Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000028
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50272/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18 September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

Between

FA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Spurling, Counsel instructed by Hunter Stone Law
For the Respondent: Mr. Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 May 2026

ORDER REGARDING ANONYMITY

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, and any family member likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought by appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulhollan (the Judge) to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against a decision made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department refusing his protection and human rights appeal.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He claims to fear the police and the government in Bangladesh because of his support for the Chatra Dal and the BNP. He has been arrested twice and has been charged and convicted of murder in a politically motivated case. He has also been politically active in the UK. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim based primarily on his credibility.
3. The Judge dismissed the appeal on the basis that they were not satisfied that the appellant was a credible witness. The Judge rejected both the appellant’s oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence which he submitted.
Grounds of Appeal
4. The Grounds of Appeal are threefold.
5. Ground 1 asserts that the Judge failed to expressly take into account the court judgement dated 20 May 2024 (“the document”);
6. Ground 2 is that the Judge unlawfully conflated their adverse credibility findings with rejection of the documentary evidence;
7. Ground 3 is that the above error infected the entirety of the judgement and the judge’s assessment of the future risk to the appellant.
Grant of Permission
8. Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan granted permission to appeal in a decision dated 21 March 2026. Within this decision they stated that:
“2…Second, the judge gave cogent reasons for rejecting other documents and for not finding the appellant credible. It is difficult to see how, in the context of the other findings, the judge would have found the document reliable. It may be the case, therefore, that any error in respect of the document is immaterial.”
9. The respondent did not file a rule 24 response to the appeal. At the hearing Mr. Terrell confirmed that the matter was opposed. It was also agreed that the Judge did have the document in question before them.
10. At the error of law hearing I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
Ground 1
Did the Judge err by failing to take into account “the document”
11. I remind myself of the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, particularly where the fact-finding Judge has considered evidence from a variety of sources and has undertaken an evaluation of it, set in the applicable legal framework. I also remind myself that no decision will be perfect, that such decisions must be read holistically and sensibly, and that there is no requirement to give reasons for reasons.
12. I find that this is a detailed decision. The judge has explained their adverse credibility findings over numerous paragraphs [17-33]. There is also a separate section dealing with the documentary evidence at [33-44]. It is correct that within these paragraphs the judge does not make specific mention of the document. However, I am not persuaded that this is in itself sufficient to persuade me that the document was not considered.
13. One reason for this conclusion is that at [31] of the decision the judge discusses the appellant’s role, stating that in his witness statement the appellant had said that he was the Assistant Organising Secretary but later claimed that this was a translation error and that he was the General Secretary. In making their findings about the appellant’s credibility the judge refers to “court documents” [31] referring to the appellant as the Assistant Organising Secretary, which is the position attributed to him in the document.
14. I also find that in discussing the appellant’s claim the judge is clearly aware that the appellant claims to have been convicted of murder and sentenced to life in imprisonment (which is evidence only arising from the document). Further at [47] the judge refers to having considered all of the evidence and at [48] specifically states that they are not persuaded that false charges have been bought against the appellant, that he has been convicted in his absence of murder and has been given a life sentence.
15. I am not therefore satisfied that the judge made an error of law.
Is it material?
16. If however an error of law was made I am not satisfied that it was material. This is because the judge gave extensive reasons for rejecting both the appellant’s credibility and the credibility of the documentary evidence, and I am not persuaded that this one document would have had any material impact on their conclusions.
17. Mr. Spurling sought to persuade me that the judge’s findings were not all negative and that consequently had the document been considered it may have made a material difference to the final decision. He pointed to [21] in which the judge finds that the appellant’s account of being arrested following participation in a demonstration in 2009 is “satisfactory” and that at [23] the judge accepts that the use of the word “us” “could be a translation error.”
18. These two “positive” findings are however, I find, in the minority. Between [17-33] I find that virtually ever other paragraph concludes with negative credibility findings and I am not persuaded that the document would have strengthened the appellant’s case because these findings are made based on his oral evidence:
“18…The lack of information about his activities casts doubt on credibility and reliability.
19…This seriously calls into question his claimed role.
20…detracts from credibility.
22…This lacks credibility.
24…This inconsistency detracts from credibility and reliability.
25…It is difficult to accept…
27…This seriously undermines credibility…
28…It is difficult to accept…
29…This inconsistency and unsure response further weakens credibility and reliability.
31…I am not satisfied that this is a reasonable explanation…
32…his failure to mention it sooner detracts from credibility.
19. The judge also makes detailed findings regarding the documentary evidence [34-38]. These include concerns about the contents of the complaint which has two different people named as No. 1 accused, the charge sheet and the FIR “not making sense” and a conclusion that it is “nonsensical” that someone who is convicted could be sent for trial…The information on this document is hard to accept and I have serious doubts that it has been issued by a court.”
20. Again, I am not persuaded that the document would have made any material difference, particularly given the anomalies in the document itself which were highlighted by Mr. Terrell such as there being two “accused no.1”and that the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with an additional year which he submitted did not make sense. I also note that within the document the appellant’s name is listed with several others as “absconded” but that it is only the appellant who is mentioned in the last paragraph of the document regarding when his sentence will start.
21. I am therefore satisfied that even if the judge did err in failing to take the document into account they would not have made any finding other than that the document was at least not reliable and possibly that it was a forgery as they did with the other documents. I am not therefore persuaded that any error would have been material.
Grounds 2 and 3
22. These grounds were not the focus of the submissions. For the sake of completeness I conclude that the judge’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence was made on the basis of both the appellant’s oral and documentary evidence. Further, that in accordance with AHMED (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan * [2002] UKIAT 00439:
“1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.”
23. Given that I have found that there was no error, and that even if there was it was not material Ground 3 is without merit.

Notice of Decision
24. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The appellant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed.

L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 July 2026