UI-2025-005908
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005908
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66594/2023
LP/00241/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14th of May 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC
Between
RU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gilbert, counsel instructed by Wilson’s LLP
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 16 April 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Iraq who seeks asylum. There is an issue as to whether he holds any other nationality. The appellant’s application for protection was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 1 December 2023. His appeal against that refusal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana in a determination promulgated on 23 September 2025.
2. The appellant appealed against that decision and permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys on 19 November 2025. The matter now comes before me to determine whether FTTJ Chana made an error of law in her determination. The parties agree that she did and that the decision must be remade.
Grounds of appeal
3. The appellant appealed on the following grounds, which I have gratefully adopted from the distillation of FFTJ Le Grys:
a. Ground 1: The FTT made a material error of fact in concluding that the Appellant held a ‘full’ Brazilian passport and was a Brazilian citizen.
b. Ground 2: The FTT made a material error of fact in finding that the expert had not indicated the evidence on which their conclusion that the appellant had refugee status in Brazil was based.
c. Ground 3: The FTT made a material error of fact in concluding that the appellant’s solicitors had given inaccurate information to the embassy.
d. Ground 4: The FTT made further material errors of fact as to the appellant’s status in Brazil.
e. Ground 5: The FTT reached irrational conclusions.
4. Granting permission, FTTJ Le Grys noted that the copy of the passport relied on in the grounds did not appear to have been exactly that before the Tribunal.
5. The respondent produced a Rule 24 response maintaining that the FTT’s decision does not contain a material error of law. In particular, the respondent relied on the comment of FTTJ Le Grys above in respect of the availability of the passport.
6. The appellant, in a further response of 4 March 2026, produced evidence that the passport in question had in fact been before the FTT, though the FTTJ appears to have overlooked it.
7. I also note that the FTTJ recorded Mr Gilbert as having been counsel at first instance when in fact it was Keelin McCarthy (though Mr Gilbert had produced the skeleton argument).
Decision and reasons
8. I am grateful to Mr Gilbert and to Ms Isherwood for their assistance. Ms Isherwood on behalf of the respondent accepted that there was an error and that the matter must be reconsidered. I agree.
9. The basis for the concession was in substance the appellant’s Ground 1 – the FTTJ proceeded on the basis that the appellant was a “full” Brazilian citizen, having an ordinary Brazilian passport with no limitations. She states at [10]:
“I find that there is no credible evidence that the passport issued to the appellant in Brazil is a passport meant for refugees. The expert stated that this document, [i]s a “Brazilian passport for foreigners which expired on 30 September 2022”. However this restriction is not reflected on the appellant’s Brazilian passport. The appellant’s passport is issued to him as a citizen of Brazil, without restrictions or conditions. I therefore find that the appellant is a Brazilian citizen. I find that the appellant has not discharged his burden of proving that he is not a Brazilian citizen.”
10. The FTT also held [30]:
“I find that there is no credible evidence before me that the appellant is a foreigner registered in Brazil or had refugee status. The appellant has a full Brazilian passport and the only issue is that it has expired and requires renewal.”
11. In fact it is in fact quite clear on the face of the passport produced that this is incorrect: the passport states that it is a “PASSAPORTE PARA ESTRANGERIO” or “Passport for Foreigners”. It gives the appellant’s nationality as Iraqi and not Brazilian. It was issued for two years only and expired on 30 September 2022. As this document was before the FTTJ there is no real doubt that this was an error of fact amounting to an error of law, and as it was the central finding on the key matter in issue the determination must be set aside.
12. The determination includes swingeing criticisms of the appellant’s solicitor in respect of her correspondence with the Brazilian authorities for the purposes of seeking to determine whether the passport could be renewed. Because of the FTTJ’s conclusion that there was no reason to believe the passport in question was one for foreigners, the solicitor’s letters and emails are variously described as having “given information to the Brazilian embassy which is not accurate”[12]; “deliberately” not asking the correct questions [14]; being “misleading” [14] (and again at [21] and again at [26] and again at [36] and again at [40]); being “disingenuous” [15] (and again at [19] and again at [30] and again at [40]); engaging in a “delay tactic” by asking questions that should be “obvious to a professional solicitor” [19]; engaging in “procrastination… to create a paper trail for the hearing” [27]; and perhaps most seriously acting not in “good faith” [36].
13. The criticisms of the appellant’s solicitor’s professional conduct are serious. I am told by the parties that she was not given an opportunity to comment in advance of their being made. It is not suggested in the determination itself that she was. In my view it is a matter of serious concern that a professional solicitor was subject to such comprehensive and potentially career-damaging criticism without having had the opportunity to comment on it and explain her conduct. It is more concerning still that the basis for this criticism was the FTTJ’s own misreading of the papers before her. I note that had the solicitor been given the opportunity to comment on the FTTJ’s concerns it is highly likely that the error that gave rise to this determination being set aside would not have been made.
14. It follows that the determination contains a material error of law. No findings can be preserved. Although the parties suggested that the decision should be remade in the Upper Tribunal, the factual issues are such that I consider it requires a full rehearing in the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana of 23 September 2025 did involve the making of a material error of law. It is set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings preserved.
Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 May 2026