Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000064
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/61188/2024
LP/01465/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DURANCE

Between

SD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms U Miszkiel, Counsel, instructed by Consulenti Italiani Law Firm
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrelly (‘the judge’) dated 29 October 2025.
2. The appellant is a national of Georgia born in 1983. The appellant claimed asylum on 10 December 2019, the day after he arrived in the UK. He claims to be at risk in Georgia due to his former role in the military, his knowledge of sensitive information, his political associations and threats that he received from government affiliated actors.
3. We are satisfied that the anonymity order should be maintained. Neither party asked us to discharge it. The appellant claims to be at risk of harm in Georgia. We are satisfied that the potential risk of harm upon identification and maintaining the integrity of the UK asylum system justify derogation from the principle of open justice.
The Respondent’s Decision
4. In a decision dated 25 September 2023 the respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim.
5. The respondent accepted that the appellant had worked for the Georgian military and that he had knowledge of the topography and troop movements in the Beloti region.
6. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was of adverse attention from his superiors in the military. The respondent considered that the appellant had provided inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation and a lack of detail.
7. The respondent concluded that if the appellant’s account had been accepted there would not be sufficiency of protection or internal relocation available to him because he feared the state.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
8. The appellant appealed against the decision and the appeal came before the judge on 19 June 2025. The appellant attended and gave evidence through a Georgian interpreter.
9. The judge accepted that the appellant served in the military for several years and held the rank of Sergeant.
10. However, the judge found that the appellant would not be at risk and dismissed the appellant’s appeal for the following reasons:
“11. I find that he has failed to demonstrate that his military career would place him in any danger on return. I accept that he did serve in the military for several years and toured Afghanistan. I accept that he held the rank of Sergeant. However, he has not established that he had access to information or was involved in such activities as would place him now in danger.
12. The appeal bundle contains details about the appellant’s country. It refers to arbitrary arrest and detention for politically motivated charges. However, this does not mean this applies to the appellant. I do not see any evidence supporting difficulties when he was in his home country.
[…]
“14. He has failed to demonstrate that he engaged in political activities which would place him at risk on return. He has suggested the ruling party, which came out of the Georgian Dream Party, were forcing him to disrupt protests and rallies. He has not substantiated this. He indicated that he is a supporter of the opposition National Movement Party but again has provided no details or evidence of his involvement. In making these comments I am conscious that there is no requirement for corroboration. That is not to say that collaborative evidence cannot strengthen a claim”.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The grounds are unparticularised but it was submitted on the appellant’s behalf that the judge (1) failed to give adequate reasons for finding the appellant would not be at risk in light of his military background; (2) failed to apply the correct standard of proof; (3) failed to have regard to relevant evidence and make findings on matters in issue; (4) treated section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 as determinative of the appellant’s credibility and (5) selectively relied on aspects of the Country Policy and Information Note.
12. The First-tier Tribunal granted permission on 6 January 2026 in the following terms:
“The grounds assert that the Judge erred by failing to give adequate reasons for finding there was no risk on return having accepted the Appellant served in the military and had knowledge of such activities. I consider there is some merit in this assertion. It is not entirely clear to me whether the Judge accepted the Appellant was forced to disrupt protests and the extent to which him leaving the military may give rise to risk or that he was threatened before he left. These factors may not have been sufficient to establish risk on return but it was nonetheless incumbent upon the Judge to make clear findings of fact in relation to such matters and consider his profile in that context with reference to relevant country background information.
The grounds assert the Judge failed to apply the correct standard of proof and placed undue weight on lack of corroborative evidence. There is some merit in this assertion. Whilst the Judge notes that pre-Nationality and Borders Act 2022 provisions apply (at paragraph [1]) there is otherwise no reference to the relevant legal framework or standard of proof. Further, it is unclear whether the Judge placed any weight on the Appellant’s oral and written testimony as to threats received or that he was being forced to disrupt protests or whether this aspect of his claim was accepted as credible. It is at least arguable the Judge placed too much emphasis on a lack of corroborative evidence.”
13. The respondent did not provide a response under rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
14. At the hearing we heard submissions from Ms Miszkiel for the appellant and Ms Nolan for the respondent.
15. At the end of the hearing we indicated that we were satisfied that the judge had materially erred in law and that our reasons would follow in writing.
Analysis
Credibility
16. We are satisfied that the judge erred in his assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
17. The only clear finding in respect of the appellant’s credibility is the judge’s finding at [15] that the fact that the appellant had passed through Poland and Greece, two safe countries, and had failed to claim protection there and had deliberately destroyed his passport adversely affects his credibility.
18. The judge was obliged to consider these factors as damaging to the appellant’s credibility under Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. However, taking those matters into account the judge was required to make a global assessment of the appellant’s credibility. [JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878] We are satisfied that the judge did not undertake such an assessment and as a result materially erred in law.
Failure to make findings
19. It is not clear from reading the decision whether the judge accepted the appellant’s account to be associated with opposition political movements and/or his account that he was forced to disrupt opposition rallies and/or his account that he was asked to falsify documents and/or his account that he received threats as a result to objecting to the above. These are key aspects of the appellant’s claim and could clearly impact on the assessment of risk. Accordingly, the judge was obliged but failed to make findings on relevant matters.
Requiring Corroborative Evidence
20. The judge correctly identifies that there is no requirement for corroboration but goes on to say that “is not to say that collaborative evidence does not strengthen a claim” at [14]. It is assumed that ‘collaborative’ is a typographical error and the judge meant corroborative.
21. There is no requirement that an applicant must produce corroborative evidence. (MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State [2023]) The absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value, for example, if it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, this may be a matter to which the Tribunal can give some weight (ST (Corroboration, Kasolo) Ethiopia [2004] UKIAT 00119).
22. The judge has not identified what corroborative evidence he considered is absent, whether such evidence could reasonably have been obtained and/or whether there is a good reason for the appellant not to having obtained it. For those reasons we are satisfied that the judge materially erred in law by requiring corroborative evidence.
Standard of Proof
23. There is no reference to the standard of proof to be applied in the decision. The judge notes that changes under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 do not apply to the appellant’s claim. That means that the lower standard of proof (reasonable degree of likelihood) applies to the appellant’s claim.
24. We note that the judge is an expert tribunal and can usually be taken to be aware of the correct legal principles. However, in this case the judge refers to the appellant not having “substantiated” or “established” aspects of his claim. We are therefore satisfied that the judge uses language which demonstrates the judge did not apply the correct standard of proof.
Failure to have regard to Relevant Evidence
25. At paragraph 13 the judge states:
“The papers include the Country Policy and Information Note on Georgia, dated September 2024. It opens by stating that protesters and supporters of opposition parties are unlikely to be of interest to the authorities. It refers to high profile opponents, which I find is not the case here. Georgian Dream has been part of the ruling coalition since 2012, and the United National movement form the opposition. The country is a parliamentary democracy. The country information indicates that arbitrary arrest and detention on politically motivated charges does occur, but it is directed towards high profile individuals. Surveillance also takes place but again it would be against opposition politicians or individuals of significance.”
26. The only reference in the CPIN to high profile opponents is in the assessment/policy section. We bear in mind what was said in KK and RS at [301]:
“We do not propose to go into any great detail in respect of the CPIN. In general terms we regard the ‘Assessment’ section as constituting a statement to the respondent’s guidance to her caseworkers on a number of thematically-arranged issues. The CPIN is simply evidence of the respondent’s position as it was at the date of its publication ... The guidance to caseworkers may be relevant in any given case where the respondent seeks to put forward an argument that is inconsistent with it. As regards the ‘country information’ section, we evaluate the source materials set out therein on their own merits in the usual manner and as part of the overall evidence before us”.
27. In Roba (OLF – MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 00001 (IAC) at [83]-[85] the Upper Tribunal drew a similar distinction between the country information section of a CPIN and the section setting out the policy position of the relevant government.
28. We note that the judge was not required to refer to all the country background evidence before him or the entirety of the CPIN. However, we are satisfied that that the reference to high profile actors indicates that the judge simply adopted the assessment/policy section of the CPIN. We have considered whether the judge may have in fact taken the country evidence before him into account and merely used the assessment/policy section as a convenient summary of his own view. However, given the language used, we consider that the judge did not do this, but even if he had the judge would have fallen into error for failing to give reasons. If the judge preferred the respondent’s policy position to the appellant’s claim he was required to give reasons as to why.
Conclusion
29. We are satisfied that the errors we have identified mean that the whole decision has been infected and needs to be set aside. We are satisfied that no findings of fact can be preserved.
30. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) we have considered whether to retain the matter for re-making in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out in Statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. We are satisfied that it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because credibility is in issue. The appellant relies on his own evidence and significant findings of fact will be re-made. The parties agreed that it was appropriate to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
31. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains material errors of law. Accordingly it is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different judge.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 April 2026