Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000073
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66507/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

J K
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The appellant in person
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 29 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Sills) promulgated on 21 October 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 5 January 2021 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a national of Namibia. The basis of his claim was that his stepmother in law and her family beat the appellant up and threatened to kill him as he refused to marry his stepmother in law after the death of his father. He had reported the incident to the police the following day but they did nothing. He also reported the incident to the village authority. He claimed that his stepmother in law’s family burned his home down. Thus, he feared return to Namibia based on a fear of being killed by his stepmother in law and her family and as the country was a small country, they would be able to find him.
4. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 5 January 2021 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Namibia. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had been subject to any forced marriage or gender-based violence. The respondent did not consider that the appellant’s account was credible. In any event, it was considered that there would be sufficient protection available and that the appellant could internally relocate.
5. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 21 October 2025, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Namibia on the factual basis as claimed. The FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 9-19.
6. When assessing the factual basis of the claim, the FtTJ found that the appellant was unable to name the police officer, the brother of his stepmother at his interview but was able to name him and his stepmother’s other siblings in a later witness statement. The FtTJ reasoned that the appellant’s father and stepmother were married for five years and his claim was that he had lived with them during that time. Whilst the FtTJ accepted that the appellant may have referred him as “uncle,” it did not follow from that he would not know his “uncle’s” name. The judge found that the appellant was not able to name his stepmother’s brother at that interview (paragraph 10).
7. The FtTJ also found that in relation to the claim that he was being forced into a marriage, Counsel at the hearing was not able to identify any country evidence to show that there was any established custom of stepchildren being required to marry their stepmother on the death of their father. He recorded that the appellant’s own evidence in interview was that marrying one stepmother “is not allowed in our culture” (see AI27). The judge found that the evidence indicated that what the appellant claimed occurred went against, rather than being required by the prevailing cultural norms.
8. The FtTJ assessed the documentary evidence including some pictures of scarred limbs. Whilst the FtTJ accepted the pictures were of the appellant’s arms and showed some scars, there was no medical report or scarring report provided in support of the claim and as a result the pictures were of little assistance. As to a picture which appeared to show the aftermath of the fire, the judge found that it provided a very limited assistance to the appellant. Similarly pictures of cattle were found to provide very little assistance to this appellant’s claim. There was a letter from the traditional authority (dated 14 November 2014) and the judge observed that was not consistent with his claim that he had reported the incident on 15 November 2014. The FtTJ found that it was surprising that the traditional authority would backdate the letter to the date of the incident as the appellant explains rather than recording the actual date. The letter simply reports part of the appellant’s account and says nothing about what the authority would do. Consequently, the judge gave little weight that document
9. The FtTJ assessed his account further and by reference to his immigration history. The FtTJ recorded that the appellant had travelled to Germany on the way to the UK but did not claim asylum. The FtTJ took into account the explanation given by the appellant that he did not know about asylum and only travelled to Germany to transit to the UK. The FtTJ found that the appellant had entered the UK on a visit visa in 2014 but did not claim asylum until 2021, over 6 years later. The FtTJ therefore assessed his explanation for the failure to claim asylum for that period of time. The explanation given was that he did not know about asylum and only found out about it in 2019. He then spent two years gathering information before claiming asylum in 2021. The FtTJ did not accept the appellant’s evidence that it was only after living in the UK for four or five years that he realised could claim asylum and also rejected his account that he did not know about the possibility of claiming asylum when he travelled through Germany. He found that the delay of six years in claiming asylum damaged his credibility and placed weight upon that.
10. Having considered the evidence “in the round,” the FtTJ concluded that he did not find the appellant’s account to be reasonably likely to be true. He placed little weight on the corroborative evidence provided and as described above and found that the appellant’s six-year delay in claiming asylum fundamentally undermined his credibility. There had been no explanation as to why the appellant was unable to name the police officer siblings at the interview but could name all the stepmother siblings in a statement. Having taken into account the findings made the FtTJ did not accept that the appellant had demonstrated his factual account to be reasonably likely to be true and therefore dismissed the appeal on asylum (protection) and humanitarian protection grounds.
11. In the alternative, the FtTJ found that even if his account were credible, the appellant could safely and reasonably relocate internally. He referred to the appellant’s account that is stepmother’s family tried to force him to marry so that she could obtain his father’s possessions. The appellant’s evidence was that he understood that these possessions had been taken by his stepmother. As this had been 11 years since the appellant’s father died, the appellant’s stepmother and her family enjoyed the property they received without issue from that time. He did not suggest he would seek to reclaim the property. The FtTJ considered that if he relocated to a city such as Windhoek, there would be a sufficient state protection for him and would not face any risk from stepmother and her family. The FtTJ found that it would not be unreasonable or unduly harsh given that the appellant did not have any significant health problems, he does not have any dependents and is a single able-bodied male who could relocate to the city and seek work there to support himself.
12. As regards the human rights aspect of the claim, the FtTJ found that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration. Those obstacles are related to his protection claim whereby his factual claim to be at risk of harm from his stepmother and her family had been rejected and therefore did not form a significant obstacle to his integration. The FtTJ found that the appellant could simply return to his home area and resume his life there. He found that he was an able-bodied male of around 36 years of age who had lived in Namibia for the first 25 years of his life. He could also relocate to Windhoek should he wish to do so and seek work. He concluded that the appellant had not established any significant obstacles to integration.
13. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
14. The appellant sought permission to appeal and that was refused by a FtTJ. The grounds were renewed before the Upper Tribunal on three grounds. In a decision made on 4 February 2026 UTJ Ruddick granted permission but only on limited grounds. Permission was refused on grounds one and three and only granted by reference to ground 2 with regard to the issue of very significant obstacles to integration.
15. No argument has been raised by way of challenge to that decision which only granted permission on limited grounds. I therefore set out the basis upon which permission has been granted. It was argued that the FtTJ erred in its consideration of very significant obstacles to integration by not taking into account the objective evidence adduced by the appellant which referred to a sanitation crisis, food insecurity and high employment and that the Herero were a marginalised minority.
16. UTJ Ruddick when granting permission stated, “ it is trite that the FTT is not required to refer to all of the evidence before it, or to every submission made by the parties. However, it is just arguable that this country evidence was potentially material to the consideration of obstacles to integration and therefore it was incumbent on the FTT to say what it made of it.” The UTJ went on to say that a consideration of whether there will be very significant obstacles to integration requires consideration of factors relating to the appellant and the country of return.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
17. The hearing took place on 29 April 2026. The appellant attended in person. The Respondent by Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer.
18. The appellant was assisted by the court interpreter in the Herero language as requested. Whilst the court interpreter attended by remote means, steps were taken at the outset of the hearing to ensure that both the appellant and the interpreter could both hear and see each other and properly understand each other. Both confirmed that they were able to understand each other and I record that throughout the hearing there were no problems identified by either the interpreter or the appellant as to any issues in this regard. It is also recorded that the submissions made by Mr McVeety were translated so that the appellant would be able to hear, understand and follow them. The interpreter was asked to do so after each line and I am satisfied that that was carried out in such a way that the appellant was able to understand and follow the proceedings.
19. The appellant’s solicitor’s had written to the Tribunal to state that whilst they remained on record as acting for him, the appellant had decided to appear in person at the hearing and represent himself. The appellant was asked if that was still his position and he confirmed that it was. He further confirmed that he was aware that a bundle of documents had been provided for the hearing sent by his solicitors along with the grounds and a Rule 25 response in answer to the Rule 24 response filed on behalf of the respondent. The way in which the proceedings were to be conducted was explained to the appellant and that each party would be able to provide their summary of any points they wished to make.
20. When asked if he wished to rely upon the evidence provided by the solicitors on his behalf he indicated that he did and that he would be in a difficult situation on return. He said that all the information had been provided when asked if there was anything else he wanted to add he said that he did not wish to because the information was in the evidence as provided.
The submissions:
21. I therefore set out the grounds. The limited grant of permission is set out above. It is submitted in the written grounds that the ASA referred to the objective evidence that the Herero are an “ethnic minority” (AB23) and are identifiable as such and that they are “marginalised”. These factors will make it difficult for the appellant to establish himself in a new area.
22. The ASA is also quoted as saying that “the objective evidence shows that there is a sanitation crisis and acute food insecurity. These conditions would be alien to the appellant within having spent 10 years outside Namibia. The same evidence confirms that the employment rate is high which would render any work experience or study undertaken in the UK is of little benefit to the appellant on return. The Herero are also marginalised as per the above submissions. These factors will make it very difficult for the appellant to integrate life back in Namibia.”
23. It is therefore submitted that no basis had been given for the FtTJ seemingly dismissing the objective evidence provided by the appellant. This is a material error of law that infects the assessment of obstacles to integration. It is therefore submitted that the FtTJ erred in law and that the consideration of the appeal was arguably inadequate.
24. There was a rule 25 reply provided in response to the rule 24 provided on behalf of the respondent. It stated that it was acknowledged that the tribunal was not required to give elaborate reasons but that the judge gave no express consideration to the objective evidence. There was no reasoning given by the judge to prefer the objective evidence in the respondent’s decision letter. It concludes that there was a material error of law on the findings on obstacles to integration and should be set aside.
25. No further submissions or skeleton argument were provided prior to the hearing. Whilst there was an application under Rule 15 (2A) in respect of an Amnesty International report dated 28 April 2025, that was stated to be relevant in the event that the Upper Tribunal re-makes the decision if an error of law is found.
26. Mr McVeety on behalf of the respondent relied upon the Rule 24 response dated 2 April 2026.
27. In respect of ground 2 and the issue of very significant obstacles to integration was the only ground for which permission to appeal had been granted and the PTA grant suggests ‘it is just arguable’ that the Amnesty International report and the Canadian IRRB reports were ‘potentially material’ to the consideration of very significant obstacles, and the issue of reintegration ‘requires consideration both of factors related to the appellant and of factors related to the country of return’. The respondent relies on and highlights R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [§13], which sets out that the Tribunal is not required to give elaborate reasons for its findings.
28. It is submitted that the FtTJ specifically addresses very significant obstacles in [§19] of the determination, setting out that the appellant can ‘return to his home area and resume his life there’. Alternatively, and in any event, given that the FtTJ rejected all other aspects of the appellant’s claim, providing detailed reasons for doing so, the respondent agrees with the PTA grant that even if the FtTJ is found to have erred in assessing every aspect of the very significant obstacles test, ‘this error cannot have been material’ to the outcome.
29. Consequently, the respondent submits that there has been no material error of law in the FtTJ’s determination of 21st October 2025.
30. In his oral submissions Mr McVeety submitted that the grounds referred to points that it is asserted the FtTJ did not consider. First, in respect of his ethnicity and tribal group. He submitted that there had been no mention in the evidence of having any problems because of his tribal background either in the witness statement or in the SEF interview. As such it did not form part of the appellant’s personal claim.
31. As to the failure to consider the objective material, any such failure to refer to that was not material to the outcome. He submitted that those two paragraphs set out in the ASA had to be considered in the context of the FtTJ’s findings of fact where the FtTJ did not accept the factual account given by the appellant as to any of the events that occurred in Namibia. Therefore, it was open to the FtTJ to find that he would not have any issues on return to Namibia based on insufficient food or sanitation because he would continue to have the support of his family. Furthermore, the appellant had made no claim that his family were in a poor situation before he left Namibia. When looking at the contents of the document, it referred to food insecurity affecting 22% of the population. He submitted that there was a considerable difference between food insecurity and famine as they were not the same thing. The appellant had made no claim that he himself came from an impoverished background and it was not a comparative test between the UK and Namibia under the Rules.
32. He submitted that the FtTJ had found that the appellant had lived for 25 years in Namibia and was therefore culturally aware of the country conditions by reference to his ethnicity and whilst food insecurity might be an issue for someone who had no experience of life in Namibia, someone in the appellant’s case of 25 years of living there and his familial contact would have that experience and would not amount to an obstacle on return.
33. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Decision on error of law:
34. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following propositions, which are not controversial, that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and that their decisions should be respected unless it is clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. The task of the Upper Tribunal is to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law. I am not determining the appeal against the decision of the Respondent. When deciding whether the FtTJ's decision involved the making of a material error of law I remind myself of the principles governing the approaches to such decisions which have been reviewed in a number of cases including Hamilton v Barrow and Ors [2024] EWCA Civ 888, Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at paragraph 26, Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74 at paragraph 50, and Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410 paragraphs 46 - 47 and Volpi and Anor v Volpi [2022]EWCA Civ 464.
35. The constraints to which appellate tribunals and courts are subject in relation to appeals against findings of fact were recently (re)summarised by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 in these terms, per Lewison LJ:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."
36. In summary, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue in play.
37. I have carefully considered the decision of the FtTJ in the light of the grounds and the matters argued but also in the context of the evidence. Having done so I am satisfied that there is no error of law material to the outcome in the decision of the FtTJ and I shall set out my reasoning for reaching that conclusion below.
38. When applying the principles set out above to the present appeal, it is recognised that a FtTJ is not required to set out each and every piece of evidence that he has considered in the appeal and when reaching his conclusions on the “principal controversial issues.” The assessment of whether they were very significant obstacles to as integration is the issue under consideration. I observe that one piece of evidence highlighted in the grounds related to a report dated 2012 and thus was significantly out of date.
39. It is instructive to set out the basis of that argument as advanced in the Appeal Skeleton Argument (“ASA”) at paragraph 29. I note that the test set out at the beginning of that paragraph is incorrect as it refers to “ there are significant obstacles to the appellant integration in Namibia” rather than the important quantitative reference to “very significant obstacles to integration” thereby demonstrating the elevated threshold that must be crossed to meet that test. The matters raised refer to the appellant having left 10 years previously and that “his only supportive family member, his father, is deceased. The appellant has no other family that he can turn to for support with his integration. The objective evidence shows that there is sanitation crisis and acute food insecurity. These conditions will be alien to the appellant within having spent 10 years outside Namibia. The same evidence confirms that the employment rate is high which would render any work experience or study undertaken in the UK as a little benefit to the appellant on return. The Herero are also marginalised.. These factors will make it very difficult for the appellant to integrate to life back in Namibia.”
40. Turning to the assessment made of whether there were very significant obstacles to his integration, and the matters raised in the ASA, the FtTJ was entitled to take into account as part of that assessment his earlier factual findings made on the factual account as presented by the appellant. The reasons set out and summarised previously demonstrate that the FtTJ’s analysis of the evidence was that the appellant had not given a truthful account of being in fear of his family members in Namibia. Those earlier findings were directly relevant to the assessment of his circumstances upon return and the FtTJ incorporated those findings in his assessment.
41. They were also relevant to the claim made in the grounds based on the ASA that referred to his membership of the Herero group. As Mr McVeety submitted it had not been evidenced that the appellant had suffered any problems as a result of his ethnicity and whilst the Herero tribe are described as “marginalised,” there was no fact specific evidence relating to this appellant or relied on as part of his claim. As part of his circumstances on return the FtTJ’s finding from the evidence was that the appellant “ can simply return to his home area and resume his life there. He is an able-bodied male of around 36 years of age who lived in Namibia for the first 25 years of his life.” Thus, that finding of having lived in the Namibia for 25 years before his length of residence in the UK, and that he could return to his home area and resume his life there, took into account his tribal ethnicity. That finding alongside the FtTJ’s earlier findings rejecting his account of being in fear of his family also addressed the claim made in the ASA that he had no family to return to for his support for integration. He therefore had family support. The evidence before the FtTJ was that the appellant came from a big family (p95) and that he had been living in the area as identified from birth until he had left in 2014 (Q8 ). Whilst the objective material referred to food insecurity and problems of sanitation, that may be an issue for someone who had never lived in Namibia or experienced life there, but on the particular facts of this appeal the FtTJ was entitled to take into account that for a significant period of 25 years which he could draw upon demonstrated that he had been able to live in his home area amongst his family and his community. The issues of food shortages was not a new phenomenon but was based on the reliance of the climate and conditions which varied. It could not properly be advanced that the appellant would not have been aware of such conditions during the 25 years that he lived there. In terms of employment the FtTJ found that he would be able to work given that he was a fit young man in good health. Whilst the grounds refer to high unemployment which would render work experience or study in the UK is of little benefit, the evidence before the FtTJ was that he had been unemployed in his own country but in the UK had undertaking construction work for a company and had a warehouse job and had undertaken courses in English and maths (paragraph 21). Thus, his circumstances on return were better than before he had left.
42. Neither party has set out or made any reference to the relevant law applicable to the assessment of whether there are “very significant obstacles to integration” under the Immigration Rules. The law is well established and set out in a number of decisions beginning with that of Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 4 WLR 152, Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 and NC v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, and that the idea of integration calls for a broad evaluative judgement of whether the individual would be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society and that other countries carried on, and a capacity to participate in it so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there and to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private and family life. Generic factors such as having good health, the ability to work and the ability to adapt to the local culture and robustness of character could be of significance and form part of that broad evaluative judgement and whether someone would encounter very significant obstacles integration. The test is an objective one and inconvenience or upheaval or even just significant obstacles would not be sufficient to satisfy the test which imposes an elevated threshold.
43. Having considered the decision of the FtTJ on this issue and whilst it was succinct, it was consistent with having undertaken that broad evaluative judgement taking into account the reality for the appellant but having concluded that he would be able to resume his life in his home country as there were no very significant obstacles to his integration.
44. For those reasons and having considered the decision of FtTJ Sills in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of a material error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

5 May 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds