Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005859
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66880/2024
LP/03749/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

RA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Karim, Counsel instructed by Kalam Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 6th October 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 5th June 2024, refusing his protection and human rights application.
Background to the appeal
2. RA is a Bangladeshi national who arrived in the UK on 26th December 2022 with leave to enter as a student and claimed asylum on 26th April 2023.
3. The appellant states that he became a supporter of Chhatra Dal, the student wing of the BNP, in 2018 and that in 2019 he became a member of Chhatra Dal. He stated that he was elected as Office Secretary of Chhatra Dal in 2020 and became a leader of the group. The appellant states that a false criminal case was made against him in Bangladesh and that threats were made against him on social media. He feared return to Bangladesh because he was afraid that he would be put in prison because of the false criminal case and that he would be harmed by Awami League supporters and members.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
4. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge found that the appellant was a low level supporter of the BNP [16] but that some elements of the appellant’s account were implausible [17]. The Judge noted that there was some inconsistency about when the appellant became involved with the BNP but she accepted that the appellant was a low level supporter [18]. The judge found that the appellant had given vague responses to questions and displayed limited knowledge of the BNP [20, 21] and that the appellant was unable to respond to the issues raised in the reasons for refusal letter [22]. The judge found that the fact that the appellant had never been arrested or detained or threatened in Bangladesh supported the conclusion that he was not politically active or of interest to the authorities [25, 27]. She also found that the appellant’s ability to leave Bangladesh using his own passport meant he was not of interest to the authorities [29]. The judge found that the appellant’s account to have been threatened after he left Bangladesh was incoherent and implausible [31]. She further found that the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in the UK damaged his credibility [34]. The judge found that the FIR and lawyer’s letter to be self-serving [36] and the letter from AHS to be vague and lacking in detail [37]. She found that the appellant’s attendance at a demonstration in the UK was simply to bolster his claim for asylum [33] and concluded that the appellant was not at risk of persecution on return to Bangladesh. The judge also refused the appellant’s Article 8 claim.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. On 29th December 2025, the First-tier Tribunal Judge granted permission to appeal on all grounds.
The ground of appeal
6. The appellant put forward 5 grounds of appeal.
Ground 1
7. The appellant submitted that the judge had compartmentalised the evidence and had assessed the documentary evidence in light of her findings regarding the appellant’s evidence rather than considering it in the round. The appellant submitted that the judge erred in finding that the documentary evidence was not credible because the appellant’s evidence of his political activity was not credible.
Ground 2
8. The appellant submitted that the judge erred in finding that there was a delay in claiming asylum and in failing to consider the explanation, given by the appellant in his Screening Interview, that he was claiming asylum because of recent threats. The appellant further submitted that the judge erred in raising this issue when it had not been raised by the respondent.
Ground 3
9. The appellant submitted that the judge failed to give adequate reasons as to why she preferred the respondent’s evidence to that of the appellant. The appellant further submitted that the judge failed to properly engage with the respondent’s December 2024 CPIN.
Ground 4
10. The appellant submitted that the judge erred in finding that the absence of arrests and detentions in Bangladesh or of threats in Bangladesh meant that the appellant had not been politically active in Bangladesh.
Ground 5
11. The appellant submitted that the judge erred in not treating the appellant as a vulnerable witness and not assessing the appellant’s evidence in light of his vulnerability. The appellant further submitted that the judge had not adequately considered the appellant’s mental health when considering whether he would face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into Bangladesh.
The Rule 24 response
12. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 16th January 2026. The respondent, submitted that the judge had properly considered all the objective evidence and relevant caselaw and had reached reasonable and adequate conclusions. The respondent further submitted that the judge was entitled to find that there was a delay in claiming asylum which undermined the appellant’s credibility. The respondent also submitted that the judge was entitled to find that the appellant was not of adverse interest to the authorities in Bangladesh. The respondent submitted that the judge had correctly assessed the appellant’s mental health in light of the evidence which was before her.
The hearing
13. I heard submissions from both parties and indicated at the end of the hearing that I reserved my decision. The submissions are fully set out in the recording of the proceedings.
Error of law decision
14. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
15. Mr Karim, in his submissions, submitted that the judge had erred in failing to consider the evidence in the round. He submitted that the judge had compartmentalised the evidence and rather than considering the documentary evidence as part of the overall assessment of credibility, had found that the appellant’s other evidence was not credible and had then gone on to find that the documentary evidence was not credible because the appellant’s other evidence was not credible. Mr Simpson submitted that it was open to the judge to take the evidence in the order that she chose to do so. He submitted that the judge had clearly considered all of the evidence in the round and had considered it alongside the inconsistencies in the appellant’s account and the lack of interest in the appellant when he was in Bangladesh.
16. The judge, in her decision, has put headers for each section of evidence she has considered. That can give the impression of compartmentalisation but does not automatically mean that she has considered each piece of evidence as a separate, discrete piece of evidence rather than considering them holistically when making her credibility assessment. The headers can simply be a signpost to what evidence the judge is considering at that time. The judge considers the documents submitted by the appellant at [35-37]. She finds that the documents are self-serving documents submitted to bolster the appellant’s claim.
17. The main thrust of the appellant’s argument under this ground relates to the finding in [36] where the judge states:
‘With regards to the Advocates letter, as I have not found the Appellant’s account credible in relation to his alleged political activity, I therefore find that this is a self-serving document submitted to help bolster the Appellant’s weak asylum claim, thus I attach limited weight to this document. I apply the same weight to the FIR and find that in applying Tanveer Ahmed (as set out in the RFRL), this is another document submitted to help bolster the Appellant’s weak asylum claim. As I do not accept that the authorities nor the AL party have any adverse interest in the Appellant, I attach limited weight to the FIR document and I find that no such complaint/arrest warrants have been issued against the Appellant’
18. The difficulty with that approach is that it reads very much as if the judge has found against the appellant in the evidence leading up to the consideration of the FIR and the lawyer’s letter and has then considered the FIR and the lawyer’s letter in light of her findings regarding the appellant’s evidence leading up to that point. It does not read as if she has undertaken a holistic approach to the evidence as is required under Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 and Francois Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367 .
19. Mr Simpson is correct in stating that it is open to the judge to decide how she will go about the task of judicial fact finding. There may also be cases ‘where concerns over the veracity of a claim and its account may be so clear-cut that the judicial fact-finder is driven to rejection of other evidence, such as supporting documents, even though these appear to be authentic.’ [QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC)). In the appellant’s case, the judge has identified areas of concern in the credibility of his evidence prior to considering the documents. However, the judge did also find that the appellant was a low level supporter of the BNP. She found that this did not place him at risk but equally she did not find the entirety of his claim to be incredible because she accepted that he was a low level supporter of the BNP.
20. Part of the basis of the judge’s adverse credibility finding was the fact that the appellant had never been arrested and detained in Bangladesh as a result of his political activities. It is not clear why this should mean that the appellant was not politically active in Bangladesh and indeed, the judge accepts that he was a low level supporter of the BNP. Not having been detained by the authorities might mean that an individual was not politically active to the extent claimed by the appellant but it may not be indicative of that.
21. Given the judge’s finding that the appellant had been a low level supporter of the BNP, it cannot be said that this was a case where the veracity of a claim was so clear cut that all other evidence must be rejected. The reading of the judge’s finding with regard to the FIR and the lawyer’s letter reads very much as if she has made an adverse credibility finding and rejected the documents solely because of the adverse credibility findings in other evidence rather than assessing the appellant’s credibility in light of all of the evidence including the documentary evidence. I find that this is a material error of law.
22. I have also considered the other grounds for permission to appeal. Whilst the respondent did not raise specific Section 8 credibility factors, it is incumbent on a judge to consider those factors when assessing credibility. Section 8 states that ‘a deciding authority shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of any behaviour to which this section applies.’ Whether or not it had been raised by the respondent, the judge still had to take account of any of the behaviours set out in Section 8. That behaviour includes a delay in claiming asylum. However, in making the assessment of whether the behaviour ultimately adversely affected the credibility of the appellant overall, it was also incumbent on the judge to take account of and make findings regarding any explanation given by the appellant as to his reasons for the delay in claiming asylum. The appellant sets out an explanation in his witness statement [9]. The judge makes the finding that the delay in claiming asylum adversely affects the appellant’s credibility [34] but does not consider his explanation for the delay or make any findings with regard to that explanation. I find that this is a material error of law.
23. At [38] of the decision, the judge states:
‘The Appellant and the Respondent’s representative referred to detailed objective evidence and case law within their oral submissions. I note that the same has been referred to within the RFRL, HO review decision and ASA. Having considered the same, I prefer the evidence submitted by the Respondent and I therefore find that the Appellant would not be at risk on return to Bangladesh.’
The judge does not set out the respondent’s evidence that she prefers over that of the appellant and crucially, she does not give any reasons at all for preferring the evidence of the respondent to that of the appellant. It is necessary for a judge to give reasons for preferring one set of evidence over another otherwise the losing party cannot know the reason why the other party’s evidence was preferred. I find that this is a material error of law.
24. It was submitted, on behalf of the appellant, that the judge erred in finding that because the appellant had not had any adverse interest from the Awami League at the time that he was in Bangladesh, the appellant was not as politically active as claimed. Given that the appellant’s fear of persecution was based primarily on adverse interest from the Awami League after he had left Bangladesh, I find that it was open to the judge to find that the lack of interest prior to leaving Bangladesh was indicative of a lack of any high level political involvement by the appellant.
25. It was also submitted, on behalf of the appellant, that the judge erred in failing to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness and in assessing his evidence in light of that. The appellant’s skeleton argument did not make any application for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness and there was no evidence to suggest that any oral application was made before the judge at the hearing. There was no medical evidence confirming any diagnosis or outlining any difficulties that the appellant may have in giving evidence. The appellant’s witness statement does not raise any issues about his mental health other than to say it would be impacted if he returned to Bangladesh because of the risk he faces there. He did not refer to any diagnosis or treatment he is receiving in the UK. The only evidence of any mental health issues came from the AIR where the appellant stated that he had been diagnosed with depression and was prescribed Mirtazapine.
26. The judge cannot be criticised for failing to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness when there was no clear evidence to suggest that he was a vulnerable witness and no application for him to be treated as such. Nor can the judge be criticised for failing to consider whether the appellant’s mental health would mean that there were very significant obstacles in reintegrating into Bangladesh. The appellant’s skeleton argument did not specifically raise any issues with regard to the appellant’s mental health under either Article 3 or Article 8. I find that there is no material error of law by the judge in failing to consider whether the appellant was a vulnerable witness and failing to consider the appellant’s mental health when assessing whether he would face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into Bangladesh.
27. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law under grounds 1, 2 and 3.
28. I have considered whether to retain the appeal before the Upper Tribunal but the material errors of law relate to credibility issues and it will be necessary for there to be a credibility assessment undertaken as a result. In those circumstances, I find that it is appropriate for the decision to be wholly set aside and for the appeal to be remitted to be reheard before the First-tier Tribunal afresh.
Notice of decision
1. The First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law.
2. I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge. For the avoidance of doubt, none of the findings of fact are preserved.

F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
3rd June 2026