Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005854
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58038/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 30th March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAINI

Between

RUHIN AHMED
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Ferguson, Counsel; Kalam Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6th March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. For ease of comprehension, I shall refer to the parties as they were constituted before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The Secretary of State appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Thorne allowing the Appellant’s human rights appeal outside the Immigration Rules on the basis of Article 8 ECHR. The decision was promulgated on 11th November 2025. The Secretary of State applied for permission to appeal, which was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Saffer in the following terms:
“It is arguable the findings are not supported by the evidence”.
3. The Appellant provided a Rule 24 response which indicated that the appeal was opposed, and also contained within it a “cross-appeal”.
Preliminary Matters
4. At the outset of the hearing I proceeded to hear submissions as to whether or not I should admit the Rule 24 response drafted by Counsel instructed by the Appellant’s solicitors and provided on 9th February 2026. According to Rule 24(2)(a) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 the time for providing a response is one month after the date on which the party filing the response under Rule 24 was sent the notice that permission to appeal had been granted. The parties agreed that the version of Rule 24 that appears on legislation.gov.uk is up-to-date and correct in this respect and has not been superseded. I observe that the Standard Directions issued by the Principal Resident Judge (undated) stipulate by direction that the Rule 24 response must be provided to the Upper Tribunal no later than 28 days from the date on which the directions are sent. It is my understanding that the directions were sent on 5th January 2026. Neither party could provide me with a definitive submission as to whether or not the Procedure Rules or the standard directions should apply, given that there is a conflict between when a Rule 24 response must be provided.
5. If the Procedure Rules being brought into force by a Statutory Instrument should have primacy over the Standard Directions as secondary legislation this would mean that the time limit for providing the Rule 24 response is one month after the sending of the notice of permission to appeal being granted on 5th January 2026. If, on the other hand, the Standard Directions are to have primacy over the Statutory Instrument, then it would mean that the time limit is 28 days as opposed to one month, even though there is only one month in the year that has 28 days in it which is February (other than in a leap year).
6. Erring on the side of caution I have taken the Standard Directions and their shorter time limit of 28 days as the applicable time limit. On that basis the Rule 24 response, as the parties agreed, is seven days out of time. The Appellant submits that the time for bringing the Rule 24 response should be extended as the lateness in filing the response was due to “an oversight of the directions ... by Mr Ahmed’s solicitors” which is not the Appellant’s fault. The Appellant also highlighted that the Upper Tribunal would be assisted by the Rule 24 response and that any delay is marginal as opposed to being serious or significant and that there is no real prejudice caused to the Secretary of State and that in the interests of justice and fairness the document should be admitted. For the Secretary of State, Mr Sheikh objected to the extension of time but accepted that there was no prejudice to the Secretary of State and also highlighted that he only prepared for the hearing the day before it took place.
7. Given those arguments I decided to extend time given that the delay was not significant contrasted with the overall time for filing the response, the solicitors had accepted blame for the lateness in the document being provided (which is not the fault of the Appellant), the document is of assistance to the Upper Tribunal, and given that if I had precluded the Rule 24 response, it would have meant that the Appellant, as the Respondent to the appeal, would not have been able to raise the further ground on which they say the appeal should be allowed, should an error of law be found, which would not be in the interests of justice and fairness or the overriding objective under the Procedure Rules. I also reached the above decision, as there was no prejudice suffered by the Respondent due to the lateness and that the position that permission to pursue a cross-appeal is governed by whether or not an alternate ground for upholding a decision is contained within the Rule 24 response (much akin to the procedure that takes place before the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)) as supported by the decision of Smith (appealable decisions; PTA requirements; anonymity: Belgium) [2019] UKUT 216 (IAC) which confirms at headnote 3 that:
“In the event that the respondent to the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal obtains permission to appeal against that Tribunal’s decision regarding the grounds upon which the First-tier Tribunal found in favour of the appellant, then, ordinarily, the appellant will be able to rely upon rule 24(3)(e) of the 2008 Rules in order to argue in a response that the appellant should succeed on the grounds on which he or she was unsuccessful in the First-tier Tribunal. Any such response must be filed and served in accordance with those Rules and the Upper Tribunal’s directions”.
Thus, being mindful of the fact that a cross-appeal would effectively be barred if time was not extended, I also bore this further factor into account in reaching my decision.
8. I then asked for an explanation as to why the composite bundle was late given that it was due to be filed by no later than fourteen days before the hearing on 20th February 2026, but was allegedly provided by the Secretary of State on 25th February 2026 but was in fact only uploaded on 3rd March 2026, less than three days before the hearing. Mr Sheikh did not have any reasons for this tardiness, but I in any event extended time for the late filing and service of the composite bundle as the Appellant was not prejudiced by the lateness in the bundle being uploaded, and as it was in the interests of justice and fairness that the bundle be admitted without any cost implications.
Findings
9. At the close of the hearing, I reserved my decision, which I shall now give. I do not find that there is an error of law in the decision, such that it should be set aside. My reasons for so finding are as follows.
10. In relation to the sole Ground of Appeal drafted by the Specialist Appeals Team the complaint is that the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons for finding in favour of the Appellant in relation to whether or not there were “very significant obstacles” to the Appellant’s integration in Bangladesh. The grounds first argue that the Appellant had revealed that he had a sister in Bangladesh which would have assisted rather than impeded his integration. In relation to this point, Mr Sheikh directed my attention to paragraph 10 of the Appellant’s witness statement of 26th November 2024. In response to that Ms Ferguson submitted that it was also highlighted in the same paragraph that the Appellant’s siblings had their own families. Mr Sheikh argued that this was evidence that the judge was aware of. Indeed, it is mentioned by the judge at paragraph 15 of the decision. Thus, I do not find that there is any indication that the judge failed to recall this or had lost sight of this fact when making his findings merely two paragraphs further into his decision, and in any event, the Upper Tribunal decision in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC) confirms that:
“It is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case. This leads to judgments becoming overly long and confused and is not a proportionate approach to deciding cases. It is, however, necessary for judges to identify and resolve key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons, so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost”.
Bearing in mind that judicial guidance, I do not find that the judge failed to resolve any conflict in the evidence (as none has been pointed to) and in any event he has explained in full, not merely brief terms, the reasons why he has found in the Appellant’s favour in relation to there being very significant obstacles to reintegration which are scattered throughout the decision but are chiefly summarised at paragraphs 40 to 47 of the decision.
11. The second point raised in the Ground of Appeal is that the Appellant has not shown evidence of his English proficiency which weighed in favour of the public interest in his removal, the implication being that the judge has failed to factor this into his findings. I note that the FtTJ explicitly notes the Appellant should have this factor held against him during the proportionality assessment under Section 117(B) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and this point is specifically noted at paragraph 39(iii) of the decision which states: “The evidence does not establish that A can speak English. This counts against A in the balance”. Therefore there is no basis to this criticism at all.
12. The next point raised in the grounds is that the Appellant has no dependants, is a grown man with no reported health problems and he could find employment in order to support himself as well as having a cultural nexus to Bangladesh. With respect to the drafter of the grounds, this appears to be an attempt to reargue the appeal, and is a mere disagreement with the outcome. There is no indication that the judge was not mindful or cognisant of these factors in making his findings in favour of the Appellant. In fact, contrary to the grounds of appeal, there was medical evidence pointing to reported health problems which were before the judge. These consisted of the Appellant’s GP records and being the subject of an ENT referral. I note, for the sake of completeness, that the health issues complained of pertain to back pain, potential hearing loss, and Type 2 diabetes. Thus, there were health problems raised, albeit these have not been counted in favour of the Appellant and a reason for his integrating into Bangladesh being a very significant obstacle. This undermines the point raised in the grounds of challenge leaving the Respondent merely pointing to the Appellant being a grown man which is a matter of fact and could not amount to a material omission, in any event.
13. Moreover, I note that the Rule 24 response is correct in noting that the Secretary of State has not challenged the findings made by the FtTJ from paragraphs 27 to 42 of the decision. This is patently fatal to any error of law prayed for by the Secretary of State, not least because these paragraphs contain the remainder of the judge’s Article 8 assessment in relation to the Appellant’s ability to meet the Rules and the extent of the public interest in his removal, illustrated by the fact that the Appellant met the twenty year residence requirement which, as the judge describes it, is an important consideration as it provided a benchmark set down by the state as to how the balance should be conducted, and that other things being equal persons, such as the Appellant, can prove that they have lived continuously in the UK for twenty years or more are considered to face significant obstacles to being able to reintegrate into society of their country of origin.
14. It is noteworthy that the reason that the Appellant could not automatically show he was worthy of a grant of leave on the basis of his human rights was solely due to being unsuitable due to having made false representations in a previous application in 2015, some eleven years ago. I also note that this is a factor which the judge has explicitly taken into account in making his proportionality assessment at paragraph 39, specifically paragraph 39(vi), which the Secretary of State has also not challenged.
15. Finally, I also note paragraph 47, which has not been challenged, mentions that the Appellant’s twenty plus years of residence is an exceptional circumstance which looked at through the prism of GEN.3.2. (as it should read) is another basis upon which the appeal succeeds outside the Rules. Therefore, given that the FtTJ had found in favour of the Appellant on this alternate basis, even if the Secretary of State were to have established an error in relation to the finding on very significant obstacles, it still would not discount the fact that the appeal has succeeded on the basis of exceptionality outside the Rules which the Secretary of State has not challenged.
16. Leaving aside the potential academic nature of the Ground of Appeal, I find that the Secretary of State’s challenge is in any event contrary to the binding authority of Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] where it was held, inter alia, that:
“ii) ... What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract”.
17. Bearing in mind that guidance from Volpi v Volpi and the fact that the judge does not need to mention specific pieces of evidence and that not doing so does not imply they have overlooked any evidence (cf. Budhathoki), and bearing in mind that I must look at whether the judge’s decision was rationally insupportable and whether or not the decision was thus open to them to reach, I also note the guidance in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 where at [26], the following was held which speaks to the high threshold for interference with a decision and fact-finding of the First-tier Tribunal:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(vi) It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107]”.
1. I thus find that the Secretary of State has not established any material error of law such that the decision should be set aside.
2. As no material error of law has been established, I do not need to go on and consider the Appellant’s “cross-appeal” as the point is academic.
3. In light of the above findings, I find that there is no merit in the grounds and that the decision is free from legal error.
Notice of Decision
4. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
5. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

P. Saini

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 March 2026