UI-2026-000035
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000035
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/75462/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21st April 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
Between
MH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Considered on the papers
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. By way of a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 January 2026, the appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal following a hearing which took place on 23 October 2025.
2. This matter has been considered on the papers in order to avoid the wasting of the parties’ resources in listing this matter for an oral hearing.
Anonymity
3. I have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. I have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. There were two grounds of appeal, however permission was only granted on the first ground, which stated, where relevant, as follows:
It is submitted with respect that the FTT J has erred in law when assessing the letter from the Sri Lankan lawyer and arrest warrant issued against the appellant in Sri Lanka. The FTT J made findings that:
‘… I find that the timing of the introduction of the arrest warrant and the fact that the Appellant did not decide to check whether one had been issued when he was allegedly told that police were looking for him, damages his credibility. Even without the Home Office challenging the authenticity of the document, I find, when considering the evidence in the round, that is false.’ (emphasis added) [20].
It is submitted with respect that the FTT J has erred in law when making findings that the arrest warrant is false particularly when there is no challenging to the authenticity of the arrest warrant from the Home office. Further when coming to the conclusion the FTT J disregarded the letter from the Sri Lankan lawyer, Attorney at Law. The attorney at law has confirmed that there is a case filed against the appellant and there is an arrest warrant issued against the appellant for his arrest. These documents are crucial in deciding whether A qualifies for asylum.
These documents were central to the appeal. Had the Judge accepted that the documents were authentic she would have looked at all the evidence in the round and would not have made the subjective incredibility findings she made and she would have had to find that A is a refugee as he falls within the risk categories in line with the current country guidance case of GJ and others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka [2013] UKUT 00319. The fact that there is an arrest warrant issued against him in Sri Lanka will put the appellant on the wanted list as a result of which he will be arrested on his return.
5. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought in relation to ground one, with the judge granting permission making the following comments.
The decision is detailed and well-reasoned, and the Judge has properly directed herself to the relevant In respect of Ground , it is correct to observe that the FtT Judge did set out a number of reasons for finding as he did in relation to the credibility of the Appellant’s core claim. However, it is in my view arguable that in relation to the approach taken with the arrest warrant the judge erred in that, in particular, he failed to have sufficient regard to the fact that it was not challenged by the Respondent, failed to adequately engage with the supporting letter from what was said to be a Sri Lankan lawyer, and/or failed sufficiently to explain the reasons for simply finding that it was false. Given the potential importance of such a document any error (if established) is arguably material. 3
6. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 19 January 2026, in which the appeal was not opposed. The relevant content of that letter is replicated below.
The respondent concedes the appeal. It is accepted that the FTTJ materially erred when he failed to consider that the arrest warrant had not been challenged by the R in the appeal. Furthermore, the FTTJ failed to engage with the letter from the Sri Lankan lawyer. In [20] he simply states he finds it false. It is submitted that the FTTJ failed to give sufficient reasons as to why he deemed the letter false.
It is submitted that the document is arguably an important piece of evidence but insufficient reasoning as to why it was deemed to be a false document are arguably material to the decision.
The R respectfully submits the case needs to be reconsidered on that point.
7. The Upper Tribunal accepts that the error identified in the grounds of appeal is both made out and material, in that the appeal was dismissed solely on the basis that the appellant had bolstered his claim by (falsely) claiming to support a proscribed political group, had provided false documents, all while not holding any genuine political beliefs. Given the paucity of reasoning and the errors therein, the respondent’s concession was therefore, rightly made. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error of law for the reasons identified.
8. As the appeal turns on the credibility of the appellant’s claimed political activity, I consider that none of the findings of the First-tier Tribunal can be safely retained.
9. Neither party has addressed whether this matter ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal or retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully consider whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. I take into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that the appellant was deprived of an adequate consideration of his protection appeal. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different judge.
T Kamara
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 April 2026