Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-005873
[HU/60634/2024]

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Promulgated

28th August 2026

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

T B
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at FIELD HOUSE
on 14 August 2026

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel
(instructed by Barnes, Harrild and Dyer)
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This the rehearing of the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 13 August 2024, pursuant to the order of DUT Judge Seelhoff dated 28 April 2026. The Appellant’s appeal had been dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Feeney on 12 September 2025, but her decision was set aside in the Upper Tribunal, save that it remained accepted that the Appellant had been the victim of domestic violence in the United Kingdom. The issues identified in DUT Judge Seelhoff’s order were:
i. Whether the Appellant’s return to Bangladesh would amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR;
ii. Whether there were very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s re-integration into Bangladesh, contrary to Appendix PL of the Immigration Rules; and
iii. Article 8 ECHR proportionality.
The evidence
2. The Appellant gave her evidence in Sylheti, interpreted by the Tribunal’s interpreter. It was agreed that the Appellant would be treated as a vulnerable witness. The Appellant confirmed as true and adopted as her evidence in chief her witness statements dated 29 January 2025 and 8 September 2025.
3. In summary, in her written evidence the Appellant said that she met her husband online in February 2019. She was living and studying in Bangladesh and he was living in England. They had an online relationship for 2 years. He asked her to come to the United Kingdom and said he would pay for her studies in the United Kingdom. He told that to her parents.
4. The Appellant obtained a student visa and entered the United Kingdom on 8 December 2021. The Appellant’s husband met her at the airport. On 22 December 2021 they had an Islamic marriage in Luton, attended by his friends. The couple went from the wedding to a house shared with the landlord, his wife and baby. They lived there from December 2021 to February 2022. Part of the agreement with the Appellant’s parents was that he would pay them £4500, but he only paid some of this.
5. Her husband was abusive from the day of the marriage. He forced himself on her repeatedly. The Appellant was not properly fed. Her husband refused her request to attend university, saying it was too much money. They moved to their own house in Bedford in February 2022.
6. The Appellant became pregnant, but her husband wanted an abortion. The Appellant refused. When his family in Bangladesh found out she was pregnant, they were “mentally abusive” to her. His family were not happy she was pregnant as they wanted his money. He continued his abusive behaviour.
7. Their baby was born on 12 October 2022, by an emergency C section. Her husband attended the hospital, but afterwards provided no support. He went back to work after she came home. He left her to manage on her own. He continued to force himself on her, while he was also having relations with other women. He had 7 people living in their 3 bedroom house. He took the Appellant to a group with the baby where she met a Bangladeshi woman. When her husband was at work she went to the Bangladeshi woman’s house. On 13 February 2024 all his cousins were shouting because the Appellant had been spotted. They threatened to kill her. Her husband kicked her and said ‘I don’t want you’. The Appellant went to the woman’s house again. The police came. They wanted to arrest the Appellant’s husband but she was so frightened of what would happen to her that she said no and went back home to give him another chance.
8. On 22 February 2024, he tried to strangle her. This time he was arrested. The Appellant was placed in a women’s refuge with her baby. The Appellant wanted to remain in the United Kingdom where she was receiving help. Her parents would support her in Bangladesh but their lives would be at risk because they had been attacked by members of her husband’s family. The Bangladeshi police would not provide protection.
9. Cross-examined, the Appellant agreed that the Bedfordshire police had decided in August 2024 to take no action against her husband. She said she had not obtained any qualifications in the United Kingdom because of her husband’s controlling behaviour. She had completed “O” and “A” level studies in Bangladesh. She had said that her parents would support her but her father had not paid her university fees. Her husband had paid.
10. The Appellant confirmed that her father had been attacked by members of her husband’s family in Bangladesh on 25 April 2024, which was after she had left her husband’s home in the United Kingdom in January 2024. The Appellant thought that the court case in Bangladesh was still running. The police there had taken no action. The Appellant had no documents from the police. Her husband’s relatives had not been convicted of anything in Bangladesh.
11. The Appellant was asked why she thought her husband’s in-laws would still be interested in her family, given that the police in the United Kingdom were taking no action against him. The Appellant replied that they still wanted revenge. She said that the threats continue. The most recent and only physical assault on her father had been in 2024.
12. The Appellant said that her father had heart trouble and was not able to work. Before becoming ill he had been a day labourer. He had inherited the family house from his grandfather.
13. In response to the Tribunal’s questions, the Appellant said that she was trying to divorce her husband. There had not been a big wedding celebration because it was a love marriage and they had met on line. Her husband’s family didn’t know. Her husband had promised her a big ceremony later. Her parents had accepted the love marriage.
The law
14. Since 2 October 2000, the commencement date of the Human Rights Act 1998, public authorities (including the Upper Tribunal) may not act in a way which is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Upper Tribunal must by Section 2 take into account the body of material commonly known by the convenient term of “Strasbourg jurisprudence”.
15. The burden of proof is upon the Appellant. In determining this appeal the Upper Tribunal has applied the lower standard of proof (a reasonable degree of likelihood/substantial grounds for believing) to the Article 3 ECHR issues. The standard is the balance of probabilities for the Article 8 ECHR claim. The relevant date is the date of the hearing.
Submissions
16. Mr Sheikh for the Respondent relied on the reasons for refusal letter dated 13 August 2024 and the review dated 3 April 2025. The Appellant’s in-laws were non-state actors. Little weight could be given to the documents from Bangladesh. Any risk had in the meantime been diminished as the CPS were not prosecuting the Appellant’s husband. Nor had anyone been charged in Bangladesh. The country background evidence showed that there was a sufficiency of protection. Internal relocation was viable. As to the Article 8 ECHR claim, the balancing exercise favoured the public interest in controlling immigration.
17. Mr Karim for the Appellant relied on the skeleton argument filed earlier and the error of law decision. The previous credibility findings stood. The lower threshold applied to the Article 3 ECHR claim. There was a live battle in the United Kingdom and an ongoing case in Bangladesh. The lack of action taken by the police in Bangladesh showed the extent of the problem and the absence of a sufficiency of protection. The police were able but unwilling to act in “family” matters. Society was patriarchal and dishonour to the family was taken seriously. Weight should be given to the Appellant’s documents. Even a low risk, e.g., 10%, needed to be considered. Internal location would be unreasonable given the Appellant’s family circumstances. The Appellant would face very significant obstacles on return to Bangladesh. In the United Kingdom she had the benefit of a support network. Her daughter’s best interests were to remain in the United Kingdom. The daughter had seen things which no child should. The appeal should be allowed.
Discussion and findings
18. The Tribunal reserved its decision, which now follows. The preserved finding that the Appellant suffered domestic violence does not extend to a general acceptance of the remainder of the Appellant’s story. Indeed, the Tribunal considers that it is necessary to treat the Appellant’s account of events with great caution.
19. In the first place, the Appellant gave misleading information in her VAF for student leave, which was dishonest. On her own account, her parents were in no position to fund her higher education, yet she represented that they were able to pay her fees. In fact the required fees were never paid in full, if at all. According to the Appellant, her fees were to be paid by a man she had never met in person, but only on line. The Tribunal infers that her true purpose in coming to the United Kingdom was to further her relationship with that man, as seen in her almost immediate entry into an Islamic marriage just days after her arrival. The Appellant failed to attend her course of study, but did not inform the Home Office that she was in breach of her visa conditions. Obviously if the Appellant wished to marry in the United Kingdom then she should have applied under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules.
20. It should be noted that the Nikkah Nama for the Appellant’s marriage shows that the dowry was £4,500, of which £2,000 was stated to have been paid. If the certificate is reliable that shows that the Appellant’s parents had paid a substantial sum to her husband and hence were well aware of the marital arrangements and approved of them.
21. A series of most untoward events followed the marriage ceremony, as described by the Appellant, “the domestic violence”. Significantly however there was no prosecution of the husband. Plainly the CPS’s required criteria for a prosecution were not met. This was explained in the decision letter sent to the Appellant and produced to the Tribunal. That perhaps puts the alleged lack of action by the police in Bangladesh into context, if fact the police have ever been involved there.
22. Documents produced from Bangladesh are problematic, given widespread corruption and the well-known ease of obtaining forgeries: see the CPIN: Documentation Bangladesh November 2024. The only document of significance which can be described as independent was the hospital report recording the “accidental” injuries for which the Appellant’s father Mr Md Tuhaid Miah (“Mr Miah”) was treated. Mr Miah’s first witness statement was expressed in vague and generalised terms. The Appellant said in her second witness statement dated 8 September 2025 that she had not been aware of the documents until recently. Her father had not understood their importance. The Tribunal has difficulty in accepting that explanation for delayed disclosure. It will be recalled that the Appellant had already made two separate applications for asylum, both subsequently withdrawn. Finding some means of remaining in the United Kingdom was plainly on her mind.
23. Mr Miah’s second and third witness statements have a scripted quality, suggesting that they have been written to address the obvious weaknesses in the Appellant’s case. There Mr Miah attempted to describe the hospital’s reference to “accidental” injuries as a protective measure on his part. But if that were so, why did not Mr Miah say so in the first place? All of Mr Miah’s witness statements are expressed in generalities and lack compelling detail. Little weight can be given to his evidence. The Appellant’s mother’s evidence was in similar terms and also attracts little weight.
24. The certificate from Mr Miah’s lawyer is a curious production. Dated 30 July 2026, it purports to record an extraordinary number of adjournments of the proceedings named, far more than any court might be expected to tolerate before striking out the case. It was submitted that this demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining police assistance in Bangladesh. In the Tribunal’s view it could equally show that in the opinion of the police the criteria for prosecution were not met. The Tribunal gives little weight to the lawyer’s certificate.
25. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the Appellant’s father was able to afford the extensive services of a lawyer if (a) he was as poor as he repeatedly claimed to be and/or (b) was unable to meet the cost of his daughter's higher education and/or (c) had participated in a dubious arrangement with a man he had never met in person, part of which involved his daughter’s marriage with a dowry payable in the United Kingdom. In any event, by whatever means the lawyer was remunerated, he was acting for the Appellant’s father and so his untested evidence cannot be regarded as independent. It attracts little weight.
26. Drawing these threads together, the Tribunal finds that the Appellant’s father was injured in a robbery on 25 April 2024 and required hospital treatment but there is insufficient evidence to show that the Appellant’s husband’s family were the perpetrators. As the Appellant says she left her husband in January 2024, it is reasonable to expect that any reaction by his family would have been immediate, not months later. It is notable that there is no mention of any such incident or any similar ongoing problem of threats facing the Appellant’s family in the local chairman’s letter dated 5 July 2026. If there had been, it is reasonable to expect that the chairman would have mentioned it and also stated what was being done by the authorities in Bangladesh about it. The Tribunal finds that the Appellant has not shown that there have been threats and an assault on her father because of her failed marital relationship.
27. If the Tribunal were mistaken to reach that finding, the Tribunal finds that the assault on the father was a single incident which has not been repeated. There was no independent or credible evidence of subsequent threats. The marriage is over and there is no motive for further assaults, otherwise they would have continued. Little weight can be given to the Appellant’s claims to the contrary. The Tribunal finds that any threat has passed.
28. The Appellant has no reason to fear domestic violence in Bangladesh, as she is separated from her husband and has indicated no intention of rejoining him anywhere. He has evidently rejected her. She said she did not know where he is. She produced no evidence of any communication from him. The Appellant’s Islamic marriage is not recognised in English law. No evidence of any current family law proceedings in the United Kingdom was produced to the Tribunal. The Appellant said that she has sole responsibility for the child. According to the Appellant her husband did not want their child and he has shown no interest in her or the child. The Appellant is free to return to Bangladesh with her child.
29. The Appellant is on good terms with her parents and no sufficient reason why she could not return to the family home with her daughter has been shown. Given Bangladesh’s large population, failed marriages are hardly an unusual event. Any discrimination the Appellant might face as a result will fall well short of persecution.
30. The current CPIN report for Bangladesh (Women fearing gender-based violence) January 2024 is of limited relevance for the reasons given above, i.e., the Appellant will not be resuming married life with her husband. In any event, the Tribunal finds that a sufficiency of protection is available in Bangladesh if protection were needed. The Appellant’s own experience in the United Kingdom shows the difficulty which the police face in dealing with domestic violence cases: the Appellant initially refused to allow her husband to be arrested. Later the Bedfordshire Police decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute, which of course does not mean that domestic violence had not occurred.
31. The police in Bangladesh are often criticised as the relevant January 2024 CPIN records but it is pertinent to recall that violence against women in the United Kingdom has recently been described as “an epidemic” and “a national emergency.” Criticism of the police response to violence against women is not confined to Bangladesh. Adequate legal mechanisms are in place in Bangladesh. The Article 3 ECHR appeal is dismissed. (It is not necessary to consider internal relocation.)
32. The Appellant’s parents’ recent claim that they cannot afford to support their daughter and grandchild attracts no weight and is a lately added assertion tailored towards assisting the case. They had supported their daughter previously and their grandchild is still very young. No reason was given why the Appellant’s parents could not assist with childcare to enable the Appellant to work on at least a part-time basis. There was no evidence that she was too unwell to work at least part time. It is clear from the Appellant’s extensive NHS records that she has been thoroughly investigated and treated in the United Kingdom following the abuse she suffered.
33. As to the best interests of the Appellant’s daughter, they are plainly to remain with her loving mother. The daughter is a national of Bangladesh. She has no connection with any relatives of her father in the United Kingdom. She has been brought up within Bangladeshi culture. She is in any event young enough to adapt to life in Bangladesh if any adaption were needed.
34. The Appellant cannot be described as integrated into the United Kingdom. She has not studied here. Most of the short time she has lived in the United Kingdom has been seriously unhappy and frequently frightening. She has limited English. She is not financially independent. The Appellant can return to Bangladesh without facing very serious obstacles. Indeed, on the contrary, she can return to the support of her own family which will provide an environment to assist her recovery from a failed marriage. Appendix PL of the Immigration Rules is not met. The Tribunal so finds.
35. As to any Article 8 ECHR claim outside the Immigration Rules, little need be said. The findings already reached by the Tribunal fall short of showing any exceptional circumstances of hardship or otherwise. The Appellant has breached United Kingdom immigration law. Proportionality favours the public interest in immigration control. The costly consequences of the Appellant’s breach of immigration control are illustrated by the present appeal.
36. The Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR appeal is accordingly dismissed. The anonymity order made earlier remains in force.
The Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant without her express consent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION
The appeal is dismissed
The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity direction.

Signed R J Manuell Dated 18 August 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell