Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005857
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56613/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LAWRENCE

Between

HEAMA PALITHA SIRISENA UDUNUWARAGE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: no appearance
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals against a decision by Judge Beg of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”), dated 29 October 2025, to dismiss an appeal by the Appellant against a decision by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”), dated 29 May 2024, to refuse a human rights claim.

Anonymity

2. I make no order for anonymity because there is no feature of the case that requires departure from the principle of open justice favouring the disclosure of the identity of parties to litigation in this jurisdiction.

Background

3. The Appellant is a national of Sri Lanka whose date of birth is given as 12 August 1941. The human rights claim that was refused by the 29 May 2024 decision was made in an application dated 20 January 2023 for leave to remain in the UK on the basis of relationships with family living in the UK and ill health. The SSHD recorded in the 29 May 2024 decision that that application followed the Appellant’s entry to the UK on 26 July 2022 with leave to enter as a visitor until 13 November 2022, and his application on 12 November 2022 for a “fee waiver”, which was granted on 12 January 2023, thus enabling him to make an application for leave to remain without the usual requirement of the payment of fees.

4. In the 29 May 2024 decision, the SSHD asserted, with reasons, that the Appellant did not meet the requirements for a grant of leave to remain on the grounds of private life in Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules and that the Appellant’s removal from the UK would not breach Articles 3 or 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”). Those same issues were essentially identified by the parties in written submissions as being for the FtT to decide in the Appellant’s appeal to the FtT.

5. The Appellant’s appeal against the 29 May 2024 decision was heard on 29 October 2025 by Judge Beg. Judge Beg recorded in the 29 October 2025 decision that the Appellant was “[u]nrepresented” and that the SSHD was represented by a presenting officer.

6. In the 29 October 2025 decision, Judge Beg found that the Appellant did not enjoy family life in the UK that engaged Article 8 of the ECHR; that any interference in any such family life by the 29 May 2024 decision would be proportionate; and that there was no credible evidence that returning the Appellant to Sri Lanka would result in him being exposed to a serious rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

7. The Appellant applied to the FtT for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”), on the following grounds:

“… the First-tier Tribunal erred in law by:
1. Failing to consider or request updated medical evidence, which was unavailable before
the hearing.
2. Failing to assess the impact of my complete dependency on family care in the
proportionality balance under Article 8.
3. Misunderstanding my intentions, implying I sought free medical care rather than
essential family support.
4. Failing to consider the risk of serious harm and suffering under Article 3, given my age,
heart condition, kidney deterioration, and mobility limitations.
…”

8. Permission to appeal to the UT was granted by FtT Judge Mulready in a decision dated 29 December 2025 on what the Judge described as “the Article 8 ground only”. Judge Mulready’s reasons for granting permission were as follows:

“1. The application is in time. The appellant is unrepresented. The grounds are that the Tribunal failed to consider or request updated medical evidence which was unavailable before the hearing, failed to assess the impact of the appellant’s complete dependency on his family care in the Article 8 proportionality assessment, misunderstood the appellant’s intentions, implying he sought free medical care rather than essential family support, and failed to consider the risk of serious harm under Article 3, given his age, heart condition, kidney deterioration and mobility limitations.

2. The first ground has no merit – the Tribunal must decide the appeal on the basis of the evidence before it at the time of the appeal hearing and made no error in not requesting more.

3. The Tribunal erred in its citing of the Kugathas test for whether Article 8 is engaged – referring to real, committed and effective support when the Kugathas test is real, committed, or effective support, albeit now to be read with IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ
1516. This error is not material however, because the Tribunal found that even if Article 8 was engaged, maintaining refusal would not be a disproportionate interference with rights protected by it.

4. The reasoning on the proportionality question arguably does not take adequate account of the evidence as to the extent of dependence the appellant says he has on his family members, including for intimate care, and appears to have rejected the consistent and mutually corroborative evidence of those family
members including having noted the lack of occupational health report and/or other independent expert evidence. There is no requirement for such corroborative evidence and it is at least arguable the Tribunal held the appellant to an erroneously high standard of proof in holding that against him.

5. As for Article 3, the Tribunal identified and applied the correct legal framework and made cogently reasoned findings which were open to it on the evidence. I cannot identify any arguable error material to the outcome of the appeal there.

6. Permission is therefore granted on the Article 8 ground only.”

9. The SSHD has subsequently made a reply under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, dated 23 September 2025, which materially asserts as follows:

“…
3. Permission to appeal was granted on limited grounds, namely on Article 8 only.

4. Ground 2 argues that the FTTJ failed to assess the impact of the appellant’s dependency on family care in the proportionality balance under Article 8.

5. It is submitted that The FTTJ adequately and reasonably assessed the evidence and found the appellant could receive adequate care in Sri Lanka as he had done in the past. The Judge was right to note at [41] that the appellant ‘had a heart bypass in Sri Lanka and had access to appropriate medical treatment before he came to the United Kingdom’ on a visit visa. The Judge also correctly noted that the appellant’s son, i.e.-the sponsor, works full time including on Saturday, and that he is available to his father only on Sundays. Thus, the FTTJ correctly noted at [31] ‘he is not in a position to be available for his father’s care most of the time other than on Sundays’. The sponsor also confirmed that he would continue to financially support his father if he returned to Sri Lanka [40].

6. Furthermore, the Judge correctly found that ‘the appellant’s medical conditions do not reach the high threshold referred to in AM [Zimbabwe][2020] UKSC 17. The appellant is receiving appropriate medication, which he would also be able to access in Sri Lanka’ as well as noting that ‘there is no credible evidence that returning to Sri Lanka will result in the appellant being exposed to a serious rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life
expectancy’ [43].

7. It is submitted that the ground amounts to nothing but a disagreement with the well-reasoned findings of the Judge.”

The hearing

10. There was no attendance by the Appellant or anyone for him. The Appellant’s son had, by way of three emails over 4 June 2026 to the morning of the hearing the following day, made a written application for the hearing to be adjourned on the grounds that the Appellant was not fit to participate effectively in a hearing, including by video link, in light of his current medical condition. The first email attached a letter from the Appellant’s General Practitioner doctor dated 3 June 2026, stating that the Appellant’s health had deteriorated significantly in recent months, that he was now largely bedbound and dependent on others for the majority of activities of daily living, requiring substantial assistance with personal care, mobility, medication management, feeding, and daily activities, that he is medically vulnerable, has severe chronic health conditions with a poor overall prognosis, that stressful situations have the potential to exacerbate his symptoms and adversely affect his health, and that it was the doctor’s opinion that the Appellant was not mentally or physically fit to participate in stressful legal proceeding. The Appellant’s son had also stated that he, the son, would be unable to attend the hearing, either in person or remotely, because his father had been experiencing significantly elevated blood pressure due to the stress surrounding the situation, and the son was currently required to care for him and monitor his condition.

11. Ms Khan noted that the appeal had previously been adjourned on at least one occasion, in March 2026, and noted that the Appellant would have had sight of the Rule 24 response, which the Respondent intended to rely on, but Ms Khan took a neutral stance on whether it would be in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence.

12. The overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly include ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in proceedings and avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. I accepted on the evidence provided that the Appellant was unable to participate in the hearing, even by video conferencing, but considered that the fact that he had been provided with the Respondent’s case in the Rule 24 notice reduced the potential unfairness of the appeal being heard without him, because that gave him the opportunity to respond to that case in writing. I also considered that the neither the son’s emails nor the doctor’s letter provided any basis for considering that the Appellant’s condition would be likely to improve, and indeed that the doctor’s letter established that the prognosis is poor and therefore the Appellant would be unlikely to be in a position where he is better able to attend a hearing in the future, meaning that adjourning the hearing would be pointless, and I considered that the issues in the case were relatively clear, to the extent that proceeding with the hearing would be compatible with proper consideration of the issues. I therefore decided that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence.

13. Ms Khan adopted the Rule 24 notice and made other submissions opposing the appeal, including responses to questions posed by me, all of which I shall address in the section below.

14. I reserved my decision to follow in writing.

Error of law

15. I raised with Ms Khan during the hearing my concern that there appeared to me to be an arguable absence of clarity as to the FtT’s findings on the extent of dependence the Appellant says he has on his family members, including for intimate care, because much of the content of the FtT’s decision under the heading “Determination and reasons” describes the evidence given by the Appellant and his family without making findings as to whether the FtT accepted that evidence or not. The FtT’s descriptions of that evidence notably include:

15.1. The Appellant stated “that his son along with grandchildren provide critical care and assistance to him” (para. 14);

15.2. “[The Appellant] stated that he also suffers from depression … and the thought of being separated from his children and grandchildren has caused anxiety” (para. 15);

15.3. “[The Appellant] stated that all his children are currently residing in the United Kingdom and supporting him” (para. 15);

15.4. “[The Appellant] stated that he is totally bedridden” (para 15);

15.5. “The appellant’s son said that he also financially supports his father.” (para. 28);

15.6. “[the Appellant] usually walks with a frame but currently cannot walk. He [the Appellant’s son] said that he [the Appellant] eats lying down because he suffers chest pain.” (para. 32);

15.7. “The sponsor said that the appellant is able to eat independently but cannot shave.” (para 32);

15.8. “The sponsor also said that his father cannot bathe independently. He said he is the one who bathes him. He also places him on the toilet although the appellant is able to clean himself.”(para. 33);

15.9. “The sponsor confirmed that he works full time. His daughter Jessica in her evidence said that her father works full time and comes home late usually about 8pm. She said he also works on a Saturday but has Sundays free.” (para. 33);

15.10. “The appellant’s granddaughter also gave evidence that her mother works from home half of the week and is out of the house for the other half of the week. She said that when her parents are not there then she will help with the appellant’s medication and food.” (para. 34);

15.11. “He [the Appellant’s son] said he [the Appellant] used to go for a walk but since April 2025 after he received the refusal letter, he stopped going for a walk.” (para. 36);

15.12. “[The Appellant’s son] said that he is worried about his father due to his age and that no one can care for him in the way that a son can.” (para. 39).

16. The discernible findings made by the FtT on the extent of dependence the Appellant claimed to have on his family members, including for intimate care, are as follows:

16.1. “I accept that the appellant has a good relationship with his son, daughter-in-law and granddaughters. They care for him at different times. The appellant’s son said that he also financially supports his father.” (para. 28);

16.2. “I do not find it credible that he eats lying down. This is unsupported by the medical evidence. I accept however that he may well need pillow or cushion support whilst sitting up to eat.” (para. 32);

16.3. “I find that given his work schedule, [the Appellant’s son] is not in a position to be available for his father’s care most of the time other than on Sundays.” (para. 33);

16.4. “I accept the evidence of the appellant’s granddaughter that the family love him.” (para. 40);

16.5. “I accept that the appellant has some emotional dependence on his relatives in the United Kingdom with whom he lives.” (para. 46)

17. Those findings do not in my judgement adequately address the factual assertions made by the Appellant and his family, including those relating to intimate care, and the son’s evidence that he care he provided his father could only be provided by a son. Those were material matters in the light of the relevant guidance given by the Court of Appeal in BRITCITS v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 368, that, when considering whether care required by an applicant can be “reasonably” provided and to “the required level” in their home country, the provision of such care needs to be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider and the perspective of the applicant, that the standard of such care must be what is required for that particular applicant and that the provision of care and the standard of care were capable of embracing emotional and psychological requirements.

18. The FtT referred to the absence of certain types of evidence, such as “credible evidence that the appellant has a professional carer who comes in to assist him with daily living” (para. 34), an “occupational assessment report of the appellant’s day-to-day needs and support” or “an independent social worker’s report with regard to the appellant’s abilities to care for himself” (para. 35). However, there is no indication that the Appellant claimed that he had such a carer and the FtT did not explain why the absence of such types of evidence was material to its reasoning. The FtT did not for example say that it considered that it would be reasonable to expect such evidence to have been provided and therefore that the absence of such evidence was an indicator of a lack of truth in a factual claim made by a party; I do not consider it obvious from the words used by the FtT that that was the FtT’s view.

19. Ms Khan submitted during the hearing that the FtT had found, without error of law, that the Appellant’s relationship with his son did not constitute a family life that engaged the protections from interference in Article 8 of the ECHR, and therefore any error of law relating to the proportionality of such an interference would be immaterial. However, I find that the FtT did not decide that matter, or that any decision it made on the matter in the negative was inadequately reasoned. The FtT said at para. 28 “Although the appellant lives with his son, there is no credible evidence that their relationship constitutes family life within the meaning and purpose of Article 8.” However, no discernible reasons are given as to why the evidence from the Appellant and his family was not considered credible, nor why such findings as are made by the FtT, including that the Appellant had “some emotional dependency” on his relatives in the UK, that they cared for him and, as is necessarily implied, that he lived with them as part of their household, did not demonstrate the dependency going beyond normal emotional ties between relatives of such age and proximity indicating that such family life exists: IA & Ors.

20. I find therefore that the decision by the FtT is vitiated by material error of law, namely inadequate reasons for findings on material matters

Disposal

21. The error of law in the FtT’s decision is such that none of the findings made by the FtT can be preserved, and therefore I consider it is appropriate that the appeal to the FtT be remitted to the FtT for hearing afresh I am satisfied that the nature and extent of judicial fact finding that is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective, it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the FtT involved the making of a material error on a point of law.

The decision of the FtT is set aside with no findings preserved.

The remaking of the decision in the appeal is remitted to the FtT, to be remade afresh by any FtT judge other than Judge Beg.

T Lawrence
Judge Lawrence
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

DATE: 8 June 2026