Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005858
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00989/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 16th of April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

J S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Ahmed counsel, instructed by Raymond Saul & Co LLP
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) has been granted permission to appeal the decision of judge of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) Moon (the judge), promulgated on 30 September 2025, allowing the appeal by JS against the SSHD’s decision, dated 3 May 2024, refusing JS’s human rights claim under article 8 ECHR.
Background
2. JS is a national of the Czech Republic, 44 years old at the date of the judge’s decision, who arrived in the UK in 2004 aged 23. He obtained Indefinite Leave to Remain under the EU Settlement Scheme on 1 March 2021.
3. Between 13 May 2022 and 2 February 2024 JS amassed 5 convictions for 7 offences relating to harassment and stalking of the same victim. On 2 February 2024 he received a custodial sentence of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment for harassment and breach of a restraining order. In consequence thereof the SSHD decided to make a deportation order.
4. JS’s representatives made human rights submissions on his behalf which led to the refusal of his human rights claim. JS appealed the SSHD’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) on the basis that there were very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation detailed in Exceptions 1 and 2 in s.117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) that would render his deportation a breach of his article 8 ECHR private life right. The arguments advanced on JS’s behalf focused on his length of lawful residence in the UK, his claimed loss of connections with the Czech Republic, and, in particular, his specialist mental health needs. It was argued that deportation would lead to a significant deterioration in JS’s mental health.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
5. The judge had before her several relevant documents including an OASys report (assessing the risks JS posed to his victim and the public), a copy of the sentencing judge’s remarks, reports by three Consultant Forensic Psychiatrists and a report by a Forensic Psychologist. The judge admitted in evidence a letter dated 3 September 2025 advising JS that he was now subject to Supervised Community Treatment under s.17 of the Mental Health Act 1983. One of the conditions of the Community Treatment Order was that JS attends a clinic once every 3 weeks to receive depot medication. The judge noted disagreement among the medical practitioners as to whether JS was suffering from a mental disorder and whether any mental disorder was a factor in his offending. The judge however appeared to prefer the most recent psychiatrist reports (a main report in December 2024 and a supplementary report in February 2025) authored by Dr J Collier which gave a definitive diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, a condition characterised by delusional beliefs in the absence of other psychotic symptoms (in this case, that the victim was in love with JS).
6. Having set out the relevant legal framework (the provisions of sections 117A – D of the 2002 Act) the judge made her findings at [43] to [54]. The judge noted the diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, that JS’s condition was being managed and that, although discharged from hospital, he was subject to supervised community treatment under s.17A of the Mental Health Act 1983. The judge set out the requirements of s.17A, noting that one of the relevant criteria for the order was that it was necessary for JS’s health or safety or that it was necessary for the protection of other persons that JS should receive such treatment. at [46] the judge stated, “It follows from subsection (5)(b) that the Community Treatment Order would not have been made if treatment was not considered necessary for the appellant's health or safety or for the protection of other persons.” At [48] the judge explained that, as Dr Collier was JS’s responsible clinician and as her report was the most recent, she accepted Dr Collier’s assessment that if JS’s mental health was not stable there was a risk of harm to the public or to himself.
7. The judge then considered the course of treatment to which JS was subject, including medication and monitoring, and stated that although no evidence was adduced by either party it was reasonable to assume that the relevant anti-psychotic medication prescribed to JS was available in the Czech Republic.
8. At [52] the judge stated, “Treatment required to keep [JS’s] condition stable requires more than medication. In order for the risk to be reduced a plan is necessary for monitoring the taking of medication. In this case the [SSHD] has not provided any evidence to confirm how the [JS’s] compliance with this will be monitored in the Czech Republic. The [SSHD] also has not provided any evidence as to how risk assessments will be carried out and funded in the Czech Republic, these assessments are vital to monitor whether there has been a deterioration in [JS’s] mental health. The updated letter provided by Dr Collier dated 27 February 2025 states that once [JS] is discharged, he will need ongoing psychiatric follow up in the community.”
9. At [53] the judge referred to an earlier report by a Forensic Psychologist who recommended that the risk assessment in respect of JS be assessed more urgently if there was a significant change in circumstances. The judge found that deportation would amount to a significant change for JS. The judge stated there was no evidence confirming how JS would be monitored or assessed during this proposed significant change.
10. At [54] the judge concluded, “It may be that a full package of support is available in the Czech Republic but the [SSHD] has not evidenced this. Based upon the evidence which I have available if [JS] is deported I cannot be satisfied that there will be a plan in place to monitor and treat his mental health condition. The expert evidence confirms that a stressful event risks a deterioration in [JS’s] mental health, the result is a risk of harm. There is no evidence or assurance to indicate that risk will be monitored or assessed on deportation. In the absence of evidence of how that risk will be managed, in my assessment this risk of harm both to [JS] and to members of the public amounts to very compelling circumstances.” I pause to note that I can find no reference in either of Dr Ciolier’s reports that JS would be at risk of harm to himself if he did not receive adequate treatment – at point 21 of her main report Dr Collier responded with a ‘yes’ to a question that if JS were discharged from hospital would he ‘be likely to act in a manner dangerous to’ himself ‘or others’. Dr Collier then explained that JS was at times angry, anxious ad agitated as a result of his delusional beliefs and had damaged property and made threats towards others. There was however no indication that he would harm himself . The appeal was therefore allowed.
The SSHD’s challenge and the ‘error of law’ hearing
11. The SSHD’s first ground of appeal is difficult to understand. The heading of the 1st ground is ‘making a material misdirection of law – inadequate reasoning of risk on return’. The SSHD appears to contend that, because there was previously disagreement amongst the medical practitioners as to whether JS was suffering from a mental illness and because the most recent medical evidence was received after the making of the deportation decision, it was ‘unreasonable and irrational’ for the judge to find that the absence of a care plan put JS at real risk of harm. The judge was however duty bound to determine the appeal on the date of the appeal, and she demonstrably took into account the evidence before her. The 1st ground of appeal then contends that, having first acknowledged that a full package of support may be available to JS in the Czech Republic, the judge failed to take account of the Facilitated Returns Scheme available to JS and that consideration would be given to JS’s needs and the provision of medical escorts on removal to mitigate harm and in respect of services regarding re-integration.
12. The 2nd ground of appeal contends that the judge materially misdirected herself in assessment JS’s private life under s.117C as she failed to properly consider the 2nd and 3rd limbs of Exception 1 in s.117C (iv) of the 2002 Act as this was relevant to the overall consideration of whether very compelling circumstances exist. It was contended in particular that the failure to consider whether there were very significant obstacles to JS’s re-integration in the Czech Republic rendered the judge’s assessment unlawful.
13. In granting permission to appeal Upper Tribunal Judge Rimington found it arguable there was a misdirection as stated in the first ground in that in relation to services regarding re-integration there was no obligation for the SSHD to provide a care plan, particularly bearing in mind there is a facilitated care package for return available and the judge acknowledged that the Czech Republic probably had care facilities. Upper Tribunal judge Rimington also found the 2nd ground arguable in that the approach to very compelling circumstances was flawed.
14. At the hearing I informed Mr Ahmed that the judge did not appear to engage in any actual balancing of the public interest considerations. Mr Ahmed argued that the grounds of appeal did not challenge the balancing exercise required by s.117C(6). I indicated my view to Mr Ahmed that the 2nd ground encapsulated my observation concerning the weighing of the public interest considerations as it contended that the judge’s very compelling circumstances assessment failed to take account of relevant factors such as the factors relating to JS’s ability to re-integrate, but that if I was wrong then, applying the principles in R (Robinson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] QB 929 (‘Robinson’), I was satisfied that there was an obvious point of law relating to the UK’s obligations under the ECHR concerning a strong public interest, which was so obvious it ‘jumped off the page’, and which had strong prospects of success ( see A (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1438, and AZ (error of law; jurisdiction; PTA practice) Iran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKUT 00245 (IAC)). Having raised this with Mr Ahmed I gave him an opportunity to consider my concerns by offering to adjourn the matter until after the lunch break. Mr Ahmed did not take me up on my offer to put the hearing back. Nor did he request an adjournment of the hearing. Having considered the submissions of the parties I reserved my decision.
Discussion
15. I will consider first the 2nd ground of appeal. The SSHD argues that the judge failed to undertake a lawful assessment of whether there existed very compelling circumstances over and above the two exceptions in s.117C(iv) and (v). Although the grounds focus on the absence of any consideration of JS’s ability to re-integrate in Czech society, I find the framing of the 2nd ground is sufficiently wide in scope to include a challenge to the failure by the judge to lawfully consider the existence of very compelling circumstances by reference to all material considerations, including engaging the public interest considerations in deportation in a balancing exercise.
16. The judge was aware of the relevant legal framework and she accurately set this out at [38] to [42]. At [42] the judge expressly stated that it was necessary for her “… to undertake a full proportionality assessment weighing the interference with the Article 8 rights of [JS’s] private life against the public interest in his deportation.” The judge properly noted that s.117C(6) required her to proceed on the basis that the public interest requires deportation unless there were ‘very compelling circumstances’.
17. There is, nevertheless, a wholesale absence of the balancing exercise that is required to be carried out by the judge when assessing whether there exist very compelling circumstances rendering JS’s deportation disproportionate under article 8 ECHR. While the judge was aware of the seriousness of the offences and the significant impact this had on the victim, there is nowhere in the section dealing with the judge’s findings and conclusions any indication that she had sought to balance the relevant public interest factors against the impact on JS’s private life rights that deportation would entail. In her actual assessment of the very compelling circumstances test the judge focuses exclusively on JS’s mental health issues without bringing to bear any of the significant public interest elements such as the deleterious effect on the victim and the risks to the public identified in the OASys report. Nor was there any assessment of the relative dearth of the private life established by JS in the UK despite his lengthy residence or any difficulties he would encounter in re-integrating to life in the Czech Republic.
18. Whilst in an earlier part of her decision the judge does refer to JS’s residence in the UK (noting the length of residence has not been challenged and that JS has worked, but that he had no family in the UK, few friends and, according to the medical practitioners, had been leading an isolated life) and his connection with the Czech Republic, the judge does not otherwise engage in an evaluative assessment of the impact of deportation on JS’s mental health condition set against the strong public interest in his deportation.
19. The judge was understandably concerned that JS’s deportation, without adequate arrangements to ensure the continuity of treatment (including medication and monitoring), could have a detrimental impact on his moral and physical integrity, constituent elements of his article 8 ECHR private life. JS had previously refused to voluntarily take his medication and was receiving depot injections. But the medical reports from Dr Collier did not suggest there was any evidence that JS would harm himself (although he had threatened others and was involved in altercations with patients while on a hospital ward) and, in any event, the impact on JS had to be measured against the strong public interest in his deportation. I find this constitutes a material error of law requiring the decision to be set aside.
20. It is not necessary for me to determine the first ground of appeal, but I make the following observations. The judge’s concern was that there was no evidence before her that the SSHD had planned for the transfer of JS to the Czech Republic in terms of the continuity of treatment, including the provision of medication and monitoring. The judge referred to expert evidence confirming that a stressful event risked a deterioration in JS’s mental health and that this would result in a risk of harm. I have already observed at para 10 above that I can find no reference to a risk of harm that JR posed to himself should his mental state deteriorate (Dr Collier noted that JS had denied any suicidal thoughts or thoughts of self-harm and she stated there had been no evidence of any harm by JS towards himself), although it was noted that JS had threatened harm to others and he had been involved in altercations in his hospital ward. I accept the judge’s observation in her decision refusing permission to appeal that that it would be ‘too much of an evidential leap’ to assume that the provision of medication and monitoring of JS could be arranged through the Facilitated Returns Scheme. Other than a risk that JS’s mental health may deteriorate if deported and if he does not received a continuity of treatment, the only other risk identified by Dr Collier was to other people. The UK’s obligations under article 8 ECHR however do not extend to the welfare of nationals of other countries. Whilst it would clearly be preferable for the UK government to liaise with the authorities in the Czech Republic concerning JS’s mental health diagnosis, his treatment and other requirements, it does not fall within the ambit of the tribunal’s assessment under article 8 ECHR to the extent that he may pose a risk of harm to other individuals outside the jurisdiction of the UK.
Remittal to First-Tier Tribunal
21. Under Part 3 paragraph 7.2(b) of the Upper Tribunal Practice Statement of the 18 June 2018 a case may be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal if the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
22. Both parties invited me to remit the matter back to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) if I set the judge’s decision aside. This was because it was said there were no material findings in respect of the relevant public interest considerations. I consider that, in these circumstances, there will need to be a full re-assessment of all the evidence rendering it appropriate to remit the matter back to the First-tier Tribunal for a full fresh (de novo) hearing.

Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains a material error of law and the SSHD’s ‘error of law’ appeal is allowed.
The matter will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) to be determined afresh by a judge other than Judge Moon.

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 April 2026