Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005902
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01388/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Moriarty of Counsel, instructed by Turpin & Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge G Clarke promulgated on 4 March 2025, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his human rights claim, in the context of deportation, dated 17 July 2024 was dismissed.
2. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria, who was born in the United Kingdom on 9 January 2025 to a Nigerian mother who was in the United Kingdom pursuant to a visit visa (albeit one using an alias name). Paperwork in relation to administrative removal was processed both in October 2007 and in January 2018, but neither were removed at those points. A human rights claim was made by the Appellant’s mother on 2 March 2015 and a period of leave to remain granted from 13 July 2015 to 12 January 2018. A further human rights claim was made by the Appellant’s mother, with the Appellant as her dependent, on 18 December 2018. That application was put on hold due to the Appellant’s criminality in the United Kingdom.
3. On 20 November 2020, the Appellant was the subject of a Child Protection Plan as a child victim of neglect.
4. On 24 February 2021, an NRM referral was made in respect of the Appellant, following which there was a positive reasonable grounds decision on 2 March 2021 and a positive conclusive grounds decision on 27 December 2021. The Appellant was not granted discretionary leave to remain on modern slavery grounds in a decision dated 6 March 2024.
5. In terms of the Appellant’s criminal convictions in the United Kingdom, the index offence was a conviction on 20 September 2021 for possessing an offensive weapon, wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and possession of Class B drug (cannabis/cannabis resin), for which he was sentenced to 78 months in a Young Offender’s Institution and for the drugs possession, he received a three-month conditional discharge, a forfeiture order and a £150 victim surcharge. The sentencing remarks are set out more fully in the First-tier Tribunal decision, but in summary the wounding offence, committed alongside another defendant was described as “… a deliberate, cold-blooded stabbing in broad daylight, in a public street, with onlookers present …” for which the Appellant provided a rambo style knife. The victim was seriously injured, losing 8 litres of blood and remained in hospital for a month afterwards, and but for very swift medical attention, it was likely the victim would have died. The Appellant was sixteen years old at the date the offence was committed.
6. Overall, the Appellant had seven convictions for fifteen offences between 27 August 2020 and 19 September 2023, including for robbery, criminal damage, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, driving offences, possession of an offensive weapon and obstructing another responding to an emergency. The Appellant has a history of violent and anti-social behaviour, with some offences committed whilst on bail and one assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed whilst in the Young Offenders’ Institute serving his sentence for the index offence.
7. The Appellant was notified of the intention to deport him on 28 September 2023, pursuant to which he made representations against deportation on 20 October 2023.
8. The Respondent refused the human rights representations on the basis that the Appellant did not meet any of the exceptions to deportation. In relation to private life, the Appellant had not been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life, having only had limited leave to remain for some 30 months’ between mid-2015 and early 2018; he was not accepted as being socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom due to his limited engagement in education and criminal convictions; and there was no evidence of very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration in Nigeria. The Appellant did not claim to have any family life in the United Kingdom for the purposes of that exception. The Respondent did not accept that there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation and noted in particular that the Appellant could use the skills obtained in custody in the United Kingdom to establish himself in Nigeria, where he would be separated from negative influences in the United Kingdom and where he has family (his father and two siblings). Further, the Appellant speaks English and his mother could assist with his integration. The Respondent also considered the very strong public interest in deportation in this case, including the assessed high risk of harm in the OASys report and the Appellant’ poor behaviour in detention. She also took into account modern slavery findings, as to criminal exploitation in earlier activity, but not the index offence, and that the Appellant could have made an application for British citizenship when he reached the age of 10.
9. Judge Clarke dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 4 March 2025 on all grounds, the reasons for which I set out in more detail below.
The appeal
10. The Appellant appeals on two grounds as follows. First, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in failing to consider whether the Appellant’s circumstances reduced the legitimate and strong public interest in removal as per Akinyemi (No 1) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 236 and Akinyemi (No 2) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2098. In particular, that the First-tier Tribunal failed to properly take into account the fact that the Appellant was eligible to apply for British citizenship from January 2015 having been born in the United Kingdom and it was not within his control as a minor to do so. Further, the First-tier Tribunal failed to properly take into account the Appellant’s mother’s difficulties in the United Kingdom, it being a new country and with significant health problems of her own and a lack of support here; and failed to consider the Respondent’s failure to consider the Appellant’s absolute entitlement to British citizenship from the age of ten and before any criminality.
11. Secondly, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in its assessment of whether there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation. In particular, that it failed to consider in the round the Appellant’s poor mental health; it failed to properly consider that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking who was vulnerable to grooming, coercion and forced labour in Nigeria; and although there was some consideration of the Appellant’s childhood, this was not in the context of considering his vulnerability and obstacles to reintegration.
12. At the oral hearing, on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Moriarty relied on the written grounds of appeal supplemented by oral submissions. In relation to the first ground of appeal, Mr Moriarty did not seek to go behind the concession that the Appellant was not in the United Kingdom lawfully for more than half of his life (albeit he was not here unlawfully either in accordance with Akinyemi) and did not expressly pursue any point that the Respondent should have taken some action the recognise or inform the Appellant’s entitlement to British citizenship.
13. On the main point in the first ground of appeal, Mr Moriarty relied on the impact of the Appellant having been born in the United Kingdom on the moveability of the public interest as set out in paragraphs 39 and paragraph 53 of Akinyemi (No 2) which state as follows:
“39. … The correct approach to be taken to the ‘public interest’ in the balance to be undertaken by a tribunal is to recognise that the public interest in the deportation of criminals has a moveable rather than fixed quality. It is necessary to approach the public interest flexibly, recognising that there will be cases where the person’s circumstances in the individual case reduce the legitimate and strong public interest in removal. The number of these cases will necessarily be very few i.e. they will be exceptional having regard to the legislation and the Rules. I agree with the appellant that the present appeal is such a case.
…
53. The UT’s approach to the public interest and the proportionality balance that is to be undertaken were accordingly flawed. The exercise of considering the strength of the public interest by assessing the factors in the case has not been undertaken. In particular, the extent to which a foreign criminal who was born in the UK and has lived here all of his life must be considered alongside all the other factors that relate to the public interest in deportation before that is balanced against an assessment of the article 8 factors. For these reasons, ground one of this appeal succeeds.”
14. It was submitted that the present case is on all fours with that in Akinyemi (No 2), in that the First-tier Tribunal erred in exactly the same way by not considering whether the strength of the public interest should be reduced by the Appellant’s time in the United Kingdom since birth, during which he was entitled to have been registered as a British citizen before going on to balance this against the article 8 factors. Mr Moriarty accepted on the facts of this appeal that there were strong facts and that the starting point for the public interest was high, but that this should have been reduced on the particular facts. He did not accept that taking the same factor into account on the Appellant’s side of the balance sheet was sufficient, nor that doing both would essentially be double counting a factor in the Appellant’s favour. Further, Mr Moriarty submitted that the error was material despite the very serious nature of offending and high risk of re-offending.
15. In relation to the second ground of appeal, Mr Moriarty did not directly challenge the First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the medical evidence, only its assessment in paragraph 116 that none of the Appellant’s medical conditions (PTSD, ADHD and anxiety) “… reach the elevated threshold of “very compelling circumstances”.” which failed to consider the same holistically together with the rest of the Appellant’s personal circumstances.
16. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Ahmed opposed the appeal on both grounds and relied on the rule 24 response submitted previously. In relation to the first ground of appeal, she submitted that the Appellant would need an exceptional case to outweigh the very strong public interest in deportation. It was not accepted that there was any error of law in the assessment of very compelling circumstances, but in any event, even if there was, it would not be material in circumstances where the Appellant had not been in the United Kingdom lawfully for more than half of his life and where the public interest was very strong based on the nature and seriousness of crimes committed. On the facts, Ms Ahmed submitted that this case is distinguishable from those in either Akinyemi and the decision went through all of the statutory and other factors before concluding that there was a strong public interest in deportation; with nothing in the decision to indicate that the public interest was thought to be fixed. It was not necessary for the First-tier Tribunal to have expressly stated that the public interest could be moveable and it was sufficient for the decision in paragraphs 134 and 135 to step back and consider all relevant factors in the round before coming to a final conclusion.
17. In relation to the second ground of appeal, Ms Ahmed submitted that this amounted to no more than disagreement with the decision and in any event, paragraphs 110, 125 and 133 of the First-tier Tribunal decision show that no factors were considered in isolation, instead there was expressly a holistic assessment
Findings and reasons
18. In relation to the first ground of appeal, I do not find the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in its approach to the balancing exercise required to determine whether there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation for two reasons. First, although in Akinyemi (No 2) the Court of Appeal referred to a person being born in the United Kingdom and living their whole life here as a factor which should be considered as part of the moveable weight of public interest and which should be considered before the factors in the Appellant’s favour are balanced against it, it would be a different side of the same coin to consider it the other way round, so as not to reduce the public interest but to strengthen the very compelling circumstances balanced against it. It can make no material difference whether the same factor is used to reduce the weight on one side of the balancing scales or increase the weight of the other side.
19. The difference on the facts between the present appeal and that in Akinyemi was that in the latter, the Upper Tribunal went no further in its assessment on either side than that Mr Akinyemi, having been born in the United Kingdom and lived here since, was not here unlawfully, such that the weight to be attached to his private life was not reduced by virtue of section 117B(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There was no positive consideration beyond that of the length of residence or ties to the United Kingdom or potential entitlement to British citizenship on either side of the balancing exercise in Akinyemi. To the contrary, in the present appeal, the First-tier Tribunal expressly took into account on the Appellant’s side of the balancing exercise that the Appellant was born in the United Kingdom; had lived here his whole life and had never been to Nigeria; was entitled to register as a British citizen from his tenth birthday (with the lack of anyone doing this for him when he was a child and this was not within his control, being described as a tragic aspect of the appeal) and that the Appellant ought to have been registered as a British citizen when he was a child. These matters were positively taken into account in the Appellant’s side of the balancing exercise and would have made no difference overall if the First-tier Tribunal had considered them the other way around, to reduce the strength of the public interest instead. It could not have done both without double counting this factor.
20. Secondly, even if the First-tier Tribunal did err in taking into account these matters on the ‘wrong’ side of the balancing exercise, I do not find that in any event that would have been material given that it still would have been entirely lawful and rational for the Judge to conclude that the public interest in deportation was extremely strong, taking into account, as they did, the statutory factors in section 117C(1) and (2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the seriousness of the index offence; the further offending whilst serving imprisonment for that and the medium risk of reoffending and high risk of harm. Even if reduced to just a strong public interest, (which undoubtedly it would have still been on the facts) this could not be outweighed even cumulatively by all of the factors considered by the First-tier Tribunal when concluding that the Appellant did not have a very strong Article 8 claim that was over and above the exceptions to deportation (para 128). The Appellant had no established family life in the United Kingdom, a limited private life and although there was some progress towards rehabilitation, this was not a weighty factor; balanced against the ties and support available in Nigeria from family.
21. The second ground of appeal also fails to establish any error of law by the First-tier Tribunal. It is noted that Mr Moriarty did not identify any particular aspects of the medical evidence as being relevant to obstacles to integration or very compelling circumstances generally and there was nothing specific in that evidence, particularly given that the Appellant was not in receipt of any treatment for any mental health conditions (and in fact was resistant to the idea of engaging in any such treatment) that could have materially supported his position in the final balancing exercise. There were recommendations for treatment and support, with a concern that removal to Nigeria would leave him vulnerable and without the moderate level of protection that he has in the United Kingdom, but that failed to take into account the family support the First-tier Tribunal found he would have on return to Nigeria. In any event, when read as a whole, the First-tier Tribunal self-evidently undertook a holistic approach to all of the factors (following an appropriate self-direction to do so) which also expressly included that he was a victim of exploitation, was vulnerable and had a difficult childhood. The perhaps slightly imprecise wording at the end of paragraph 116 does not go against the decision read as a whole to establish an error of law on this ground.
22. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed on both grounds.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is not necessary to set aside the decision.
The decision to dismiss the appeal is therefore confirmed.

G Jackson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27th July 2026