Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:
UI-2026-000051, UI-2026-000053
UI-2026-000055, UI-2026-000045
UI-2026-000046, UI-2026-000047

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/77240/2024, PA/77242/2024
PA/77244/2024, PA/75775/2024
PA/75776/2024, PA/75777/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHEPHERD

Between

AA, BB, CC
DD, EE, FF
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Ferguson, counsel instructed by JK Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellants have been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their appeals. The appeals of all appellants took place jointly via CVP on 31 October 2025, however, the judge produced one decision in relation to AA, BB and CC and a second decision concerning DD, EE and FF.
2. AA (UI-2026-000051/PA/77240/2024) and DD (UI-2026-000045/PA/75775/2024) are brothers, and the remaining appellants are their respective dependants.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal, in two identical decisions dated 5 January 2026.
Anonymity
4. We have continued the anonymity orders made by the Upper Tribunal. We have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
Factual Background
5. The appellants are nationals of Turkey. Appellants AA and DD each have a dependent spouse and children.
6. AA was born in 1988 and entered the United Kingdom by sea on 30 November 2023. His asylum claim is based on his support for the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) which he states led to his detention on two occasions. He fears the Turkish authorities due to his political opinion, ethnicity and Alevi faith. That claim was refused by way of a decision letter dated 5 November 2024, principally for a want of credibility or plausibility. It was also not accepted that simply being a member of the HDP would result in persecution or that Kurdish Alevi Turkish citizens faced a low risk of official and societal discrimination. The only material facts accepted were the appellant’s, identity, nationality, ethnicity, faith and that he was as supporter of the HDP
7. DD was born in 1987 and entered the United Kingdom by sea on the same date as his brother, AA. His asylum claim was also primarily based on his involvement with the HDP and two resulting arrests. That claim was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 24 October 2024 on credibility grounds owing to inconsistencies and a lack of detail. The material facts accepted were the appellant’s identity, nationality, ethnicity, and that he was as supporter of the HDP.
The First-tier Tribunal hearing
8. The judge recorded that the provisions of the Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022 applied owing to the date the claims were made. The judge heard evidence from both AA and DD on their own behalf as well as witnesses in each other’s appeals. DD’s wife also gave evidence.
9. The judge dismissed the appeals. His reasons included that the appellants had not demonstrated that they could speak Kurdish, that DD’s account of activities was vague and formulaic, that AA’s account of his activities was general and lacking detail, that there was a failure by both brothers to mention important aspects of their claims during the screening interview and that they had failed to take advantage of opportunities to apply for asylum in other countries.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. The ten lengthy grounds of appeal are helpfully summarised as follows in the permission application.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves material errors of law, encompassing procedural unfairness, misdirection in law with respect to conceded facts, failure to take proper account of material evidence, reliance on speculation and conjecture without evidential foundation, irrational reasoning that directly contradicts the evidence before the Tribunal, confusion and misapplication of evidence between the linked appeals, an erroneous approach to the standard of proof, and inadequate reasons that fail to sufficiently explain key findings.
11. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought, with the judge granting permission making the following remarks.
There is a bundle of further evidence which was uploaded on case PA 77240 2024. This included GP records and a letter. There is no reference to an analyses (sic) of this documentation in the decision and no mention of a consideration of treating the appellant as a vulnerable witness. In the decisions of the Tribunal, there are slight differences in the two decisions, however there appears to be generalised paragraphs applied to both appellants, even though their activities in Turkey for HDP differed and their answers given in interview to the respondent. I grant permission to appeal. I make no comment on the other grounds.
12. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 21 January 2026, in which the appeal was opposed, with detailed comments being made. The appellants filed a rule 25 response dated 24 February 2026.
The error of law hearing
13. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellants containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellants’ and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
14. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision.

Discussion
Ground one – Going behind a concession
15. We find merit in this ground which alleges that firstly, in relation to DD, the judge went behind the respondent’s concession in the decision letter that he was of Kurdish ethnicity and a supporter of the HDP. That concession was maintained at the hearing and indeed the judge records this at [34]. Yet in the following paragraph [35] the judge says the following:
Despite coming from a part of Turkey which has a significant Kurdish population, the Appellant demonstrated no ability to speak any form of Kurdish. It would be expected that one of the Kurdish dialects would be spoken in the family home, even if the Appellant had been required to learn and speak Turkish for his education and his employment.
16. We find that the foregoing passage indicates that, to some extent, the judge did not accept the concession as to the appellant’s ethnicity. The concerns as to the judge going behind concessions does not end there and is revisited when discussing ground seven.
17. It is further argued that the same facts were conceded in relation to AA at the hearing. Indeed, the judge records this concession at [32] of AA’s decision and restates the same at [35]:
It was accepted that the Appellant’s claim if proved fell within the Refugee Convention. The Respondent conceded at the hearing that the Appellant was of Kurdish ethnicity and was a HDP supporter. The Tribunal accordingly finds those facts are in effect proven. But the Tribunal is unable to accept that the Appellant proved the other key elements of his claim.
18. Yet at [36] the judge plainly rejects the concession as to AA’s ethnicity and did so in the following terms:
The Appellant demonstrated no ability to speak any form of Kurdish. If he were Kurdish, it would be expected that one of the Kurdish dialects would be spoken in the family home, even if the Appellant had been required to learn and speak Turkish for his education and his employment.
19. We find that that the judge’s departure from the respondent’s concession as to the appellants’ ethnicity amounted to an error. We find that it was material as it was the starting point from which the judge assessed the remainder of both appellants’ claims including their motivation for involvement in political activity.
Ground two – procedural unfairness
20. There is no indication from the decision in either of the decisions that the judge raised his concerns as to the appellants’ ethnicity with the parties. Indeed, the grounds contend that he did not, and we find that had he done so, an attempt could have been made to address those concerns either by further oral evidence or submissions.
21. This is an obvious error and there are several authorities which emphasise the requirement to give notice of adverse allegations, such Balajigari [2019] EWCA Civ 673 and AM (fair hearing) Sudan [2015] UKUT 656 (IAC), which says at headnote (ii):
If a judge is cognisant of something conceivably material which does not form part of either party’s case, this must be brought to the attention of the parties at the earliest possible stage, which duty could in principle extend beyond the hearing date.
Ground three - perversity
22. There is merit in the point made in the third ground which refers to the evidence contained in the background material, including the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN): Kurds, Turkey, October 2023, as to the pressure on Kurds not to speak their own language and that ‘many’ Kurdish people did not speak Kurdish. In criticising the appellants for their inability to ‘demonstrate’ that they spoke Kurdish, the judge did not take into consideration this evidence of discrimination and intolerance towards Kurds in Turkey which was mentioned by the appellants in their asylum interviews when discussing their ability to speak only a little Kurdish.
Ground seven – errors of fact
23. It is argued under this ground that the judge confused the evidence and failed to consider the relevant facts set out in the evidence regarding both appellants’ HDP activities and their family involvement in the same.
24. Despite the respondent’s acceptance of DD’s support for HDP, the judge states at [36]:
The Appellant’s account of his claimed HDP activities was vague and formulaic, as was his explanation of his political commitment. He provided no cogent description of the contents of the leaflets he claimed to have distributed, nor whether they were printed in Turkish or Kurdish or both. That was information for him to provide. The Appellant’s lack of any real depth of knowledge of Kurdish culture tends to indicate a lack of any commitment to Kurdish causes or political alignment.
25. Yet in DD’s asylum interview, from Q57 onwards, he provided information as to the aims and objectives of the HDP, explained how those aims resonated with him, named the founders of the party, described his own activities and gave an account of the main speaker at the last Newroz celebration he attended. There was no question posed to which he was unable to provide a relatively detailed response. What is missing from the asylum interview are any questions as to the contents of the leaflets he distributed.
26. The judge proceeds, at [37] to also reject the concession made regarding AA’s support for HDP in near identical terms to the paragraph mentioned above in DD’s decision:
The Appellant’s account of his claimed HDP activities was very general and lacked any specific detail, as was his explanation of his political commitment. He provided no description of the contents of the leaflets he claimed to have distributed, nor whether they were printed in Turkish or Kurdish or both. That was information for him to provide. The Appellant’s own lack of any real depth of knowledge of Kurdish culture tends to indicate a lack of any commitment to Kurdish causes or political alignment.
27. As for AA, from question 55 onwards of his asylum interview record, he provided a detailed account of his support and his specific role in raising funds and organising meetings for the HDP. During the same interview, the appellant mentioned his family’s longstanding support, the reasons HDP appealed to him and his motivation to continue supporting them notwithstanding the risks. Of particular interest, is AA’s description in response to question 67 of the appearance and content of the leaflets (referred to as brochures in the interview) he distributed.
28. The content of the respective interview records supports the complaint in the grounds that the judge may well have become confused in respect of the differing nature of the appellants’ claims. It is apparent that their accounts are not identical and that AA appears to have had far more involvement than DD in supporting the HDP.
29. While the judge does not expressly state what evidence he is referring to when he criticised the appellants’ accounts, the judge’s lengthy summaries of the appellants’ oral evidence include no mention of them being asked about the HDP, the content of the leaflets distributed or their family involvement in the party.
30. In addition to the inaccuracy of the judge’s assessment of the interview records, the reasons provided are inadequate in that the judge finds the appellants’ accounts to be ‘vague’ or ‘lacking specific detail’ without reasons or by reference to any of the evidence adduced. It is also unclear at times to which appellant the judge is referring. The confusion of the judge is apparent at [42] of both decisions where he stated the following:
In the first place, the Appellant was (on his own case) merely an HDP supporter, not a leader or organiser. He held no administrative role and had no access to party records.
31. The above finding, which might be accurate for DD, does not take into account that AA had stated in interview that he was working for the HDP to the extent that he was ‘taking part in getting the donations; organising meetings I was very active in the party.’ That was in addition to distributing leaflets, putting up flags and attending HDP demonstrations as well as other celebrations.
32. The judge commented at [37] of DD’s decision that:
His description of his family’s HDP involvement was similarly vague and formulaic. He gave no examples of his family’s claimed activism. He did not explain whether the family’s support was financial or took some other form,
33. In AA’s decision, the judge made a near identical comment at [38].
34. In AA’s interview record, the appellant gave an example of his family’s involvement, stating that they attended ‘all the meetings’ and that they had introduced him to the party. There were two parts to AA’s interview and in the second part he was asked for more information as to whether his father held a significant role. In his response to a series of questions, AA confirmed that was the case and spoke of his father undertaking duties for the HDP in the local area including that he was involved in decisions and discussions.
35. Given the number and length of the grounds of appeal we have placed our focus on what we consider to be the stronger complaints. That is not to say that the other grounds were unmeritorious. We conclude that the errors identified are material and suffice to render the decisions unsafe. We, accordingly, set aside the decisions without preserving any findings.
36. We canvassed the views of the parties as to the venue of any remaking should the panel detect a material error of law and have taken them into account. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), the panel carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. We took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as our conclusion that the nature of the errors of law in these cases meant that the appellants were deprived of a fair hearing and of the opportunity for their cases to be put. We consider that it would be unfair for any of the parties to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and we therefore remit the appeals to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decisions of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decisions of the First-tier Tribunal are set aside.
The appeals are remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different judge.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 March 2026