Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005810
UI-2025-005811
UI-2025-005812
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/73286/2024
PA/72841/2024
PA/73283/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 3rd of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNETT

Between

A.F.
M.A.
I.M.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Fazli of Counsel.
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity. They have made a protection claim and there are children involved in these proceedings.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 9 October 2025, and uploaded to MyHMCTS (CCD) on 11 October 2025, who dismissed the appellants’ appeal from a decision of the respondent to a refuse a protection claim. The decision of the respondent is dated 3 October 2024. I should note here that the second and third appellants are the minor children of the first appellant. I will refer to the first appellant as the appellant from here onwards.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by a judge of FtT, in these terms:
2. In light of positive finding on the appellant’s claim at [14] and [16], it is arguable the judge has erred at [18] of the decisions in requiring corroborative evidence of the links of the appellant’s in-laws whilst failing to consider the appellant’s evidence about them, as identified in response to questions in the interview at [74]–[82].
3. Accordingly this in turn may impact on the judges’ assessment on internal relocation.
3. The decision granting permission is dated 23 December 2025 and was not limited in scope.
Background
4. The appellant is a national from Pakistan. The other two appellants are her two young dependent children.
5. In brief, she claimed protection on the basis that she feared her husband and his family. She had been subjected to domestic violence both in Pakistan and in the UK. She claimed she could not relocate and there was no protection which she could obtain. She claimed the family of her husband were influential.
6. It was also stated that the appellant’s medical condition was such that a return to Pakistan would result in her suffering serious harm.
The decision of the FtT
7. The FtT dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The judge set out briefly the appellant’s claims [4]. The judge records that the respondent accepted that the appellant had been subjected to domestic violence [6] in the UK. The judge set out the issues which remained in dispute between the parties [6] to [7].
8. The judge set out the appellant’s claims and of domestic violence [15] and [16]. The judge concluded that he found it credible that the appellant had been subjected to violence and threats in the past but did not accept that it had been “severe”. In [16] no further detailed reasons are provided regarding why the judge came to the conclusion it was not “severe”.
9. The judge then set out extracts of background country evidence [17]. The judge states that there was a lack of evidence of a continuing adverse interest [17]. The judge also stated that the appellant had provided no evidence at all to support the assertion that her husband’s family were influential in Pakistan. The judge held this against the appellant and concluded it affected her credibility. In [18] the judge concluded that the appellant could internally relocate. The judge found the first appellant was highly educated and had access to a large amount of money £36,000. The judge took an example of one city and concluded that if the family had an on- going interest they would not be able to find the appellant. He rejected the assertion that the NADRA system would enable the family to track her and noted that there was no evidence put forward to support the assertion. The judge stated he had put an understanding of NADRA to the advocate and there were no submissions made to the contrary.
10. From [19] the judge considered the appellant health conditions and the evidence submitted in support. The judge noted that the most recent correspondence stated she had “mild levels of psychological distress”. The judge rejected the medical claim concluding that there would not be a serious and irreversible decline in her health or that there would be no facilities to treat her health condition if required.
11. At [22] the judge noted that no argument was advanced on the basis of article 8 by the advocate.
Grounds of appeal.
12. The grounds of appeal make a number of assertions regarding the approach of the judge. I will provide a brief summary of the grounds of appeal here. I have taken the numbering as (a) to (e).
13. The grounds set out the apparent positive findings which had been made at [6], [14], [16] and [20].
14. The principle ground (a) upon which the appeal was advanced, was an assertion that the decision lacked adequate reasons. In [6] and [20] the judge had accepted the claim of the appellant. However it is asserted that this was not clear and adequate reasons had not been provided as to whether the judge accepted that the appellant was subjected to sexual abuse and forced marriage. It is asserted that these finding were important to the consideration of internal flight and whether the appellant could obtain protection.
15. Ground (b) asserts that there was procedural unfairness as the appellant was not probed further about the influence of her husband’s family and that it was wrong for the judge to require corroboration.
16. Ground (c) asserts that the judge proceeded on a procedurally unfair basis by not putting to the appellant that the NADRA would not enable the family to track her.
17. Ground (d) asserts that the judge failed to consider 2 pieces of important evidence. The first that there had been a local authority assessment which stated that the appellant’s husband had taken all of her money, and a country policy information note (CPIN).
18. Ground (e) asserts that the judge erred and failed to properly consider article 8 and the best interests of the children.
The hearing and submissions
19. The parties made submissions which are contained in the record of proceedings. I will set those submissions out below in so far as is necessary in explaining my decision.
20. However, I should note that the bundle provided to the Upper Tribunal contained additional documents (the appellant’s bank statements of an account in the UK) which had not been before the First-tier Tribunal. There was no explanation of the inclusion of this material and there was no application to admit it. The way in which the bundle had been provided suggested the material had been before the FtT. Mr Fazli was asked for an explanation. He could not provide a full explanation at the hearing and so time was given for this matter to be addressed.
21. I should also note at this juncture that in light of what the judge had recorded at [18] and that Mr Fazli did not have a statement to demonstrate the contrary, he abandoned ground (c), that there had been procedural unfairness to the appellant regarding the evidence about NADRA before the Tribunal.
Analysis and conclusions.
22. Relatively recent authority (Ullah v SSHD [2024]EWCA Civ 201, Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, and Chowdhury v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 36) has emphasised that the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because they would have expressed themselves differently from the First-Tier Tribunal, that the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that a point had not been taken into account even if not expressly mentioned, and that judicial restraint should be exercised even though not every step in the reasoning was fully set out, as the issues might be set out by inference. I have borne those principles in mind.
23. I also had in mind the Court of Appeal’s dicta in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 that it is not the role of an appellate court to come to its own conclusions on the evidence before the Judge. It is essential that there is appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with the decision of the expert first instance judge.
24. I have considered carefully the decision of the FtT Judge. It is a relatively short decision, and the reasoning is condensed. There are aspects which could have been expressed differently and more comprehensively but this is not a basis upon which this Tribunal should interfere with the decision. I turn to the grounds of appeal
25. I can deal fairly shortly with ground (c) as Mr Fazli did not place any reliance upon this ground and abandoned it before me.
26. I turn next to the main focus of the appeal (a) concerning the findings which had been made by the judge. The judge accepted that the appellant was a credible witness and that she had given a truthful account. This is clear from [20]. However, there were aspects which the judge clearly did not accept which included that the violence the appellant had suffered was not “severe”. Before stating this the judge recorded the appellant’s evidence which she had previously given. It is not clear what incidents of violence or threats the judge did accept and it is concerning that the appellant in her witness statements makes a reference at para [13] to sexual violence. However the witness statement gives little detail about any assaults. It states:
11. I was in a relationship with someone in Pakistan and my father saw me with him and beat me. He then arranged my marriage with my current husband and forced me to marry him. I am a victim of forced marriage.
12. I clearly answered that in August 2023 my father-in-law grabbed me from behind to sexually assault me, but I managed to run away from him. Since this incident, He became very angry with me and would take every opportunity to harass and threat me.
13. I was a victim of domestic abuse and sexual assaults in Pakistan by my husband and in-laws and also in the UK.
27. In interview the appellant stated she was grabbed from behind and was quickly released and she ran away. (see Qu 88) No more details are given. The appellant stated her father in law had “a bad eye” for her. It is in this context that the decision has to be viewed.
28. This is a very experienced judge. The judge stated he had regard to all the material submitted in the appeal. I have read the decision carefully and considered the decision holistically. I am satisfied that the judge considered the appellant’s claims as against the prospects of her suffering further abuse, obtaining protection and the possibility of internal relocation. In the circumstances, and although it would have been better if the claim of sexual abuse and forced marriage had been addressed more clearly, and in detail, I conclude that there is not a material error of law. On the basis that the appellant had suffered domestic abuse, the focus of the decision was the finding that the appellant was not now subject to an on-going threat or adverse interest from her husband or his family, they did not have influence and would not be able to track her down. The judge concluded that the appellant could obtain protection and seek to relocate. I conclude that the ground of appeal does not establish a material error of law.
29. I turn to ground (b). It was not for the judge to probe the witness. The appellant was represented and the issue of the influence of her husband’s family had been put in issue by the respondent in the reasons for refusal letter. In her statement the appellant stated that the family were politically very influential (see paragraph 10 of her witness statement). The judge concluded that the fact that no evidence had been produced as to their influence, damaged the appellant’s credibility. This is after the judge set out the appellant’s claims, including that she had stated her husband’s family were illiterate, ignorant and uneducated. The judge reached the conclusion that the appellant had not established that they had any influence. Mr Fazli submitted that the lack of any evidence ought not to have been held against the appellant as it is difficult to understand what she could have produced to demonstrate the influence. He referred to the interview record and the claims the appellant had made, that her husband’s family were connected to gangsters and the police. I note that the appellant stated in interview that her husband’s family had connections with gangsters in the local party and local areas (see Qu 74 onwards). She claimed they had contacts to the local representatives on the basis of money. The appellant provided no evidence at all regarding the political influence and the representatives she claimed her husband’s family were connected to, ie social media, news reports.
30. In looking at the question of procedural fairness I have considered Abdi [2023] EWCA Civ 1455. I am not satisfied that the judge was not entitled to take such matters into account. Although another judge might not have drawn such a conclusion, it was not an error for the judge to do so. I conclude that there is no material error of law in this respect.
31. In ground (d) it asserts that the judge failed to take into account the local authority assessment and the CPIN report. However the judge made a finding about money which was disclosed in the appellant’s entry clearance application in a bank account of the appellant in Pakistan [16] and [18]. This finding was not about what was available to her in her accounts in the UK. The local authority report was centred on the UK. There was nothing the appellant put forward to demonstrate that the money was not still available to her and Mr Fazli could not point to anything. Although the judge did not refer to the CPIN about the low levels of employment, he had regard to the fact that the appellant had employment in Pakistan previously, she was highly educated and had lived in both the UK and Qatar. I conclude that there is no material error of law demonstrated in the ground of appeal.
32. In ground (e) it is asserted that the judge did not properly consider article 8. The judge recorded that article 8 was not pursued before him [22] and there was no suggestion the appellant had a protected private or family life right in the UK. Mr Fazli did not produce or have any evidence that what the judge recorded was not correct. Mr Fazli however submitted that it was incumbent upon the judge to consider article 8 given it was in the ASA (appeal skeleton argument) and referred to a number of factors that the judge had not considered and whether there were insurmountable obstacles to private and family life being conducted in Pakistan. During Ms Ahmed’s submission she stated it would have been helpful if the judge had said more but pointed to findings made by the judge regarding the appellant’s health [13], [19] and [22]; that the best interests of the children was to remain with their mother [21] and why the judge concluded that the appellant could return to Pakistan and seek employment and utilise the money in her Pakistani bank account until, she found employment. I agree that the findings made by the judge dispose of a suggestion of very significant obstacles to integration. I conclude that there is not a material error of law in the circumstances.
33. I am not satisfied that there are material errors of law in the decision as set out in the grounds of appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Iain Burnett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 May 2026.