Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005934
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58601/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBNAL JUDGE SYMES

Between

MANOLITO SANTOS BAYLON
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Rai, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the appeal of Manolito Santos Baylon, a national of the Philippines born on 7 December 1961, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal of November 2023 to dismiss his appeal, itself brought on the basis of the refusal (on 9 July 2024) of his human rights claim (made on 20 March 2023).

2. The Appellant contended on the appeal that he met the requirements of the twenty-year long residence limb of the private life route. He claimed to have arrived in the UK in early 2003 and to have remained here ever since. He originally lived with his mother until 2018 when she left the UK; subsequently he had lived with two partners here, neither of whom attended the Tribunal as a witness. He had worked during his residence here but none of his employers wished to involve themselves with supporting his case. At the hearing below he relied on his own witness statement and oral evidence supported by Mrs Agullana, a family friend.

3. The First-tier Tribunal noted that there was evidence of his arrival here in 2003 though observed that he had necessarily remained in the UK subsequently. It seems there were difficulties in receiving the evidence of the supporting witness:

“The evidence of Mrs [Agullana] was unusual. She gave evidence by video link. When contacted she said that she could not hear what was being said. She could not speak properly because she had a cold. She appeared not to understand basic questions which were put to her.”

4. These difficulties in the course of the hearing took the Appellant's counsel by surprise: he explained he had had a conference with this witness that very morning during which Mrs Agullana could hear, speak, and understand everything which was asked of her. Eventually the First-tier Tribunal contacted her by telephone and she confirmed the contents of her statement; she had known the Appellant for many years, seeing him two or three times a year at parties.

5. The Appellant adduced some documentary evidence relevant to his residence: Home Office letters from 2003, GP records from December 2022, three passports bearing stamps though not one covering the period from 2008 to 2014; some letters and supporting statements from individuals, not all of whom provided an address, saying they had known the Appellant at various times.

6. The First-tier Tribunal concluded, as to the Appellant's long residence claim, that

(a) The evidence from the Appellant and Mrs Agullana, whilst relevant and admissible, could not be classified as independent, and there was no corroboration such as photographs of their acquaintance over the years.

(b) Some photographs showed him in the UK but were not (and could not be) dated.

(c) The gaps in the passport evidence raised the possibility of him having exited the UK over that period; besides, unlawful departure and return was perfectly feasible for a motivated individual.

(d) The letters and statements from individuals who did not attend could be given only little weight given they had not attended for cross examination.

(e) Whilst acknowledging that an unlawful resident would not possess the same documentary footprint as someone who has been lawfully resident, there was nevertheless in general very little supporting documentary evidence by way of tenancy agreements, visits to GPs, doctors and dentists, utility bill or council tax payments, telephone accounts, purchase or delivery receipts, or photographs showing the Appellant and his acquaintances; possible sources of support from former employers and partners had not been forthcoming.

7. Alternatively, he did not face very significant obstacles to integration in the Philippines, a country where he spoke the language, had lived until adulthood, had relatives, and where he was entitled to all the rights and benefits of his nationality. He had worked and formed relationships in the UK and could do so on a return to his country of origin.

8. Grounds of appeal contended that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in

(a) Failing to make a clear credibility finding on the evidence of Mrs Agullana.

(b) Failing to give appropriate weight to the passport evidence which was consistent with a long period of uninterrupted UK residence, and failing to properly take account of the Appellant's evidence that the passport relevant to the period from 2008 to 2014 was missing. A Philippines passport issued on 6 January 2003 and valid until 6 January 2008 showed only a multiple entry visit visa and no other travel; another passport issued on 18 July 2014 and valid until 17 July 2019 was not stamped or endorsed by any authority; and a further passport issued on 18 July 2019 and valid until 17 July 2029 also bore no stamps.

9. Judge Lawrence granted permission to appeal for the First-tier Tribunal on both grounds on 30 December 2025.

10. Before me Mr Rai developed the grounds of appeal. For the Respondent it was submitted that the appeal lacked merit and represented an illegitimate attempt to re-argue factual findings that were in truth open to the judge below.

Discussion

11. At the hearing I declared that I had identified no error of law in the decision and that the appeal would be dismissed. These are my reasons.

12. The First-tier Tribunal noted that the evidence from the family friend Mrs Agullana was admissible but, as the judge put it, was not truly independent. This was a reasonable point to make: as a friend she may have a vested interest in procuring immigration status for the Appellant. The judge did not treat this as a justification for discounting her evidence altogether. In fact her evidence was of very limited utility even if accepted: she only saw the Appellant two or three times a year and in general appeared to have so little contact with him that she must have been reliant on his own account of how he spent his time to form any view on his continuous residence in this country. The only possible finding on her evidence was that it did not meaningfully advance the Appellant's case.

13. The Appellant provided a witness statement dated December 2024 in which paragraphs 4 to 9 give rather scant detail of how he has spent his twenty years in the UK. He provided only the most limited of corroborative evidence. In Khan [2016] EWCA Civ 416 Beatson LJ recognised that it would be wrong to attempt to restrict the forms of evidence that could satisfy a decision maker as to the length of a person’s residence. It was likely that those lacking status would not have access to “official” documentation, and non-official but "independent" documents and letters from neighbours and friends would be a relevant potential source of corroboration. There is virtually nothing of that nature here.

14. It is always possible that someone who has broken the immigration laws in one way, by very significant overstaying, is willing to break them in other ways too, for example by travelling abroad during their UK residence and thus breaking its continuity. Whilst in many cases one might doubt the likelihood of a migrant so doing, given the dangers that irregular travel might occasion and the uncertainty of securing a return to the UK, the Appellant's ability in this particular appeal to repeatedly avail himself of passport facilities from his country of nationality plainly raises the possibility that he might have travelled abroad. The absence of passport stamps for much of his stay here does not prevent the inference drawn that he might have done so between 2008 and 2014.

15. I conclude that this is not an appeal where, notwithstanding Mr Rai's elegantly concise submissions, I can find that the judge's conclusions on the relevant primary facts were such that the judge was “plainly wrong”. He considered all relevant evidence, attributed reasonable and balanced weight to the strands of potential corroboration, and provided tenable reasons for his conclusions.

16. So the appeal must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision:

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; its decision shall stand. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

30 April 2026

Upper Tribunal Judge Symes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber