Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005846
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00884/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
And

JABBIR ALI MOHAMED ABA NUR
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr L Youssefian, Counsel instructed by Sabz Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 1 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. On 10 April 2026, my decision (the error of law decision) allowing the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s (SSHD) appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chohan (FTTJ) in respect of the appellant was promulgated. Having set aside the FTTJ’s decision I decided to retain the matter in the Upper Tribunal. I preserved some of the findings made by the FTTJ and directed that there would be a further hearing after which I would remake the decision in respect of Mr Aba Nur’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision to refuse his human rights claim to remain in the United Kingdom. Having conducted the further hearing on 1 June 2026, this is my decision (the re-making decision).

2. Although it was the SSHD who appealed to the Upper Tribunal, in this remaking decision I will refer to Mr Aba Nur as “the appellant” because it is his appeal against the SSHD’s decisions that I am now considering. This remaking decision should be read in conjunction with my error of law decision which for ease of reference, is attached as an Appendix to this decision.

Background

3. The appellant is now 28 years old. He is a Dutch national who was born in Amsterdam but who moved to the United Kingdom with his mother, father and siblings when he was four years old, and who has been lawfully continuously resident in the United Kingdom since then. On 8 September 2020 he was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom.

4. On 18 July 2021 the appellant drove a car while alcohol and cannabis was in his system, at speeds of up to 50MPH in a 30MPH area and through red lights, until he collided with a raised pedestrian island causing his car to fly into a public house. The appellant’s best friend Farakh Akhtar, who was a passenger in the car, died from the injuries he suffered in the collision. The appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving and on 16 April 2024 he was sentenced to term of four years imprisonment. The appellant was released from the custodial element of that sentence on 16 April 2026.

5. As a result of the appellant’s conviction and sentence, on 1 August 2024 the respondent took a decision to deport him and invited him to submit representations as to why he should not be removed from the United Kingdom (“the stage 1 decision”). In response to that notice the appellant made representations that his deportation would be incompatible with his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to respect for his private and family life (“the Article 8 claim”). The respondent considered that claim but refused it in a decision dated 13 June 2025 (“the stage 2 decision”) and maintained the deportation order in respect of the appellant. The appellant appealed against the stage 2 decision to the First-tier Tribunal.

6. As explained in paragraph [1] above, I must now remake the decision in respect of the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim.

7. At [5] – [13] of my error of law decision I set out the legal framework which I must apply when remaking the decision. As that framework identifies the ultimate issue for me is whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 to deportation, which, following a full proportionality assessment, outweigh the very strong public interest in the appellant’s deportation as a foreign criminal.

8. I must resolve that issue in the context of the findings of fact that were made by the FTTJ which I preserved in my error of law decision (see [38] of that decision). For ease of reference those findings are:

a) In relation to Exception 1: (i) that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for more than half his life; (ii) that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom; and (iii) that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Holland.

b) In relation to Exception 2 the Judge’s findings were that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his British partner but that the effect of his deportation would not be unduly harsh on his partner.

c) Prior to his imprisonment the appellant contributed to the care of his cousin Omar but he was not Omar’s main carer and the appellant’s removal would not adversely affect Omar.

9. Following the error of law decision, the appellant and his partner have each provided further witness statements. The appellant attended the remaking hearing and gave oral evidence. I have taken account of that evidence and all the documentary evidence in the 1166 page hearing bundle that has been adduced, and had regard to it when reaching my decision. I have also had regard to the very capable submissions that were made by the Ms Clewley and Mr Youssefian. Although I will not set out those submissions in detail here, I will refer to them in my analysis of the ultimate issue below.

Analysis

10. To undertake the full proportionality assessment necessary to resolve the issue in this appeal, I adopt the “balance sheet approach” first setting out those factors on the public interest side of the scales, second setting out those factors on the appellant’s private and family life side of the scales and third weighing those competing factors against each other to establish whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 which, outweigh the very strong public interest in the appellant’s deportation.

The Public Interest

The seriousness of the offence

11. Section 117C(1) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) states that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest, whilst s.117C(2) states that the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal. At [62] of his judgment in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Lord Hamblen explained that these statements are consistent with the Strasbourg jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights where the nature and seriousness of the offence is the first of the factors listed to be taken into consideration. The seriousness of the offence is therefore the touchstone for assessing the weight of the public interest in deportation.

12. The best assessment of the seriousness of the offence committed by the appellant comes from the Judge who sentenced the appellant, the Honorary Recorder of Manchester (“the Sentencing Judge”). He had the opportunity to study all of the evidence of the offending including the “CCTV style” video footage showing the driving which led to the death. The Sentencing Judge followed the structured approach required by the Sentencing Council guidelines to decide on the appropriate sentence. That involved him first making an assessment of the seriousness of the offence the appellant committed by reference to culpability and harm. With regards culpability the Sentencing Judge placed the offence in the overlap between the highest two categories of culpability recognised in the guidelines. With regard to harm the Sentencing Judge noted that “the harm could not be higher it is the death of an individual and therefore harm is not, as it were, a discrete factor in determining the level of sentence”.

13. The Sentencing Judge then concluded:

“In my judgement after a trial, taking into account the competitive element of your driving, the consumption of alcohol and drugs, the high speed, and what must have been errors of judgement in your driving or loss of control by you, the appropriate sentence after a trial in this case but ignoring any mitigating features would be eight years imprisonment”

14. On the basis of this thorough assessment it is clear that the offence the appellant committed was of one of great gravity such that the public interest in the appellant’s deportation is very weighty. Mr Youssefian acknowledged the gravity of the offence and the consequent public interest in deportation but carefully sought to argue that specific features of the offence mean the public interest in the appellant’s deportation is reduced.

15. In relation to the first of those factors, it is clear from the Sentencing Judge’s remarks that there were “compelling mitigating features” to the appellant’s offence. The Sentencing Judge noted the appellant’s heartfelt and deep remorse for the offence and its tragic consequence. I accept the appellant’s evidence that the responsibility for the death of his close friend is a weight he carries constantly. The evidence before the Sentencing Judge was that the family of Farakh Akhtar had forgiven the appellant and the evidence before me from Farakh Alhtar’s sister was that she treats the appellant as family now. The Sentencing Judge said that these mitigating factors, principally the appellant’s remorse, meant that the sentence should be reduced to six years imprisonment rather than eight. In other words these mitigating features identified by Mr Youssefian did reduce the seriousness of the offence and consequently the public interest in deportation.

16. Mr Youssefian additionally relied on features of the offence such as the absence of intent or malice, as features which he argued reduced the public interest. The fact that there was no such intent or ill-will however is reflected in the offence for which the appellant was convicted. Had there been such intent or malice the offence would have been murder or manslaughter rather than causing death by dangerous driving. The seriousness of the offence of causing death by dangerous driving the appellant did commit is not reduced by the fact it was not an offence of murder or manslaughter. Likewise the public interest in the appellant’s deportation arising from the serious offence he did commit is not reduced by the fact he did not commit a more serious offence.

17. Neither does the fact the sentence imposed on the appellant was reduced to four years to reflect the fact the appellant pleaded guilty reduce the seriousness of the offence or the weight of the public interest. That is made clear by [69] of Lord Hamblen’s judgment in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department in which he pointed out that the responsible acknowledgement of guilt does not impact on the seriousness of the offence committed.

18. Ultimately therefore, I am satisfied that offence that the appellant committed was a very serious one involving significant culpability and a high degree of harm. It was consequently considered by the Sentencing Judge, who was the person in the best position to make the assessment, to be of such seriousness that, notwithstanding the appellant’s deep remorse and the forgiveness of the victim’s family, warranted a significant sentence of six years imprisonment. In view of that assessment and applying section 117C(2) of the 2002 Act the public interest in the appellant’s deportation remains substantial notwithstanding those features of the offence identified by Mr Youssefian.

Rehabilitation

19. At [58] of his judgment in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Lord Hamblen recognised that a person’s positive rehabilitation is a relevant factor when assessing the strength of the public interest in that person's deportation. In that paragraph he said that while the sole fact that no further offences have been committed is likely to be of little or no material weight in the proportionality balance: “If, on the other hand, there is evidence of positive rehabilitation which reduces the risk of further offending then that may have some weight as it bears on one element of the public interest in deportation, namely the protection of the public from further offending.”

20. Lord Hamblen went on the agree with the following summary of the position identified by Underhill LJ in the Court below:

“What those authorities seem to me to establish is that the fact that a potential deportee has shown positive evidence of rehabilitation, and thus of a reduced risk of re-offending, cannot be excluded from the overall proportionality exercise. The authorities say so, and it must be right in principle in view of the holistic nature of that exercise. Where a tribunal is able to make an assessment that the foreign criminal is unlikely to re-offend, that is a factor which can carry some weight in the balance when considering very compelling circumstances. The weight which it will bear will vary from case to case, but it will rarely be of great weight bearing in mind that, as Moore-Bick LJ says in Danso, the public interest in the deportation of criminals is not based only on the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal in question but also on wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern.”

21. In the appellant’s case, the sizable evidence adduced causes me to find that the appellant is not likely to re-offend. That evidence includes the fact that the offence of causing death by dangerous driving is the only criminal offence the appellant has committed, there being no other history of criminality or suggestion of offending in the short time since his release from prison. More significantly, the evidence includes the Sentencing Judge’s informed assessment that “I am entirely confident that you will not re-offend. I am entirely confident that you will be able to rebuild your life and be a good citizen leading a productive and, I hope happy life in the future”. The evidence further includes the probation officer’s informed assessment in the OASys report that the risk of offending is low (assessed as being 8% in the first year following release and 14% in the first two years after release) and that the appellant is not linked to others known to the criminal justice system. A letter from the appellant’s Offender Manager when he was at Morton Hall prison refers to the appellant complying with all of his sentencing plan, attending courses and volunteering while in prison. The appellant’s evidence is that he was given enhanced prisoner status while in HMP Huntercombe. Finally there is evidence of positive rehabilitation that occurred during the long delay between the offence being committed and the appellant being sentenced (a delay which the Sentencing Judge said the appellant was not responsible for, and should not have happened) including the establishment of a charity in the name of Farakh Akhtar.

22. Having found that the appellant is unlikely to re-offend, applying the legal position as summarised by Underhill LJ above, it is apparent that the public interest in the appellant’s deportation is reduced because the first limb of the public interest identified – protecting the public from further offending - is negated. As Underhill LJ identified there are two other limbs to the public interest, deterrence and public concern. Underhill LJ’s statement that a finding that the appellant is not likely to re-offend will rarely be of great weight because of these two other limbs to the public interest must be considered however, in the context of a caveat added by Lord Hamblen at [59] of his judgment in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department to his agreement with Underhill LJ’s summary:

The only caveat I would make is that the wider policy consideration of public concern may be open to question on the grounds that it is not relevant to the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime and disorder. In Hesham Ali it was the view of Lord Wilson that this was a relevant consideration (see paras 69 to 70) but that was not a view endorsed by the majority. That is not, however, an issue that falls for consideration on this appeal.

23. My finding that the appellant is not likely to re-offend therefore means that the public interest in the appellant’s deportation is reduced because there is no public interest in his being deported to protect the public from him reoffending, but not it is not reduced to zero because there remains a public interest in his deportation to deter others from offending and to reflect public concern that those non-United Kingdom nationals who commit serious offences should not be permitted to live here. In light of Lord Hamblen’s caveat, public concern while it attracts some weight as an element of the public interest in deportation is not as significant as the public interest in protecting the public from further offending.

Conclusion on the strength of the public interest

24. Bringing this together, the appellant has committed a very serious offence in which both his culpability and the harm caused was high. There is therefore a substantial public interest in his deportation applying s.117C(1) and (2) of the 2002 Act. The weight of that public interest in deportation is reduced because of the appellant’s high degree of remorse and the fact he is not likely to offend again in the future but is instead likely to lead a productive life in the community if given the opportunity. The public interest remains significant however, primarily because of public concern that those who are not British (even those who have spent almost their entire life in the United Kingdom) and who commit serious offences should not be permitted to live in the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding the arguments expertly advanced by Mr Youssefian the weight on this side of the scales remains in all the circumstances considerable.

The Appellant’s Private and Family Life

25. An assessment of the strength of the appellant's private and family life in the United Kingdom must begin with the preserved finding by the FTTJ that the appellant could not meet the requirements of either Exception 1 or 2 to deportation under s.117C(4) and c.117C(5) of the 2002 Act. Those findings are not however determinative of whether the appellant’s private and family life in all the round amounts to the very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions that outweighs the public interest in his deportation. This is because, as Jackson LJ explained at [30] of his judgment in NA (Pakistan v Secretary of State for the Home Department) [2016] EWCA Civ 662 (a passage which was quoted with approval by Lord Hamblen at [50] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department), a serious offender like the appellant who has been sentenced to four years or more imprisonment:

…, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of article 8.”

26. It is necessary therefore to have careful regard to the particular factors identified in the two Exceptions in order to assess the weight of the appellant’s private and family life and whether it is sufficiently substantial to outweigh the strong public interest in deportation.

Exception 1 (Private Life) Factors

27. Exception 1 relates to the appellant's private life. The first preserved finding in relation to Exception 1 is that (i) the appellant has been continuously resident in the United Kingdom for more than half of his life. Mr Youssefian’s submission was that there are aspects of this finding which, he said showed the appellant’s private life went well beyond what was necessary to establish this limb of the Exception.

28. Mr Youssefian submitted firstly that the appellant’s lawful residence in the United Kingdom extended to considerably more than half his life. I agree with Mr Youssefian’s submissions and find that the evidence demonstrates that the appellant’s private life goes well beyond what is required to establish the first limb of Exception 1. The appellant has in fact spent twenty four of his twenty eight years (or 84% of his life) lawfully resident in the United Kingdom. This is considerably more time than the “more than half” of his life that the first limb of Exception 1 has been interpreted as requiring (see SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 2112 at [53] and CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 at [27]).

29. Secondly, Mr Youssefian submitted that particular weight is to be attached to the fact the appellant’s continuous lawful residence in the United Kingdom began when he was just four years old and included almost all of his childhood. Again, I agree with Mr Youssefian’s submission and find that the fact the appellant’s continuous lawful residence in the United Kingdom included the majority of his childhood, all his education, and the entirety of his adult life means he goes well beyond what is required to establish this limb of the Exception.

30. Strasbourg jurisprudence including Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47 has long established that particular weight is to be attached to private life established in the host country during childhood or youth. This principle was recognised domestically in Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 30. In that case the Court rejected the suggestion that there is “a condition subsequent” which meant that very serious reasons were required to justify deportation in the case of a settled migrant who lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood in the host country, but regarded the principle that particular weight is to be attached to private life established in the host country during childhood or youth as not in dispute.

31. I find therefore that the appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom having been established during the appellant’s childhood and having been established over the vast majority of the appellant’s life, goes well beyond what is required to meet the first limb of Exception 1.

32. The second preserved finding in relation to Exception 1 is that (ii) the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. Mr Youssefian also submitted that the appellant’s circumstances went well beyond simply establishing that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated. Again, I agree with this submission.

33. The evidence shows that apart from his time in prison the appellant has been resident in the same city in the north of England, and that during his residence in that city he has established a vast network of community links and connections through his education, consistent work and charity endeavours. That evidence included many character references and letters of support from members of the community which demonstrate that the appellant’s integration goes well beyond that a bare meeting of this limb of the Exception. Examples include letters from the Chief Executive Officer of a community football club who speaks of the appellant orchestrating various events to bring the community together, as well as further letters from Directors of various charities who describe the appellant’s passion for volunteering, fundraising and commitment to the community. The appellant’s deep social and cultural integration is further demonstrated by the number of visitors he had while in prison. The appellant’s Offender Manager said that the appellant had 51 visits while at HMP Morton Hall including visits from his parents, sibling, nephew, cousins, girlfriend and other friends. It is further significant in terms of integration that upon his recent release from prison, the appellant has immediately resumed part time employment.

34. I am satisfied therefore that not only that the appellant meets the requirements of the first two limbs of Exception 1 but further that he goes well beyond what is necessary to meet the requirements of those two limbs.

35. The preserved finding of the FTTJ is that the appellant does not meet the third limb of Exception 1 because he would not face very significant obstacles to integration in the Netherlands. This finding was explained by reference to the support (including financial assistance) the appellant would receive from his family and partner, the skills the appellant has acquired thorough work plus vocational and educational courses while in prison. It is also relevant to note that the country to which the appellant would be deported has a culture of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and civil liberties which is shared with the United Kingdom and which will mitigate obstacles to integration (see the judgment of Andrews LJ in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Ackom [2025] EWCA Civ 537).

36. There were however factors which as the FTTJ identified would make integration in the Netherlands more difficult for the appellant. The appellant is unfamiliar with the Netherlands having not returned there following the family’s departure when he was four and there are no family members left in the Netherlands (the family having emigrated to the Netherlands from Somalia). The appellant’s mental health was another factor identified by the FTTJ as an inhibitor when reintegrating. The FTTJ referred to ADHD and autism being a specific challenge for the appellant, however it was apparent from the appellant’s evidence before me that he has not been diagnosed or even undergone a full assessment for either condition. More significant is the fact the appellant’s mental health has in the past been such that he was “sectioned” for his own safety in 2017 and that his mental health again suffered following the offence with the realisation that his actions had resulted in the death of his friend. Whilst the FTTJ noted that the appellant would be able to access care for his mental health from within the Netherlands, it is apparent that the appellant’s fragile mental health will make integration in the Netherlands more difficult. The appellant’s circumstances do not therefore meet the requirements of the third limb of Exception 1 and certainly do not go well beyond those requirements. They do however involve circumstances which will make starting again in the Netherlands difficult.

37. Overall, viewing the appellant’s private life through the lens of Exception 1, it is apparent that whilst the appellant does not meet all three limbs of the Exception, there are aspects of the appellant’s private life which extends well beyond the requirements of the Exception. The appellant’s private life is firmly and deeply entrenched in the United Kingdom, which is the country in which he has lived since the age of four, where he has been educated, where all his close family reside and where he has support structures in place. The appellant’s integration in the United Kingdom goes well beyond simple residence and involves a positive history of work and a deep association to the community with his charitable enterprises being widely recognised. The appellant’s connection to the Netherlands by contrast is minimal as he has not returned since the age of four and his family did not stay there long enough to establish any real connection to the country. I conclude therefore that the appellant has established a private life of very great substance in the United Kingdom and that substantial weight must be given to that private life.

Exception 2 (Family Life) Factors

38. The preserved finding of the FTTJ is that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his British partner Ms Lindenstruth, but that the effect of the appellant’s deportation would not be unduly harsh on her. This finding involves therefore a conclusion that there is a family life shared by the appellant and Ms Lindenstruth but that in the context of the deportation decision it is not one of substantial weight.

39. That conclusion is borne out by the evidence. I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of the appellant and Ms Lindenstruth that they have been in a committed relationship since 2022 and they have a shared hoped of marrying and building a home together in the future. I also recognise the evidence of Ms Lindenstruth’s visits to the appellant in prison and her support of him through these proceedings both of which show a commitment to an enduring relationship. It is relevant to the weight of the family life they share together however, that the relationship has existed for a relatively short time, it began after the appellant committed the offence which led to the deportation order, and they have never lived together, indeed Ms Lindenstruth lives in a different city to the appellant. For half of the time the relationship has existed the appellant has been in prison significantly restricting the couple’s ability to form a family life and even after his release there are restrictions on his liberty which limit their ability to be together through the licence conditions that apply to him.

40. Whilst I do not minimise the affection that the appellant and MS Lindenstruth hold for one another or doubt their commitment and intention to build a life together in the future, the reality is that the family life they currently share is of little substance.

Factors not falling within the Exceptions

41. The appellant’s relationships with his wider family do not fall within the factors considered as part of the two Exceptions to deportation but do unquestionably form part of his private and family life in the United Kingdom. It is necessary therefore to assess the strength of those relationships to determine the weight to be given to them in the proportionality assessment.

42. I accept the evidence of the appellant that prior to his imprisonment he has always lived with his parents and that following his release from prison he has returned to live with his mother, father and cousin Omar who is 19 years old and has autism and Downs Syndrome. The appellant does not specify who else, if anyone, lives in the family home, neither does his mother or father in their witness statements. There is however evidence that suggests that the appellant has siblings who also live in the house. That evidence includes the reference in the OASys report to the appellant saying that he lives in the family home with his parents, adult siblings and Omar. There is also the first two pages of a CAFCASS report about Omar written in 2019, which says that Omar lives with his carer (the appellant’s mother) and her five children - four of whom are adults plus a reference in a later Education, Health and Care Plan for Omar to him living with the appellants parents “and their 5 children (all older than Omar)”. Further there is a witness statement from the appellant’s sister Zaman who does not provide her address, but describes the appellant as her protector and friend. This was the only part of the appellant’s case which in my view lacked transparency but on the limited evidence provided I find that the appellant lives with his mother, father, cousin and also with his siblings, in the family home.

43. It has never been suggested that there are the additional elements of dependency which mean that the appellant shares a family life that engages article 8 of the Convention with his parents and siblings. Whether described as private or family life it is, in my assessment, clear from the evidence that the appellant shares a close relationship with his parents in which they provide one another with emotional and financial support and that the appellants separation from his family will have a significant impact. The OASys report refers to the good relationship they share and the positive upbringing the appellant received. The evidence is that the appellant was particularly supported by his parents in 2017 when his mental health was such that he had to be sectioned. The appellant’s mother has health issues which means that she requires additional support from the appellant and his siblings. Before going to prison the appellant contributed to the family’s finances and since his release he has begun to do so again. I accept Mr Youssefian’s submission that the appellant’s is a close knit family and that the deportation of the appellant will have a significant adverse impact on the appellant’s parents and siblings.

44. The documentary evidence about Omar indicates that Omar was born and brought up in the USA and came to live with the family in September 2018 after his mother died and when his father (the appellant’s uncle) went to Somalia. It is apparent from the documentary evidence that the arrival of Omar with his significant needs was a shock to the family. As already identified, the FTTJ rejected the appellant’s assertion that he was the main carer for Omar and I have preserved the finding of the FTTJ that whilst the appellant contributed to Omar’s care, the appellant’s removal would not adversely affect Omar. The appellant’s evidence to me was that since his release from prison his father has primarily cared for Omar but he has been helping daily tasks such as feeding Omar, getting him ready for school and taking him out to the park or city. This evidence is consistent with the FTTJ’s finding which I maintain. It is a feature of this close knit family that they care for Omar together, however the appellant’s particular part in the care can be taken on by other members of the family without Omar suffering any significant detriment, as was the case while the appellant was in prison.

45. Overall therefore, I find that the appellant’s relationships with his parents, siblings and the cousin with whom he lives, form a significant part of the appellant’s private life which is not reflected in an assessment of his ability to meet the requirements of the two Exceptions. I find that separation from his family will have a significant adverse effect on the appellant. These are factors that add to the weight to be attributed to the appellant’s private and family life.

Conclusions on the strength of private and family life

46. The appellant has established a substantial private life during his lengthy residence in the United Kingdom. Some aspects of that private life, including the length of his residence and his social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom go well beyond what is required to meet Exception 1. Other important aspects of his private life are not recognised by the considerations that arise when applying the Exceptions. The fact that the appellant came to the United Kingdom as a child and spent his childhood and almost all his formative years in the United Kingdom is a weighty factor not recognised within the Exceptions. Likewise, the close relationship with his parents and the close knit family with whom he has always lived apart from his imprisonment and who continue to be his primary source of support, is also a significant factor not reflected in the Exceptions. The appellant’s private life is in all these circumstances, very weighty.

47. The appellant’s family life with Ms Lindenstruth by contrast consists mainly of their intention to build a home and a family in the future. Whilst that intention is no doubt genuine, it is not a factor that attracts much weight in the balancing exercise.

Weighing the competing factors

48. This is a case where the weight on each competing side of the scales is substantial. It is an illustration of why Lord Wilson described this issue as “one of the most controversial questions which the law of human rights can generate” in which “considerations of public policy on the one hand and of what is said to be private existential need on the other clash like warriors” (see [1] of Lord Wilson’s judgment in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [202] UKSC 17 a case which ultimately concerned AM’s Article 3 Convention rights). The strength on both sides of the scales is such that different Judges may disagree about where the balance lies. The heavy burden of determining which side of the scales should prevail, however falls on me.

49. In my judgment the strength of the appellant’s private life is such that it can properly be described as amounting to very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions and it is of such weight that it outweighs the public interest in the appellant’s deportation.

50. I reach this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was unable to meet the full requirements of either Exception. I find the length of the appellant’s residence, his deep integration into the community in the United Kingdom and the complete absence of ties to country to which he will be deported, to be factors identified in the descriptions of Exception 1 which are of an especially compelling kind, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the first two limbs to Exception 1. I also find that there are factors which are not reflected in the descriptions in the Exceptions, which make the appellant’s private life especially weighty including his young age when he arrived, his development within the United Kingdom plus his close relationship with his parents and siblings. Taken together I find these factors do constitute a private life which amounts to very compelling circumstances over and above those described in the Exceptions.

51. When concluding that the appellant’s private life is so compelling that it outweighs the strong public interest in his deportation as a foreign criminal, I have regard to my finding that that public interest is reduced because the evidence strongly points to the fact the appellant will not offend again and the public does not require protecting from him. Rather as the Sentencing Judge stated the evidence suggest the appellant “will be able to rebuild [his] life and be a good citizen leading a productive … life in the future”. Whilst the public interest remains significant because of public concern in foreign criminals being deported that public concern must be tempered by the particular circumstances of the appellant.

52. On balance therefore, despite having regard to the serious offence he committed and giving significant weight to the public’s concern that foreign criminals are not allowed to stay in the United Kingdom, and the need to deter others from committing serious offences like that committed by the appellant, I conclude that the appellant’s private life when considered cumulatively is so strong and so compelling that exceptionally, it outweighs the public interest in deportation.

Notice of Decision

The appellant’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 June 2026

3. On 18 July 2021 the appellant drove a car while alcohol and cannabis was in his system, at speeds of up to 50MPH in a 30MPH area and through red lights, until he collided with a raised pedestrian island causing his car to fly into a public house. The appellant’s best friend who was a passenger in the car died from the injuries he suffered in the collision. The appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving and on 16 April 2024 he was sentenced to term of four years imprisonment. The appellant continues to serve the custodial element of that sentence.

4. As a result of the appellant’s conviction and sentence, on 1 August 2024 the respondent took a decision to deport him and invited him to submit representations as to why he should not be removed from the United Kingdom (“the stage 1 decision”). In response to that notice the appellant made representations that his deportation would be incompatible with his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to respect for his private and family life (“the Article 8 claim”). The respondent considered that claim but refused it in a decision dated 13 June 2025 (“the stage 2 decision”) and maintained the deportation order in respect of the appellant. The appellant appealed against the stage 2 decision to the First-tier Tribunal.

Legal Framework

5. The appeal was a human rights appeal as defined in s.82 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) and, by virtue of s.84(2) of that Act, the ground of appeal available to the appellant was that the respondent’s decision was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.

6. The appellant’s Article 8 claim was that the respondent’s decision was incompatible with his right under Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to respect for his private and family life. Article 8(2) of the ECHR says that right must not be interfered with by a public authority “except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

7. In the appellant’s case the existence of a private and family life engaging Article 8(1) ECHR was agreed. It was also common ground that the respondent’s decision to interfere with that private and family life was in accordance with the law because sections 3(5) and 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 provide the respondent with the power to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign national where the respondent considers their deportation would be conducive to the public good, and section 32 of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007 provides that the deportation of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months is conducive to the public good and requires the respondent to make a deportation order in those circumstances.

8. The disputed issue in the appellant’s case was whether the interference with the appellant’s private and family life is proportionate when the public interest in deportation is balanced against the strength of his private and family life in the United Kingdom (“the public interest question”).

9. Part 5A of the 2002 Act (s117A- S.117D) provides the Tribunal with a complete code for answering the public interest question (see HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22). Section 117A(2)(b) requires that in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals the Tribunal must have regard to the considerations listed in s.117C of the Act.

10. Section 117C(1) of the 2002 Act states that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest while s.117C(2) says that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in the deportation of the foreign criminal. Subsections 117C(4) and (5) provide two exceptions to the public interest in deportation where a foreign criminal has been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment. Exception 1, set out in s.117C(4) applies where an appellant (i) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life; (ii) is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom; and (iii) would face very significant obstacles to integration in his home country. Exception 2 in s.117C(5) applies where a person is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying child and the effect of the person’s deportation on that partner or child would be “unduly harsh”.

11. Section 117C(6) provides that in the case of a foreign criminal who, like the appellant, has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years:

“the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”

12. At [46] – [71] of his judgment in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Lord Hamblen gave guidance to a Tribunal applying section 117C(6) of the 2022 Act and “The very compelling circumstances test” it involves. At [47B] Lord Hamblen approved the following explanation of the test from the Judgment in the court below given by Lord Justice Underhill:

…a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C(6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that ‘the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’.”

13. At [51] – [52] of his judgment Lord Hamblen explained that all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered when applying the very compelling circumstances test, including those identified by the European Court of Human Rights as relevant to the article 8 proportionality assessment and that the weight to be given to the relevant factors falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities.

The Judge’s Decision

14. The appellant’s appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chohan (the Judge) on 3 October 2025 and the Judge’s decision was promulgated on 29 October 2025.

15. Having dealt with preliminary matters the Judge identified the issue for the hearing at [7] as “Are there very compelling circumstances that outweigh the strong public interest in the appellant’s deportation?” At [8] the Judge noted that: “The appellant must demonstrate very compelling circumstances beyond those outlined in Exceptions 1 and 2 of section 117C. Nevertheless, these Exceptions provide a pertinent starting point for assessment.”

16. The Judge found at [9] that the appellant met the first two limbs of Exception 1 as he had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life and was socially and culturally integrated in the country. He then considered the third limb, namely whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Holland if he had to return. The Judge had regard to the appellant’s unfamiliarity with the Netherlands, his mental health challenges and the fact that his family are in the United Kingdom but, having noted the high threshold that the term involves, concluded at [13] that the appellant would not in fact very significant obstacles to integration in Holland. The judge explained that conclusion further at [14] and [15] noting that the appellant’s family would be able to visit him in Holland and maintain regular contact with him, that the appellant has completed various educational and vocational courses which he could put to good use and that he would be able to access necessary care in the Netherlands. The Judge’s conclusion expressed at the end of [15] was: “Over time, it is expected that the appellant would adapt and overcome any initial hardships experienced during reintegration in the Netherlands.”

17. Turning to Exception 2, the Judge found at [16] that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a British partner and noted the evidence of that partner that she would not relocate to the Netherlands with the appellant if he were removed. At [18] the Judge records his assessment that: “I am not persuaded that the consequences would reach the threshold of unduly harsh for the partner in the event of the appellant’s deportation” stating that despite their reservations the appellant and his partner could maintain their relationship through visits and modern communication as they were doing while the appellant is in prison.

18. At [20] the Judge turned to the very compelling circumstances test stating:

20. The question then arises as to whether there are very compelling circumstances in this case. This necessitates a comprehensive proportionality assessment, weighing the impact on Article 8 rights against the significant public interest in deportation.

19. At [21] the Judge noted that the appellant arrived in the United Kingdom at the age of four, that his family members and partner continue to live in the United Kingdom and that the appellant lacks social, cultural and familial ties to the Netherlands. At [22] the Judge considered a specific part of the appellant’s relationship with his young cousin who the Judge said has been diagnosed with autism spectrum condition and Downs Syndrome. The Judge concluded that the appellant contributed to this cousin’s care but rejected the appellant’s assertion that prior to his incarceration he was his cousin’s primary carer. The Judge found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the appellant’s removal would adversely affect his cousin.

20. At [23] – [26] the Judge considered the offence the appellant committed. He noted that the family of the appellant’s friend who died in the collision had extended their forgiveness to the appellant, that the offence was not premeditated and the appellant had demonstrated remorse. The Judge noted the assessment of probation officers that the risk of the appellant reoffending is low, that the sentencing judge recognised the appellant’s remorse, previous good character and guilty plea when fixing the appropriate sentence. At [27] and [28] the Judge noted the appellant’s rehabilitative work since being sent to prison noting his participation in various courses and remunerated mentoring role in prison. The Judge also noted the appellants role with a charitable organisation and positive character references submitted on his behalf.

21. At [29] the Judge set out his conclusion applying the very compelling circumstances test as follows:

29. Hence, in light of the appellant’s early and lengthy residence in the UK; the presence of his family, including his partner, who are supportive; favourable sentencing remarks (i.e., guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, and a low risk of reoffending); absence of prior convictions; previous good character; and significant social and cultural integration prior to his offence, as evidenced by his longstanding presence and community engagement, I find that there are indeed very compelling circumstances, which outweigh the strong public interest in favour of deportation. Accordingly, the appellant’s deportation would constitute a disproportionate interference with his family and private life under Article 8.

22. The Judge then allowed the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

23. The respondent sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on a single ground averring that the Judge made a material misdirection of law regarding the very compelling circumstances test. The Judge refused the respondent permission considering their application amounted to no more than a disagreement with his decision. Permission was granted however on renewed application to an Upper Tribunal Judge who considered it arguable that the Judge had misdirected himself as to the threshold for the very compelling circumstances test or that his conclusion that the threshold was met on the facts of the appellant's case was wrong. Thus the matter came before me.

24. The appellant served a response to the respondent’s notice of appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 in which he submitted that the Judge applied the very compelling circumstances test correctly and reached a conclusion that was reasonably open to him, reminding this tribunal of the need to exercise judicial restraint on appeal.

25. A consolidated bundle was prepared in advance of the hearing before me, and Ms Ahmed submitted a skeleton argument on the morning of the hearing. I heard helpful submissions from Ms Ahmed and Mr Youssefian consistent with the written submissions made previously. Those oral submissions were of high quality and I intend no disrespect by not setting them out in detail here, instead I will refer to them where necessary to explain my decision.

26. Having considered those submissions and all the material submitted I have come to the firm conclusion that the decision of the Judge did involve an error of law as the Judge failed to correctly apply the very compelling circumstances test, and that the decision must be set aside. My analysis of the competing arguments and the reasons for my conclusion follow.

Analysis

27. Mr Youssefian correctly identified that the Judge appropriately directed himself to s117C(6) and the very compelling circumstances test at [8] of his decision so he was clearly aware of the test that had to be applied. Mr Youssefian was equally correct when saying that the Judge is an experienced and specialist tribunal and so I should be slow to infer that having identified the appropriate test the Judge failed to apply it. I have had regard to [72] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Hamblen’s reminder of the need for judicial caution and restraint when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. Despite this, it is quite clear to me when the decision is properly analysed that the Judge failed in substance to apply the very compelling circumstances test.

28. The fact that the Judge lost sight of the threshold to be applied in the very compelling circumstances test is immediately apparent from [20] of his decision in which he introduces his consideration of the test. The Judge is correct when stating in that paragraph that the very compelling circumstances test necessitates a comprehensive proportionality assessment weighing the impact on Article 8 rights against the significant public interest in deportation. That brief summary replicates the first half of the guidance of Underhill LJ approved at [47B] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. The Judge did not however go on to recognise the rest of Underhill LJ’s guidance which is replicated at [12] above and which makes clear that “In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C(6)…to proceed on the basis that ‘the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’” (my emphasis). The omission of this part of the test from the Judge’s summary of the test he applied is significant because it indicates that the Judge lost sight when conducting the proportionality assessment, of the strength of the public interest and the necessity for something very compelling to displace the requirement for deportation that ordinary would result from the strength of the public interest..

29. By referring to the first part of Underhill LJ’s guidance about a full proportionality assessment without acknowledging the second part of the guidance about the strength of the public interests side of the scales in that assessment, the Judge set up an assessment in the following paragraphs which failed to recognise the weight of the public interest in the deportation of serious offenders as assessed by Parliament within its margin of appreciation.

30. Mr Youssefian sought to uphold the Judge’s assessment by referring to the Judge’s references to the serious or significant public interest in deportation that applied in the appellant’s case. It is correct that at [20] the Judge refers to the “significant public interest” in deportation, at [23] to the “substantial public interest” in deportation and again at [29] to the “strong public interest” in deportation. None of these references to the weight of the public interest however recognise that the power of the public interest in the deportation of serious offenders who receive sentences of four years or more is such that it can only be outweighed by very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2.

31. In other words, it is apparent that whilst the specialist Judge undertook his proportionality assessment recognising that there was a strong, substantial or significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation, he did not in that assessment recognise that the public interest was so strong, so substantial and so significant that it could only be outweighed by very compelling circumstances that were over and above the two Exceptions. Had the Judge recognised that this was the strength of the public interest then he would have begun his balancing of the competing interests with the fact that he had already found that the requirements of the two Exceptions had not been met. Instead, the Judge makes no reference in his proportionality assessment to his earlier findings that the appellant does not meet the requirements of either of the two Exceptions demonstrating that the appropriate very compelling circumstances test was not in substance being applied.

32. There is a further demonstration that the Judge impermissibly undervalued the strength of the public interest in the appellant’s deportation apparent from the reasons the Judge gave at [29] for concluding that the public interest is outweighed. In that paragraph the Judge refers to the appellant's good character and lack of convictions prior to the offence that led to the sentence of imprisonment and to the “favourable sentencing remarks” made about the guilty plea, remorse and low risk of re-offending as factors which the Judge said meant that the public interest was outweighed. These were all however factors that the sentencing judge took into consideration before determining that the appropriate sentence was one of four years imprisonment. In fact the sentencing judge made clear that the seriousness of the offence was such that, ignoring these mitigating factors, it merited a sentence of eight years imprisonment. As Lord Hamblen explained at [67] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department it was that assessment of seriousness which was the touchstone for determining the strength of the public interest in deportation applying s.117C(2) of the 2002 Act.

33. Finally, it is apparent that the Judge did not in substance apply the very compelling circumstances test because his explanation at [29] for why the appellant’s article 8 rights outweigh the public interest is irreconcilable with that test. I have already discussed the Judge’s reference to mitigating factors of the offence and why these could not be factors to reduce the public interest below that identified in the very compelling circumstances test. Almost all of the other factors the Judge refers to at [29] to explain his decision – the appellants early and lengthy residence in the United Kingdom, his significant social and cultural integration, his community engagement and integration and the presence of his partner in the United Kingdom – are factors which are covered in the two Exceptions. The Judge however had already determined that the appellant had not met the requirements of either of these Exceptions.

34. Mr Youssefian submitted that factors which do not of themselves establish the requirements of the relevant Exception is met, might still when combined together establish very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions. That possibility was acknowledged by Underhill LJ in Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 74 and described as “an Exception-overlap case”. It is impossible however in the circumstances of this case and on the very limited explanation provided in [29] of the decision to understand how the factors which the Judge identified as being insufficient to establish the Exceptions were met came to be regarded as factors which are very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions.

35. Mr Youssefian referred to features of the appellant’s case which do not come in the category of either Exception and which may lead to a conclusion that there are very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions. Such features, he submitted, include the appellant’s relationship with his parents and siblings, and the particular weight to be given to the fact the appellant was a child when he arrived in the United Kingdom and is still a young adult (see for example Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47 and Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 30). These may well be relevant factors in the proportionality assessment, however they were not factors that the Judge used to explain his decision (beyond a brief reference to the presence of the appellant’s family in the United Kingdom and the appellant's “early” residence in the United Kingdom). In fact it is significant that the Judge rejected the appellant’s suggestion that his deportation would have an adverse effect on his cousin.

36. Overall the Judge’s explanation for his conclusion that the public interest had been outweighed makes it plain that the Judge was not correctly applying the very compelling circumstances test and was not giving appropriate weight to the public interest in the deportation of serious offenders. For all these reasons, it is quite clear that the Judge misdirected himself in law and failed in substance to apply the very compelling circumstances test as he was required to do. The Judge did not recognise that the public interest required deportation unless there were very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions and the Judge did not explain how there were such very compelling circumstances when the appellant was unable to meet the requirements of either Exception. It follows that his decision must be set aside.

Remaking

37. A full proportionality assessment as identified at [47B] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department proceeding on the basis that the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in the two Exceptions, must now take place. I am persuaded by Mr Youssefian’s submissions that before that assessment can take place it will be necessary to hear updated evidence from the appellant and his family given almost six months have passed since the Judge made his decision. I am not however satisfied that extensive findings of fact will be required and so in accordance with the guidance of the Presidential Panel in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and applying the Tribunal’s Practice Direction I direct that the decision is remade in the Upper Tribunal.

38. The Judge’s findings in relation to the two Exceptions have not been challenged and can be preserved. Those findings were in relation to Exception 1: (i) that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for more than half his life; (ii) that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom; and (iii) that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Holland. In relation to Exception 2 the Judge’s findings were that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his British partner but that the effect of his deportation would not be unduly harsh on his partner.

39. The Judge’s finding that prior to his imprisonment the appellant contributed to the care of his cousin but that he was not his cousin’s main carer and that the appellant’s removal would not adversely affect his cousin has also not been challenged and is preserved.

40. The appeal will now be listed before me for remaking on the first available date convenient to counsel. The appellant’s representatives must submit witness requirements including the details of any interpreter required for that hearing within seven days of receiving this judgment.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chohan contained an error of law and is set aside.

The appeal will be listed before Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt for remaking on the first available date.