Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-005942
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/69390/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

SA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M West, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background to the Appeal
1. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered the United Kingdom on 25 December 2022 with entry clearance as a student. He claimed asylum on 8 June 2023. His claim was refused on 5 August 2024 and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The basis of the claim was that the Appellant had been involved in Bangladesh with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), in particular its student wing, the Jatiotabadi Chatro Dal (JCD), and that because of that political involvement he had been attacked, hospitalised, detained and made the subject of politically motivated criminal proceedings and arrest warrants. He also relied upon sur place political activity in the United Kingdom and evidence concerning his mental health.
3. The appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Howard (“the judge”) on 16 October 2025. In a decision promulgated on 2 November 2025, the judge dismissed the appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
4. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The grounds challenged the judge’s approach to the standard of proof, the treatment of documentary evidence, the treatment of country conditions and the changed situation in Bangladesh, the approach to obstacles to integration, and the treatment of the expert evidence. Permission was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence on 30 December 2025.
5. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 Response opposing the appeal. In relation to the judge’s assessment of the documentary evidence, however, the Respondent accepted that the judge’s references to the non-production of “originals” were “strange”, whilst contending that any error was not material.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge
6. The judge concluded that the Appellant had not established the core of his account.
7. The judge relied upon a number of matters said to undermine credibility, including delay in claiming asylum, asserted inconsistencies in the evidence, and concerns about the reliability of a number of documents. In relation to the hospital letter, the judge accepted that, “on the face of it”, it corroborated the account of hospitalisation, but went on to criticise it by reference to language, spelling, date format and what was said to be an apparent semi-erasure.
8. At paragraph 94 the judge said:
“Seventh, the appellant has provided alleged charge sheets, statements and arrest warrant for the appellant along with translations ... I note that the originals have not been presented. In light of my concerns regarding the appellants [sic] other documents, I am also not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated on balance that the arrest warrant and charge sheets are reliable either.”
9. At paragraph 99 the judge said:
“… I note that in support the appellant has provided further documents in this regard ... I note that the originals have not been provided. I note that background evidence indicates that fraudulent notary practices in Bangladesh are common. I am not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated that these documents are reliable either.”
10. At paragraph 103 the judge concluded:
“Considering the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that on balance that the appellant has demonstrated a genuine subjective fear of persecution for a UN1951 [sic] Refugee Convention reason on the basis of his alleged support for the BNP/ JCD in Bangladesh. I am not satisfied on balance that the appellant has given a credible account at its core.”
11. At paragraphs 107 and 108 the judge further concluded that, even applying the lower standard of proof, there was no reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted on return and that the Appellant had not demonstrated either active involvement in the JCD of the BNP or the reliability of the documents upon which he relied.
12. The judge then turned to the changed political circumstances in Bangladesh, noting the fall of the Awami League government, the information contained in the December 2024 CPIN, and the decision in MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812. The judge gave reduced weight to the expert report and concluded that the Appellant was not at real risk on return.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
13. I am grateful to Mr West, who adopted a pragmatic and realistic approach in his submissions. The grounds had been drafted by other counsel and, as I observed during the hearing, not all of them readily made sense. Mr West properly confined his submissions to those grounds which could sensibly and properly be advanced.
14. Mr West submitted that ground 2 was his principal ground. He did not pursue ground 1. He did not seek to trouble the Tribunal with ground 4. As to ground 5, he did not in substance pursue it and indicated that he did not understand it in the way in which it had been framed. He submitted that ground 3 depended upon ground 2 being made out.
15. Mr West submitted that the judge materially erred in his treatment of the documentary evidence, in particular by proceeding at paragraphs 94 and 99 on the basis that original documents had not been provided. He submitted that there was no requirement for the Appellant to produce physical originals in the manner contemplated by the judge, that the issue had not been raised by the Respondent, and that the Rule 24 Response in substance accepted error in that regard.
16. Mr West submitted that the error was material because the documents in question were central to the claim, including the court materials and arrest-related documents said to show that the Appellant had come to adverse attention in Bangladesh.
17. Mr West further submitted that judge’s reasoning in respect of the documentary evidence was speculative. He relied in particular upon paragraph 90 of the decision, where the judge said of the hospital letter that it “would appear” that part of it had been “semi-erased” and that it gave “the distinct impression” that the letter had been amended. In that context Mr West submitted that the judge’s reliance on different date formats was not, without more, a rational reason to reject the document.
18. In relation to ground 3, Mr West submitted that the judge’s assessment of country conditions and risk on return was unsafe because it depended upon the flawed documentary and credibility assessment. He accepted that it was open to the judge to consider MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812, but submitted that MU was not country guidance and did not relieve the judge of the obligation to determine the Appellant’s own case by reference to the evidence before the Tribunal.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
19. Mr Simpson submitted that, although there had been an error in the judge’s references to originals, the true question was one of materiality. He relied upon the Rule 24 Response, which characterised the point as minor and not material in the context of the wider adverse credibility findings.
20. Mr Simpson submitted that the documentary issue formed only part of a broader credibility assessment, including the judge’s reasoning concerning the Appellant’s political activity, the visa application, the account of arrest and release, and the Appellant’s departure from Bangladesh on his own passport. He submitted that the judge would inevitably have reached the same conclusion.
21. In relation to ground 3, Mr Simpson submitted that the challenge could not succeed unless ground 2 was made out. He submitted that the judge had been entitled to rely upon the changed country circumstances and the reasoning in MU.
Consideration
22. Ground 1 was not pursued. Ground 4 was likewise not pursued. Ground 5 was not pursued in substance, Mr West indicating that he did not really understand it in the way in which it had been framed. I agree with that observation. I therefore make no findings on those grounds.
23. I am satisfied that ground 2 is made out. The challenge under this ground was directed to the judge’s treatment of the documentary evidence and, in particular, to the judge’s reasoning in relation to the court documents and the hospital letter.
24. First, the judge proceeded at paragraphs 94 and 99 on the basis that original documents had not been presented or provided. The Respondent’s Rule 24 Response accepted that those references were “strange” and that the Appellant should not have been expected to provide physical originals in the way contemplated by the judge.
25. I acknowledge that the judge directed himself by reference to Tanveer Ahmed, and Mr West did not challenge the underlying principle that it was for the Appellant to show that the documents relied upon were reliable. His complaint, correctly in my judgment, was that the application of that principle was materially flawed because the judge treated the absence of originals as an adverse feature when, on the Respondent’s own case, that was not a proper basis for doing so.
26. The documents in question were not peripheral. They included court documents, charge sheets and arrest-related materials said to support the Appellant’s case that he had come to adverse attention in Bangladesh and remained the subject of extant criminal proceedings there. The judge’s subsequent reasoning, including paragraph 108, returned expressly to the conclusion that the Appellant had not shown the documents to be reliable. The erroneous approach to the supposed absence of originals therefore infected an important part of the credibility assessment.
27. Secondly, the grounds challenged the judge’s treatment of the hospital letter. At paragraph 87 of the decision the judge recognised that, on its face, the letter corroborated the Appellant’s account of having been in hospital for three weeks from 7 January 2021. The judge then gave reasons for rejecting it, including it being written in English, spelling errors, the use of different date formats, and, at paragraph 90, the following observation:
“Most concerning of all however, is that it would appear that a whole section of the letter appears to have been semi-erased from the letter, with the signature from the Hospital placed on top. It gives the distinct impression that the letter has been amended.”
28. Mr West submitted that this aspect of the reasoning was obscure; the judge was engaging in conjecture as to the appearance of the document, and that it was not clear what was meant by the expression “semi-erased”. He submitted that this was not a mere disagreement with the weight to be attached to the document, but a complaint that the reasoning itself was inadequately explained and insufficiently grounded in the evidence.
29. Mr Simpson submitted that this was no more than a disagreement with the judge’s evaluation of the evidence, and suggested that the point being made was that the middle text of the document did not match the rest of it. During the hearing, the representatives and I considered the hospital letter itself in an attempt to understand what the judge meant by the document having been “semi-erased”. Mr Simpson did his best to articulate the Respondent’s position, but he too was unable to identify with any real clarity the feature of the document said to justify that conclusion.
30. I accept Mr West’s submission on this point. Having regard to the hospital letter and to paragraph 90 of the decision, it is not sufficiently clear what the judge meant by the document having been “semi-erased”, nor is it clear on what evidential basis the judge concluded that the signature had been placed “on top” of an erased section or that the document had been amended. In circumstances where the judge had already accepted that the letter, on its face, corroborated the Appellant’s account of hospitalisation, a more clearly reasoned explanation was required if that document was to be rejected on what was, in substance, an allegation of alteration or tampering.
31. I do not suggest that every concern identified by the judge about the hospital letter was necessarily illegitimate. A judge is entitled to consider the form and appearance of a document as part of the overall assessment of reliability. Nor do I suggest that paragraph 90, taken in isolation, would inevitably have required the decision to be set aside. The difficulty is that this reasoning forms part of a wider assessment of the documentary evidence, which was already materially flawed by the judge’s erroneous reliance on the non-production of “originals”. When that error is read together with the inadequately explained reasoning at paragraph 90, the safety of the judge’s overall treatment of the documentary evidence is undermined.
32. Nor am I persuaded by the Respondent’s submission that these errors were immaterial because there were numerous other adverse credibility findings. As Mr West submitted, the findings were not uniformly adverse. The judge recorded at paragraph 86 that the Appellant’s account was “consistent” with his earlier evidence, and at paragraph 87 recognised that the hospital letter, on its face, corroborated the account of hospitalisation. Other findings were findings of little weight rather than outright rejection. In those circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that the outcome would inevitably have been the same absent the errors identified above.
33. Further, I do not accept that the change in government, or the fact that the BNP is now in power, is sufficient without more to render the error immaterial. If the documents relied upon by the Appellant were capable of showing that he remained the subject of extant criminal proceedings, even if falsely motivated, that would remain potentially material to the assessment of risk on return. The relevant question is not confined to whether the Appellant’s political party is now ascendant at national level. It extends to whether, in reality, the Appellant would face arrest, detention, prosecution, ill-treatment, or a lack of effective protection by reason of those proceedings or by reason of adverse interest at a local level.
34. Taking those matters together, I am satisfied that the judge’s assessment of the documentary evidence was materially flawed. Ground 2 therefore succeeds.
35. I am also satisfied that ground 3 succeeds. Mr West advanced that ground as dependent upon ground 2, and in my judgment he was right to do so. The judge’s assessment of risk on return was built upon the conclusion that the Appellant’s account had failed at its core and upon the rejection of the documents said to support that account. It was, of course, open to the judge to refer to the changed political circumstances in Bangladesh and to the Court of Appeal’s decision in MU. I do not consider, however, that MU answers the materiality point in the present case. It does not relieve the Tribunal of the obligation to determine this Appellant’s own case by reference to the evidence before it. Here, the documentary evidence was said to go beyond mere political allegiance and to evidence extant criminal proceedings and continuing adverse interest. Once the judge’s treatment of that evidence is shown to be materially flawed, the later assessment of present and future risk, including the significance to be attached to the changed political circumstances, cannot safely be preserved.
36. I therefore conclude that grounds 2 and 3 are made out. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law and must be set aside.
Disposal
37. The representatives agreed that, if ground 2 were made out, the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. I consider that to be the proper course. The errors identified go to the core of the credibility and risk assessment. None of the findings of fact can safely be preserved. The appropriate course is therefore for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Howard.
38. The anonymity order shall continue unless and until varied by the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before any judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Howard. No findings are preserved.

R. Bagral
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 May 2026