Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005806
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59331/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 2nd of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

SMA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss L Burnard, Counsel instructed by Barnes, Harrild & Dyer
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Iraq and made an asylum application on 12 October 2021 which was refused on 16 October 2023. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) which refused the appeal in a determination dated 21 October 2025.
2. The appellant’s case in the FtT was that he had been in a relationship with a girl whose family intended to marry her to another man, and as a result he is now at risk from that girl’s father and brothers, who are active in the PUK.
3. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on two grounds:
a. One. The FtT failed to give adequate reasons when determining that there was sufficient protection; and
b. Two. The FtT failed to give adequate reasons and failed to take into account material considerations and evidence when determining that the appellant is not at risk of treatment contrary to art 3 due to being undocumented.
i. Failing to take into account evidence showing that CSIDs are no longer in use;
ii. Failed to apply the case of SA (Removal destination; Iraq; undertakings) Iraq [2022] UKUT 00037 (IAC)
4. I heard submissions from both parties. I reserved my decision. I apologise to the parties for the time it has taken me to issue this decision. I remind myself of the need to show respect for the findings of the FtT where the case was heard by a judge with extensive skills and knowledge in this specialist jurisdiction and who had presented to them the evidence and arguments to which I am now referred as part of the submissions on appeal. My function is to consider any errors of law, and not preference of style or approach.
5. On the day of the hearing, the appellant sought to add another ground of appeal, namely: Three, that there is an error of law arising from insufficient reasons in the FtT’s finding in the alternative that, if there is no sufficiency of protection, the appellant could relocate internally. The appellant asserted that it is not clear whether, and to what extent the finding on internal relocation is contingent on sufficiency, and that the finding is inconsistent with the evidence that the appellant would have to return to their home area to obtain an INID (that return would undermine the protection provided by internal relocation).
6. The representatives for both parties took some time to discuss the case. The outcome of that discussion was that the respondent was content for the additional ground of appeal to be considered (I therefore determined that it should be).
7. The respondent further conceded that there was a material error in the FtT determination in respect of grounds one and three.
8. On ground one, the appellant submitted that the FtT was presented with the Actors of Protection CPIN, and submissions based on the Honour Crimes CPIN. The former makes vague reference, says the appellant, to the ability of the police to protect. The latter speaks directly to the inability of the authorities to provide effective protection to persons at risk of honour crimes.
9. The FtT dealt with this at [33-34] and I agree with the parties that it is not clear how the FtT resolves that tension in the evidence and comes to the conclusion it does.
10. On ground three, the FtT deals with the question of internal relocation at [35-39]. The FtT had concluded that there was sufficiency of protection, and so did not need to consider the alternative of internal relocation. The respondent concedes that the reasons given in relation to internal relocation are insufficient, and I agree that the reasons given in the alternative by the FtT are not such that they prevent the error on ground one being material. This is because the FtT does not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that the appellant can relocate to an area not controlled by the PUK [39], or how the appellant could either internally relocate without an INID card, or could return to his home area to obtain an INID card whist there is not sufficiency of protection there (remembering that the internal relocation assessment is made in the alternative of the finding on sufficiency of protection).
11. Looking at grounds one and three together, I therefore find there is a material error in the approach the FtT has taken.
12. On the second ground, the appellant points to the FtT considering the relevant CPIN but not other country evidence on whether CSIDs are currently in use. The respondent submits that the CPIN is more recent than the other country evidence the appellant relies on. The FtT makes clear at [10] that they have taken into account all of the evidence provided to them. However, it is not sufficiently clear, in my judgment, why the FtT appears to prefer the CPIN over other country evidence, which I find to be an error. Because this leaves unclear to the parties how the FtT came to the conclusion that was reached, I judge this to be material.
13. Given the extent of fact finding that will be required in the re-making, I consider it appropriate that this matter is remitted to the FtT with no findings of fact reserved.
Notice of Decision
The determination of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
I allow the appeal.
I remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact retained.

D Cotton

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 May 2026