Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005851
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01817/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

AMRIK RAM
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Ahmed, Counsel instructed by Ishwar Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 15 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant, a citizen of India, appeals, with the permission of the Upper Tribunal, the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTTJ”) promulgated on 23 September 2025, dismissing his appeal on human rights grounds from the respondent’s decision of 25 August 2023 refusing his application of 8 December 2022 for permission to stay on the basis of private life (long residence).
2. The appellant claimed to have entered the UK on 1 July 2002 illegally. He said in his witness statement for the hearing that he had lived in the UK continuously since that date. He had travelled to Italy in 2008 for a month as one of his friends told him that he could get papers there but as that option was not available, he returned within a month. He said he used the name Amar Jit Singh when he was confronted by immigration in 2008 (at port on arrival) and used the name Amarjit Singh on utility bills and for the GP.
3. The FTTJ has recorded in the background section of the decision that the appellant applied for asylum on 12 June 2008 which was treated as withdrawn on 8 July 2008 and that the appellant accepted that he had left the UK for Italy in a lorry in 2008 and stated that he remained in Italy for “a few months” [3]. It is not clear where the reference to “a few months” comes from. It may well have been the oral evidence given to her. The FTTJ does not specifically record at [8] that the appellant was cross-examined but he must have been asked some questions (see [12] and [21]). As some of the medical evidence in the bundle was unclear and illegible the FTTJ discussed with the appellant whether he wished to proceed and he did [6].
4. The FTTJ concluded:
(i) The respondent had been aware and accepted that the appellant had used the names Amrik Ram and Amar Jit Singh [14];
(ii) The appellant had produced utility bills in the name of Amarjit Singh; only little weight was attached to those documents because there was no way to verify whether they related to the appellant or someone whose name he was using [14];
(iii) She did not accept that the appellant entered the UK in 2002 because there was no corroborating evidence of this other than some British Gas letters addressed to Amarjit Singh which was not an uncommon name, and the medical records (in the name of Amarjit Singh) gave a date of entry into the UK as 2 October 2009 which contradicted the claim to have entered in 2002;
(iv) She did not accept that the appellant had been continuously resident in the UK since 2008 because the appellant had, on his own evidence, used two names and dates of birth and had entered and left the UK illegally. The utility bills were not evidence of continuous residence and there was an unexplained gap in the utility letters between 2011 and 2014. It was entirely possible that the appellant had exited and re-entered the UK on more occasions than the admitted occasion in 2008 [18];
(v) The appellant had been reporting in 2015 – 2017 but then did not report until 2019 when he reported until 2021. The appellant was in the UK during those periods, but outside those times it was possible that the appellant had left and re-entered the UK [19];
(vi) Little weight was attached to the letter of support which put the appellant in the UK between 2012 and 2022 because the author had not attended the hearing. The medical records, where legible, had no entries between 2009 and 2017. She could only find that the appellant was continuously resident in the UK between 2015 – 2017 and 2019 – 2021 dates for which she had the appellant’s reporting record [20];
(vii) She did not accept that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration into India as he spoke the language and had a wife and children in India and he could live with them on return, he had no health issues and some work experience in the UK and would be enough of an insider to partake in society and conduct life there [22];
(viii) Article 8 was engaged in respect of private life, but the appellant did not meet immigration rules and did not appear to speak English. In his favour he had spent time in the UK over a number of years, worshipped in the UK and had at least one friend in the UK but the factors raised by the appellant did not outweigh the public interest [28].
Grounds
5. The grounds were summarised in (i) as failing to take relevant matters into consideration or taking irrelevant matters into consideration and failing to give anxious scrutiny to all the evidence. They aver specifically (I summarise) that the FTTJ erred:
(a) in treating the reporting record as a determinative factor for the purposes of continuity of residence. By doing so, she failed to give proper consideration to other supporting evidence, such as utility bills, which corroborated the appellant’s claim to have been continuously resident since arrival in 2002;
(b) in failing to take into consideration that there was no requirement to provide any specified evidence for the purposes of demonstrating continuous residence;
(c) in failing to take into account that those in the UK without leave would be likely to have no official documentation particularly in the early period of their residence;
(d) in failing to take into proper consideration the various utility bills between 2002 and 2009 which was independent evidence in support of the appellant’s claimed date of entry and to have lived continuously in the UK – (i) the evidence of utility bills was recognised in Home Office guidance as being amongst the evidence which could be relied upon to support a claim of continuous residence and as the FTTJ accepted that the appellant had used both names she had effectively excluded the evidence of the utility bills – (ii) the FTTJ had speculated in stating that “Amarjit Singh” was not an uncommon name without any evidence or reasons to support it;
(e) (i) in overlooking that there were utility bills between 2011 and 2014 which were relevant evidence of continuous residence so that she had failed to take into consideration material evidence and (ii) speculating that it was entirely possible the appellant had left and re-entered the UK without any reasoning and failing to take into account relevant evidence;
(f) In failing (i) to take into account the handwritten confirmation of the appellant’s reporting which showed that he had been reporting in 2015 and from January to June 2016 on which date further reporting was suspended. The evidence of suspension provided an explanation for the lack of reporting between 2015 – 2017; (ii) to take into account that reporting had recommenced on 16 February 2023 and that there was reporting throughout 2023-2025;
(g) In failing to take into account the utility bill in 2022, the fee waiver application of September 2022 and evidence of the private life application of 8 December 2022 so she had erred in discounting periods after 2021;
(h) There had been procedural unfairness, the appellant being unrepresented, in not giving anxious scrutiny to all the evidence and not giving an opportunity to the appellant to clarify matters of concern arising from the evidence.
Submissions at the hearing
6. The bundle prepared on behalf of the appellant did not include the respondent’s bundle prepared for the hearing before the FTTJ. I drew to the attention of the representatives that I had a copy of the respondent’s bundle so that I had all the evidence which had been before the FTTJ.
7. Mr Ahmed relied on the grounds. He drew to my attention the documents which showed that the appellant was required to report in February 2023, and then monthly thereafter, that he was required to report in March 2020 to speak with an official at the High Commission, that he was required to attend an interview at the East Midlands reporting centre on 3 March 2017, and that in June 2016 reporting had been suspended. He said he was making the point that the FTTJ had said the only evidence she could go on was the reporting record but if there was no evidence for ten different years that did not mean the appellant had been out of the UK ten times. He took me to the utility bills for various dates, June 2014, April 2013, July 2012, June 2011, June 2010, July 2009, March 2008, March 2007, March 2006, March 2005, September 2004, September 2003, and July 2002.
8. Mr Ahmed submitted that there had not been proper scrutiny of all the documents and if any were rejected there should be some reasoning stated. There was no specific evidence in the rules to show continuous residence. The FTTJ should have taken into account that where there was unlawful residence it was more probable than not that there would be gaps and difficulties behind that and the difficulties someone resident in the UK unlawfully had in producing documentation should be taken into consideration.
9. Looking at it in that light, he submitted, the FTTJ’s findings that the appellant was not continuously resident in the UK other than between 2015 – 2017 and 2019 – 2021 did not stand up. There were errors, and they were material ones, he submitted.
10. Mrs Arif said that the FTTJ’s decision was careful, structured and reasoned, engaging with all material evidence and the grounds were simply disagreeing with lawful findings. She referred me to Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 in particular the part at [2 (iii)]. The FTTJ said she had considered the oral evidence and submissions and the documentary evidence [8], [9]. That she did not specifically turn her attention to the oral evidence did not mean that she had overlooked it. In response to the specific grounds she said (I summarise):
(a) The FTTJ did not rely solely on the reporting records; she was entitled to conclude that only the reporting records showed reliable evidence of presence in the UK and she explained why the other evidence did not demonstrate continuous residence; she had given intelligible reasons for the same;
(b)/(c) There was no mandatory documentary requirement a judge is simply required to assess whether the evidence meets the balance of probabilities standard and the evidence was insufficient and unreliable. The lack of formal documents did not mean that gaps had to be accepted;
(d) The appellant had used inconsistent identity details including different names and dates of birth; the finding that the name was not uncommon must be seen in that context; it was not speculation. The FTTJ had relied on contradictory evidence from medical notes which said the appellant had entered in October 2009, that was a rational evidence-based conclusion and no error arose;
(e) Although some documents did exist during that period, they were sporadic and the FTTJ had said in the same sentence that utility bills were not evidence of continuous residence. There was an absence of a consistent evidential record, and this was a reasoned inference grounded on evidence and not speculation;
(f)/(g) The FTTJ was not looking at reporting requirements but rather at continuous residence. There was no material error in not dealing with 2023. The later evidence did not remedy earlier deficiencies, and cumulative gaps defeated the claim;
(h) The FTTJ did not need to refer to every piece of evidence, she had considered the oral evidence and there was no indication the appellant had been prevented from saying what he wanted to.
11. Mr Ahmed responded that people who remained here without status could not be expected to produce evidence for every single day and month over 20 years. Findings were only on the balance of probabilities. There was no proof produced by the respondent that the appellant had left the UK, the appellant could not prove a negative. It had been accepted that the appellant used an alias and given the totality of the evidence produced by the appellant that evidence belonged to him. The FTTJ had simply confined her findings to the independent evidence without having proper regard to the fact that even if there were gaps it did not necessarily mean that the appellant had not been continuously resident. If anxious scrutiny had been made then the decision would be different. The evidence simply did not support the decision that the appellant had only been continuously resident for the years identified. The FTTJ ought to have considered the totality of the period up to the date of the hearing and the claim that residence had been continuous.
12. I indicated that I was going to reserve my decision. The parties agreed that if the decision were to be set aside it would need to be remade in the First-Tier Tribunal given the extent of necessary fact-finding.
Conclusions on each part of the grounds
13. Mrs Arif referred me to the decision in Volpi v Volpi. Paragraph 2 is the relevant part of the decision which discusses the approach of an appeal court to an appeal on a question of fact. It states: “The following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract”.
14. With that in mind I turn to the grounds, which I analyse one by one.
(a)
15. I agree with Mrs Arif. The FTTJ did not treat the reporting record as determinative. Having analysed the evidence, including the appellant’s own evidence, the utility bills, the medical records, the letter of support from an individual and the letter from the temple (see [16] – [20]) she concluded that she was only satisfied that the appellant was continuously residing in the UK during the time periods for which she had his reporting record. In other words, her conclusion that the reporting record was the only reliable evidence was reached after considering all the evidence. This ground discloses no error on the part of the FTTJ.
(b) and (c)
16. The FTTJ did not have to remind herself that there was no requirement to produce any specific evidence for the purposes of demonstrating continuous residence. As an expert tribunal aware of the law, she would know this and there is nothing in the decision to indicate she expected any specific document or expected the appellant to have a wealth of documents. She also did not need specifically to remind herself that people in the UK without leave would be unlikely to have official documentation. In fact, the appellant claimed that he had utility bills covering a great deal of the period in issue. As Mrs Arif points out, the lack of formal documents does not mean that a judge is bound to accept an appellant’s uncorroborated evidence of the time he has spent in the UK. A judge would be wrong to take as damaging the credibility of an undocumented appellant such as this appellant that he had, for example, no bank statements or no tenancy agreements to prove residence, but that does not mean that a judge would be bound to find his evidence reliable. The FTTJ made no error as alleged.
(d)
17. It is right that Home Office guidance recognises utility bills as being evidence which may be submitted by an applicant to show continuous residence in the UK. The FTTJ accepted that the respondent was aware that the appellant had used both the names Amrik Ram and the name Amar Jit Singh. Contrary to what was said in the grounds she did not exclude the evidence of the utility bills (“I therefore do not discount the evidence” [14]), she in effect recognised that Amar Jit Singh and Amarjit Singh are simply different variations in English spelling of the same name, but by attaching little weight to those utility bills she was saying that she did not find them to be reliable evidence that the appellant was contracting with those utility companies on the dates stated. There was, as she said, no way of verifying whether they related to the appellant or someone else called Amarjit Singh. The FTTJ having considered all the evidence, would have appreciated that none of the bills in the name of Amarjit Singh corresponded to any of the addresses at which the respondent had written to Mr Amar Jit Singh, Mr Singh or Mr A.J. Singh notifying him of bail, or attendance requirements for interview or similar. It depended on accepting the word of the appellant that he was the person to whom those bills related. It was open to the FTTJ not to do so.
18. The grounds suggest that the FTTJ erred in saying that there was no corroborative evidence to support his claim. She did not say that; she accepted that the utility bills could be corroborative (see [16] “there is no corroborative evidence of this, other than some British Gas letters…”) but said that Amarjit Singh was not an uncommon name. That was not speculation; the FTTJ was entitled to use her experience as a judge in that tribunal, and it is well known that many, if not most Sikh men bear the name Singh. Moreover, paragraph [16] must be read as a whole. The lack of acceptance that the appellant had entered the UK in 2002 was not simply because only the utility letter supported the same. There were no letters from anyone confirming the appellant’s entry into the UK in or about 2002 and the medical records also in the name of Amarjit Singh relied on by the appellant gave a different date of entry into the UK; 2 October 2009.
19. The FTTJ was entitled only to give little weight to the utility bills and not to be satisfied on the appellant’s own evidence that he had entered the UK in 2002 because there was nothing beyond the utility bills/letters to support the appellant’s word and the medical records on which he relied gave a contradictory date for entry to the UK. The FTTJ did not err as averred in this part of the grounds.
20. I observe that utility bills are, contrary to the submissions in the grounds, not completely independent evidence. A person simply tells the utility company that they are now responsible for that utility at that address. Of course, if the bill is a reliable document, it is evidence independent of that person that they must have told the utility company, at a date on or before the date on the bill, that they were the responsible person for that utility at that address.
21. I have found that the FTTJ did not err as averred, but on scrutinising the documents whilst considering my decision, it is apparent that no tribunal judge could find that the copy utility bills/letters produced are reliable documents:
(i) The appellant said he entered the UK on 1 July 2002. The first utility letter is a British Gas annual electricity summary dated 4 July 2002. It explains Amarjit Singh’s electricity use this year as 2716.64 kwH and then says that he used 2975.24 kwH last year. Neither seems possible for someone who had only been in the UK for three days at the date of the letter;
(ii) The water bills for March 2006, March 2007 and March 2008 are identical in the sense not only is the total payable identical each year, the balance brought forward from the last bill as unpaid and the amounts credited as payments and adjustments since the last bill are identical, although curiously the section on the second page of each bill which lists payments received and adjustments since the last bill is blank;
(iii) The utility letters dated July 2009 and June 2010 are completely identical apart from the dates of the letters and the dates of the summary period - they each show precisely the same amount of electricity being used in the year of the letter (3387.13 kWh) and the previous year (2798.97 kWh). That does not appear possible; the previous year usage in the letter of June 2010 should correspond with the current year usage in the July 2009 letter;
(iv) The utility letter dated 8 July 2012 is identical in electricity usage to the letters of July 2009 and June 2010 - 3387.13 kWh referenced as being used that year and 2798.97 kWh being used the previous year, only the address on the letter is different to that of the letters of July 2009 and June 2010.
(e)
22. The FTTJ did overlook some utility letters. There is no gap. There are bills or letters for each year from 2008 up to and including 2014. It can be seen from the appellant’s reporting record that he absconded in 2008 and then did not come to the respondent’s attention until he was detained in February 2015 and subsequently granted temporary admission and began reporting. However, although the FTTJ was wrong to overlook the letters, she had already explained why she could only give little weight to the utility letters, so that it could have made no difference to her conclusion. She said the utility bills were not evidence of continuous residence, but she did not mean that they were not capable in principle of being such evidence; she had already explained that she did not discount the utility evidence, she simply only gave it little weight. Her conclusion that the appellant could had exited and re-entered the UK on more occasions than the admitted occasion in 2008 was not speculation. This was an appellant who not only accepted that he had used a false name and date of birth to the respondent, but it was also, unusually, his case that he had left and re-entered the UK since the first occasion on which he entered illegally (albeit he maintained that he had only been absent for a period which would not have broken his continuous residence – i.e. he had not been out of the UK for more than 6 months at any one time). The FTTJ’s lack of satisfaction that the appellant had been continuously resident since 2008 was based on those factors (see [18]). She made no material error as alleged.
(f)
23. The grounds are mistaken. The FTTJ accepted that the appellant was continuously resident between 2015 – 2017 which covered the period of suspension relied upon, and 2019 – 2021 which covers the 2020 letter and entries to which Mr Ahmed drew my attention at the hearing. It is right that the FTTJ did not refer specifically to reporting which postdated the application to the respondent, but she noted the letter of 12 January 2023 [15 (i)] specifically granting the appellant immigration bail, which is the first letter in the evidential sequence in the appellant’s bundle before the FTTJ and has the dates of reporting on the back monthly from March 2023 to August 2025. The FTTJ must have been referring at [20] to periods which predated the application. This makes sense, because the period before the application would be the period considered by the decision maker concluding whether an applicant had the necessary 20 years’ continuous residence. The FTTJ made no error of law.
(g)
24. The FTTJ noted the 2022 utility letter addressed to Amrik Ram in the list of documents, so was clearly aware of this evidence. As a letter in the name of Amrik Ram, the appellant’s name as per his passport, the letter was clearly capable of being evidence of continuous residence which linked to the appellant and therefore with a link to the appellant was different from the other utility letters. The fee waiver application might also be said to be evidence of presence in the UK. However the reporting record ended in April 2021 and the utility bill in the name of Amrik Ram was for July – August 2022 more than a year later. Given her earlier findings, it was open to the FTTJ to have limited continuity of residence to a period ending in 2021, but even if the FTTJ should have considered the appellant as being continuously resident in 2022 it could not possibly have made any material difference to her ultimate conclusion.
(h)
25. The FTTJ gave proper consideration to the evidence as a whole. She did not err as alleged in this ground. Mr Ahmed simply did not develop this part of the ground at the hearing in the sense of developing what matters he said the FTTJ should have put to the appellant which were not put to the appellant. The appellant was represented by his current solicitors when he made the application to the respondent, and the decision letter was sent to them. They wrote a letter of application for the appellant and could have chosen to deal with an obvious inconsistency on the face of the documents uploaded with the application such as the form of March 2017 in which Amarjit Singh applied for registration with a GP where the “date you first came to live in the UK” is written as 2 – 10 – 2009 (see [16]). The respondent’s case has been since the decision letter that there was no evidence linking the appellant to the name of Amarjit Singh and the decision shows the appellant was questioned about this at the hearing [12]. The appellant was aware that it might be suggested that he had not been continuously resident in the UK and his witness statement deals with this and explains the documents he relied upon to show continuous residence in the UK namely utility bills, immigration records and medical records, that he had only left the UK in 2008 and that he claimed to have been reporting since 2015 in the name of Amar Jit Singh. The appellant’s witness statement dealt only with his life in the UK, but the appellant was clearly questioned at the hearing about matters relevant to his return to India (see [21] – [22]).
Overall conclusion
26. There is nothing to indicate that the FTTJ did not give the evidence the proper balanced consideration (see Volpi v Volpi at [2 v]). Her conclusion was perfectly rationally supportable. She explained why she did not find the appellant’s own evidence that he entered in 2002 to be reliable and that she could only give little weight to the documents said to corroborate the same [13], [16]. There was an immigration record of a port entry by the appellant to the UK in 2008, but the FTTJ was not satisfied that the appellant had been continuously resident since 2008. The FTTJ fully explained why that was so. She explained that the appellant had used an alias and had admittedly re-entered the UK. She gave little weight to the utility bills/letters, the medical records in the name of Amarjit Singh did not have entries for many years and she gave little weight to the letter of support which was relevant to the years from 2012 onwards. Mr Ahmed submitted that gaps in the evidence did not necessarily mean a lack of continuous residence and that people without status could not be expected to produce evidence for every single day and month over 20 years. That is of course right but that does not mean that the FTTJ erred in this case, where the appellant had on his own account left and re-entered the UK, had absconded between 2008 and 2015 and the FTTJ could only give the supporting evidence little weight. The burden of proof is on the appellant and the FTTJ was entitled not to be satisfied that he had met that burden on the evidence she had. As I have noted above, it could not possibly have been material even if the FTTJ should have found the appellant to have been continuously resident from 2019 through to 2022, the year before the application.
27. In fact on the evidence before the FTTJ, even if, contrary to my conclusions she should have been satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant had been continuously resident from 2015 to the date of the hearing, so for ten years, or even since his entry to the UK in 2008 so for 17 years, on the relatively limited evidence before her of the appellant’s private life in the UK and the evidence that he had family members in India [21] – [28] any rational tribunal would have been bound to dismiss the appellant’s claim once they were not satisfied that the appellant met the 20 years’ residence requirement of immigration rules.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains no material error of law and stands.
The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 August 2026