Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005863
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58170/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

GHFRAN AL ASAAD
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Shabbir (Advocate) instructed by McGlashan MacKay Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Preliminary and Procedural matters

1. Mr Shabbir and the three witnesses attended the hearing via CVP. They were:

(i) Mr Taha Yasin Bdiwi (the Appellant’s husband);
(ii) Ms Maisoun Kharsim Mejharish (the Appellant’s mother-in-law, and mother of the Appellant’s husband); and
(iii) Mr Yassin Ahmad Bdiwi (the Appellant’s father-in-law, and father of the Appellant’s husband).

An interpreter, Mr Al-Kadi, was present at Field House. It was confirmed in relation to each witness that the interpreter and witness were able to hear and understand each other clearly and that the language being spoken was Syrian Arabic. There were no issues in relation either to interpretation or technical operation of the CVP connection.

2. In addition to the oral evidence, I have witness statements on behalf of the Appellant from the Appellant, her mother, her father and her aunt, the sponsor and the sponsor’s mother and father.

3. Application was made for the sponsor to be treated as a vulnerable witness on account of mental health difficulties impacting his memory in particular, and therefore affecting his ability to give evidence. This was not opposed by the Respondent, and I determined it to be appropriate for the sponsor to have the opportunity to have breaks as required, and for questions to be single issue short questions. Following this approach, there were no issues or concerns in relation to the sponsor’s ability to give evidence.

4. I am grateful to both Mr Shabbir and Ms Keerthy for their helpful arguments, written and oral.

5. I have considered all evidence and submissions, whether or not specifically referred to.

6. In reaching my decision, I have taken into account the contents of the appeal bundle, an addendum bundle, a skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellant, and the oral submissions of Mr Shabbir and Ms Keerthy.

Background

1. The Appellant’s date of birth is 2 January 1993. She is a Syrian citizen. On 16 November 2023 she submitted a family reunion application for leave to enter the United Kingdom. The basis of the Appellant’s claim is that she is the wife of a person who has protection status (Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) of the Immigration Rules in force at the relevant time) (“FRP”).

2. By letter dated 26 June 2024, the respondent refused that application.

3. The Appellant appealed against that decision, and her appeal came before First-tier tribunal Judge McGrade (“the Judge”) on 10 October 2025. By decision dated 13 October 2025, the appeal was dismissed.

4. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, which was granted on 29 December 2025. The appeal came before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Welsh on 17 March 2026. By a decision dated 1 April 2026, it was determined that there was an error of law in the Judge’s decision, and that there should be a remaking of the decision by the Upper Tribunal. Findings were preserved, which I shall detail later in this decision.

5. The re-making hearing took place on 22 May 2026.

Relevant law

6. The issues in the appeal before the Judge relevant to determination of her eligibility under Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) of the Immigration Rules at 4.1.

7. The issue that remains in dispute is determination of whether the requirements of paragraph FRP.4.1(b) are met. This provides, so far as material, that an applicant must have formed part of the family unit of the sponsor before the sponsor left the country of their habitual residence in order to seek protection.

8. The Appellant relies upon the case of BM and AL (325D(iv); meaning of “family unit”) Columbia [2007] UKAIT 00055 (Mr Justice Hodge, President, sitting with Senior Immigration Judge Batiste). In that decision, the Upper Tribunal concluded that the issue as to what is a “family unit” is a question of fact [27] and, whilst the Appellant and sponsor living in the same household is a relevant fact, it is not a prerequisite and nor is it determinative [26-28].

9. I am asked to consider whether, in the event that the FRP criteria are found not to be met, there are exceptional circumstances which would mean that a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant and her sponsor and breach their rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.

The issues upon re-making

10. The issues (see above) have been substantially narrowed by the carefully considered preserved findings made within the error of law decision such that the sole issue is now the application of FRP 4.1(b). This was agreed by the parties as being the outstanding issue under the Rules. Issue two, as agreed between the parties, arises in the event that the Appellant does not meet the requirements of FRP and requires consideration of whether there are exceptional circumstances which would mean that a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant and the sponsor and breach their rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.

The preserved findings

11. The preserved findings are:

(1) The Appellant satisfies the requirement of paragraph FRP 4.1(c) because the Appellant and sponsor were validly married following their proxy marriage in 2022 [para. 10 of the Judge’s decision].
(2) The Appellant satisfies the requirement of paragraph FRP 4.1(d) because the couple were in a genuine and subsisting relationship at the date of the application for entry clearance and remain in such a relationship [para. 11 of the Judge’s decision].
(3) Were it not for the civil war in Syria, the couple would have married sooner and lived together [para.13 of the Judge’s decision].

The evidence of the Sponsor and witnesses

12. Each witness confirmed their respective witness statement and was tendered for cross examination. The core of the factual case presented by the Appellant and sponsor was that they had known each other as children because their families were neighbours until the Appellant’s family relocated. A romantic relationship developed in about early 2010. This led to a nikah ceremony on 7 June 2010, conducted by a Sheikh, at which their families attended, and there followed a celebration meal. The Appellant and sponsor were both underage so could not enter into a legal marriage at that time.

13. The Appellant and sponsor did not live together after the ceremony. It is apparent from the evidence, written and oral, that they remained in contact with a pattern of visits to each other’s homes. Those visits took place with their families i.e. they did not independently of their families visit each other. There was no joint household or joined finances, and each lived with their respective families. This was said to be because they were committed to finishing their studies.

14. In 2011, as a consequence of the Syrian war, the sponsor and his family relocated, firstly to Daraa close to the Jordanian border and then, in January 2012, to Jordan. The Appellant, in 2011, had commenced University in Aleppo. Following a siege in Aleppo she returned to her family’s home in Hama, where she was reunited with her family. She had a brief period of study in Damascus.

15. The sponsor and his family left Jordan in January 2017 to travel to the UK through the refugee resettlement programme. The sponsor has since been recognised as a refugee. Following the Appellant’s completion of her undergraduate studies, her evidence is that she decided to apply to come to the UK by way of a family reunion visa.

16. There was no significant credibility issue relied upon in relation to the evidence: Ms Keerthy did not take a point about the Appellant’s application having stated that she and the sponsor first met in 2012: this was said on the Appellant’s behalf to be a mistake by her solicitor, and was accepted as such.

17. There was a point taken regarding messages between the Appellant and sponsor, the evidence of which was said to be dated only from 2021. The sponsor’s evidence was that there were earlier messages available, going back to 2017, and that messages before that date had been lost when phones were lost or damages as his family moved locations.

18. The absence of photographic evidence of the nikah, or indeed photographs of the Appellant and sponsor together, was relied upon. The explanation for this was said to be that when the sponsor and his family left their home in Syria, they did so in a state of urgency and expected to return soon, and so did not take much with them. In the event, they were displaced in Jordan for five years before coming to the UK.

19. The other factual matter said to undermine the credibility of the account relates to the absence of evidence of communication between the Appellant and sponsor prior to 2021.

20. The factual account presented by the witnesses is at its core consistent as between the various sources of evidence and documents. I do not regard it is undermining that account that there are no photographs of the Appellant and sponsor together, having regard to the explanation for that i.e. the sponsor and his family having needed to flee their home when the war began. The Appellant also moved from place to place within Syria.

21. On analysis, there are translated Facebook messages in the bundle which pre-date 2021, the earliest of which is dated 3 July 2017. In the context of the sponsor and his family having been in Jordan from 2012 to 2017 and then having travelled to the UK as refugees, I am satisfied that the absence of messages between the Appellant and sponsor prior to 2017 is not such as to undermine the credibility of the account each gives as to the manner in which their relationship began, the nikah ceremony, and their intention thereafter to legalise the marriage when of age (and their plans having been interrupted by the outbreak of war).

22. Overall, I found that the sponsor and each of his parents gave credible evidence which was consistent, reasonably detailed and supported by the written evidence of the Appellant, her parents and her aunt. Whilst the Appellant’s written evidence and that of her parents and Aunt was also consistent with the evidence of the live witnesses, I have attached less weight to it as it was not tested by cross examination. The overall picture, however, is of a broadly consistent account. This credibility finding has been taken account of in my conclusions.

23. The acceptance of the underlying factual premise advanced by the Appellant does not, however, fully answer the question of whether the Appellant formed part of the family unit of the sponsor before the sponsor left the country of their habitual residence in order to seek protection.

Immigration Rules FPR 4.1 (b) analysis

Was the Appellant part of the family unit of the sponsor before the sponsor left the country of their habitual residence in order to seek protection?

24. The burden of proof is upon the Appellant and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

25. The relevant time period in relation to this analysis is the period prior to January 2012 (the date when the sponsor left Syria).

26. The submission of the Respondent is that a romantic relationship at that time is accepted, however, that is insufficient. The Appellant and sponsor are said to have had no more than an intention or aspiration to start family life together. At its highest, the Appellant’s case is that there was a promise and an intention to live together after their studies were completed, but this is insufficient to establish a family unit. In reality, each remained within the family unit of their respective families with whom they lived. They had chosen not to cohabit although they could have done so following the nikah. There was no joint household, and it is said to be relevant that their visits to each other’s homes were always together with their families. There was no dependency evidenced, and no evidence is produced of communications between them at the relevant time.

27. The Respondent further relies on the lengthy time lapse before the Appellant and sponsor legally married (in 2022). They could, it is said, have done so sooner as the impediment to doing so (being underage) had long ceased to be relevant, and the proxy marriage they underwent in 2022 could have taken place before then. The evidence is that the legal marriage in 2022 took place in order to support the Appellant’s immigration application.

28. The Appellant places emphasis upon the fact that she and the sponsor knew each other from childhood and points to the relationship having become romantic in or about early 2010. They were both still at school, but spoke regularly. As to whether the ceremony was a marriage or a betrothal, the submission of the Appellant is that it was a marriage and that a betrothal would not require the permission of the Appellant’s father, or the presence of a religious officiant. It was invalid as a matter of law, but is said to be relevant to whether a family unit was established as matter of custom and religion. The Appellant and sponsor, it is submitted, regarded themselves as entering into a committed relationship.

29. In support of the position that a family unit was formed, the Appellant points to the frequency of visits between her and the sponsor and their intention to legalise the marriage and to live together once they were legally able to do so. The Appellant also invites consideration of the reason that those plans did not come into effect, namely, the intervention of the war and the sponsor’s displacement from Syria.

30. On the face of it, it does not appear that much changed in practical terms for the Appellant and sponsor after the nikah ceremony: each lived within their own family, visiting each other together with their families in a manner similar to their visiting pattern prior to the nikah. A dowry was agreed between the families but was not paid. The Appellant’s statement of 11 November 2024 explains at para.10 that:

A dowry usually only gets paid when the couple completes the court registration of the marriage, so that the bride can get special wedding clothes, and special nighties, and things like that for when she moves in properly with her husband [emphasis added].

31. They did not have joint finances, but that is perhaps unsurprising as both were studying. The lack of joint finances is regarded as secondary to the couple not having employment (and also not living together).

32. Looking at the evidence overall, and conducting the holistic assessment that is required as to whether there was a family unit at the relevant time, I conclude that there was, for the following reasons:

(a) The nikah ceremony, in my view, is to be regarded as more than a betrothal or engagement: it was regarded by the parties to it and their families as a marriage, albeit one that was not legally valid. The couple appear to have recognised that there were further steps to solemnise the relationship (see para.10 of the Appellant’s statement of 11 November 2024) and that they were not yet “properly” moving in together but it was nonetheless regarded as valid and binding for some purposes.

(b) The Appellant’s evidence in her statement of 11 November 2024 at para.13 is that she and the sponsor intended to complete the legalities of the marriage once they finished their exams. That does not indicate that they did not consider there to be a marriage, but that there was a final step to legalising it.

(c) The hallmarks of a commitment are there, as there was a religious officiant, witnesses state that families were present, and there was a celebration afterwards. It was not a legal commitment but appears to have been regarded by the Appellant and sponsor as a religious commitment and as more serious than the stage of being in a romantic relationship.

(d) I take into account the reasons why the couple did not live together: they were both young: the Appellant was 17 and the sponsor 14 and they planned to continue their education which they could not both do for logistical reasons if they immediately lived together. Living together is not critical to there being a family unit, but it is relevant.

(e) It is relevant to take into account the reasons why the Appellant’s and sponsor’s plan to finish education and then live together did not happen. As of 2011, their plans were interrupted by the start of the war and the displacement of the sponsor, with the Appellant also moving locations within Syria. It is a preserved finding that, but for the war, the couple would have married sooner and lived together. That is supportive of the proposition that they formed a family unit on 7 June 2010 and were awaiting a change of circumstances that would enable the family unit to live together.

(f) The Respondent points to the delay in the Appellant and sponsor entering into a legal marriage, which did not take place until 2022. It would of course have been possible for the parties to enter into a legal marriage by proxy before then, and I accept that this step was motivated by the Appellant’s plan to make this immigration application. I also accept, however, that the Appellant and sponsor did not regard it as necessary to enter into a legal marriage during the period before 2022 because they regarded themselves as married by virtue of the nikah. The Appellant’s evidence is that her siblings did not legalise their marriages until they had children, because prior to that, it was not of “benefit” to them to legalise the marriage. This, in my view, tends to support the view that the Appellant and sponsor regarded themselves as married with effect from 7 June 2010.

(g) It is a preserved finding, and I accept, that the relationship is genuine and subsisting.

33. I conclude, having regard to all relevant circumstances, that a family unit was formed between the Appellant and the sponsor before the sponsor left Syria.

34. Accordingly, the requirement of FRP 4.1(b) is met. Taken together with the preserved findings, the Appellant meets the requirements of Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) of the Immigration Rules at 4.1.

Article 8 ECHR

35. The argument under FRP.7.1 is in the alternative to that above under FRP 4.1. Having determined that the appeal should be allowed by reference to FRP 4.1, it is not necessary to go on to consider FRP 7.1.

Notice of decision

The appeal is allowed under Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) of the Immigration Rules.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 June 2026