Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2026-000066
FtT No: PA/68749/2023
LP/11921/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 18 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O'CALLAGHAN

Between

MK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar, Counsel, instructed by Addison & Khan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No‑one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of India who seeks leave to remain in this country on human rights (article 8 ECHR) grounds.
2. The First‑tier Tribunal previously allowed the appellant's human rights (article 8 ECHR) appeal by a decision dated 19 June 2025. The respondent was granted permission to appeal, and having identified a material error of law I set aside the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal in relation to the article 8 appeal alone by a decision sent to the parties on 2 April 2026.
3. The appellant did not cross-appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss her asylum and human rights (article 3 ECHR) appeal and so the decision stands in respect of those issues.
4. By my error of law decision, I directed that all findings made by the First‑tier Tribunal were to be preserved, save for those located at [38] to [52] and [55] which concerned the article 8 appeal.
Anonymity
5. I previously made an anonymity order in my error of law decision. Neither representative asked me to set aside that order. I have considered whether the order should continue. I consider it appropriate the order continue as the appellant's private life rights as protected by article 8 presently outweigh the general right of the public to know that she is a party to these proceedings. I reach this conclusion consequent to the Home Office accepting that the appellant has previously received threats from her first husband and his family.
6. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Issues
7. By means of a helpful skeleton argument prepared by Mr Badar and dated 13 May 2026, the appellant identifies two issues as arising in this appeal:
(i) Did the appellant cheat in her ETS/TOEIC test?
(ii) Would her return to India breach her protected article 8 rights?
8. Mr Badar confirmed that the appellant relies upon her article 8 private life rights alone, both under and outside the Immigration Rules. No family life rights are asserted by the appellant as being relied upon.
9. The issue of credibility remains live in this matter.
Relevant facts
10. The appellant is a national of India and presently aged 39. She was awarded a degree in India and subsequently applied in 2011 for a Tier 4 (General) Student visa. She was granted entry clearance on 18 February 2011 and travelled to the United Kingdom on 3 March 2011, securing leave to enter on the same day. Following variation applications, she was granted further leave to remain on 21 February 2013 and again on 5 July 2013. Her leave was subsequently curtailed consequent to the respondent being informed that she was not attending her place of education. The decision to curtail leave was issued on 10 June 2014 and her leave expired on 15 August 2014. She was subsequently served an IS151A as an overstayer on 28 August 2014. She has not possessed lawful leave in this country for almost twelve years.
11. She has married twice. Firstly to ‘RK’, who subsequently entered the United Kingdom as her spouse, and then to ‘JS’. Having reacquainted herself with JS on a trip to India, the appellant married JS a month to five weeks after they met. The second wedding was on 24 April 2013, and as confirmed in her asylum interview, she returned to the United Kingdom “a few days later”. She acknowledged in her asylum interview that it was the couple’s intention to bring JS over to the United Kingdom as her dependent.
12. She claimed asylum on 2 May 2018 relying upon threats made to her by RK and his family. The respondent refused the application over five years later by a decision letter dated 18 December 2023. It was accepted that the appellant had been threatened by RK and his family. It was also accepted that the appellant had been subject to attempted exploitation from RK. However, the respondent concluded that there was no real risk of harm because the appellant had failed to show how RK and his family would have the means or motivation to find her on return to India. In any event, she could receive protection from the Indian authorities and internal relocation was reasonably available to her.
13. Importantly, the respondent informed the appellant by her decision:
‘Furthermore, you submitted a TOEIC certificate from Educational Testing Service ('ETS'). Using voice verification software, there is significant evidence to conclude that your certificate was fraudulently obtained by the use of a proxy test taker. In fraudulently obtaining a TOEIC certificate, you willingly participated in what was clearly an organised and serious attempt to defraud the SSHD and others. I am satisfied that your presence in the UK is not conducive to the public good because your conduct makes it undesirable to allow you to remain in the United Kingdom.’
14. The decision letter additionally addresses the appellant's mental health concerns which include, on her account, Post‑Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, suicidal ideation and auditory hallucination.
15. On 23 October 2018, the appellant was referred to the National Referral Mechanism. The Competent Authority decided by a Conclusive Grounds decision dated 18 July 2024 that the appellant was not a victim of modern slavery. The appellant sought a review of that decision which was declined.
Decision of the First‑tier Tribunal
16. The appellant attended the hearing at Hatton Cross on 18 June 2025. She did not give evidence. Her friend Mr Haras Ali Kiyani attended and gave evidence. The First‑tier Tribunal considered the appellant to be vulnerable and applied the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010, Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Witnesses. The Tribunal did not draw an adverse inference from the appellant's unwillingness to give oral evidence and to expose herself to cross-examination.
17. I observed to Mr Badar at the error of law hearing that there was no medical evidence before the First‑tier Tribunal that the appellant was unfit to give evidence.
18. As to the appellant's personal history, the First‑tier Tribunal observed the respondent's acceptance that the appellant had received threats from RK and his family but noted that the respondent had not conceded that there was an ongoing risk or that RK and his family had any elevated profile. Observing that the appellant last had contact with RK and his family in 2013, the First‑tier Tribunal found, inter alia, that the appellant's claim as to her continuing fears of RK and his family were not credible. Even when taking her claim at its highest the First-tier Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence that RK and his family have any political or other influence nor do they have elevated status in India.
19. Further, the appellant was not credible as to her being encouraged to marry RK by means of a sham marriage to enable him to enter the United Kingdom as a dependent on her student visa. Relevant to the appeal before me, the First-tier Tribunal found, at [25] and [26]:
‘25. ... I find that the appellant’s relationship with RK was something which she entered into willingly without being coerced. I further find that she did so to facilitate RK’s entry to the UK.
26. After divorcing RK the appellant returned to India in April 2013. She did so despite her claims to fear him and his family. While she claims to have received threats from RK and his family, she came to no harm and managed to return to the UK. It was whilst in India on that occasion she resumed relations with a friend of hers, JS, whom she married on 24 April 2013. He then entered the UK as the appellant’s dependent. The appellant’s ability to lead her life in India in 2013, including marrying again, is at odds with the suggestion that she was still fearful of RK and his family and was the subject of a real threat from them. The appellant married on this second occasion, again, with a view to facilitating her second husband’s entry to the UK.’
[Emphasis added]
20. It was therefore found as a fact that the appellant entered into two marriages, firstly with RK and then with JS, with the view of facilitating their entry to the United Kingdom. The underlying rationale of the marriages was therefore to help both husbands enter this country at a time when the appellant could sponsor them through her student status.
21. The appellant’s article 3 claim was dismissed. I observe that little weight was placed upon the expert medical report prepared by Dr Jan Falkowski, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 12 December 2024.
22. Relevant to these proceedings, I observe that little weight was placed upon a country expert report prepared by Dr Farhaan Wali, dated 3 February 2025. The First-tier Tribunal concluded that Dr Wali erroneously placed significant reliance upon what the appellant stated as to the potential influence of RK and his family on the authorities in India when assessing her ability to access suitable treatment for her mental health.
Vulnerability
23. When seeking to be treated as vulnerable in these proceedings, the appellant places weight upon two recent letters: the first from her GP dated 17 April 2026 and the second from a clinical nurse dated 27 April 2026. The GP sets out the appellant’s history of other recurrent depressive disorders and PTSD He opines that the appellant remains ‘highly vulnerable with ongoing suicidal ideation’. The clinical nurse references the appellant having suicidal thoughts, low mood, anxiety, auditory hallucinations, poor sleep and poor appetite.
24. I observe the guidance of the Court of Appeal in AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, [2018] 2 All ER 350, at [21] to [22]. As explained at the hearing, I treat the appellant as vulnerable because I accept at the outset that she has a longstanding diagnosis of ‘other recurrent depressive disorders’, arising when a person has repeat episodes of depression that do not fit the exact rules for standard major depression or other specific depressive types (ICD-10, F33.8). However, as explained to the parties, the medical diagnosis as to the appellant having PTSD was one that I am required to assess in my decision.
Evidence
25. The appellant relies upon two witness statements. The first was filed with the First‑tier Tribunal and is dated 14 June 2024. It runs to 34 pages. The second witness statement was filed in readiness for this hearing. It is 10 pages in length and is dated 9 May 2026. The second witness statement provides detail as to how the appellant prepared for and took her TOEIC test. It also addresses her ongoing medical condition and her life in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the appellant details at [49] and [51] of the second statement:
‘49. I confirm that following the death of my father and estranged husband [JS] (who was believed to have been murdered by [RK] and his hired hitmen), I literally do not expect to have anyone I can look up to for any material help nor do I have anything to live on.’
‘51. I confirm that I have very little or no contact with my mother and my siblings, who I believe have moved on with their respective lives and do not want to have any contact with me as a fear from [RK] and his family. I also do not want to compromise safety and social and cultural wellbeing either.’
26. In her oral evidence the appellant confirmed that she had first found out about the allegation that she had committed fraud in respect of the TOEIC test when her asylum claim was refused in December 2023. When asked about her family in India, she stated that she has two sisters and one brother as well as her mother. She had no contact with them for a while and now has "very little" contact which is conducted by telephone. She was unable to remember for how long she had no contact with her family. She replied when asked as to when contact recommenced, "six months, eight months, a year." When asked how contact was resumed, she said, "someone contacted me. I did not know who they were. My sister contacted me." She explained that her sister phoned to confirm that the appellant's second husband, JS, had been killed and her father had died. She further explained that her sister was able to contact her because she was still using her telephone number that had previously been given to family members. When asked about her present contact with her family she stated that there was "little contact". Her mother would like to keep in touch but as the family had received threats from RK, and because her mother was living with the appellant's brother and was dependent upon him, she was unable to have much contact. This was because her brother does not want to know the appellant. Her sisters have married and live in their own homes.
27. In answer to questions from Mr Ojo the appellant said that JS had died In India last year. He had always remained in India and had not travelled to the United Kingdom. When asked how he died she replied that he was murdered. She thinks that RK hired someone to kill him. It is her belief the RK was behind JS's death. She accepted that she had not sought to obtain a death certificate for the resumed hearing explaining that she did not want to be involved with the police because this would cause her more problems.
28. The appellant was given the opportunity to explain why there was an inconsistency as to the state of her personal health when meeting healthcare professionals, with her medical evidence identifying her as being depressed, suicidally ideated and suffering auditory hallucinations, and evidence from people who meet her and see her in a different light. She explained that at the suggestion of other people she volunteers to keep herself occupied and to be engaged. Mr Ali stays with her at these times, and she feels safe when he is present. She accepted that she had started a childcare course and has undertaken exams in recent weeks. Mr Ali does not stay with her with her when she attends her course or sits exams.
29. She was asked by Mr Ojo about how she met Mr Ali. She explained that she was homeless and was standing at the corner of a street crying. Mr Ali approached her and asked what was wrong. She explained that she was hungry and he got her some food. She could not remember how long she had been homeless for. She could not remember where she was sleeping at the time other than "maybe somewhere on the road". She could not remember what time of year she met Mr Ali. She could not recall in which part of London this meeting occurred.
30. Mr Ali gave evidence and relied upon a witness statement filed with the First‑tier Tribunal, dated 14 June 2024. He explained in this statement that he met the appellant in 2015 and out of good nature he provided her with food when he saw that she was hungry and offered her accommodation. He allowed her to stay in the living room of his flat which he also shared with lodgers. He subsequently moved to another part of London and the appellant moved with him. He observed that the appellant has mental health issues, and he has seen her suffer over time. He accepts in his witness statement that his business was visited by immigration officers on 23 March 2023. At this time the appellant was visiting his shop, and the officers assumed that she was working there. Consequently, he was given a notice of illegal working penalty. However, he appealed, explaining that the appellant was not working at the store and was simply visiting. This was accepted and he was not subjected to a fine. It is not contested by the respondent that the appellant has never worked for Mr Ali.
31. In his oral evidence Mr Ali confirmed the events of his first meeting the appellant. It was nighttime and he had finished work when he met the appellant in the summer of 2015. He approached her and she explained that she was not feeling well and was hungry. He got her some food and then, when she felt better, she explained that she was homeless and he offered to put her up in his home. The meeting took place some five to ten minutes' walk from his home. He cannot remember the appellant stating how long she had been homeless, but he does recall that she had not showered for a time. He confirmed that the appellant sometimes comes to visit him at his business, meeting him outside. He takes her to the ‘Beauty Store’ in South London every Sunday where she volunteers and stays there for two or three hours with her. The ‘Beauty Store’ is run by a business partner. He confirmed that the appellant does attend college twice a week and has been for some two to three months. She travels to the college on her own.
32. Mr Ali was asked about when the appellant got back in contact with her family in India to which he said it was recently before clarifying that it was some three to five months ago. When asked why the family got back in contact, he explained that they said her that RK had threatened the family and she was not to return because of the threats. I note that there was no reference in Mr Ali's evidence to the appellant being informed that her former husband JS had been killed.
33. I turn to the supporting documents. A letter is provided by the ‘Beauty Shop’, dated 10 April 2026. The shop is in Thornton Heath, South London, and sells beauty products. The author of the letter, Mr Gulam Murtaza, details:
‘[The appellant] has been volunteering with us for the past one year. She has been attending once a week during this period.
Throughout her time with us, she has shown a positive attitude, commitment and a strong willingness to contribute. We are very pleased with her efforts and the support she has provided to the activities and daily work of the shop.
She has demonstrated reliability, good customer service skills, and a genuine interest in helping others. She is a very supportive and honest person, and we value her involvement as part of our team.
We are happy to continue supporting her journey and personal development.’
34. The appellant has been volunteering at ‘Beauty Shop’ since around April 2025, travelling to and from her home in East London.
35. I also note a letter from a women's support group dated 27 April 2026. The chairperson confirms:
‘I am writing to provide a supporting statement for our client [the appellant] who was referred to [the support group] from the Mental Health and Wellness Team. She has been volunteering with us for the past four weeks.
During this time, she has shown a positive attitude, commitment, and willingness to contribute. We are pleased with her input and the effort she has made to engage with our activities and support the work of the organisation.
She has demonstrated reliability and a genuine interest in helping others, and we value her involvement as part of our tea.
We are happy to continue supporting her journey and development.’
36. The similarities in the letters, both structure and content, are noted.
37. There are emails filed confirming that the appellant seeks volunteering positions and that has volunteered at a food bank. She is seeking to study English for speakers of other languages and has commenced a childcare course.
38. The appellant has filed considerable medical evidence which includes, but is not limited to, the following letters and reports. I address them by the most recent first.
39. There is a letter from an NHS Mental Health Wellness Team dated 27 April 2026 detailing that the appellant has been known to adult mental health services since 2018. She has from that time a diagnosis of ICD-10 F33.8 ‘other recurrent depressive disorders.’ She has also been diagnosed with PTSD since 2024. She has a reported history of suicidal thought, low mood, anxiety, auditory hallucinations, poor sleep and appetite, and financial difficulties, largely caused by her current immigration status.
40. A letter from her GP dated 17 April 2026. It refers to her history of recurrent depressive disorders and PTSD. The letter details inter alia that the appellant continues to experience persistent and severe symptoms, including chronically low mood, markedly poor sleep with frequent distressing nightmares, reduced appetite (often eating once daily), lack of motivation, and significant impairment in concentration. She remains highly vulnerable, with ongoing suicidal ideation. She consistently reports feelings of sadness, hopelessness and helplessness. Of particular concern, she has recently described an escalation in suicidal thoughts, which she associates with distress regarding the prospect of further court proceedings. She has expressed that she feels unable to continue coping and has endorsed strong suicidal ideation.
41. The GP letter confirms the appellant's current medication. She is prescribed venlafaxine NR 300 milligrams once daily, in the morning. This is an antidepressant used to treat depression and is available only with prescription. It increases levels of serotonin and noradrenaline. Its common side effects include problems sleeping and headaches. She is also prescribed mirtazapine 45 milligrams to be taken at nighttime. This is a tetracyclic antidepressant often prescribed for major depressive disorder. Her third prescribed medication is olanzapine 2.5 milligrams to be taken at nighttime. This is antipsychotic medication and is understood by this Tribunal that it may have been prescribed in respect of the appellant asserting at various occasions that she suffers auditory hallucination.
42. There are several letters from NHS Mental Health Services to the appellant's GP. I note those dated 12 March 2025, 8 May 2025, and 13 January 2026.
43. There is a letter from Dr Haben Ghezai, Clinical Psychologist, dated 12 March 2024. Dr Ghezai was treating the appellant at this date. She observes that the appellant's initial referral to psychological services was in March 2020 and consequently the report is built upon a lengthy history of engagement. Dr Ghezai reports that the appellant presents with symptoms fitting PTSD and presents with various symptoms such as re-experiencing symptoms, avoidance and hyperarousal. I note that the foundation of the appellant’s PTSD is said to be her past traumatic experiences of being sex trafficked. This is repeated throughout the letter where it is observed that the appellant has a history of being abused and exploited by sex traffickers and is fearful of being found by her sex traffickers. Consequently, the appellant is ‘having suicidal thoughts on a daily basis’, has stated she believes she would be ‘better off dead’, struggles to leave the house, struggles to concentrate and struggles to be able to talk about her experiences. Dr Ghezai confirms her clinical opinion that the appellant is a victim of sex trafficking and currently suffers from PTSD and depression. As discussed below, a month after this report was signed, and having scored within the range of severe depression (27/27) when completing a PHQ-9 in preparation for the report, the appellant was volunteering at ‘Beauty Place’.
44. I observe that in her Home Office interview conducted on 11 October 2018, the appellant referred to RK threatening to tell people living in the locality that her ‘parents sell girls for sex’, and that she separated from RK when they arrived at Heathrow Airport. She recounts RK later contacting her on several occasions demanding money because he had spent so much money on her. He initially wanted the appellant to sleep with him, but when she refused, he said she could ‘start doing some work and pay me back because here you can sleep with other people and pay me back like that.’ She stayed in her room and did not leave for three days. The appellant’s version of events was not accepted by the First-tier Tribunal in 2025, with it being found that the appellant had willingly married RK to facilitate his entry into this country from India. A negative Conclusive Grounds decision was issued in 2024. However, she continues to assert a history of being a victim of sex trafficking. I observe the definition of trafficking and its three constituent elements particularised in the Slavery and Human Trafficking (Definition of Victim) Regulations 2022.
45. Two further medical reports were before the First‑tier Tribunal. The first is a medico‑legal report prepared by Dr Falkowski and the decision to place little weight on it was not subject to cross‑appeal. The second document is a medico‑legal report prepared by Dr Ahwe, consultant psychiatrist, dated 29 October 2020. It adds very little to my assessment and was not expressly relied upon by Mr Badar. I make one observation, namely that at paragraph 3.2 of the report Dr Ahwe identified the appellant as having a poor command of English and so required an interpreter. For my part, this appears to be an error. It may simply be that Dr Ahwe assumed this to be the case by an interpreter attending, but as I have observed previously, the appellant's English was deemed sufficiently strong to enable her to be granted a student visa.
46. Mr Badar sought to rely upon the report of Dr Wali, as does the appellant expressly in her second witness statement. However, Mr Badar recalled the First-tier Tribunal placing little weight on the report and accepted this conclusion was preserved by my error of law decision.
Law
47. The private life assessment under the Rules was confirmed by Mr Badar to be solely confined to paragraph 276 ADE1(vi). The appellant’s application was made in 2018 and therefore is caught by the saving provisions following the deletion of this Rule on 20 June 2022. It is for the appellant to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that she satisfies the provisions of this rule.
48. The appellant also relies upon article 8 ECHR outside of the Rules. She is required to show that article 8(1) is engaged and, if so, it is for the respondent to show that her decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 are relevant to any assessment of article 8 outside of the rules.
Discussion
49. I am grateful to Mr Badar and Mr Ojo for their submissions. I confirm that I have read all the papers, both those referred to in this decision as well as those that are not. I sought with fairness to address relevant issues with Mr Badar during his submissions and provided the appellant an opportunity to answer any concerns that appear to arise from the papers. This is particularly so with regards to the inconsistency of how she presents herself to healthcare professionals in contrast to others with whom she engages.
TOEIC
50. Turning firstly to the TOEIC issue. In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, [2024] 1 WLR 4055, at [22], Green LJ said:
‘The legal burden of proving that the Appellant acted dishonestly lies upon the SSHD. There is a three-stage process: (i) the SSHD first must adduce prima facie evidence of deception ("the first stage"); (ii) the Appellant then has a burden of raising an innocent explanation which satisfies the minimum level of plausibility ("the second stage"); and (iii), if that burden is discharged, the SSHD must establish on a balance of probabilities that this explanation is to be rejected ("the third stage") …’
51. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed this legal analysis in Chowdhury v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 36. The question for this Tribunal is whether the respondent has discharged the burden of establishing whether it is more probable than not that the appellant acted dishonestly.
52. The respondent has filed evidence as to the appellant’s use of dishonesty including a witness statement from Nancy Quan, the senior executive officer for the pre‑appeal review unit, that is dated 2 May 2024. Ms Quan explains the content of annexe witness statements from Rebecca Collings and Peter Millington. Also provided are an ETS look‑up tool for the appellant relating to her test date of 19 September 2012 in which she is recorded as securing a speaking score of 190 and a writing score of 190. The test was conducted at the London College of Media and Technology, which I address below. Also relied upon is a well-known report from Professor Peter French concerned with forensic speaking comparison tests undertaken by ETS, dated 20 April 2016. The respondent has provided a college look‑up tool relating to the London College of Media and Technology for tests held on 19 September 2012. I address this document below.
53. In broad terms, the history of the TOEIC litigation commenced in 2010 when the respondent decided that the then existing arrangements of a testing facility in the English language as part of the process for determining whether leave to enter or remaining in the United Kingdom for certain purposes should be replaced by one in which a small number of testing services would be licensed, and only tests taken with those providers would meet the requirements of the Rules. Six providers were approved to work under licence, of which ETS was one. The licences began on 6 April 2011.The licensee had the responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the test procedure. The level of competence required varied according to the immigration category under which an application was made.
54. In 2014, the BBC conducted an investigation for its Panorama programme in which undercover reporters gained access to several test centres across the United Kingdom where ETS English language tests were being undertaken by people subject to immigration control who required proof of their English language skills to make their applications for leave to remain. Using covert recording, the investigation revealed significant flaws in the test processes. Some TOEIC tests set by ETS were not sat by the actual candidates but by substitute, or proxy, test-takers. The abuse included the use of proxies to undertake speaking and listening tests on behalf of the candidates and the provision of correct answers for those sitting written tests.
55. On 6 January 2014, five weeks before the Panorama programme was broadcast, the BBC wrote to the respondent summarising the results of an investigation into the integrity of testing at two ETS centres:
(i) Registered candidates standing aside from a secure computer terminal, allowing other people with superior English language skills to take the oral and written parts of the exam on their behalf. The proxy sitters were organised by the very staff who were supposed to ensure the proper conduct of the exam.
(ii) Verification trips, intended to act as proof that the registered candidate sat the exams themselves, being falsified by staff at those centres in order to facilitate this fraud.
(iii) Exam invigilators at one centre dictating the correct answers to the registered candidates in the multiple choice part of the exam.
(iv) At another centre multiple choice exam answer papers were filled out and submitted without the registered entrant even being present.
56. Following the BBC investigations, ETS undertook analysis of the speaking tests to identify where tests were taken by proxy test takers. The analysed results where a test result was to be withdrawn were split into two cohorts. Firstly ‘invalid’, where the analysis indicated that cheating in the test took place. Secondly ‘questionable’, where analysis had not proven cheating, but where concerns were deemed sufficient to withdraw the test result.
57. Where a test certificate has been classed as invalid, ETS has confirmed through voice matching analysis that cheating is likely to have taken place.
58. In this matter, ETS has declared the appellant’s test results ‘invalid’ consequent to the certificate being fraudulently obtained using a proxy test taker. The appellant has acknowledged before this Tribunal that she secured a recording of her test and accepts that it is not her voice on the recording. There is no challenge to this fact by written representation or submission, nor has the appellant advanced an explanation as to why somebody else's voice is recorded on her test.
59. As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ram v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1323, [2024] Imm AR 87, at [5], the correct approach for a tribunal which has to determine whether an applicant for leave to remain used a proxy in the spoken English part of the ETS test is that set out in the Presidential Panel decision of DK and RK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKUT 00112 (IAC). I observed [126] to [129]:
"126. The two strands, therefore, amount respectively to the virtual exclusion of suspicion of relevant error by ETS, and the virtual exclusion of motive or opportunity for anybody to arrange for proxy entries to be submitted except the test centres and the candidates working in collusion.
127. Where the evidence derived from ETS points to a particular test result having been obtained by the input of a person who had undertaken other tests, and if that evidence is uncontradicted by credible evidence, unexplained, and not the subject of any material undermining its effect in the individual case, it is in our judgment amply sufficient to prove that fact on the balance of probabilities.
128. In using the phrase 'amply sufficient' we differ from the conclusion of this Tribunal on different evidence, explored in a less detailed way, in SM and Qadir v SSHD. We do not consider that the evidential burden on the respondent in these cases was discharged by only a narrow margin. It is clear beyond a peradventure that the appellants had a case to answer.
129. In these circumstances the real position is that mere assertions of ignorance or honesty by those whose results are identified as obtained by a proxy are very unlikely to prevent the Secretary of State from showing that, on the balance of probabilities, the story shown by the documents is the true one. It will be and remain not merely the probable fact, but the highly probable fact. Any determination of an appeal of this sort must take that into account in assessing whether the respondent has proved the dishonesty on the balance of probabilities."
60. Where ETS accuses an appellant of cheating, evidence from that service which points to the test having been taken by someone else is strong evidence of the appellant's dishonesty and calls for a credible explanation in response: Varkey (ETS: Hidden Rooms) [2024] UKUT 00142 (IAC), [2024] Imm AR 816.
61. The appellant observes that she secured an IELTS on 29 August 2009 confirming her standard of English language to be sufficient to enable her to secure her entry into the United Kingdom as a student. Her contention is that there was no need for her to engage in deception or dishonesty because she had the requisite command of the English language. She also explains in considerable detail in her latest witness statement how she prepared for the TOEIC test, how she booked her test with the London College of Media and Technology, and how she had travelled from her then home in Gravesend to the test centre in Bow, East London as well as her taking three trips over time to that test centre. She also details how she conducted herself on examination day.
62. The respondent has filed with this Tribunal a short report from Project Façade which was a criminal inquiry into abuse of TOEIC. The report addresses acts at the London College of Media and Technology, which is the test centre attended by the appellant. The report confirms at paragraph 10 that the criminal inquiry into the college revealed there were 2,389 TOEIC speaking and writing tests conducted between 15 May 2012 and 20 March 2013 of which 1,033 were identified by ETS to be invalid, 1,356 were questionable and no test result was not withdrawn. The percentage of invalid tests was 43%. The appellant’s test was on 19 September 2012 and so falls within this timeline. The report compares the London College of Media and Technology results with those tests taken between 11 April 2011 and 9 February 2012 at the public test centres in Bloomsbury and Westminster where 1,039 were taken of which only 3 were invalid, none were questionable and the percentage of invalid results was 0.28% Pertinent to the conclusion of the report was that at an ETS audit conducted at London College of Media and Technology on 16 May 2013 it was recorded that 47 candidates were taking a test and none were able to provide identification to the ETS auditor so as to confirm that they were the person said to be undertaking the test. All 47 tests were cancelled. Additionally, one invalid candidate was interviewed under caution and admitted that a proxy took the test on his behalf. He was issued with a criminal caution and a statement was provided. The respondent considers that there was organised and widespread abuse of TOEIC at the London College of Media and Technology and I conclude this test centre was a vehicle for fraud.
63. I acknowledge the detail that the appellant provides as to how she travelled to the test centre, how the building looked inside and her actions on the day. Such knowledge could well have been, and I find was, gleaned by attending the test centre and standing aside to allow a proxy to take her place. Her voice is accepted as not being on the test recording. I also note her contention as to her command of English being sufficiently strong to secure her success on the IELTS whilst in India. However, as Mr Badar properly accepted, precedent authority has confirmed that there may be many reasons as to why somebody with a strong command of the English language may have used a proxy test taker, for example, simply a fear that they may fail or nervousness about taking a test.
64. What is established as fact in this appeal is that the appellant's voice is not on the recording of her test. More pertinently the Project Façade report concerning London College of Media and Technology establishes to my satisfaction that fraud was rampant in the undertaking of the TOEIC tests on its premises. In those circumstances the respondent has adduced prima facie evidence of deception. The appellant comes nowhere close to meeting the burden placed upon her of raising an innocent explanation that satisfies the minimum level of plausibility. In the circumstances I find that the appellant engaged in dishonest behaviour and deception in respect of her TOEIC test.
65. Consequently, this appellant has adverse findings in these proceedings not only of having married to facilitate the entry of two Indian nationals into this country but also in acting dishonestly when securing a TOEIC test certificate in 2012 and using it to secure further leave to remain in 2013.
Article 8 – Private life
66. I turn to article 8 and the appellant’s case in respect of private life. I will explain my reasoning below but at the outset I confirm my conclusion that the appellant engages in manipulation and deceit. Whilst I accept that she suffers from other recurrent depressive disorders, I conclude that there is overwhelmingly strong evidence that the appellant has operated deceit upon healthcare professionals, as well as persons engaged with various support services, by her assertion that she suffers PTSD consequent to being a victim of sex trafficking. Having taken time to consider both the papers and the oral evidence, I am satisfied that the appellant seeks to remain in the United Kingdom at all costs and has done since at least the time she claimed asylum in the summer of 2018.
67. The appellant lawfully entered the United Kingdom and remained lawfully present in this country for over three years before overstaying. Consequently, I conclude that she has established a private life in this country. The question for me is the proportionality of the proposed interference with her protected private life rights by her removal from this country.
68. In terms of the medical evidence, there is no foundation for the appellant's assertion that she is a victim of sex trafficking. Her marriage with RK was entered into willingly, and whilst there appears to have been subsequent difficulties with RK and his family following the ending of the relationship some years ago, she had a student visa which she utilised going in and out of this country. She has returned to India without difficulty. Her claims about RK, someone she has not seen for over a decade, have become ever more outlandish to the extent that she now asserts not only that he continues to target her family in India but that he arranged for a hitman to kill JS.
69. Further, there is notable inconsistency in her behaviour away from her one-to-one engagement with healthcare professionals and when she recounts her conditions to them.
70. I referred Mr Badar to certain documents in the bundle so that he could address me upon them during his submissions. I considered this act to be fair as it permitted the appellant and her representative the opportunity to address perceived inconsistencies in behaviour. I also raised the inconsistencies in short questions to the appellant at the conclusion of her evidence.
71. I observe a letter from the Mental Health Wellness Team to the appellant's GP dated 13 January 2026. The letter confirms that there had been a routine planned review the previous day, Monday 12 January 2026, but due to the appellant's presentation it had to be switched to an urgent review that required escalation, because although the appellant had been fairly stable for several months since having last been seen in July 2025, she presented as having in the previous few weeks experienced a severe decline in her mental state and her overall mental health. She was reporting increased suicidality linked with feelings of being very upset with the prospect of having to go through further court proceedings. She expressed not feeling as if she could go on any longer and held her hands to her neck. She denied having made any attempts to kill herself though had referenced previous attempts such as by jumping down a flight of stairs. It was considered that her living alone added to her risk. However, I observe that the appellant volunteered at ‘Beauty Shop’ the day before the review, namely on Sunday 11 January 2026. The letter from ‘Beauty Shop’ is clear as to the appellant having attended the shop ‘once a week’ for a year. There is no reference to her missing days, such as 11 January 2026 or for several weeks preceding that day. As noted above, the letter records the appellant as demonstrating reliability, good customer service skills and a strong willingness to contribute. Most pertinently she was identified as having a positive attitude and commitment. This is entirely inconsistent with her having several weeks of mental health deterioration and increasing suicidal ideation.
72. Coupled with this inconsistency are the references throughout the papers as to the appellant not willing to leave her home at a time when she visited Mr Ali's business and travelled to south London to volunteer at ‘Beauty Shop’. I note a letter from the Mental Health Wellness Team to her GP following a face-to-face meeting on Wednesday 7 May 2025 where she informed a healthcare professional that she does not leave the house due to fear and has feelings of being followed. She recounts experiences auditory hallucinations every other day which are worse at night, often hearing threats of being killed, remains scared of crowds and has a fear of men due to her PTSD. By this time, she had commenced her weekly volunteering with the ‘Beauty Shop’ and no concern as to her personal welfare at the time is recorded by in the letter provided by that business. I note that at the meeting on 7 May 2025 the appellant did not disclose that she was volunteering at ‘Beauty Shop’ and had been at the shop the previous Sunday for several hours.
73. Additionally, the same Mental Health Wellness Team wrote to the appellant’s GP following a review in March 2025 where she disclosed that the day before she went out late in order to jump in front of a train or in front of a car because she was so distressed. She felt immensely suicidal. She was not sleeping or eating very much and presented as being very depressed and anxious. Within weeks, the appellant was volunteering at the ‘Beauty Shop’ with no concerns on her part or on the part of the business.
74. The appellant’s primary explanation as to the inconsistency is that she was making efforts to engage with other people at the recommendation of both Mr Ali and mental healthcare professionals. I do not accept this as plausible. I conclude on the evidence before me that the appellant has advanced a false narrative of suffering from PTSD in respect of her being the victim of sex trafficking when such an event did not occur. This is an example of her deceit. She presents herself as suicidal with deteriorating mental health to healthcare professionals whilst at the same time presents herself to others in good humour. The most striking example is her volunteering with ‘Beauty Shop’ on Sunday 11 January 2026 and the following day attended a planned mental health review where she reported increased suicidality. I conclude that she has adopted this approach with healthcare professionals to manipulate them, as she wishes to stay in this country.
75. I find that the appellant simply has not been truthful to healthcare professionals and support workers. She has sought to manipulate these hardworking and caring people simply to secure an evidential foundation to stay in this country. Her aim for some time has been to lay a paper trail establishing suicide ideation and significant mental health concerns that would aid her initially in her application for asylum and then her appeal. Such efforts have been solely focussed on her goal of staying in this country.
76. The appellant does not suffer from PTSD, suicide ideation or auditory hallucination. She has not tried to commit suicide, nor has she heard voices. I am satisfied that various healthcare professionals and support workers would not have been as willing to favourably opine in respect of the appellant’s presented health concerns if they were aware as to how she presents and conveys herself elsewhere.
77. I turn to her personal circumstances. I do not accept the evidence of Mr Ali and the appellant that they met when she was homeless. What is striking in both their evidence is their lack of recollection of an event that was important to them being the time they first met, purportedly in unusual circumstances, and Mr Ali offering the appellant, a lone female, somewhere to reside. The appellant was unable to recall how long she had been homeless, what time of year her homelessness occurred, what time of year the meeting took place and how far she walked with Mr Ali to his home. Mr Ali had no recollection of how long she had been homeless though he confirmed that he had asked her questions about her circumstances.
78. I am not required to identify what sort of relationship Mr Ali and the appellant have, whether it is romantic, platonic or simply a friendship. I am only required to assess whether they are being truthful on issues relevant to the appeal before me. As I observed to Mr Badar, Mr Ali has not stated that he cannot provide financial support to the appellant on her turn to India. I find that he can and that he would, having supported the appellant on his own evidence for over a decade.
79. I am required to make findings on two issues identified by the appellant as key to her appeal. Will she be returned to India as a single female and will she have familial support at home on her return?
80. I accept that she would return as a single female who has other recurrent depressive disorders. However, I do not accept that she has no contact with her family. Her evidence on this matter has been inconsistent throughout. The appellant and Mr Ali were inconsistent as to the circumstances in which her family resumed contact in recent times. The appellant was vague as to when that first telephone call occurred; either six months, eight months or a year ago. Mr Ali recalled that it took place more recently, some three to five months ago. The appellant was clear that her sister phoned to tell her that her husband JS had been killed and to also inform her that their father had died. This sister was able to contact the appellant because she had not changed her telephone number. Mr Ali, who resides with the appellant, provides a different version of events. The appellant's family contacted her to repeat that RK had threatened them and that she should not return to India because of the threats. I am satisfied that neither the appellant nor Mr Ali are truthful in this matter. To the requisite standard I am satisfied that the appellant has remained in contact with her family throughout her time in this country. Her evidence that her brother wants nothing to do with her is simply untrue. She seeks to hide any links with her family in India because she is highly motivated to remain in this country.
81. In conclusion, I find that the appellant can return to India and seek the support and protection of her family with whom she remains in contact. While she may require medical care, there is no evidence before this Tribunal that she could not afford to seek medical care or that she could not afford, either through her family or through Mr Ali, to secure the medication she requires to address her underlying depressive condition.
82. I turn to consider the appellant's case under and outside of the Rules.
83. Firstly, in respect of very significant obstacles under the Rules, the concept of integration requires a broad evaluative assessment of whether the appellant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in India is carried on and her capacity to participate in it so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day to day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to her private life. I find that she would not face very significant obstacles to her integration on her return to India. She resided there during her formative years and well into adulthood. She secured a university degree. She will have retained a knowledge of the culture and how society works in India. I do not accept that in her time away she will have become estranged to life there. As observed previously, I do not accept that she has no family to turn to in the country, and I find to the requisite standard that she continues to have friends with whom she can rebuild links on return. I have found that Mr Ali will continue to provide support from the United Kingdom. Observing the respondent’s CPIN ‘Medical and healthcare provision, India’ (April 2023), her health issues can be addressed by medical services in India through which she can secure medication. I do not accept that there are any hardships, either individually or cumulatively, that amount to very significant obstacles to her integration on return.
84. Turning to article 8 outside of the Rules, I observe the Supreme Court judgment in R (Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11, [2017] 1 WLR 823, where Lord Reed held, at [56], that article 8 cases considered outside of the Rules are not to be approached by searching for a unique or unusual feature, and in its absence rejecting the application without further examination. The test for an assessment outside of the rules is whether a fair balance is struck between competing public and private interests. This is the proportionality test, at [41] and [60]. Consequently, ‘exceptional’ must be construed as not imposing any incremental requirement over and above that arising out of the application of an article 8 proportionality test. As observed above, in considering the issue of proportionality I am mindful that the burden of proof rests on the respondent and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
85. I observe the approach to be adopted to the article 8 assessment as detailed in the judgments of R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27, [2004] 2 AC 368 and Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167. The House of Lords reaffirmed in Huang, at [19] ‑ [20], the confirmation by Lord Bingham in Razgar, at [20], that a decision on proportionality must always involve the striking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community which is inherent in the whole of the ECHR. The severity and consequences of the interference will call for careful assessment when assessing whether the proposed interference is proportionate to the legitimate public ends sought to be achieved. The proportionality test is to be applied in the circumstances of the individual case, and the facts must be evaluated in a ‘real world’ sense: EV (Philippines) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 874, at [58].
86. I also note the helpfulness of adopting the balance sheet approach: Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, [2017] Imm AR 484, as followed in TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, [2018] Imm AR 1301, at [35]. However, such approach is not a mandatory requirement.
87. On the respondent's side of the balance is the public interest in the appellant returning to India. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. The appellant has been an overstayer for almost twelve years. She has no permission to remain in this country and is presently unable to satisfy the requirements of the Rules. I observe that she exercised deception when previously seeking to stay in this country and has been found to have married in order to facilitate the entry of Indian nationals to this country.
88. I place the appellant’s other recurrent depressive disorders on her side of the balance, though I observe antidepressant medication, both generic and branded formulations, can be obtained in India: CPIN ‘Medical and healthcare provision, India’ (April 2023). The appellant has been present in the United Kingdom since 2011, save for her return to India on holiday. At the outset her status was precarious, and she has been an overstayer for more than a decade. I accept that she speaks English to degree level, but this is a neutral factor. She is not financially independent. On her own account she has a very small circle of friends in this country, no employment and limited personal interests. Whilst she has on her account one strong friendship in this country, namely Mr Ali, they are not related and are not in a relationship. It is open for Mr Ali to travel to India to meet her or to remain in contact with her by use of modern means of communication. The appellant is not integrated into this country. I observe that she can return home to join her family in India and will be financially and emotionally supported on her return.
89. In the circumstances the balance tips significantly in favour of the respondent. The appellant’s removal from this country does not disproportionally interfere with her protected article 8 rights and consequently this appeal is properly to be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
90. By its decision of 2 April 2026, the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal in respect of the human rights (article 8 ECHR) appeal on the ground that it was subject to material error of law.
91. That decision is remade and the appellant's appeal is dismissed.
92. The Upper Tribunal confirmed by its decision of 2 April 2026 that the First‑tier Tribunal decision in respect of the appellant's asylum and human rights (article 3 ECHR) appeal stood as not being subject to material error of law.
93. The anonymity order is reaffirmed.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 August 2026