Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005856
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55673/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22nd April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

MD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms N Bustani of counsel, instructed by Lawmatic Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, aged 24 (date of birth 6 June 2001). He arrived in the UK on 4 October 2022, with a grant of entry clearance. On 28 November 2022, he claimed asylum. That claim was refused on 20 February 2024. He appealed against that decision, and his appeal was heard on 6 October 2025. By decision dated 22 October 2025, First tier Tribunal Judge Meyler (“the Judge”) dismissed his appeal. He sought permission to appeal, which was refused on 13 December 2025 by First tier Tribunal Judge Gumsley. On 22 January 2026, Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi granted permission to appeal. The appeal came before me on 27 March 2026 to consider whether there is an error of law in the Judge’s decision.
2. The basis of the Appellant’s claim for asylum and humanitarian protection was his association with Bangladesh Islami Chattrashibir (BICS), the student wing of opposition political party namely Bangladesh Jamaat-E-Islami (BJEI).
3. The Respondent, in her refusal letter and review, took issue with the Appellant’s credibility. The issues in dispute before the Judge are recorded at [8] of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) decision as follows:
(a) Whether the Appellant is a supporter of BJEI;
(b) Whether the appellant was the Organising Secretary and a member of
BICS;
(c) whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear and/ or was at real risk from the Bangladesh Chhatro league (BCL), the student wing of Awami League (now deposed);
(d) If the appellant is at risk from non-state actors, sufficiency of state protection; and
(e) availability of internal relocation.
4. The Judge found the Appellant’s claim to political involvement to be credible at [20]. Impliedly, it was agreed between the parties, the Judge also accepted the Appellant’s claim to have been subject to the issuing of a politically motived arrest warrant. Although this is not expressly stated at [20], the Judge rejected the Respondent’s challenges to the Appellant’s credibility and accepted his account of his political activity, which included the claim that he was wanted under a politically motivated arrest warrant, the warrant being referred to in the Appellant’s witness statement. It is notable that, when evaluating risk on return, the judge focuses largely on the current status of such arrest warrants under the current (rather than previous) regime.
5. The grounds of appeal allege that the Judge:
(1) Relied upon the Country Policy Information Note (“CPIN”) dated December 2024 in relation to the political situation in Bangladesh and regarded this as determinative of the country situation, without having any or sufficient regard to the materials put before the Tribunal by the Appellant, including (but not limited to) an expert report from Mr Tushar, dated 25 September 2024.
(2) Failed to assess the sufficiency of protection for the Appellant as someone who was subject to an arrest warrant.
(3) Failed to make findings in relation to internal relocation.
(4) Acted unfairly and improperly in its treatment of Mr Tushar’s report.
The Appellant accepted in the course of the hearing that Ground 5, placing reliance on the above grounds cumulatively, is not a free-standing ground of appeal.
6. There is some overlap between the grounds of appeal, acknowledged in the submissions on behalf of both parties.
7. It is convenient to consider grounds 1 and 4 together. Ground 1 alleges that the Judge erred in placing “determinative weight” on the CPIN in relation to “current conditions, contrary to the established principle that a CPIN is a policy tool, not authoritative evidence”. Ground 4 alleges that the Judge summarily dismissed the opinion of Mr Tushar as “no longer sustainable” [22], on the basis that the views expressed were “speculative” and “not borne out by subsequent events”.
8. It is important to recall the timeline of events. The Awami League (led by Sheikh Hasina) ceased to be in power in Bangladesh in August 2024. An interim BJEI government was installed. Mr Tushar’s report was produced the following month, in September 2024. The CPIN is dated December 2024. The sources cited in the CPIN include a report by the International Crisis Group (“ICG”) dated 14 November 2024.
9. The Judge addressed the report by Mr Tushar at [22] as follows:
The report by the expert, Mr Md Solaiman Tushar was prepared in relation to a BNP supporter (p432/1028 refers) and is now quite dated (p480 refers - 25 September 2024). The report was prepared only a month after Sheikh Hasina fled Bangladesh at a time of immense instability and his report must be read in that light. Whilst in those circumstances, his speculation that anything could happen is understandable; Sheikh Hasina may return, her supporters may wreak havoc in revenge attacks. However, with the benefit of hindsight, over a year on from that report, that degree of speculation has not been borne out by unfolding events and his opinion is therefore no longer sustainable. Moreover, the majority of the report is focused on background history of events prior to the change of regime and due to the date of the report, could not take into account all the reforms undertaken by the interim government, led by the Novel peace laureate, Mohammed Yunus, much less the impact of these reforms. The report is therefore not a fair reflection of the current situation or risk arising for those fearing the Awami League or its supporters. The very fact that an up-to-date report based on the facts of this case has not been presented is perhaps in itself telling.
10. The Judge was required to give weight to the evidence before her. I am satisfied that, in evaluating the weight to be given to Mr Tushar’s opinion, the Judge was entitled to have regard to the fact that it was written only a month or so into the interim government. The Judge was, similarly, entitled to give weight to the CPIN. The CPIN had the benefit of being based on reports, including the ICG report, based on three months’ experience of the interim government. Looking at the decision as a whole, I do not find that the CPIN has been regarded as “determinative” of circumstances in Bangladesh. It has simply been given greater weight, for reasons that are explained in the decision, and which fall within the discretion of the Judge to determine what weight to give items of evidence.
11. Ground 2 alleges that the Judge failed to assess the sufficiency of protection for the Appellant. The Judge addressed the risk to the Appellant of the arrest warrant being enforced at [25] and [26]. The latter paragraph says as follows:
I find that the interim government has withdrawn thousands of false or politically motivated cases filed under the previous administration and initiated reforms to increase judicial independence, restructure the police and combat corruption. I acknowledge that many of the current police officers would have been appointed at the time of the Awami League regime, as a full clean-out is impractical and that corruption, bribery and infrastructural issues will remain issues (Section 13 of the CPIN, dated December 2024). However, I find that the change of regime will have had an impact on what rogue police officers can get away with and that the Awami League will no longer have any significant influence over law enforcement officers and the judiciary. I therefore find that the appellant will not be at real risk of serious harm by the state and will have a fair hearing, if it is that the charges have not already been withdrawn.
12. This ground was amplified in oral submissions. The Judge, having accepted that the Appellant is the subject of an arrest warrant, it is submitted, then went on, impermissibly, to speculate that the warrant would either have been withdrawn or would not result in an unfair prosecution. I do not consider this to be speculation that amounts to an error of law. The Judge conducted an assessment of the evidence to determine risk to the Appellant of being a victim of a politically motivated arrest and/ or prospection. In assessing risk, the Judge acknowledged that there remained difficulties with the interim regime [26] but was nonetheless satisfied, on the basis of the evidence that politically motivated cases had been withdrawn as well as systemic changes, that there was no real risk of serious harm by way of arrest and/ or prosecution.
13. The grounds allege that the Judge failed to assess whether the changes relied upon were sufficiently durable as to address risk to the Appellant.
14. The Appellant further alleges that the Judge did not have any or sufficient regard to other materials in the bundle, which included newspaper reports post-dating the CPIN and which are said to support the view that there was not stability or durable change in Bangladesh.
15. I conclude that the Judge had regard to the durability of change by considering the CPIN (which benefitted from being based on information gathered over a longer period of time than Mr Tushar’s report).
16. I note that at [30] the Judge noted that reforms to the judiciary were reported in the CPIN to have been particularly effective. This supports the view that the Judge had in mind the durability of change.
17. I do not consider that the lack of specific reference to the news reports relied on by the Appellant amounts to an error of law: in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 (at paragraph 2 (iii)) it was held that “iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it”.
18. I consider that the Judge was not impermissibly speculating as to what would happen, but rather, conducted an analysis of the evidence and came to a view of risk to the Appellant. I consider that view to be one which is not vitiated by error of law.
19. Ground 3 relates to the Judge’s approach to internal relocation. The Judge did not make a finding on this issue, beyond identifying it as an issue in dispute. It would not be relevant to the Appellant’s fear based on arrest and prospection. Insofar as the Appellant might be at risk in his home area or online, the Judge concluded that he could seek protection from the authorities [30]. I do not consider the issue of internal relocation to be material, as the Judge concluded that the Appellant was not at risk of persecution or harm on return.
20. I conclude that there is no material error of law.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The anonymity direction previously made shall continue because the matter relates to a protection claim.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 March 2026