Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000058
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/58455/2024
LP/03969/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Hyder of Westbrook Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms K. Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. I consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweighs the public interest in open justice at this stage in the appellant’s asylum claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, born in 1995. He arrived in the UK on a student visa on 4 October 2022 and he claimed asylum on 26 February 2023. The appellant claimed to have been a local leader of Chatra Dal, the youth wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Bangladesh, and to have been arrested, beaten and detained by the police for five hours in connection with his political activity. He also said he had managed a Facebook page in Bangladesh “to advocate for justice and democracy”, but that this page had been hacked by supporters of the ruling Awami League party and “destroyed” at the end of 2021. In February 2023, he had begun posting against the Awami League on social media, leading to threats being made against his life. He had also joined the BNP in the UK. There were false cases pending against him in Bangladesh.
3. In a decision dated 13 March 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim. She accepted that the appellant was a member of the BNP and had been the secretary of the local division of Chatra Dal. However, she rejected all of the other material facts of his claim, pointing to: the appellant’s lack of knowledge about the BNP when asked about the party at his substantive interview; his failure to mention his arrest and detention at his screening interview; an inconsistency between when he said he began posting on Facebook in the UK and when he said his parents had been threatened because of those posts; his failure to provide evidence of his political involvement, the threats he had received, and the criminal cases pending against him, in spite of having said that he would do so; and the fact that he claimed to have received threats because of his social media posts, but the account was a private one. In addition, she found on the basis of the evidence in her CPIN, Bangladesh: Political parties and affiliation that low-level members of the BNP were not at real risk of persecution.
4. The appellant appealed, and on 30 July 2025, the respondent conducted a respondent’s review. She withdrew the concession that the appellant had been a member of the BNP and a local Chatra Dal secretary. The respondent also submitted that even if the appellant’s account were accepted, due the fall of the Awami League regime, the appellant would not face a real risk of harm from either the Awami League or the authorities. She relied on the evidence in her updated CPIN, Bangladesh: political situation (December 2024)
5. After the respondent’s review had been conducted, the appellant submitted his evidence in support of his appeal. His personal evidence consisted of a statement from himself, dated 6 October 2025, a statement from his wife of the same date, evidence that his wife had been granted settlement under the EUSS, their religious marriage certificate, and evidence that his wife was in her first trimester of pregnancy. He also submitted more than 20 news articles about the political situation in Bangladesh.
6. The appellant’s appeal was heard before the FtT on 14 October 2025. The appellant was represented by Mr Hyder. On 17 October 2025, the FtT dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
7. The appellant now appeals against that decision.
The challenged decision
8. The FtT’s decision begins by setting out a summary of the appellant’s claim and his immigration history [1]-[4] and the respondent’s reasons for refusal [5]-[8]. At [10], the FtT set out the evidence before it. At [11], it recorded that at the commencement of the hearing, Mr Hyder had clarified that a reference to an expert report in his skeleton argument was an error, while the respondent had consented to the consideration of the appellant’s relationship with his wife as a new matter. At [12], it recorded:
“In the Home Office review it was noted that the respondent withdrew the concession that the appellant had membership of the BNP student wing, and at the
commencement of the hearing the Presenting Officer also withdrew the concession that he would be at risk on return if the material facts of his case were accepted.”
9. Mr Hyder confirmed at the hearing before me that he did not object to the withdrawal of these concession at the time.
10. At [13]-[15], the FtT recorded that it heard evidence from the appellant and his wife, followed by submissions from the representatives.
11. At [16]-[19], the FtT set out the legal framework for the appeal, followed immediately by its credibility findings:
“16. The burden of proof is on the appellant in respect of his asylum claim, and the test is the balance of probabilities under Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. I have found the appellant’s account wholly lacking credibility. He was both casual and vague in giving oral evidence. He provided inconsistent evidence regarding his claimed membership of the student wing of the BNP, and as stated in the refusal letter, was unable to give some basic information regarding the history, logo and officials of the student wing.
“17. He had said in his screening interview (5.4) that he was not arrested or detained, then later changed his account in the asylum interview that he was briefly detained, but then released.
“18. In respect of any Facebook accounts, this was a private account and would not have come to the attention of the authorities in Bangladesh. Nor did he provide any documents relating to any summons or court procedure in which he claimed to be involved.
“19. He also claimed to have attended demonstrations or protests in the UK, but could provide no information regarding any dates or photographic evidence of these claimed activities.”
12. Paragraph 20 begins, “Above all I take careful note of the CPIN [of] December 2024.” The FtT then set out its reasons, based on specific passages of that CPIN, for finding that “Even if I were to accept the appellant’s membership of the student wing of the BNP”, he would be “unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state.” These included that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had resigned on 5 August 2024 and the interim government was made up of student and “civil society representatives from BNP/JEL”. At [21], the FtT acknowledged the news articles submitted by the appellant and accepted that there were “ongoing issues with stability” and “incidences of former BNP supporters being targeted.” However, it found that these were “piecemeal and not consistent level” [sic]. It further noted from the CPIN that the police had been politicised. It concluded, “It appears that some officials appointed by the Awami League remain in power, but as stated, I do not consider that this amounts to placing the appellant at risk on return.”
13. At [22], the FtT made its final comments on the appellant’s asylum claim:
“I have considerable concerns about the actual activity of the appellant as an official within the student organisation of a local branch of the BNP, although he has now provided documentation listing a number of officials, including himself. Above all, even if I accepted that he was a low-level supporter or member, the objective evidence does not support any claim that he will be at risk of persecution on return.“
14. At paragraphs [23]-[25], the FtT gave its reasons for finding that the appellant and his wife were not in a genuine and subsisting relationship. These included strong adverse credibility findings about both the appellant and his claimed wife.
15. The final paragraph of the FtT’s reasons was:
“I also have concerns about the appellant’s overall credibility, under Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 – firstly, because he came to the UK with a student visa, claiming to have completed the first semester of his (MA Leadership and Communications) studies in Portsmouth (he was then living in London), but could provide no evidence of any educational documents or travel between London and Portsmouth, which he stated took place three days a week. Nor could he provide any evidence why he ceased those studies, save to say that his father’s business was affected and he could no longer support the appellant’s studies. Secondly, I consider that his reason for coming to the UK was not to carry out studies, but to make a claim for asylum. In that context I also find as going to his credibility his late claim for asylum, which he did not make until nearly five months after arriving in the UK.”
The grounds of appeal
16. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on three grounds.
17. Ground One: “Error of law in the assessment of risk on return and misapplication of country evidence”. The appellant makes three submissions under this heading:
(i) The FtT treated the general conclusions in the respondent’s 2024 CPIN as decisive, rather than conducting an individualised assessment;
(ii) The FtT failed to give adequate reasons why he would not be at real risk, given his “claimed political involvement, past detention, alleged false criminal case, and sur-place political activities in the UK”; and
(iii) The FtT failed to apply the “lower standard of proof” applicable to the question of real risk.
18. Ground Two: “Unlawful conflation of credibility findings with the assessment of future risk”. The appellant submits that “It is well established that even where parts of an appellant’s account are not accepted, the Tribunal must still assess whether the accepted or assumed facts, taken together with objective evidence, give rise to a real risk of persecution” and that the FtT therefore erred by not carrying an “alternative risk assessment” on the “assumed factual basis that his account was true.”
19. Ground Three: “Procedural unfairness in the reliance on Section 8 credibility findings”. The appellant submits that the FtT “relied heavily” on adverse credibility findings related to his alleged misuse of a student visa and failure to attend his university course, as well as on the delay in his asylum claim. This was procedurally unfair because the respondent had not raised these issues in the refusal letter or respondent’s review.
20. Ground Four: “Inadequate reasoning and failure to properly engage with relevant evidence”. The appellant submits that
(i) “The Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting or attaching little weight to evidence supporting my claim, including documentary and contextual evidence relating to political affiliation and country conditions”
(ii) “The decision does not explain why such evidence was insufficient, unreliable, or irrelevant. This lack of reasoning frustrates appellate scrutiny and constitutes an error of law.”
The hearing
21. At the hearing before me, all parties had sight of the bundle that the Upper Tribunal had created on the appellant’s behalf. I heard submissions from Mr Hyder and Ms Khan. I have taken those submissions into account in full and will refer to them where necessary in the discussion below. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
22. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have borne in mind the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4]. I have considered the determination as a whole and avoided “island hopping”. See: Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
Ground One
23. At [16]-[19] of its decision, the FtT rejected the appellant’s account in its entirety and gave its reasons for doing so. It was not thereafter required to conduct an alternative assessment of whether the appellant would have been at risk if his account had been true. This is clearly set out at section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”):
“(3) Subsection (4) applies if the decision-maker finds that—[emphasis added]
“(a) the asylum seeker has a characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a) (or has such a characteristic attributed to them), and
“(b) the asylum seeker fears persecution as mentioned in subsection (2)(b).
“(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—
“(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
“(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.”
24. The FtT nonetheless did carry out an assessment of the risk to the appellant in the alternative, as it expressly said it was doing in the second sentence of [20]. This was a sensible “belt and braces” approach, as described in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) at [26].
25. This assessment is, however, only an alternative. If the FtT was right to dismiss the appeal because the appellant’s account was untrue, the alternative reasons for dismissing the appeal become irrelevant. The was recognised by the Upper Tribunal judge who granted the appellant permission to appeal when he observed that:
“It is arguable that, in assessing risk on return, the judge applied an incorrect standard of proof. That would be an immaterial error if it were unarguably the case that the appellant had been found to have no subjective fear of persecution on political grounds. However, it is arguable that the judge did not in fact make any such conclusive finding.”
26. I find that the FtT did make a conclusive finding that the appellant had no subjective fear of persecution on political grounds at [16] when it said “I have found the appellant’s account wholly lacking credibility”.
27. Mr Hyder at first submitted that the FtT had not given adequate reasons for this finding. I disagree. The reasons are set out at [16]-[19] and are entirely clear and sufficient for the appellant to know why he was not believed.
28. Mr Hyder accepted that there had been no challenge to those reasons in the grounds of appeal. He then tried to raise a criticism of them at the hearing. This was that the FtT had failed to engage with what the appellant had said in his witness statement, which spoke to some of these issues. I asked him to take me to the witness statement, and he drew my attention to two paragraphs in which the appellant had responded to adverse credibility points made in the refusal letter and endorsed by the FtT. The first was at [16]:
“In the refusal letter, the Home Office mentioned that there was an inconsistency regarding my statements about being detained in Bangladesh. Specifically, they stated that in my Screening Interview (SCR), I answered “no” when asked if I had ever been detained, but in my main interview, I mentioned being detained for five hours. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify this misunderstanding. During my screening interview, I was given very limited time to explain my situation, which may have led to a miscommunication. The five-hour detention I referred to in my main interview was not an official arrest or imprisonment, as I also clarified in AIR: 77.”
29. The second was at [24], where the appellant asserted:
“the DM’s [decision-maker’s] statement that I did not adequately explain the party logo is not entirely accurate. I did describe the logo during the interview; however, due to nervousness and stress at that moment, I may not have expressed myself as clearly as intended.”
30. I asked Mr Hyder if the appellant had ever given any explanation for his failure to provide supporting documents, which was another issue raised in the refusal letter. He took me to [27], but this in fact did not address the issue. On the contrary, the appellant simply asserted that the respondent had accepted his membership in the BNP (which was no longer the case by the time the statement was written) and stated that he was “not submitting any new or fresh evidence at this stage”.
31. Given that these criticisms of the adverse credibility findings were not raised prior to the hearing, they would have to be Robinson obvious for me to even consider them. They are not Robinson obvious. They are not even arguable. It is trite that the FtT does not need to refer to every submission an appellant makes. Nor do I consider that these particular statements are of such substance that the FtT was required to comment on them. They are nothing more than vague assertions that there may have been a misunderstanding or miscommunication.
32. Because the FtT’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account in its entirely were clearly open to it on the evidence before it, any error in its assessment of whether the appellant would be at risk if his account had not been true cannot have been material.
33. Ground One is not made out.
Ground Two
34. Ground Two is not made out because it proceeds on a false legal and factual basis. There is no legal basis for the submission that the FtT was required to carry out an alternative risk assessment in which all of the facts put forward by the appellant are assumed to be true. This is only required in the context of a decision to certify a claim as clearly unfounded under section 94 of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002. Nor is it factually correct that the FtT did not carry out such an assessment. It did so at [20]-[21].
Ground Three
35. Ground Three is not made out. Mr Hyder accepted that the FtT was required to consider whether the appellant’s credibility was damaged by any of the behaviours listed in section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of claimants, etc.) Act 2004. This is because section 8(1) stipulates that a “deciding authority shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of any behaviour to which this section applies”, while section 8(7) defines “deciding authority” as including the FtT. The appellant was legally represented at his appeal and he should have been advised that the FtT would be required to consider whether he had used deception when entering the UK or had unreasonably delayed claiming asylum. Moreover, Mr Hyder accepted that all of the section 8 points taken by the FtT in its decision had been put to the appellant at the hearing, and he had had a fair opportunity to respond to them. The best Mr Hyder could suggest was that if the FtT was concerned that there was no evidence that the appellant had travelled to Portsmouth to attend his course, fairness required that the appellant be given an opportunity to produce such evidence. However, he accepted that he did not request an adjournment at the time.
36. Ground Three is not made out.
Ground Four
37. Ground Four is entirely unparticularised. The appellant does not identify what evidence supporting his claim was rejected. The only point in the decision at which the FtT refers to any documentary evidence submitted by the appellant is at [22], where it says
“I have considerable concerns about the actual activity of the appellant as an official within the student organisation of a local branch of the BNP, although he has now provided documentation listing a number of officials, including himself.”
38. Although this could have been more clearly expressed, it is trite that this is not an error of law. Nor is the FtT is required to set out every step in its reasoning. In accordance with Tanveer Ahmed, the FtT was entitled to put no weight on these documents, given that it had “considerable concerns” about the credibility of the appellant, who had produced them. As to the appellant’s “contextual evidence”, this may refer to the news articles about recent events in Bangladesh. The FtT did consider these at [21], and it did not reject them as unreliable or irrelevant. Nor did it fail to give a clear reason for finding them insufficient to establish a risk on return to members of the BNP. Its reason was that the evidence showed that the targeting of BNP members was piecemeal and inconsistent. Even if the FtT had erred in so finding, moreover, it would not have been material, because its finding that the appellant was not a member of the BNP was entirely sustainable.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 17 October 2025 contains no material errors of law and is upheld. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 April 2026