Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000014
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66309/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

JI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms. Reynard, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr. Sheik, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Order Regarding Anonymity

Anonymity was ordered by the Upper Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force in the terms below.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. He applied for asylum and protection on 22nd February 2023, the same day that he was served with removal directions. The appellant’s claim was refused on 25th March 2024. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The appellant claimed to fear persecution on his return to Pakistan from both his family and the Pakistan authorities. He said that the Pakistan authorities wished to arrest him because of his (imputed) political opinion. He also claimed to be at risk of harm from his family and Imam as a result of his inter-faith marriage.
3. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was of adverse interest to the Pakistan authorities. Although the appellant’s marriage was uncontested, the respondent did not accept that this placed the appellant at risk of harm.
4. In the alternative the appellant claimed to be at risk on return on account of his mental health or that his health created very significant obstacles to integration. The appellant has a diagnosis of a mild to moderate ‘depressive disorder – although the ongoing stress of his situation may suggest an experience of adjustment disorder.
5. His appeal against that decision was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal Judge [the ‘Judge’] in a decision dated 1st August 2025. The judge dismissed the appellant’s protection claim; found that his health condition(s) did not engage article 3 ECHR and when dismissing the appellant’s article 8 ECHR appeal, found that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration on return to Pakistan.
6. Permission to appeal against the judge’s decision was granted by Upper Tribunal, Judge Blundell on 29th January 2026 on three grounds:
(1) The Judge erred in his application of the law and failed to make adequate findings;
(2) The Judge erred in his assessment of the evidence and/or failed to consider the evidence in the round;
(3) The Judge made findings and inferences of fact that are based on a view of the evidence that could not reasonably be held;
Hearing
7. In granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell focused on two specific aspects of the judge’s decision at [23] and [27], noting:
(1) At [23] It is agreed that the judge incorrectly recorded the expert psychiatric evidence. The judge records the recommendation for treatment as ‘Firstline antidepressant therapy’ whereas at [§7.2.1.6.1] the report records: ‘I recommend against antidepressant therapy as a first line intervention in this case’. (My emphasis).
(2) At [27] the judge placed reliance on the presence of family members in Pakistan which was wrong because the respondent accepted that the appellant’s family had disowned him.
8. Despite the focus on [23] and [27] of the judge’s decision the parties agree that I should consider all grounds of appeal above.
9. As they focus on the judge’s reasoning, the grounds of appeal overlap. In her oral submissions, Ms Reynard agreed that the starting point is to examine the errors made by the judge and then to consider their impact on the judge’s findings taken as a whole. Ms. Reynard made submissions consistent with her written grounds. Mr Sheik responded relying upon the Secretary of State’s Rule 24 Response. I refer further to some of the parties submissions below.
Discussion
10. In assessing the judge’s reasoning, I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC).
11. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ. 464, at [2], the Court of Appeal reiterated the caution with which an appellate tribunal must approach findings of fact. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Ground one
12. At ground §30, Ms. Reynard submits that the judge failed to make adequate findings as to credibility and the judge erred in failing to consider the impact of the appellant’s mental health conditions on his ability to recall events. This is revisited in ground three at [§43] of the appellant’s grounds.
13. Ms. Reynard submits that the judge failed to properly consider an expert psychiatric report prepared on the appellants behalf, specifically:
I noted a limited engagement by JI in interview, with features of affective blunting and limited expression apparent. I would suggest these factors are considered in the context of any hearing – the role of an intermediary or similar agent may be beneficial in supporting him in this regard.
The report also records that in 2019, the appellant complained of ‘memory disturbance’.
14. No intermediary was instructed or reported on behalf of the appellant. Ms. Reynard confirmed that at the hearing no application was made for an adjustment to how the appellant would be cross-examined. There was no other proper basis referred to in the report which suggested that the appellant’s mental health was such that he could not properly recall events when being cross-examined or otherwise.
15. The judge’s reasons at [22] for rejecting the appellant’s protection claim relate to the paucity of evidence relied upon by him, not because of any matter related to his inability to give evidence effectively or for reasons connected to memory loss. The Judge records: ‘He claims to have been threatened on WhatsApp and X, but he has submitted no evidence of these threats and did not know who sent them.’ This aspect of ground one of appeal has no merit.
16. The remainder of ground one submits that the judge’s assessment as to whether there were very significant obstacles to reintegration into Pakistan was considered without regard to the cumulative impact of all obstacles on the Appellant's ability to integrate.
17. The judge’s assessment of the obstacles to integration are set out throughout his decision and are summarised adequately at [27]. It is clear, when reading the whole of the decision rather than applying a narrow textural analysis, that the judge considers the evidence in the round. This aspect of ground does not have merit. The criticism is repeated at grounds 2 and 3, below.
Grounds two and three
18. It is convenient to take grounds 2 and 3 can be taken together. As drafted, ground 2 already has some overlap with ground 1.
19. In his report Dr. Shepherd went on to advise against Firstline anti-depressant therapy as the appropriate treatment for the appellant. This is incorrectly recorded by the judge, and the matter referenced by Upper Tribunal Blundell when granting permission to appeal, see [7], above.
20. The appellant submits that the error by the judge was material to his assessment of obstacles to integration because the judge failed to properly understand or assess what the appellant’s needs in Pakistan would be.
21. In his witness statement dated 9th January 2025, at [§48] the appellant confirmed that he was taking anti-depressant medication daily and had been doing so since December 2023. Further, at [190] of the appellant’s bundle before the Judge, the appellant relied on a photograph of the medication he was taking – Sertraline at 100mg daily dose.
22. In so far as the judge incorrectly recorded the experts recommendation it is important to record that the advice and recommendation of Dr Shepherd was not adopted by the appellant. The reason for not following this advice was not explained by the appellant either in his witness statement or subsequent cross-examination. The appellant [§54 of his witness statement] said that he would not receive any kind of support for his health conditions in Pakistan. This assertion was echoed in the Appellant skeleton argument.
23. This argument is without merit. The appellant has not set out what specific support was needed and how it was not available. The judge recorded the appellant’s actual treatment, not the recommendation which was itself was not adopted. The error made by the judge was not material to his ultimate decision.
24. Ms Reynard submits the judge failed to give adequate weight to the medical report from Dr Shepherd in addressing the importance of family support to assist with the appellant’s mental health. At 7.2.6.1 of his report, Dr. Shepherd records: ‘Family support, through his Aunt and Uncle, is of clear value in promoting JI’s sense of connection, identity, and meaning.
25. When considering the judge’s reasons as a whole, it is clear that the judge considered all the evidence, even if not directly referred to.
26. Ms Reynard submits that the Judge did not consider in sufficient detail the practicalities of the Appellant’s integration, including his ability to seek employment and find accommodation, particularly within the context of him having no family support.
27. The appellant’s case before the Judge was that he had one friend in Pakistan and no other ties. He does have family there but had no contact with them since his father passed away three years ago. The judge’s findings at [27] are literally speaking correct. The appellant does have family in Pakistan. The appellant has said that he had lost contact with his immediate family as a result of his inter-faith marriage of which they did not approve, but following his divorce from his wife it is possible for those connections to be reestablished. Even without family, the judge’s finding is not materially flawed.
28. In his witness statement at [56] The appellant claimed to have one friend in Pakistan who could support him. This chimes with a letter of support [134] written by ‘ZB’ a Pakistani national living in Pakistan who has a known the appellant since 2007 and whom he describes as ‘like a brother to me’. The evidence before the judge was that the appellant was or had been able to work as a mobile phone salesman. His mental health was not a bar to employment.
29. The judge’s findings as to very significant obstacles to return simply reflect what is in reality a paucity of evidence of very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan.
30. It is also submitted that the judge did not adequately consider the extensive objective evidence provided relating to firstly the issue of interfaith marriage, divorce and the misuse of blasphemy laws in Pakistan. This ground is not linked to the errors of fact referred to above.
31. At [21] The judge reached the conclusion that the appellant’s account of fearing his family was undermined by his repeated return visits to Pakistan; that the appellant’s family had moved away and he did not know where they are; the Imam who may have been initially involved in discussions with the family has also moved away such that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that he would be at risk on return on account of his marriage, which dissolved in 2018.
32. Here, the challenge to the judge’s reasons is without merit the judge having reached a determination of the risk posed by the appellant’s family such that it was unnecessary for him to further explore objective evidence and blasphemy laws.
33. It is submitted made findings and inferences of fact that are based on a view of the evidence that could not reasonably be held. These are set out fully at [43] of the appellant’s grounds. These include the finding that the Imam has moved away [21] which it is submitted is inconsistent with the Appellant saying he does not know where the Imam has gone. All these matters are simply a disagreement with the findings of the judge by applying a narrow textual analysis to a broader decision. They do not amount to an error of law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the Judge does not contain an error of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Paul Lewis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7th April 2026