Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005808
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01122/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23rd June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

IGOR SZTYLKO
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs Newton, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Holmes, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellants.

Heard on 2 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals, with permission, against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge promulgated on 25 September 2025 allowing the Respondent’s appeal on human rights grounds pursuant to Article 8 ECHR.
2. For continuity and ease of reference, we refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly, Mr Sztylko is referred to as “the Appellant” and the Secretary of State as “the Respondent”.
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Poland born on 1 March 2003. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom in July 2008 at the age of five with his family. He subsequently resided continuously in the United Kingdom. On 20 July 2021 he was granted indefinite leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme.
4. On 20 November 2023, following convictions at Preston Crown Court, the Appellant was sentenced to a total term of 3 years and 1 month imprisonment. The offences consisted of possession of Class A drugs with intent to supply, possession of Class B drugs, and breach of a suspended sentence order arising from possession of a knife or bladed article in a public place.
5. On 7 December 2023 the Respondent made a stage 1 deportation decision pursuant to section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007. Human rights representations were subsequently made on the Appellant’s behalf in January 2024.
6. By a decision dated 13 May 2024 the Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claim and made a deportation order. The Respondent concluded that the Appellant’s deportation was conducive to the public good by reason of his offending and that neither Exception 1 in section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 nor any very compelling circumstances applied.
7. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Cole sitting at Manchester on 8 September 2025. Before the First-tier Tribunal the Appellant relied upon evidence concerning his upbringing, residence and family life in the United Kingdom. The evidence included witness statements from the Appellant, his mother, sister and friends, educational records, evidence of rehabilitation, and medical evidence relating to the Appellant’s younger half-sister Yasmin, who has autism and developmental difficulties.
8. The Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was, in summary, as follows. The Appellant contended that he had lived in the United Kingdom since early childhood and had spent the overwhelming majority of his life here. He submitted that he was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Poland.
9. The Appellant further relied upon his close family life with his mother, stepfather and younger siblings. Particular reliance was placed upon the Appellant’s role within the family in assisting with the care and support of Yasmin.
10. The Appellant accepted the seriousness of his offending but relied upon evidence of rehabilitation, including the contents of an OASys report dated 15 November 2024 which assessed his risk of serious recidivism as low and recorded his engagement with rehabilitative work in custody.
11. The Respondent opposed the appeal. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant had resided lawfully in the United Kingdom for most of his life but disputed that he was socially and culturally integrated given the seriousness of his offending behaviour, his criminal associations, and his prior non-compliance with community orders.
12. The Respondent further contended that the Appellant retained linguistic and cultural ties to Poland, spoke conversational Polish, had family members there including his grandmother, and possessed skills acquired in the United Kingdom which would enable him to reintegrate and obtain employment. The Respondent additionally argued that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory exceptions.
13. In a decision promulgated on 25 September 2025 the First-tier Tribunal allowed the appeal on Article 8 grounds. In summary, the Judge found that the Appellant met Exception 1 in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act. The Judge found that the Appellant had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life and was socially and culturally integrated notwithstanding his criminal offending.
14. In relation to integration into Poland, the Judge accepted that the Appellant spoke conversational Polish but found that he could neither read nor write Polish and had not visited Poland since 2019. The Judge noted that the Appellant’s immediate family all resided in the United Kingdom and that the Appellant remained emotionally and practically dependent upon them.
15. The Judge further attached weight to evidence concerning the Appellant’s close relationship with his younger autistic half-sister and concluded that, cumulatively, there existed very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Poland.
16. The Judge additionally considered, in the alternative, whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above Exception 1.
17. In that regard the Judge took account of the Appellant’s lengthy lawful residence, his family life in the United Kingdom, his rehabilitation, his young age at the time of offending, and the OASys assessment indicating a low risk of serious reoffending.
18. The Judge concluded that the cumulative effect of those matters outweighed the strong public interest in deportation and that deportation would amount to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s Article 8 rights.
19. The Respondent sought permission to appeal. The Respondent’s grounds may be summarised as follows.
Ground 1: Social and cultural integration / very significant obstacles
20. The Respondent contends that the Judge failed adequately to consider the Appellant’s criminal behaviour, non-compliance with court orders, and criminal associations when assessing social and cultural integration under section 117C(4)(b).
21. The Respondent further argues that the Judge failed properly to apply the relevant legal test concerning “very significant obstacles” to integration in Poland. Reliance is placed upon Ackom v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 537.
22. It is submitted that the Judge’s findings were internally inconsistent because the Judge accepted that the Appellant spoke conversational Polish and would likely improve his language abilities relatively quickly, whilst simultaneously concluding that his inability to read and write Polish constituted a very significant obstacle.
Ground 2: Very compelling circumstances
23. The Respondent further argues that the Judge materially erred in the assessment of very compelling circumstances under section 117C(6).
24. It is submitted that the Judge relied substantially upon matters already considered under Exception 1 without identifying sufficiently compelling additional factors.
25. The Respondent additionally contends that inadequate reasons were given concerning the effect of deportation upon the Appellant’s younger half-sister and that there was insufficient corroborative evidence regarding the Appellant’s claimed caring role.
26. Finally, the Respondent submits that insufficient weight was attached to the seriousness of the Appellant’s offending and that excessive weight was placed upon evidence of rehabilitation.
27. Permission to appeal was initially refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dieu on 21 November 2025. In refusing permission, the Judge considered that the grounds amounted largely to disagreement with the evaluative findings of the First-tier Tribunal and that the Judge had adequately directed himself in law.
28. The Respondent renewed the application to the Upper Tribunal. On 2 February 2026 permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal. In granting permission, the Upper Tribunal considered it arguable that the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to very significant obstacles and very compelling circumstances may have been inadequate, particularly in light of the guidance in Ackom.
29. The matter therefore comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
Discussion
Ground 1: Exception 1 – Social and Cultural Integration and Very Significant Obstacles
Social and Cultural Integration
30. We are not persuaded that the Judge materially erred in his assessment of the Appellant’s social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom.
31. The Respondent submits that the Judge failed adequately to account for the Appellant’s criminal offending, criminal associations, and prior breach of a community order. We reject that submission. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision demonstrates that the Judge was fully aware of the seriousness of the offending and factored it into the evaluative exercise required by section 117C(4)(b) of the 2002 Act.
32. At paragraph 28, the Judge expressly acknowledged that the offending adversely impacted upon integration. The Judge nevertheless concluded that, weighing all matters in the balance, the Appellant remained socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. That conclusion was plainly open to him on the evidence.
33. The Judge was entitled to place significant weight upon the Appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom at the age of five, his completion of the entirety of his education here, his continuous residence over approximately fifteen years, and the fact that his principal familial, social and cultural ties were all located within the United Kingdom. Those findings were unchallenged.
34. As the Court of Appeal observed in Binbuga (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 551 and CI (Nigeria) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027, criminal offending is relevant to the assessment of integration but is not determinative of it. The exercise remains a broad evaluative judgment. The Judge directed himself appropriately to that task. What the Respondent’s submissions amount to, in substance, is disagreement with the weight attributed to competing factors. That is insufficient to establish a material error of law.
Very Significant Obstacles to Integration in Poland
35. We are similarly unpersuaded that the Judge materially erred in concluding that there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Poland.
36. The Judge correctly directed himself in law. At paragraph 33 he referred to Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, adopting the orthodox broad evaluative approach to integration. He further directed himself by reference to Parveen v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932. We discern no legal misdirection.
37. The Respondent contends that the Judge’s reasoning was internally contradictory because he accepted that the Appellant spoke conversational Polish whilst also concluding that there would be very significant obstacles to integration. We reject that submission.
38. The Judge clearly distinguished between elementary conversational ability and meaningful functional integration. The evidence before the Tribunal was that the Appellant could not read or write Polish, had never received education in Poland, and had spent virtually his entire formative life in the United Kingdom. The Judge was entitled to conclude that those matters would present substantial practical difficulties in securing employment, navigating public services, and establishing independent adult life.
39. Nor did the Judge place determinative weight on language difficulties or employment prospects alone. Rather, the assessment was cumulative. The Judge considered the Appellant’s lengthy residence in the United Kingdom from early childhood, the absence of meaningful independent ties in Poland, the limited support realistically available from his elderly grandmother, the Appellant’s continuing emotional dependency upon his immediate family in the United Kingdom, and the fact that he had not returned to Poland since 2019.
40. The Respondent’s reliance upon Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537 is misplaced. The Judge did not proceed on the impermissible basis that inability immediately to obtain employment or improve language skills was sufficient of itself. Instead, he conducted the nuanced, fact-sensitive, cumulative assessment required by the authorities.
41. It is also significant that the Judge expressly recognised that the issue was finely balanced and that the Appellant has only just proven that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Poland. The Respondent argued that this was suggestive of the Judge expressing significant doubt in his own decision. We reject that submission. Far from disclosing legal error, that careful treatment demonstrates judicial restraint and attentiveness to the elevated statutory threshold.
42. In substance, the Respondent seeks to revisit findings and evaluative conclusions that were properly open to the Judge on the evidence. That approach does not disclose an error of law. Accordingly, Ground 1 is not made out.

Ground 2: Very Compelling Circumstances
43. We are likewise satisfied that the Judge directed himself correctly in relation to section 117C(6) and the assessment of very compelling circumstances.
44. The Respondent submits that the Judge merely repeated factors already considered under Exception 1 and failed to identify anything “over and above” those matters. We reject that submission.
45. The structure of the decision demonstrates that the Judge appreciated the distinction between the statutory exceptions and the separate exercise required under section 117C(6). At paragraph 52 the Judge recognised that Exception 1 had “just” been met. He then proceeded to undertake a distinct assessment of very compelling circumstances at paragraph 53 onwards.
46. The Judge plainly placed the seriousness of the offending at the forefront of his analysis. He referred to the sentencing remarks, acknowledged the gravity of the Class A drug offences and possession of a bladed article, and recognised the strong public interest in deportation reflected in section 117C(1) and (2).
47. The Judge nevertheless identified additional features which, cumulatively, he considered capable of outweighing that public interest. These included the Appellant’s youth and immaturity at the time of the offending, the sentencing judge’s own reduction in sentence on grounds of immaturity, the positive OASys assessment indicating a low risk of serious reoffending, evidence of rehabilitation and engagement with courses in custody, the existence of strong continuing family support, and the impact of deportation upon the Appellant’s autistic younger half-sister.
48. The Judge was entitled to attach weight to the professional assessments contained within the OASys report. The Respondent’s criticism of the Judge’s reliance upon rehabilitative evidence amounts, again, to disagreement with weight rather than the identification of legal error.
49. Further, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellant enjoyed a continuing protected family life with his immediate family notwithstanding his adulthood. The evidence from family members was accepted as credible. There was no requirement that every aspect of that evidence be independently corroborated by documentary material before it could properly be relied upon.
50. The Respondent relies upon Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987 in support of the proposition that “something more” was required. In our judgment, the Judge identified and articulated that “something more”. The cumulative combination of lengthy residence from early childhood, narrow satisfaction of Exception 1, immaturity at the time of offending, credible rehabilitation, low risk of serious reoffending, enduring family dependency, and the consequences for a vulnerable autistic sibling were all matters properly capable of contributing to the elevated threshold under section 117C(6).
51. The proportionality assessment under section 117C(6) is paradigmatically evaluative and fact-sensitive. The question for this Tribunal is not whether another Judge might have struck the balance differently, but whether the conclusion reached was reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal Judge on the evidence. In our judgment, it plainly was.
52. Reading the decision fairly and holistically, we are satisfied that the Judge properly directed himself in law, identified the relevant statutory framework and authorities, considered the material evidence, and conducted a structured proportionality assessment.
53. The Respondent’s challenge ultimately amounts to disagreement with evaluative findings that were properly open to the Judge.
54. Accordingly, we conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. The Respondent’s appeal is therefore dismissed.
Notice of Decision:
1. The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

J. Greer

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Greer