevant to the appellant’s claim. With regard to the criticism of the judge giving weight to a report from Professor Baluchi, Ms Keerthy submitted that he did not rely on the report for its findings, but only to show that the appellant had received support and assistance in preparing his appeal. As for the other medical expert reports, Ms Keerthy submitted that the judge was entitled to accord them the weight that he did. The reports were based upon the appellant’s own narrative, whereas that narrative had been found to be untrue. The judge engaged with the country expert evidence and properly found that it could not resurrect a case which had been found to be lacking in credibility.
26. With regard to the second ground, Ms Keerthy accepted that the judge had wrongly stated that it had never been NX’s case that he was personally actively involved in any anti-regime politics, but she submitted that that was not a reason to overturn the judge’s decision, particularly when there was nothing to show that NX’s activity would have given rise to an imputed political opinion for the appellant. Ms Keerthy submitted that the judge’s findings were consistent with the guidance in SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran (CG) [2016] UKUT 308 with regard to the appellant’s illegal exit from Iran. With regard to the issue of national service, the expert evidence did not suggest that the appellant would be at risk for not completing military service and, in any event, the appellant’s claim was that he had not avoided the draft but had just lost his paperwork. He would receive a fine at most. As for ground five, Ms Keerthy submitted that the expert reports did not say that the appellant would be at risk of persecution as a result of his mental health. The judge gave adequate reasons for giving the weight that he did to the expert reports. He was entitled to find that the appellant would have family support in Iran and that he could access treatment for Article 3 purposes. As for Dr Preston’s report, the judge was entitled to reject her conclusion about destabilisation. The judge properly applied the relevant test for Article 3 and Article 8 and gave weight to relevant matters. The judge’s decision should be upheld.
27. Ms Benfield reiterated previous points in reply. She submitted that it was not the case that the experts had simply based their reports upon the appellant’s narrative, but they had had many pieces of evidence before them which they took into account when reaching their conclusions.
Analysis
28. Permission was granted primarily on the first and second grounds of appeal, which relate to the judge’s consideration of the impact on the appellant’s protection claim of the execution of his brother T and the grant of asylum to his other brother NX. Having considered the findings made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lewis with reference to the tribunal decisions in the appeal of NX and the appellant’s earlier appeals, I have to agree that the judge’s application of the principles of Devaseelan to those decisions has resulted in a decision which failed to take account of all relevant factors and a failure to undertake a full and proper assessment of the risk to the appellant on the basis of his brothers’ activities.
29. Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that Judge Lewis gave consideration to the three tribunal decisions made in 2004 and 2007, in the appellant’s previous appeals and the appeal of his brother NX, he did not proceed to make his own assessment of current risk to the appellant. Rather, he considered the matter settled by the decisions of the previous tribunals, following the Devaseelan principles, and declined to proceed to a fresh risk assessment, as is apparent from his comments at [20]. I agree with the assertions made in the grounds and by Ms Benfield that he did so on a flawed basis. That flawed basis was that the appellant’s claim was not previously advanced on what had happened to T and NX (see [16(ii)]), but was only advanced on his own claimed involvement in importing anti-government media and the two year detention which followed; and that NX succeeded in his appeal on a basis which was not connected to the substance of the appellant’s protection claim as advanced before the two previous tribunals (see [17]). Neither appear to be entirely correct or, at least, not as clear cut as the judge considered the matter to be.
30. With regard to the former, although the decision of Judge Bennett in the appellant’s appeal in 2004 focussed on the events from 1998, namely the appellant’s claimed involvement in importing political materials from Dubai and his arrest, detention and escape, it is apparent from [2(a)], [2(b)], [21(a)] and [21(b)] that the appellant had raised other matters including the arrest and execution of his brother T and the difficulty he faced during military service. I agree with Ms Benfield that any failure to present or emphasise those matters within a particular legal framework can reasonably be explained by the fact that the appellant appeared as a litigant in person, but the matters were nevertheless raised before the judge. It is relevant to note from Judge Bennett’s comment at the beginning and end of [21] that he rejected the appellant’s account of those matters purely on the basis that his account of his arrest and detention was not considered to be credible, and not on the basis of any particular inconsistencies arising specifically from his account in those respects. As for the 2007 decision made by Judge Dickson, both parties accept that that decision was simply based on Judge Bennett’s decision and the lack of any further evidence, with no separate or specific assessment being made.
31. With regard to the latter, the decision of Judge Henderson in 2004 in NX’s appeal, the judge specifically set out at [3] the bases upon which NX claimed to be at risk, which included not only his own political involvement but also the fact that he came from a family with an anti-government profile. At [4] Judge Henderson referred to NX being detained as a result of the activities of T and also referred to the appellant being imprisoned after being found with political publications (albeit giving a different account of the period of detention), and at [5] she referred to NX being detained again as a result of the activities of two other brothers, and those of another brother and his sister.
32. Accordingly there were aspects of the appellant’s claim upon which he had previously relied, and which had been rejected by previous tribunals, but which had nevertheless been accepted as true by another tribunal in his brother’s appeal. That was clearly relevant to the question of the impact of NX’s successful appeal and his subsequent grant of refugee status on the appellant’s own protection claim. In so far as Judge Lewis considered at [20] to [24], on Devaseelan principles, that that was evidence which was available at the time of the previous tribunal hearings which ought reasonably to have been presented at that time, and that the appellant was improperly seeking to re-open matters already properly determined, I agree with Ms Benfield that that cannot be a sufficient basis in itself to decline to consider its impact on the appellant’s claim at the current time. That is particularly so when considering, as submitted by Ms Benfield, that the appellant was, at the time of the appeals in 2004 and 2007, a litigant in person with mental health problems who could not be expected to have advanced his case on a specific legally based framework.
33. For all these reasons I accept that the judge made errors of law in his decision, as articulated in the first two grounds of appeal. It is therefore necessary for that part of the judge’s decision to be re-made, with a full assessment undertaken as to the impact on the appellant’s protection claim of the decision in NX’s appeal and his recognition as a refugee. Whilst that assessment may lead to the same outcome, that is not necessarily the case and it is incumbent on the judge re-making the decision to make full and clear findings on the matter.
34. As for the remaining challenge to the decision of Judge Lewis, it seems to me that, other than in so far as the other grounds are impacted by the error in the first two grounds, I find little or no merit in those other grounds. The third ground asserts that the judge failed to make findings on relevant matters and failed to engage with the submissions in the skeleton argument. It is relevant to point out that the ‘skeleton argument’ was 27 pages long, twice the length of the judge’s decision, and did not set out the issue in the appellant’s appeal in concise and easily discernible terms. The judge cannot be criticised for not having addressed each part of that document. Having said that, the appellant’s extended absence is a matter which the judge ought to have considered when assessing risk on return to Iran, but as an additional element to other risk factors. The fourth ground, which criticises the judge’s findings in relation to the lack of papers to confirm the appellant’s completion of national service, is little more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings and an attempt to re-argue the matter. The judge considered the risk factor at [29] and had regard to the expert evidence in so doing, reaching a conclusion which was open to him on the available evidence. The same can be said for the fifth ground, which addresses the judge’s findings on the risks to the appellant arising from his mental ill-health. That was dealt with at length by the judge from [42] to [46], with reference to the medical and country expert evidence, and again was determined by the judge by way of cogent reasoning on the evidence available to him.
35. As for the sixth ground, the Article 3 assessment, the judge had full regard to the relevant caselaw and applied the appropriate test in considering whether the high threshold was met for making out such a claim. In making his assessment the judge clearly had regard to the medical evidence, the medical experts’ reports and the country expert reports. Although he did not specifically mention Dr Preston’s report in his Article 3 assessment, it is clear from his findings at [58], albeit at that point concerning risk of re-offending, that he had had regard to her reports. As he confirmed at [8] of his decision, he had regard to all the documentary evidence and the fact that he did not expressly mention a document did not mean that he had not considered it. The judge gave cogent reasons for concluding that the Article 3 threshold was not met. Likewise in his Article 8 assessment, the judge considered all relevant matters from [53] to [59], including difficulties documenting and returning the appellant, the support he received in the UK and that which he could expect on return to Iran, his length of residence in the UK and lack of knowledge of the systems and structures of Iran, barriers to integration and social isolation, and the risk of decline in his mental health. The grounds simply seek to re-argue the matter and amount to a disagreement with the judge’s findings in that regard. The judge, however, was fully entitled to reach the conclusions that he did.
36. Taking all of these matters into account, I accept that the judge’s decision has to be set aside and re-made, on a limited basis. The judge’s decision on the appellant’s brothers’ activities, the execution of T and the grant of asylum to NX and the impact of those matters on the appellant’s own protection claim is set aside and the matter is to be reconsidered and re-decided.
37. There are findings which are to be preserved. The judge’s adverse findings on the appellant’s claim as to his conversion to Christianity and the risk arising from his Christian faith have not been challenged. The judge gave cogent reasons for finding the appellant’s claim in that regard to be lacking in credibility and unreliable and was entitled to conclude as he did. The judge’s findings in that regard are therefore preserved. The judge’s findings on the risks arising from the absence of confirmation of completion of national service and from the appellant’s mental health condition, as well as his findings on Article 3 and Article 8 are also preserved, although that is subject to any impact arising from a renewed assessment of risk on return on the basis of his brothers’ activities and NX’s recognition as a refugee.
Decision
38. The decision of Judge Lewis is therefore set aside to the extent stated above. The decision will be re-made at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal on a date to be notified to the parties.
Directions
• Should the parties seek to rely upon any further evidence not previously before the First-tier Tribunal, that evidence shall be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served upon the other party in an indexed, consolidated bundle, together with any relevant application under Rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules, no later than 7 days before the date of the resumed hearing.
• No later than 5 days before the hearing both parties shall file and serve skeleton arguments setting out their respective cases. The appellant is reminded of the observations made at [34] above in regard to the length and usefulness of the skeleton argument.
• The appellant’s solicitors are to notify the Tribunal, no later than 7 days before the hearing, if the appellant will be giving oral evidence, whether there are any other witnesses, and whether an interpreter is required. In the absence of any such request, no interpreter will be booked for the hearing.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 April 2026