Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2026-000044
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/62568/2024
LP/01937/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

RA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Miah, counsel
For the Respondents: Ms Everett, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 7 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him, including his name or address. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. By a decision dated 4 November 2025, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s 17 April 2024 decision to refuse his 4 June 2021 protection and human rights claim.
2. Thereafter, the Appellant’s applied in-time for permission to appeal. By a decision dated 4 January 2026, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal. The appeal came before me for an error of law hearing on 7 April 2026.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He arrived in the UK on 6 April 2021 as a visitor, with his wife and son, both also nationals of Bangladesh. He made a protection and human rights claim on 4 June 2021, with his wife and son as dependants on his claim.
4. In short summary, the claimed factual basis for the Appellant’s protection claim was as follows. He held a senior position as Joint General Secretary of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (the ‘BNP’) in South Surma Upazila and organised several political events against the ruling Awami League (‘AL’) government. As a result, he was subjected to harassment by the AL and its supporters, including a violent attack in December 2020. The AL also brought false, politically-motivated criminal charges against the Appellant. On 9 July 2024, he was convicted in absentia and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.
5. In addition to his protection claim, the Appellant raised discrete claims under: (1) Article 3 ECHR, on the basis of ill-health (migraines and/or Functional Neurological Disorder, possible cancer, and mental ill-health); and Article 8 ECHR, on the basis of facing very significant obstacles to integration on return (for the purposes of paragraph 276ADE(vi) Immigration Rules) and in all the circumstances (assessed outside the Immigration Rules).
6. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on all grounds on 17 April 2024. She refused his protection claim essentially on the basis that she did not accept the credibility of the core of his claimed factual account. The Appellant duly appealed.
7. By a decision dated 4 November 2025, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds. In respect of the Appellant’s protection claim, the Judge did not accept the credibility of the core of his claimed factual account and found that he would not be at risk on return and/or would have a sufficiency of protection in any event. In respect of the Appellant’s Article 3 ECHR health claim, the Judge found that he had not made out his prima facie case. In respect of the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim, the Judge found that there would not be very significant obstacles to his integration on return and that his removal would be proportionate assessed outside the Immigration Rules.
8. The Appellant raised five grounds of appeal. Permission was granted on all grounds. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a rule 24 response defending the appeal.
Hearing
9. Before me, the documentation was as follows: (1) a consolidated bundle, 747 pages; (2) the Appellant’s 7 October 2025 witness statement, 5 pages; (3) the Appellant’s undated First-tier Tribunal appeal skeleton argument, 9 pages; (4) the Respondent’s 18 November 2024 First-tier Tribunal review, 10 pages; and (5) the Respondent’s 16 January 2025 rule 24 response, 4 pages. For the avoidance of doubt, items (2) to (4) had been before the First-tier Tribunal but had been omitted from the consolidated bundle in error.
10. Mr Miah applied for the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal to remain in force. Ms Everett had no objection to this on behalf of the Respondent. I acknowledge the importance of the principle of open justice. However, I grant the application because the Appellant is a protection claimant, and I consider that disclosing his identity could potentially cause him harm in the event that he is returned to Bangladesh.
11. Mr Miah adopted the grounds of appeal (which he had not drafted) and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1. The Judge had misdirected themselves by rejecting various items of documentary corroboration relied upon by the Appellant because they had rejected the credibility of the Appellant’s claimed membership of the BNP, thereby breaching the requirement to assess them in the round (see QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC)).
b. Ground 2. The Judge failed to raise with Appellant their concerns about various items of documentary corroboration relied upon by him, thereby depriving him of a fair opportunity to dispel those concerns (see TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, [2025] AC 374).
c. Ground 3. The Judge’s rejection of various items of documentary corroboration relied upon by the Appellant was inadequately reasoned (see South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953).
d. Ground 4. The Judge’s assessment of risk on return and sufficiency of protection was legally flawed, in particular because it failed to take account of the Appellant’s conviction / sentence. Mr Miah confirmed that this ground of appeal could succeed only if Grounds 1, 2 or 3 were to succeed.
e. Ground 5. The Judge’s assessment of very significant obstacles was legally flawed, in particular because it failed to take account of the Appellant’s conviction / sentence (I note that this was something of a reformulation and narrowing of Ground 5 as pleaded). Again, Mr Miah confirmed that this ground of appeal could succeed only if Grounds 1, 2 or 3 were to succeed.
12. Ms Everett adopted the Respondent’s rule 24 response (which she had not drafted) and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1. The Judge had expressly stated that they had considered the documents “in the round with the appellant’s credibility” at paragraph 27.
b. Ground 2. If the Judge’s concerns were not raised with the Appellant, that did not cause any unfairness because they were perfectly ordinary concerns that arise routinely in cases in which credibility is in dispute. They were therefore foreseeable and could and should have been dealt with in advance by an individual with legal representation.
c. Ground 3. The Judge’s reasons were clear and detailed and certainly adequate in the legal sense.
d. Ground 4. Ms Everett agreed that this ground of appeal would stand or fall with Grounds 1 to 3 (i.e. if any one of them were to succeed, it would succeed too).
e. Ground 5. Again, Ms Everett agreed that this ground of appeal would stand or fall with Grounds 1 to 3 (i.e. if any one of them were to succeed, it would succeed too).
13. In terms of disposal, both representatives agreed that, if I were to find a material error of law in respect of Grounds 1, 2 or 3 (and therefore also 4 and 5), then the decision should be set aside in its entirety and the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh on all grounds. That was because they agreed that any material errors in the Judge’s adverse credibility findings would be capable of affecting all elements of the decision.
14. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Decision and reasons
Ground 1
15. Ground 1 discloses a material error of law.
16. In QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China, a panel comprising the then President and the then Vice-President confirmed that the decision in Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD* [2002] UKIAT 439, [2002] Imm AR 318 remains good law as regards the correct approach to documents adduced in immigration appeals (headnote, paragraph 1).
17. For present purposes, the key principle is that decision-makers must consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round (Tanveer Ahmed, paragraph 38(2)).
18. I acknowledge, as Ms Everett correctly submitted, that the Judge expressly stated that they had considered the documents “in the round with the appellant’s credibility” at paragraph 27. Nevertheless, I must consider whether they did so as a matter of substance. I find that they did not do so, as follows:
a. At paragraph 27, the Judge considered the Appellant’s documentary corroboration as a whole and said, “I do not place weight upon this evidence because of inconsistences in the core of the appellant’s oral evidence given to the respondent” (my emphasis).
b. At paragraph 29, the Judge placed no weight on a document purporting to be a newspaper report that corroborated the Appellant’s factual account “for the reasons I have set out above.” In context, this must be read as a reference to the reasons given at paragraph 27. That is, this document was rejected because of inconsistences in the core of the Appellant’s account.
c. At paragraph 35, the Judge considered various court documents, a charge sheet and an arrest warrant, and found, “I place no weight upon these documents, because I have not accepted that the appellant was a member of the BNP and because of the ease of which documents are obtained” my emphasis).
19. I consider that these three passages reveal that the Judge rejected the Appellant’s documentary corroboration “because” they had (already) rejected the credibility of the Appellant’s claim to be a member of the BNP. Clearly, that was impermissible. It was incumbent upon the Judge to consider the Appellant’s claimed membership of the BNP and the reliability of the documents together, as a part of an in-the-round assessment, not separately and sequentially. I do acknowledge that, at paragraph 35, the Judge provided an additional reason, namely the ease with which fraudulent documents may be obtained in Bangladesh. In my judgment, this additional reason is not sufficient to cure the Judge’s substantive failure to undertake an in the round assessment of all of the evidence.
20. This error of law was certainly material. Clearly, it cannot be said that any rational Tribunal would have come to the same conclusions if it had not been made (see SSHD v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636).
21. This disposes of Ground 1 and Grounds 4 and 5, because both representatives agreed that if Grounds 1, 2 or 3 were to succeed then Ground 4 and 5 would also succeed.
Ground 2
22. Ground 2 does not disclose a material error of law.
23. First, there was no record of proceedings or any evidence of any sort before me to confirm whether or not the concerns in question were raised with the Appellant at his First-tier Tribunal hearing. Neither Mr Miah nor Ms Everett appeared below, so they were not able to assist me in this regard (see Abdi v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1455). I acknowledge that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal were drafted by counsel who did appear below. However, in circumstances where he did not appear before me to assist me in this regard, I do not consider the assertions made in the grounds of appeal to be sufficient (no discourtesy to counsel is intended).
24. Second, in any event, I accept Ms Everett’s submission that, even if these concerns were not raised with the Appellant, it did not cause any unfairness to him because they were perfectly ordinary concerns that arise routinely in cases in which credibility is in dispute. In circumstances where the Appellant had the benefit of legal representation, they were therefore foreseeable and could and should have been dealt with in advance.
Ground 3
25. Ground 3 does not disclose a material error of law.
26. In my judgement, the Judge’s reasoning in respect of the Appellant’s documentary corroboration was very clearly intelligible and legally adequate in the sense that it enabled the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached (see per Lord Steyn in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 2) at paragraph 36). In short, the Judge placed no weight on the documents in question because (1) they had rejected the credibility of the Appellant’s claimed membership of the BNP and (2) fraudulent documents may easily be obtained in Bangladesh. I have already found that reasoning to be legally flawed – see Ground 1, above – but that does not mean that it was inadequate in the legal sense.
Conclusion
27. The representatives were in agreement that, if I were to find a material error of law in respect of Grounds 1, 2 or 3 (and therefore also 4 and 5) – as I have done – then the decision should be set aside in its entirety and the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh on all grounds.
28. I concur that the decision should be set aside in its entirety, because the material error of law in the Judge’s adverse credibility findings would be capable of affecting all elements of the decision. Having considered the Practice Direction and Practice Statement, and also having had regard to the guidance in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, [2023] 4 WLR 12, I consider that this is a case in which the nature and extent of the necessary fact-finding means that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh on all grounds.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside in its entirety.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh before a differently constituted Tribunal.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 April 2026