Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005798
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66828/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20 April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

SU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Chelliah, Counsel instructed by Saint Martin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L. Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier judge dated 27 October 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant his protection claim.
2. The appellant is a 65-year-old national of Bangladesh. The appellant’s case is that he is a member of the Bangladesh National Party (the “BNP”) which were political opponents of the then government. He was attacked by members of the pro–government Awami League (“AL”) and the police during a demonstration in June 2009. He was further attacked by members of the AL in August 2009, necessitating hospital treatment. Subsequently, the magistrates court issued a warrant for his arrest in July 2024. If returned to Bangladesh, the appellant fears he will be arrested on the basis of the warrant that had been issued on a ‘a false case’.
3. The appellant originally came to the UK on a visa on 17 May 2010 and subsequently applied for asylum on 11 January 2020 which was refused on 12 December 2023. The respondent found that the appellant’s explanation of the risk of persecution on return was not credible given the inconsistencies in his narrative and by reference to external information and refused his asylum and humanitarian protection claims.
4. The judge, in reviewing the evidence relating to the arrest warrant, found it not to be reliable given it had not been verified and that no evidence had been provided by the appellant, despite being represented, of any defence lodged or otherwise supporting his claim that the allegations were false. More generally, the judge found that in absence of any credible explanation as to why the appellant had delayed his asylum application for 10 years, and with the change of government in July 2024 the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof that he had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to his home country. Similarly, there was no basis for the grant of humanitarian protection or under the Human Rights Convention.
5. The appellant appealed against the judge’s decision which was granted, in part, by First-tier judge Le Grys on 22 December 2025. Out of the eight grounds asserted, only the fifth ground which related to a failure by the judge to properly undertake an Article 8 assessment, was granted as a basis for appeal.
Initial Matters
6. I confirmed to the parties that to comply with the granted anonymity order made by the judge and with the appellant’s wishes as to the name he is to be known by, my decision will refer to the appellant as “SU” rather than the current abbreviation.
7. I had not been able to access Mr Chelliah’s skeleton argument but Ms Clewley confirmed she had received a copy and sent me the document by email. I considered its contents before continuing.
8. I reminded the parties that the only ground granted for appeal was the fifth ground relating to the Article 8 claim.
Submissions
9. Mr Chelliah referred to his skeleton argument dated 1 April 2026 and submitted that the judge had failed to properly address the Article 8 claim and provide adequate reasons for his decision to refuse the appellant’s appeal. In essence, the judge had failed to conduct a proportionately test taking into account the appellant’s private life of over 15 years in the UK and that during that time he had taken part in meetings of and provided support to the UK BNP.
10. Ms Clewley relied on her Rule 24 response and stated that the appellant’s submissions before the judge did not advance the Article 8 claim on a private life basis but on the same grounds as the asylum claim, focussing on very significant obstacles and internal relocation, which the judge had rejected and which were not the subject of this appeal. In addition, s117B Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 required a judge to place “little weight” on the appellant’s private life given it was acquired whilst his immigration status was uncertain.
Decision and Reasons
11. The judge had clearly and correctly set out in paragraph 47 the burden of proof requirements for any human rights appeal. Additionally, he had specifically referred to the appellant’s Article 8 claim in three paragraphs of his decision:
“19. The appellant has not raised any exceptional circumstance in relation to his private life to qualify for leave on a discretionary basis.
58. In relation to the appellant’s human rights claim, this has been dealt with adequately by the respondent. In my judgement, the appellant does not have a meritorious claim.
65. I am also required to consider whether the appellant's claim engages any rights protected under the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Human Rights Convention). I have examined whether the appellant's rights as enshrined in those Articles may be breached on his return. However, in the light of my findings above, I find that there are no substantial grounds for believing that that will be the case. I therefore find against the appellant on human rights grounds also. “
12. Mr Chelliah has suggested that the judge had not properly considered the appellant’s Article 8 claim by failing to conduct a proportionality test and expressly considering the appellant’s private life in the UK as part of that assessment. Looking at the appellant’s skeleton argument before the judge, paragraphs 44 to 54 deal with the issue under the heading “Appellant’s claim under Article 8”. Paragraphs 44 and 46 (there is no 45) consider “very significant obstacles” under PL5.1(b) of the Immigration Rules, and paragraphs 50 to 54 deal with internal relocation. Only paragraphs 47 to 49 are relevant to the current ground of appeal which quotes GM (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1630 setting out the requirements for the proportionality test and then continues
“48 The appellant respectfully requests that the appeal be granted. It is submitted that the weight of subjective and objective evidence establishes that the appellant does indeed have a well founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh on the basis of his political opinion as an active member of the BNP sufficient to prima facie engage the 1951 Refugee Convention and that neither internal relocation nor protection from the state will adequately address that well founded fear.“
49. In light of the above observations, the Respondent’s rejection of the Appellant’s claim given the evidence advanced in support of his claim, is irrational. “
13. There is no mention in the skeleton of the basis as to why the appellant’s private life should outweigh the principle of effective immigration control. Paragraph 8 of the appeal grounds however refer to the judge “overlooking the appellant’s 15 years residence in the UK, family ties, and established private life” which do not appear to have been expressly raised before the judge. I asked Mr Chelliah about the weight the judge would have placed on the appellant’s private life in light of his immigration status and Mr Chelliah conceded that, in accordance with Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, it would be little weight. Furthermore, the judge was provided with no evidence of family ties and when I asked Mr Chelliah about the basis of the private life claim aside from residence, the only evidence he submitted was his age and the single statement in paragraph 17 of the appellant’s witness statement which stated:
“…I tried to attend various meetings arranged by the UK BNP and supported them where necessary”.
14. Taking this all into account, I conclude that the judge, whilst he could have been more explicit in his treatment of the Article 8 claim, had clearly turned his mind to the issue in paragraphs 19, 58 and 65 of his decision and given both the absence of any proportionality argument in the skeleton and the paucity of evidence available to him to support such claim, adequately dealt with the Article 8 issue. This is line with GM (Sri Lanka) which makes it clear that “proper evidence” is required to support an Article 8 claim. Even if that was not the case, and the judge had erred in not expressly conducting a proportionality assessment, the appellant’s claim was, in any event, bound to fail. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 required the judge to attach “little weight” to the appellant’s private life where his immigration status was either unlawful or precarious, which was the case throughout the entire period since his arrival in the UK in 2010, and the only suggested factors to balance against the need for effective immigration control was his age and his attendance at unspecified BNP meetings in the UK and undocumented level of support of its cause. I conclude there was no rational basis for the judge, taking those factors into account and weighing them against the need for effective immigration control, to determine that the appellant could be successful in his Article 8 claim. Accordingly, even if the judge had erred in not explicitly applying a proportionality assessment the outcome of the decision would have been the same.

Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out above, there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 April 202