UI-2026-000067
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2026-000067
First-tier Tribunal No: PA 62927/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 June 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY
Between
H.T (Malaysia)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr West, Counsel, instructed by MSR Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House 28 April 2026
ANONYMITY ORDER
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant made a protection claim 30 October 2020 which was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 17 November 2023. First-tier Tribunal Judge Revill (“the Judge”) went on to dismiss the appellant’s appeal in a decision dated 13 October 2025. The appellant was granted permission to appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge McMahon on 6 January 2026 on the one ground argued. The application was not opposed, and an error of law was found in a decision dated 5 March 2026. The appeal was retained for remaking in the Upper Tribunal with certain of the Judge’s findings preserved.
Anonymity Order
2. The Judge issued an anonymity order. Neither party requested that the order be set aside. I observe that the appellant seeks international protection and consider that his private life rights protected under Article 8 ECHR presently outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings. The latter right is protected by Article 10 ECHR.
Relevant Facts
3. The appellant is a national of Malaysia. The appellant’s claim is that he was politically active in the Democratic Action Party (DAP), was detained for six weeks and illtreated and fled Malaysia following persistent harassment.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
4. The Judge found the appellant was credible and accepted his claimed history. The Judge accepted that the Convention reason of political opinion was engaged, and that the appellant has a genuine fear for that reason. The judge was not satisfied that the change of government in Malaysia, including the participation of the DAP in the new government, undermined the appellant’s claim. The undisputed evidence before the judge was that the appellant would not be openly politically active on return. However, the judge found that the reason for this was not because of a fear of persecution, but instead because he wished “to avoid political matters due to his past experiences”. The Judge also found that the appellant would not modify his behaviour on return and therefore could not benefit from the principles in HJ Iran and HT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and LC Albania v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 351
5. In the error of law decision, the findings made by the Judge in the First-tier Tribunal were preserved save for paragraphs 53–56.
Hearing
6. The appellant has prepared a consolidated and supplementary bundle and also lodged a skeleton argument. The pagination in this decision is the PDF numbering of the composite bundle, unless otherwise indicated.
7. The hearing has been recorded. The appellant adopted his statements dated 7 April 2024 and 4 September 2025. He accepted that he had not been politically active in the UK since his arrival in 2016, but went on to state that he had made political posts privately that only his friends could see. He explained that he was safe in the UK and that if he was sent back, he did not want to face any problems. He accepted that in his written evidence he had stated that the DAP had sacrificed their principles but said that he was still critical of the government. He complained about the corruption and lack of human rights. He clarified that he would not be political on return because he was scared.
8. The representatives agreed that the preserved findings included that the appellant would not be politically active on return. The only issue in this hearing was his reason for not being politically active.
9. Ms Keerthy relied on the respondent’s decision and review and noted that the appellant had not been politically active here and that he was disillusioned with the DAP. She argued that he was no longer interested in politics and that he was now in a new relationship and was focused on his private life. She further argued that he would not modify his behaviour on return, he had no political identity to protect and that he would not be active in any country. In further discussion regarding the need for the modification of the appellant’s behaviour, Ms Keerthy accepted that if the reason the appellant has not been politically active in the UK, and would not be politically active in Malaysia, was because he was afraid, then that must satisfy the HJ Iran and LC Albania test.
10. Mr West argued that if one of the reasons for the appellant’s failure to be politically active on his return was his fear then that was adequate to meet the test in HJ Iran and LC Albania. Mr West relied on passages from the appellant’s written evidence which substantiated the claim that he remained fearful of the Malaysian government.
Analysis
11. The only outstanding issue to determine in this appeal is whether a material reason for the appellant deciding not to express his political opinions is fear of persecution. The appellant has clearly stated in oral evidence that the reason that he would not be active on return to Malaysia is because he is scared. He has also stated that that is the reason why he has not been active in the UK, as he is not secure in the UK and if his asylum claim is refused, he may be returned. I accept that the appellant has clearly stated in paragraphs 8 and 11-13 of his updated statement that he is fearful on return, not least because he fears persecution for his views on racism against ethnic minorities. In his up-to-date statement he has also confirmed that he has continued his political activities privately with friends and colleagues but not openly.
12. I accept, as did the Judge in the First Tier, that the appellant may also seek to avoid being publicly political because he has been traumatised by the ill-treatment he received and subsequent persistent harassment. However, I am not satisfied that the adverse effects of trauma would be exclusive of also holding a fear of future persecution. I am satisfied that a fear of future persecution is at least one of the reasons why the appellant has suppressed public political activity in the UK and would continue to do so if he were to be returned.
13. It has not disputed that (i) the appellant has a genuine political opinion, (ii) that open expression would expose him to a risk of persecution and that (iii) he would suppress that expression on return. I find that a material reason for that suppression would be his fear of persecution
Conclusion
14. The appellant’s protection appeal is allowed. I find that the appellant has established to the lower standard that there is a real risk of him suffering persecution contrary to Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees if returned to Malaysia.
15. In these circumstances, there is no need to determine the Article 8 appeal.
Notice of Decision
16. I allow the protection appeal on asylum grounds under the 1951 Refugee Convention
17. The anonymity order is to continue.
F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28 May 2026