UI-2025-005928
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005928
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53424/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th of March 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHEPHERD
Between
MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Burrett, counsel instructed by Rashid Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 12 March 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal following a hearing which took place via CVP on 20 October 2025.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 30 December 2025.
Anonymity
3. We have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. We have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
Factual Background
4. The appellant is a national of Albania, now aged twenty-five. She entered the United Kingdom concealed in a lorry in June 2021, having been trafficked from Albania to Belgium and then to the United Kingdom.
5. The appellant applied for asylum on 2 August 2022. The basis of that claim was that she was forced into sexual exploitation by her employers in Albania. The appellant was trafficked to Belgium before being brought to the United Kingdom where she was forced into further exploitation. The appellant escaped after some months and, after being taken in by a stranger, approached the United Kingdom authorities for help.
6. On 3 August 2022, a referral was made for the Competent Authority to assess whether the appellant was a victim of modern slavery. A positive Conclusive Grounds decision was arrived at on 8 June 2023.
7. By way of a decision dated 22 January 2024, the Secretary of State refused the appellant’s protection claim. The respondent accepted the appellant’s name, nationality and that she had been a victim of modern slavery by non-state actors. No issue was taken with any aspect of her account. Nonetheless, the respondent did not accept, considering her individual circumstances in line with TD and AD (Trafficked women) (CG) [2016] UKUT, that the appellant would be at risk of re-exploitation on return to Albania. Additionally, it was felt that there would be sufficient protection for her from persecution in Albania and that it was reasonable to expect her to relocate within Albania away from those she feared.
8. The appellant appealed which led to the respondent carrying out a review of her case on 22 October 2024. The respondent endorsed the schedule of issues in the appellant’s skeleton argument which are as follows:
(i) Whether there is any part of Albania where the Appellant could avoid further contact with her traffickers;
(ii) Whether the Albanian authorities can provide sufficiency of protection;
(iii) Whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh.
9. The respondent identified one further matter which was in issue which was ‘Article 3 ECHR.’ On this issue, the respondent simply argued that the appellant could not satisfy the test in AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17. As for the expert report of Revd Dr Carrie Pemberton Ford on the risk to the appellant of re-trafficking, the respondent submitted that the Tribunal was better placed to form an independent view on the three issues agreed to be in dispute.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
10. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge noted that the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness as she suffered from depression and anxiety and had self-harmed. The judge made negative credibility findings in relation to the appellant’s evidence including as to the lack of contact with her relatives in Albania since she had been in the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the judge found that the appellant would not be at risk of harm in Albania and, in any event, there was a sufficiency of protection available to her and she could relocate. The Article 8 appeal was also dismissed.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
Ground i - included a complaint as to a failure, in considering credibility of the appellant’s account of contact with her family, to take into account that the appellant had been found by the respondent and the NRM to have given a truthful account
Ground ii - a failure to consider the expert country report in assessing risk on return.
12. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought, with the judge granting permission making the following remarks:
Firstly, in ground 1 it is argued that the Respondent in the capacity of NRM and as SSHD accepted the Appellant as a credible witness as to her claim to have been trafficked, and did not dispute her evidence as to her family disowning her, meaning that she could not rely on them to assist her in resettling in Albania; accordingly there was no good reason for the Judge to go behind the parties positions; further, her evidence was supported by the Country Expert. Arguably, it is an error of law to look behind any concessions made (but not highlighted at the hearing) and in any event not to state what weight/absence of it should be given on that point to the country expert.
Secondly, in ground 2, it is argued that the Judge failed to give weight to the country expert on the risk on return, relevant extracts being set out in detail [at paragraphs 15-19 in the grounds] but not addressed in the decision; arguably it is an error of law to fail to give weight to the Country expert’s opinion, absent of explaining why that had not been done.
13. The respondent filed no Rule 24 response.
The error of law hearing
14. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
15. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
16. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision which we provide, below, with reasons.
Discussion
Ground one
17. Prior to the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, no aspect of the appellant’s claim had been found to lack credibility. There is no mention in the decision under challenge of a rejection of any part of the appellant’s account of her experiences prior to or after arriving in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the issues upon which the appellant’s claim were rejected were as set out in the appellant’s skeleton argument and replicated in the Respondent's Review.
18. At 26-34 the judge provides a series of reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim that her family did not want to have anything more to do with her because of the nature of the work she was forced to do. The judge’s concerns include at [28] that, during her evidence, the appellant did not repeat a statement she had made in her screening interview that the traffickers had threatened to kill her father if he did not give her details. The judge considered this to be a discrepancy which cast doubt on the appellant’s credibility and concluded that this aspect of the appellant’s claim was a ‘fabrication.’ The problem with this reason is that without knowing the context, including what questions were put to the appellant on this topic, we find it difficult to understand how any such discrepancy was raised.
19. The judge raises a further discrepancy as to who it was the appellant spoke to on the single occasion she communicated with her family in Albania after coming to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, it is implied that other aspects of the appellant’s claim have differed. We note that the appellant provided a very detailed account of her communication with her family in her asylum interview and that there was no criticism of this in the respondent’s decision refusing her asylum claim. There is no indication from the First-tier Tribunal decision that the judge’s concerns were brought to the attention of the parties during the hearing. If they were not, there is an obvious unfairness in preventing the appellant from having a chance to address the concerns during her oral evidence or her counsel from dealing with them during submissions. If the concerns were raised, there is no mention in the decision of any response or submissions made.
20. The judge appeared preoccupied with the family with whom the appellant has been residing in the United Kingdom. Many adverse comments were made regarding the appellant’s evidence in relation to this family. We find it is understandable that the appellant was ill-equipped to deal with this issue which had never previously been a concern. Given that the family are not related and have not witnessed any of the events experienced by the appellant, we consider it is entirely reasonable that they were not called as witnesses. However, the judge relied upon an absence of evidence from this family to add to her negative credibility findings. We find that it was unfair to the appellant to do so.
21. We agree with the points made in the grounds that there has been a failure by the judge to carry out a holistic assessment of all the evidence when considering this issue of family contact. There is no consideration by the judge of the positive credibility findings by the respondent both in relation to the asylum claim and trafficking claim, alongside of the concerns identified by the judge. Nor did the judge factor in the undisturbed positive findings such as that the appellant was trafficked in the first place owing to the absence of family support which left her vulnerable.
22. Furthermore, we find that there has been a failure to take into consideration the evidence of the country expert whose opinion is that the appellant’s account of becoming estranged from her family owing to the stigma of being trafficked for sexual exploitation was consistent with the expert’s knowledge of patriarchal attitudes in Albania as well as other sources cited. There was no criticism, either by the judge or by the respondent, of the opinion expressed in the expert report.
23. The aforementioned errors are plainly material, as they were heavily relied upon by the judge in assessing risk on return as well as to reject the appellant’s claim that she would receive no family support either in her home area or in relocating.
Ground two
24. We could not detect the weight attached to the expert’s report by the judge. If substantial weight was placed upon it, the judge made no assessment of the expert’s detailed opinion that the appellant was trafficked by an OCG, that she would be at risk of re-trafficking from her previous traffickers, that she would not receive sufficient protection from the traffickers by the Albanian authorities, or that she could not internally relocate. If the judge placed little or no weight on the expert report, no reasons were provided. The judge reproduces passages from the report of Dr Pemberton-Ford, without commentary at [22-23], however, we find that there was a failure to engage with this evidence.
25. We note that the appellant has been receiving CBT to address her trauma and evidence of this was included in the appellant’s bundle. The expert considered the appellant’s mental health and concluded at 4.3.3 of the report that, ‘Sending her back to the place where the trafficking occurred would likely hinder her progress towards healing.’ There is no indication from the decision that the judge took into consideration the psychological impact on the appellant in assessing the issues in dispute.
26. We conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains material errors which render the findings unsafe. The decision is set aside, with no preserved findings.
27. We canvassed the views of the parties as to the venue of any remaking should the panel detect a material error of law and have taken them into account. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), the panel carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. We took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as our conclusion that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing and of the opportunity for her case to be put. We consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and we therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
28. Finally, we would add that there remains a further disputed issue which the next judge will have to resolve. That issue is whether the appellant would need to return to her home area to obtain new identity documents. This matter came about from the expert's report which was previously before the First-tier Tribunal. The identity document issue feeds into the question of the feasibility and reasonableness of internal relocation.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different judge.
T Kamara
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16 March 2026