Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005930
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55016/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9 April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

SHILOH OYEH CHIAMAKA
Respondent

Representation:
For the Secretary of State: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For Miss Chiamaka: Mr Bhebhe of Njomane Law

Heard at Field House on 13 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State. She appeals with permission against the decision dated 26 October 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gordon Lennox (“the FTTJ”) who allowed the appeal of Miss Chiamaka on Article 8 grounds against a refusal of entry clearance dated 18 April 2024. The appellant’s entry clearance application was made on 20 January 2024.
2. For ease of reference, I will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal where Miss Chiamaka was the appellant and the Secretary of State was the respondent.
3. The appellant is a citizen of Uganda. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that she meets the relevant entry clearance requirements of the Child of a Parent route under Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules , including that her sponsor mother has had sole responsibility for her upbringing. The refusal of the respondent was a disproportionate interference with the right to respect for family life under Article 8.
4. The respondent disputed it was demonstrated that the sponsor had had the claimed sole responsibility for the appellant’s upbringing and contended that the decision to refuse was proportionate in terms of Article 8.
5. The FFTJ was not satisfied that the appellant demonstrated the sponsor had the claimed sole responsibility but going on to consider matters generally under Article 8, including the best interests of the child, found the refusal decision of the respondent was a disproportionate interference with the right of the appellant to respect for family life established with family members living in the UK.
The Ground of Appeal
6. In summary, the ground of appeal relied upon by the respondent raises that the FTTJ has failed to give adequate reasoning for the decision on proportionality, particularly given the findings made on the issue of sole responsibility which rejected a number of claims advanced by the appellant.
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
7. The core of the respondent’s submission under Ground 1 is that, when assessing proportionality, including the issue of the best interests of the child, the FTTJ does not give adequate reasoning as regards the current role of the appellant’s biological father.
8. The background for this submission is the finding at paragraph 38 of the decision that the biological father has been involved in the appellant’s upbringing at least until 20222/2023 and the finding at paragraph 39 of the decision that it was not demonstrated that the appellant’s sponsor mother had sole responsibility for her at the time of the application on 20 January 2024. The appellant has not challenged these findings by any cross-appeal.
9. The submission of the appellant is that it was open to the FTTJ to treat the appellant’s adoption on 16 December 2024 by Mr Serunjogi as transforming the landscape in terms of the family relations of the appellant and her best interests.
10. Turning to the decision on proportionality, it can be seen that the FTTJ adopts the balancing exercise method, recommended by the leading authorities.
11. It is the best interests of the child to join family in the UK, as assessed by the FTTJ, which it is found at paragraph 48 of the decision outweighs the “strong” public interest in maintaining effective immigration control.
12. I am satisfied that there are two important findings underpinning the FTTJ’s conclusion.
13. Firstly, at paragraph 40 of the decision the FTTJ accepts that since the December 2024 adoption both the sponsor mother and Mr Serunjogi have had parental responsibility, which is supported by a letter from the appellant’s school.
14. This is in contrast to the FTTJ at paragraph 38 of the decision:
• finding that there is very little evidence of the role the sponsor mother has previously provided in the appellant’s life, including the taking of important decisions;
• rejecting the claim, pursued in the evidence of the sponsor and Mr Serunjogi, that the biological father has never had any contact with or provided support to the appellant.
15. I observe that finding that there is parental responsibility possessed by the sponsor and Mr Serunjogi is not necessarily the same as finding that the appellant no longer has any significant relationship with the biological father who has been involved in her life. Moreover, notwithstanding the FTTJ finding that there had been past involvement by the biological father with the upbringing of the appellant, the school letter is silent about the biological father’s involvement at any time or such involvement ceasing.
16. Secondly, at paragraph 45 of the decision, when considering the best interests of the child, the FTTJ finds:
While her father may have had involvement in her life, I am not satisfied that this is continuing given that Mr Serunjogi became her adoptive father in December 2024.
17. I observe that there is no further explanation or reasoning given by the FTTJ for this finding.
18. It is in the context of the now absence of involvement by the biological father in the appellant’s life that the FTTJ finds the family unit of the appellant now consists of her sponsor mother, Mr Serunjogi and her half siblings, who are living in the UK.
19. If the FTTJ relied on the sponsor and Mr Serengoji’s own evidence to find there was no longer involvement by the biological father following the adoption, I am satisfied this requires explanation, particularly as they had not been believed on other important matters. If the FTTJ relied simply on the legal event of the adoption, I am satisfied this still required reasoned explanation for why the biological father, who the FTTJ found to have been involved in the upbringing of the appellant for much of her life, would cease all involvement with the appellant. If other evidence was relied upon, this needs to be identified and explained.
20. In the circumstances, I am persuaded by the submissions of the respondent rather than of the appellant. I am not satisfied there is adequate reasoning by the FTTJ on this matter.
21. The assessment of proportionality under Article 8 requires the proper weighing and assessment of all relevant matters. A failure to given adequate reasoning on a relevant matter is an error of law.
22. I am satisfied that the FTTJ has made a material error of law on a matter that is relevant to the consideration of proportionality in the appellant’s case and that I should set aside the decision.
Remaking
23. I have considered whether the findings of the FTTJ on sole responsibility should be preserved. In effect, I have found there to have been a material error of law in the FTTJ’s assessment of the family life of the appellant. I take the view that findings on the historic and current roles of the biological father, the sponsor mother and Mr Serunjogi have a bearing on the sole responsibility issue under the Immigration Rules as well as any proportionality issue arising. I consider fairness requires the appeal be heard afresh.
24. It is normally for this Tribunal to rehear an appeal, even if some further fact finding is required. This was the request of the respondent before me while the appellant requested the appeal be remitted. Given the extent of the fact finding on the family life of the appellant that may be required in a fresh hearing, I consider it is appropriate to remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The decision dated 26 October 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Gordon Lennox contains a material error of law. I set it aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any judge except for Judge Gordon Lennox.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 April 2026