UI-2025-005914
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005914
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64794/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23
rd of April 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER
Between
DM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss Patel, of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 27 March 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is an Iraqi national, born on 1 January 1990, of Kurdish ethnicity. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of a Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dismissing his protection and human rights appeals, promulgated on 14th September 2025 following a hearing at Bradford on 1st September 2025.
Anonymity
2. The Appellant has the benefit of an anonymity order, given the nature of his claim. Although there is a presumption in favour of open justice, the publication of the Appellant’s name in connection with an application for international protection, may put him at greater risk of harm, should he be returned to his country of origin. In those circumstances, the presumption in favour of open justice is outweighed and the Appellant should continue to benefit from an anonymity order.
The Background
2. It is the Appellant’s case that he engaged in a relationship with a woman (‘G’) against the wishes of G’s family. This caused the Appellant problems because G’s family viewed the existence of this relationship as having besmirched the family’s honour. As a consequence, G’s family sought to punish the Appellant. Fearing serious harm, the Appellant fled Iraq.
3. The Respondent did not believe the Appellant’s claims about his reasons for leaving Iraq and refused the Appellant’s application for asylum. The First-tier Tribunal agreed with the Respondent and dismissed the Appellant’s Appeal.
4. The Appellant sought permission on 3 grounds which were, in reality, variations on the same theme. The Appellant argued that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision relied ostensibly on its own view as to the probability of the Appellant’s claims or, alternatively, did not provide sufficient reasoning to entitle the reader to understand why it found as it did.
5. At the hearing before me, Mr McVeety indicated that the Secretary of State did not oppose the Appellant’s Appeal. He told me that he had particular concerns over the finding, at [15], that G would likely require a chaperone at all times in public. This finding, Mr McVeety noted, does not appear to be supported by any of the evidence before the Tribunal and, he told me, either speculative or unreasoned. Either way, it contaminated the decision with material legal error, in his view. He asked me to allow the Appellant’s appeal and remit the matter to a differently constituted First-tier Tribunal.
Grounds of Appeal: Discussion and Findings
6. In light of Mr McVeety’s concession, it is unnecessary for me to say much more.
7. It is a trite proposition of asylum law that findings in respect of the plausibility of a claim must be based on reasonably drawn inferences, supported by background evidence before the Tribunal, and not on the Judge’s own view of the inherent probability of the claim. In the present case, the Tribunal reaches findings as to the inherent probability of the Appellant’s account without disclosing, on the face of the determination, what background evidence informed those findings. The only conclusion open to an informed reader is that the Tribunal relied on its own speculative assumptions as to life in Iraq.
8. At [15], the First-tier Tribunal finds the Appellant’s claim to have met G to be implausible. The decision states, “If this was the case his daughter would be likely to require a male chaperone at all times in public which would prevent the Appellant and G having socialised in person on the single occasion he claims they did”. The difficulty with this conclusion is that there was no evidence before the First-tier Tribunal tending to suggest that either G’s family required G to have a male chaperone at all times, and there was no background evidence tending to suggest that such a practice is common in Iraq. This being so, this Tribunal can have no confidence that the First-tier Tribunal correctly understood or applied the guidance in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037. This is a material legal error which contaminates the entirety of the First-tier Tribunal’s findings of fact.
Disposal
9. I have considered the appropriate disposal having regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements and the guidance in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). The error identified goes to the core of the credibility assessment. In those circumstances, none of the findings of fact can safely be preserved. Extensive fact finding will be required. Having regard to the overriding objective, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than Judge Hillis.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
2. The matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined de novo by a judge other than Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal Hillis.
J. GREER
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
19 April 2026