Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005792
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02073/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

1st June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNS

Between

UM
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr O Sobowale of counsel (instructed by AB Legal Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Mrs R Abdul-Karim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 17 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Decision and Reasons

Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals a decision by a First-tier Tribunal (“FtT) Judge (“the Judge”) dated 26 September 2025 dismissing her protection claim.

2. The FtT made an anonymity order. We continue the anonymity order given that it is accepted that the Appellant is a victim of rape and preserving her anonymity outweighs the public interest in open justice.

The Background
3. The Appellant, a national of Namibia, had applied for international protection.

4. The claim was refused by the Respondent for reasons set out in a decision dated 22 March 2024.

5. In summary, the Judge found that the Appellant’s claim to be bisexual was wholly lacking in credibility. He found that she had not claimed this during her initial asylum interview [11], she had not provided any supporting evidence of her claimed relationship with a woman in 2024 [12], she had given a conflicting account of when she realised she was bisexual [14] and the evidence she gave about having a one-night stand resulting in pregnancy [15] was at odds with the evidence given by her child’s father which pointed to a more involved relationship [18]. The Judge therefore concluded that because the account was not credible, he was not required to consider sufficiency of protection or internal relocation in Namibia because the Appellant would not face a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Namibia [23].

6. The Appellant was refused permission to appeal by the FtT on 12 December 2025. Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins granted permission to appeal on 12 January 2026.

7. The appeal therefore turns on whether the First‑tier Tribunal materially erred in its treatment of the Appellant’s account of past harm, her risk on return as a woman in Namibia, and the availability of sufficient state protection

The Grounds of Appeal
8. In summary the grounds of appeal assert that:
(i) The Judge failed to make findings about the risk on return to the Appellant arising out of the historic rape by her cousin (which had been conceded by the Respondent in the refusal letter) and the risk of forced marriage to a family member (again this had been conceded by the Respondent),
(ii) The Judge did not make any findings on internal relocation and sufficiency of protection, having found that the Appellant was not credible on the claim about her sexuality.

Permission To Appeal
9. Permission to Appeal was granted on 12 January 2026 by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on all grounds. He found that it was arguable that the Judge should have considered whether there was any risk to the Appellant given the concessions in the refusal letter although he acknowledged that the decision [5] indicated that “concessions” had been withdrawn rather than solely the concession about the Appellant’s sexuality. UTJ Perkins reminded the parties that if an error of law was found then they should be prepared to deal with the final disposal of the appeal at the error of law hearing.

The Issues In The Appeal
10. The issues before us are whether the Judge erred in law in not assessing whether there would be sufficiency of protection and whether the Appellant could internally relocate in light of the fact that she would be returned to Namibia as a female who had been raped by her cousin and who was at risk of forced marriage on return. If such an error had been made, then the issue is whether it is material to the outcome.

The Hearing of the Appeal- Error of law
11. Mr Sobowale repeated the two grounds set out in the application for permission to appeal. He submitted that the Judge had failed to make findings on core matters, namely sufficiency of protection and risk on return and that these were material errors of law.

12. Mrs Abdul-Karim explained that there was no Rule 24 response. She initially opposed the appeal and maintained that any risk to the Appellant stemming from the possibility of forced marriage was dependent upon the Appellant’s account of her sexuality being believed. She argued that it had not been believed and so this part of the claim fell away, although she acknowledged that the Respondent had not withdrawn its concession on this point.

13. The appeal was stood down so that Mrs Abdul-Karim could consider her position.

14. When the appeal resumed Mrs Abdul-Karim conceded that as the Respondent had not withdrawn the concessions about the Appellant being a victim of rape and at risk of forced marriage, the Judge had erred in law by not considering the Appellant’s risk on return arising from those concessions. She accepted that the errors of law were material and the appeal should be allowed.

15. Both representatives confirmed that if we found an error of law, they would both be in a position to deal with the remaking of the decision on submissions only because neither felt oral evidence was required on the outstanding matters. The submissions would focus on whether the Appellant could establish a convention reason, whether there would be sufficiency of protection and whether she could reasonably internally relocate.

Our Analysis- Error of law
16. We agree that the Judge erred when he found that “the previously indicated concessions had been withdrawn” [5]. Mrs Abdul-Karim was the Presenting Officer at the FtT and also before us. She confirmed that the only concession which had been withdrawn was as to the Appellant’s sexuality.

17. Therefore, the following two concessions were before the FtT as set out in the refusal letter dated 22 March 2024 [7] (page 170 in the composite bundle).
• “You were raped by your cousin”
• “Your uncle is forcing you to marry”

18. We find that despite the Judge finding the Appellant lacked credibility this did not negate the concessions which had been made by the Respondent in the refusal letter. We find that it was incumbent upon the Judge to consider and make findings about whether the Appellant was at risk on return to Namibia because of the two conceded matters set out above. This would have necessitated him making findings on whether there was sufficient protection available to her and whether she could reasonably be expected to relocate internally within Namibia to avoid such harm. The Judge declined to do this having found the Appellant’s account of her sexuality not to be credible [23].

19. Had the Judge determined that there was inadequate protection and no safe and reasonable internal relocation option then the Appellant would have been found to be a refugee (if a convention reason had been found) or would have been eligible for humanitarian protection. Thus, we find the error of law to be material.

20. The Appellant did not seek to challenge the adverse credibility findings and accordingly the findings at [11]-[22] are preserved. In short, our starting point is that the Appellant is neither bisexual nor gay and has not had a same sex relationship. Further there is a preserved finding that the Appellant’s 10-year-old daughter was not raped in Namibia as alleged [20] and [21].

21. As to disposal we accepted the representatives’ position that further oral evidence was not required such that we could proceed to remake the decision following a short recess (applying s.12(b)(ii) of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007) and paragraph 7.2 of the Senior Presidents’ Practice Statement.

Remaking Hearing
Legal Framework
22. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds the Appellant must show that she has a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason. The burden of proof is on the Appellant. The asylum claim was made after 28 June 2022 and the provisions of section 32 Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply and thus it is therefore necessary to determine on the balance of probabilities whether taking her case at its highest the Appellant has a characteristic which would cause her to fear persecution for a refugee convention reason and whether she does fear persecution as a result of that characteristic. If yes, then the issue to be determined is whether there is a real risk or reasonable degree of likelihood that she would be at risk of persecution on return to Namibia. If she is unable to establish a convention reason but she is at risk of harm, then she would be entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection.

23. There was a dispute between the parties about whether there was a convention reason which applied.

24. The sufficiency of protection test is whether the state is willing and able to provide a reasonable level of protection, not a guarantee (Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 AC 489). Internal relocation is assessed under Januzi [2006] UKHL 5, considering safety and undue harshness.

25. We remind ourselves that Paragraph 339 K of the Immigration Rules apply because the Appellant is a victim of rape and also threats of forced marriage: -
339K. The fact that a person has already been subjected to persecution or serious harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm will be regarded as a serious indication of the person's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.

Submissions
26. Both representatives confirmed that the relevant documents were contained in the Composite Bundle which consisted of 232 pages. The page references set out below are to pages in the PDF composite bundle. Mrs Abdul-Karim also sought to rely on the CPIN “Women fearing gender-based violence Namibia- December 2025”. Mr Sobowale confirmed that he had considered it.

27. Mr Sobowale submitted that the Appellant was a member of a particular social group. He submitted that Namibian society is patriarchal and that women from poorer backgrounds were subservient to men and treated like chattels. He submitted that the Appellant was at risk of forced marriage not just because of her sexuality but because her father had passed away and that she feared all of her family except her sister (page 195 question 31). He submitted that the Appellant’s mother would benefit financially from any marriage (page 196 question 32), the inference being that she would positively welcome it and thus not support her daughter. He submitted that it was accepted that the Appellant was from the Herero tribe (page 200 question 58) and was thus a rural area. He referred to the Appellant's fear of her uncle (question 82) and the powerful village chief (question 83) who would exert influence over the police (page 41) and therefore the Appellant could not expect State Protection.

28. Mr Sobowale acknowledged that there was not much objective evidence but referred to the prevalence of violence against women and girls in Namibia (page 87 and page 115) and whilst acknowledging that the article at page 135 referred to a different tribal group he submitted that it was evidence that rural women lacked financial autonomy. He submitted that the Appellant had tried to relocate to Windhoek but was tracked down. He submitted that the Appellant would succumb to a marriage to a local dignitary and become another wife for this man against her will.

29. In response Mrs Abdul-Karim relied on the CPIN. She submitted that the Appellant would be unable to show that she was a member of a particular social group [2.1.3] and therefore her claim at the highest would be one of humanitarian protection. She submitted that the Appellant feared non-state actors namely family members from the Herero tribe (page 200). She referred to steps which were taken to protect women [4.1.2] and submitted that the Appellant could relocate to an area where her tribe did not have presence such as Windhoek. She submitted that there were no barriers to relocation [5.1.6] and that this applied equally to women [5.1.5].

30. In response Mr Sobowale submitted that the Appellant could be tracked down by her family. He submitted that she could not rely on the state for protection because she has a family member who is a police officer.

Preserved Position And Approach
31. The findings of fact from [11] to [22] are preserved. The two concessions which were not withdrawn by the Respondent are preserved, namely that the Appellant was raped by her cousin and her uncle was forcing her to marry (refusal letter page 170).

32. Although Mr Sobowale made submissions about the Appellant’s account that she had been stabbed and beaten by her cousin in Windhoek when he found her with her female lover, it follows from the Judge’s unchallenged rejection of her account of being bisexual or lesbian, that this account was also rejected because, applying the judge’s findings, the cousin could not have found her with a female lover.

33. Accordingly, we proceed on the basis that:
a. The Appellant is a Namibian national from Okakarara (refusal letter page 170);
b. She fears serious harm including forced marriage and gender‑based violence from non‑state actors within her family;
c. Those actors include maternal uncles; one said to be a police officer and another a traditional authority / village chief.

34. Therefore, we approach the Appellant’s protection claim on the basis of whether the factors set out above would mean that she would be unable to return to her home area (due to a lack of protection) and if so, would it be safe and reasonable for her to relocate.

35. The Respondent’s position on those matters was not entirely clear. The refusal letter was not clearly expressed. At [9] it stated that “it is considered that there would be sufficient protection from persecution in your country of origin” but did not specify whether this was throughout Namibia or only in a particular area. This is because the letter then continued at [10] that “It is considered that you could relocate to Windhoek, Swakopmund or Walvis Bay within your country of origin”. The thrust of the Presenting Officer’s oral submission was that the Appellant could relocate to an urban area such as Windhoek.

The Background Material
36. Mr Sobowale relied on Namibia: The NGO Report To the UN Human Rights Committee, 140th Session (Civil society's responses to the list of issues) (5 February 2024) wherein it records that violence against women in Namibia is widespread (page 87). He referred to gender-based violence as set out in the US Department of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Namibia, 22 April 2024 (page 115). We accept that evidence and find that women are more likely to be at risk of violence than men in Namibia.

37. Mr Sobowale relied on an Article from The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Namibia: Traditions and practices of the Himba [Omuhimba (singular), Ovahimba (plural)] ethnic group of the Ovaherero, including sexual practices and polygamy; location in Namibia; state protection (2019-August 2021), 2 September 2021. Whilst Mr Sobowale acknowledged that this article concerned a different tribe (ie Himba not Herero) he said it was good evidence of the challenges faced by the police in offering protection to rural women. To that extent we agree but, overall, we do not find this article to be of other assistance in this appeal. It refers to the practice of child marriage. This Appellant is currently 35 years of age and so not a child.

38. The Respondent relied on the CPIN: Women fearing gender-based violence, Namibia, December 2025 (“the CPIN”). We were not assisted by the CPIN on the issue of forced marriage because it only related to the practice as it related to children, not adult women. However, otherwise the CPIN was relatively detailed and sourced, and we attach weight to it. To the extent that the policy section relied on the country information contained in the country information section of the CPIN, we found the conclusions therein justified and, to the extent we cite from the policy section, we do so on that basis.

39. Insofar as the CPIN deals with the risk of gender-based violence (“GBV”), we note the evidence therein as to the factors which increase that risk [3.1.7] but overall, the CPIN concludes that women are not likely to face discrimination or GBV to the level that amounts to persecution.

40. In summary, the CPIN records that Namibia has a comprehensive legal framework criminalising rape, domestic violence and forced marriage‑related abuse (CPIN 3–4). The CPIN describes a functioning criminal justice system, with police and courts operating nationwide, and the presence of GBV Protection Units across all regions (CPIN 4.1–4.12). The CPIN acknowledges challenges—under‑reporting, resourcing, and delays but does not identify a systemic unwillingness or inability by the state to protect women from non‑state harm (CPIN 4.12–4.14). Women are able to move freely within Namibia, and internal relocation to urban centres such as Windhoek and Walvis Bay is described as generally feasible and reasonable (CPIN 5.1–5.7).

Discussion And Conclusions
41. The Appellant filed a witness statement dated 2 January 2024. She did not give oral evidence before us. Apart from the Appellant’s claim about her sexuality [22] and her claim that her daughter had been raped [21] which was rejected by the Judge and not subject to challenge before us, her written evidence was not challenged.

42. The Appellant is a victim of rape. She was raped by her cousin on several occasions when she lived in her home area. The last time he raped her was around 2012. Her daughter was born in 2012, conceived as the result of rape (page 42 [5]). The rape was reported to the police, and the Appellant received a crime number, but she did not pursue the complaint because her mother threatened suicide (page 42 [3]).

43. The Appellant’s uncle has tried to force the Appellant to marry a village elder, and the Appellant does not want to do this. (page 41 [2]). When she lived in Windhoek, the coercion was by text message to the Appellant from her mother and uncle (page 43 [6]).

44. We find that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution if she were to return to live in her home area. This is for the following reasons. She was raped on several occasions when she lived in her home area in the past. She was threatened with forced marriage. This “will be regarded as a serious indication of the person's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated” (Paragraph 339K Immigration Rules). We are unable to find that there are good reasons why this will not be repeated. This is because the Appellant’s uncle is a serving police officer and the father of the man who raped her (page 41 [2]) and so could exert influence in the rural area where she lives. Her other uncle is a village chief (page 41 [2]). She cannot expect support from her wider family including her mother. This has not happened in the past (page 41 [3]) and the family have tried to force her to marry this elderly uncle since her father’s death on 7 October 2018 (page 64 [4.1]). The CPIN references a UN study and notes the persistence of “difficulties in accessing protection and assistance for women in rural areas” (CPIN 4.1.3.). There is a real risk that the Appellant could be raped by her cousin and would become the victim of a forced marriage in her home area against which she is not likely to be protected.

45. We move on to consider if there is a safe relocation option available to the Appellant which is not unduly harsh upon her.

46. The Appellant has lived in Namibia away from her home area including Sa and Walvis Bay (page 42 [5]). She lived in Windhoek from 2018. She was employed in Windhoek selling CCTV in a shopping mall (page 42 [6]) and she had her own flat (page 42 [6]).

47. The Appellant rules out relocation because she says that she would have contact with her sister who cares for her daughter. She says that her sister would be pressured into revealing the Appellant’s whereabouts (page 43 [9]) and the family would be able to locate her (page 43 [10]. She also claims that her family would be able to locate her through her uncle who is a police officer (page 43 [10]). She says that she fears persecution or serious harm because the family would then force her to marry the Village Chief against her will. She does not say that she fears that her cousin would rape her again.

48. Nevertheless, the Appellant’s own case is that she remained in Windhoek from 2018 to 2022 (apart from a trip back to her own village in 2018 for her father’s burial). We therefore find that the Appellant was able to live independently and work in Windhoek for a period of 4 years. Applying [32] above the Appellant was not assaulted in Windhoek by a family member. The Appellant said that she was receiving text messages from her mother and uncle trying to persuade her to return and get married. This sort of pressure (without more) would fall very considerably short of persecution, serious harm or a threat of either.

49. Applying the FtT’s preserved findings, the Appellant’s cousin did not contact her for the four years she lived in Windhoek. There are good reasons for concluding that serious harm will not be repeated there.

50. In any event, we are satisfied that the police force in an area such as Windhoek is effective. If the Appellant’s cousin tracked her down in Windhoek she could expect help from the police. She could locate to a state-supported shelter (CPIN 4.1.2) of which there are 8 in Namibia.

51. We find it is highly unlikely the Appellant will be the victim of forced marriage to a Herero tribal elder if she relocated to Windhoek, a place she lived in successfully for four years shortly before departing for the UK. Despite the fact that during some of the time she lived in Windhoek her family (including her mother and uncle) knew of her whereabouts they did not take her back to her home village against her will nor were they successful in securing her return. The text messaging may resume when the Appellant returns to Namibia (if the family become aware of her return), but this will fall far short of serious harm.

52. We find that the police would afford the Appellant sufficient protection from violence or threats of violence from her family. The background information to which we have referred leads us to conclude that the police would afford the Appellant sufficient protection in an urban area such as Windhoek. The Appellant says that the police could not assist her because her uncle is a serving police officer (page 41 [2]). That is relevant to the issue of sufficient protection in her home area, but the Appellant has fallen far short of satisfying us that either of her uncles or any other family members have influence over the police in an urban area such as Windhoek. The CPIN does not support the proposition that such roles confer effective nationwide impunity or control over the justice system as a whole (CPIN 4.3–4.6). We are thus satisfied that the Appellant would be able to avail herself of state protection in an urban area such as Windhoek. The CPIN evidences that the Namibian state has taken reasonable steps to prevent, investigate and punish gender‑based violence, including specialist units and protection orders (CPIN 4.1–4.12). Urban centres provide access to police, courts, hospitals, shelters, and employment outside traditional family structures (CPIN 4.1–4.12; 5.1–5.5). -

53. The Appellant would thus have sufficiency of protection from her cousin, mother, uncles and the village elder if she lived in an urban area away from them.

54. We still need to consider whether internal relocation is reasonable (or not unduly harsh) for the Appellant, even though we have found it to be a safe option for her.

55. Considering the evidence in the round, we find that it would be reasonable for the Appellant to relocate say to Windhoek as submitted by the Respondent. In brief this is because she has successfully lived there in the past, over a protracted period of four years, and this is consistent with the CPIN. The Appellant is educated and has been able to work, support herself and live independently there.

56. We also note Mr Sobowale’s submissions that the Appellant would be more likely to choose to live in an urban area rather than a rural one.

Conclusions
57. We therefore conclude that the Appellant’s claim for international protection is not made out to the required standard. She is notable to show a lack of effective state protection in an urban area such as Windhoek, and she has been unable to show that it would be unreasonable to expect her to relocate to an urban area within Namibia such as Windhoek as the Respondent suggests.

58. We have not gone on to consider whether the Appellant has established a convention reason for her refugee claim, more specifically whether she is the member of a particular social group. We determined that it was not necessary to make such a finding because her claim was not made out. She could safely and reasonably internally relocate and if found by the family members she fears then there would be sufficiency of protection.

59. Therefore, her appeal must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law, and the decision is set aside with the findings at [11]-[22] preserved.

2. We remake the decision.

3. The appeal is dismissed on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds.

C Burns
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Burns

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 May 2026