Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005892
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00066/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th April 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
ARIF BULLICI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr K Pullinger, Counsel, instructed by Calices Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chinweze (“the judge”), promulgated on 13 October 2025, by which he dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim.

2. The appellant was born in 1959 and is a national of Cyprus (he is also a Turkish national by virtue of the fact that he was born in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). He has resided in the United Kingdom since 1980 and was granted indefinite leave to remain in 1982. He has a truly awful criminal record, having been convicted on three occasions for very significant Class A drugs offences relating to conspiracies to possess and supply heroin. The first of these was in 1997, for which he was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment (reduced to 8 years on appeal). The second was in 2002, for which he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. The third was in 2015, for which he was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment (reduced to 21 years on appeal). He has been at liberty since 2024.

3. In August 2016, the respondent began her latest attempt to deport the appellant. On 18 September 2020, the respondent issued a ‘stage 1’ decision under the Borders Act 2007. A deportation order was signed. In response, the appellant made human rights submissions and these were treated as a human rights claim. That claim was refused with a right of appeal.

4. On 28 November 2022, the respondent confirmed that the appellant had been granted settled status under the Windrush Scheme (I was not provided with the details of this. In light of the appellant’s criminality, the grant appears somewhat surprising, to say the least).

5. Prior to the appeal being heard, on 5 August 2025 the appellant purported to make an application under the EUSS. It transpires that at some point he also made further submissions based on human rights grounds.

The judge’s decision
6. With respect to the judge’s detailed decision, I will attempt to pare it down to its bare essentials.

7. The judge concluded that the purported EUSS application had been made outside of the ‘grace period’ (i.e. after 30 June 2021): [29]. Thus, the application would only be considered valid if the respondent accepted it was so in the exercise of her discretion and a decision on that had not been made: [45]. It followed, concluded the judge, that the applicant could not rely on an exception under section 33(6C) of the Borders Act 2007, could not rely on the Withdrawal Agreement, and did not fall within the staged-approach set out in Abdullah and Others (EEA, deportation appeals, procedure) [2024] UKUT 00066: [37]-[45]. Thus, the judge proceeded to consider only the human rights claim: [46].

8. The judge went on to assess the appellant human rights claim under Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and Article 3 ECHR (medical grounds). For detailed reasons set out at [56]-[79], the judge concluded that the appellant’s deportation would be proportionate and would not violate Article 3 rights. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The grounds of appeal
9. Four grounds of appeal were initially put forward. First, the judge had erred by failing to appreciate that the EUSS application had in fact been treated as valid by virtue of a Certificate of Application (“CoA”) and this meant that the appellant was entitled to rely on EU law in his appeal. Second, the judge was wrong to have refused the appellant’s adjournment application. He should have adjourned the human rights appeal pending a decision on the EUSS application. Third, the judge erred in his approach to Abdullah. Again, reliance was placed on the valid EUSS application. Fourth, the judge erred in concluding that the appellant was not a “relevant person” for the purposes of section 33(6B) and (6C) of the Borders Act 2007.

10. Permission was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. In the renewed application, the grounds were noticeably narrowed down. It is said that, in effect, the judge made an error of fact when concluding that there was no valid EUSS application. The renewed grounds said nothing about reliance on the original grounds.

11. Permission was granted by the Deputy President of the Upper Tribunal.

The hearing
12. I commend the conduct of Mr Pullinger and Ms Clewley at the hearing. Mr Pullinger exercised good judgment and pragmatism in his approach to the appeal, recognising certain weaknesses in the grounds and assisting me with other matters. Ms Clewley demonstrated flexibility and careful consideration in response to the evolving nature of the appellant’s case.

13. Mr Pullinger informed me that the appellant’s EUSS application had been decided on 16 March 2026 and had been refused with the right of appeal. There was now an appeal pending before the First-tier Tribunal. In addition, the further human rights submissions had been considered, treated as a fresh claim, and refused with a right of appeal. There is now also a human rights appeal pending before the First-tier Tribunal. The two appeals have been linked.

14. Mr Pullinger confirmed the outset that he was not pursuing grounds 2 and 4. In respect of the former, he properly acknowledged that there had in fact been no adjournment application by the appellant at the hearing. Indeed, his representative (not Mr Pullinger) urged the judge to proceed: [28]. For the avoidance of any doubt, he did not pursue an argument that the judge should have adjourned the case of his own volition. Such a submission would have been untenable, given his ignorance of the CoA (as to which, see below).

15. In respect of ground 4, Mr Pullinger recognised that the grant of settled status under the Windrush Scheme could not have brought the appellant within the ambit of a “relevant person” pursuant to section 33 of the Borders Act 2007.

16. Mr Pullinger accepted that the CoA had been in the possession of the appellant’s representatives prior to the hearing, but had not been provided to the judge. There was no explanation for that failure.

17. Mr Pullinger made skilful arguments based on various passages within Abdullah in an attempt to demonstrate that the appellant had been entitled to rely on EU law in his appeal before the judge, notwithstanding the fact that the EUSS application was made after the grace period. Having said that, he quite properly accepted that those submissions had not been put to the judge.

18. If I were to set the judge’s decision aside, Mr Pullinger urged me not to preserve any of the findings made in relation to the human rights claim. This was on the basis that the two pending appeals before the First-tier Tribunal should take place on a clean slate, as it were.

19. Ms Clewley submitted that there was no error of fact made by the judge because the CoA could and should have been provided by the appellant. In any event, the submissions made on Abdullah had not been put to the judge and in light of Lata (FtT: principle controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC) and now AL (by her litigation friend, CB) [2026] EWCA Civ 370, it cannot be said that he erred in law. She submitted that the judge’s findings of fact in relation to the human rights claim had not been challenged and were sound. They should be preserved.

20. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Conclusions
21. I acknowledge the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. In particular, I must take account of what was, and importantly what was not, put to the judge at the hearing.

22. The appellant has failed to show that the judge made an error of fact amounting to an error of law. Having regard to the well-known to set out in E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49, at [66], (a) there was a mistake as to the existence of the CoA and its effect that the EUSS application had been deemed valid by the respondent (b) the fact was “established” in that it was objectively verifiable by virtue of the CoA (c) but, the appellant was clearly at fault for not having provided the CoA to the judge. Whilst it might be said that the respondent was also aware of the CoA, it was for the appellant to make out his case.

23. Thus, ground 2 of the original grounds and the renewed grounds have not been made out.

24. Ground 4 fails because the alternative submissions made by Mr Pullinger at the hearing had not been made to the judge. In light of Lata and AL, the judge cannot be criticised for failing to address points which had not been canvassed before him and there is no error of law.

25. It follows that there is no basis on which to set the judge’s decision aside.

26. It also follows that the appellant’s pending appeals before the First-tier Tribunal will proceed in light of the undisturbed findings made by the judge on the appellant’s human rights claim and the Devaseelan guidelines.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision stands.

The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is accordingly dismissed.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 21 April 2026