Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000079
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51867/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

S R
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Chaudhry, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 27 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 6 November 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 17 January 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam made an anonymity order on 18 February 2026, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Botswana. He sought protection on the grounds that he faced a real risk of serious harm and/or persecution based on his fear that if returned to Botswana, he would be assaulted and harmed by his half -brother for having a relationship with a woman his half-brother was to marry. He had been assaulted by him on 2 occasions on 30 September 2020 and in December 2021. He had moved to different are of Botswana and lived there for 3-4 months He arrived in the UK on 30 September 2022, having left Botswana on 29 September 2022. He claimed asylum on the basis that he was in fear of his half-brother if he returned to Botswana and that he could not relocate as he would be found wherever he lived due to his half-brother’s enmity and their shared kinship as a member of the Herero community.
4. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 17 January 2024 refused the claim.
5. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 6 November 2025, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 13-17 ( including the Article 8 assessment). The FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he would be at risk of harm on return to Botswana and found that he could internally relocate to a different area of Botswana.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the basis of 6 grounds. They are as follows:
Ground 1 which related to the misdirection on standard of proof (NABA 2022) whereby the Judge wrongly applied the balance of probabilities to the entire asylum assessment. Under s32 NABA 2022, this standard applies only to establishing the Convention characteristic and genuine fear. The future risk assessment must still be conducted on the reasonable degree of likelihood standard. Applying the higher test throughout materially distorted the credibility and risk findings.
Ground 2 – Failure to Engage with Expert & Medical Evidence. The Judge gave no lawful reason for rejecting Dr Karekwaivanane’s unchallenged expert evidence on Herero kinship structures and internal relocation. The medico-legal report of Dr Longman, confirming injuries consistent with violent assault, was not analysed. This breaches Mibanga and amounts to failure to consider highly material evidence.
Ground 3 – Error on Sufficiency of Protection; The conclusion that the Appellant “could seek protection” was unsupported. Evidence showed police deference to customary systems and withdrawal of his complaint under family pressure. The Judge failed to apply the Horvath test of effective protection in practice.
Ground 4 – Error on Nexus / Particular Social Group: The Judge accepted the Appellant is Herero yet wrongly stated this was “not the basis” of the claim. The harm arose precisely from breaching Herero customary marriage rules and associated kinship authority. Mischaracterising this as “domestic incidents” ignored the Convention nexus.
Ground 5 – Procedural Unfairness & Mischaracterisation of Evidence: The Judge stated the Appellant “did not mention” relevant cultural factors in interview, yet the Appellant fully described the customary marriage expectations and elder authority underpinning the dispute. Treating these as irrelevant was unfair and factually wrong.
The Judge also failed to address corroborating injury evidence, amounting to procedural unfairness.
Ground 6 – Flawed Internal Relocation Assessment; The finding that the Appellant “could not easily be located” was speculative and ignored expert evidence on nationwide Herero networks. The Judge did not apply the required Januzi two-stage test (safety and reasonableness).
7. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 6 January 2026.
8. The hearing took place on 27 April 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was present at the hearing and was represented by Ms Chaudhry, of Counsel and the respondent was represented by Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer.
9. Ms Chaudhry indicated that she relied upon the grounds of challenge and supplemented them with her oral submissions. Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer confirmed that there was no Rule 24 response under the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 but that the position of the Respondent was that there was no error law that was material in the decision of the FtTJ. Both advocates made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
Discussion:
10. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
11. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
12. Dealing with ground 1, it is submitted that the judge failed to follow Sections 31-36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 in respect of the varying standard of proof and applied the wrong standard of proof ( see JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC).
13. Whilst the decision letter erroneously referred to the date the appellant claimed asylum as 1981, there is no dispute that the appellant claimed asylum on 30 September 2022. As this is a claim which post-dated the coming into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) the statutory framework of that Act applies when considering whether the appellant qualifies for protection. Section 32 of NABA states:
“(1) In deciding for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention whether an asylum seeker’s fear of persecution is well-founded, the following approach is to be taken.
(2) The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities—
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality…. as a result of that characteristic…..”
14. If it is found that the asylum seeker has the relevant characteristic or would have such a characteristic attributed to them and if they do in fact fear persecution, then under section 32 (4) and (5):
“(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality…..

(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.

(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).
15. If the appellant does not qualify for asylum, then the claim falls to be considered as a claim for humanitarian protection. In this case, under paragraph 339C immigration rules, a person who is not a refugee (and not otherwise excluded) qualifies for humanitarian protection if substantial grounds have been shown for believing that if returned to their country of origin, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and they are unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. Serious harm includes torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in their country of origin (paragraph 339CA).
16. The headnote to JCK sets out the following:
Sections 31-36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply in an appeal where the claim for international protection was made after 28 June 2022.

2. In an appeal to which s32 NABA 2022 applies, the proper approach is to address each of the questions posed by the section expressly and sequentially.

3. Question 1 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention. In simple terms: is there a Convention reason?

4. Question 2 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant "does in fact fear" such persecution. This is the 'subjective fear' test.

5. Questions 3-5 are matters of objective evaluation and must each be determined on the lower standard of proof: 'a reasonable degree of likelihood'. Is it reasonably likely that there is:

a risk of harm
an absence of state protection, and
no reasonable internal flight alternative
17. Ms Chaudhry submitted that the FtTJ applied an overall higher standard of proof and as this was a post- NABA appeal, the FtTJ should have assessed the issue of risk on the lower standard. She submitted that the grounds all feed into each other in this respect.
18. Mr Wain by way of response submitted that the FtTJ did refer to the correct legal framework and that the substance of the decision followed the correct process of asking the two questions as identified above in JCK ( as cited) and that the FtTJ applied the correct law in his decision.
19. I have considered the submissions made in the context of the FtTJ’s decision. I am satisfied that the FtTJ was aware that this was an appeal brought in the context of the new legal framework under section 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act” ) as the appellant had made a protection claim after 28 June 2022. The FtTJ had regard to the respondent’s decision letter at paragraphs 2–5 of the decision which also set out the relevant sections of NABA and also the respondent’s review which also made reference to the framework .The FtTJ expressly recorded at paragraph 12 the relevant framework by reference to section 32 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022. I accept the submission made on behalf of the respondent that at paragraph 13 of the decision the FtTJ followed the correct process of assessing the two questions identified in the decision of JCK relating to the Convention reason and the subjective fear test on the balance of probabilities. Those reasons two questions were answered by the FtTJ at paragraph 13 and related to the historical facts which concerned the events in Botswana and whether or not the appellant was in fear. The FtTJ address the issue of risk on return and also internal relocation and sufficiency of protection. As to the “subjective fear,” the credibility of the appellant’s account although not determinative was relevant in that assessment ( see paragraph 17 – 18 of JCK) and is acknowledged in the decision of JCK it is not possible to evaluate subjective fear without having some regard the context in which that fear is said to arise. The FtTJ addressed that within the decision at paragraph 13.
20. When reading the decision as a whole, the judge had correctly identified the legal framework and whilst the reference to it was in brief terms, it is clear that the FtTJ identified and was aware that this was appeal under the new provisions and it was not necessary for the judge set out any further reference to that. It can be viewed on the decision and read that the FtTJ who is a judge of a specialist tribunal is taken to be aware of the correct standard of proof and applied it. The FtTJ identified the balance of probabilities and starting with the issue of Convention reason and the assessment of subjective fear, before turning to the assessment of risk. The grounds refer to applying the higher test but do not identify by reference to the decision made where that occurs. I am not satisfied that ground 1 is established.
21. Whilst the remainder of the grounds are pleaded as separate grounds, as Ms Chaudhry submitted, some of the grounds either feed into the other or are replicated.
22. Dealing with ground 2 paragraph 3 and ground 5 paragraph 7, those grounds assert that the FtTJ was procedurally unfair by failing to address the medical evidence and failing to engage with the medical evidence. Those grounds are without merit. The respondent accepted that that the appellant had been attacked on two occasions causing injuries to his chin and forehead. The FtTJ expressly addressed this at paragraph 14 by accepting that the appellant had suffered injuries from those two assaults as confirmed in the medical report. That being the case there was no reason to analyse the report of Dr Longman any further. The acceptance of those injuries and that they were caused by the appellant’s half -brother was accepted by the FtTJ and therefore it is not established that the judge erred in law.
23. Dealing with ground 4 this is headed, “Error on Nexus/PSG”. Ms Chaudhry submits that the FtTJ accepted that the appellant was a member of the Herero tribe but wrongly stated that this was not the basis of the claim. It is submitted that having been assaulted for breaching Herero customary rules, the FtTJ was wrong to state that it was domestic violence as it ignored the Convention reason.
24. She further submitted that also fed into ground 5 (paragraph 6) where it is stated that the FtTJ’s finding that the appellant had not mentioned cultural factors in interview was in error. Questions 27 questions 41 referred to his background. Lastly in this context, it was asserted that the FtTJ gave no reasons for rejecting the “unchallenged expert evidence” on Herero kinship structures and internal relocation ( see ground 2 (paragraph 1).
25. Mr Wain submitted that the FtTJ had considered the expert report and accepted the point raised that he was a member of the Herero minority tribe (see paragraph 13) but did not accept the expert’s assessment of risk either in the home area, but also in the context of being able to relocate to a different area and by reference to the findings made at paragraphs 14 and 15. He submitted that the FtTJ assessed the evidence of the appellant but was entitled to make finding at paragraph 13 and also those set out between paragraphs 14 – 15 when assessing the Convention reason and then later the risk on return and therefore it supported the overall finding made that the FtTJ did not accept the expert’s assessment of risk for the reasons given.
26. Having considered the decision of the FtTJ in light of the evidence and those submissions I am satisfied that the grounds have not been established for the reasons given below.
27. Whilst the grounds refer to the “unchallenged evidence” of the expert, the respondent’s review plainly put the expert evidence in issue both in the context of risk of return and also in the context of internal relocation by reference to this particular appellant’s factual account and on the basis that he been subjected to 2 incidents of assault but also the ability shown to live in Botswana since the incidents in September 2020 December 2021 and not having left Botswana until September 2022. It is equally clear that the FtTJ had considered the report as indicated by the assessment carried out between paragraphs 13 – 15 but was rejected by the FtTJ for the reasons that were given.
28. Whilst the FtTJ’s reasoning is brief it engaged with the factual claim made, and the principal controversial issues identified. The FtTJ accepted that he came from a minority tribe in Botswana namely the Herero as set out in the country expert report and on the basis of the submissions made. However, where the FtTJ departed from that was the assessment made of the reasons for the attacks on him and in the context of the factual claim that had been made.
29. The FtTJ accepted that he had been involved in two incidents where he was injured by his half-brother (see paragraphs 13 and 14) and accepted the medical evidence but was entitled to find that the reasons for those assaults were not based on his membership of the Particular Social Group identified. The FtTJ made his findings on this issue at paragraph 13. The FtTJ referred to the two assaults- one on 30 September 2020 and the second on the 26 December 2021 which were the result of the appellant’s half-brother consuming alcohol and expressing regret thereafter. The FtTJ found them to be domestic incidents of violence which were aggravated by the appellant’s half-brother’s consumption of alcohol and then followed by later regrets. This was consistent with the appellant’s evidence given in interview at question 24, where reference is made to the attack where there had been “influence of alcohol”. Similarly, a question 31 the appellant gave an account of their having been celebrating independence on 30 September 2020 and at that event his half-brother had hit him on the chin but had returned the next day to apologise and blaming the alcohol for the incident. After the second incident in December 2021, again there was a celebration where drinking was involved and reference made to his brother hitting with the brick. Again, there was reference to feeling bad about what had happened. Whilst the ASA referred to the appellant having suffered “sustained persecution” following a “violent familial dispute”, the appellant’s own evidence was that his half-brother began verbally abusing him in 2020 and that there were two assaults separated by a number of months on 30 September 2020 and December 2021 and on both occasions were incidents where the person involved had been under the influence of alcohol and after each incident expressed regret and remorse as explained by the appellant in his interviews at question 31 question 33. Therefore, those factual findings made were in accordance with that evidence.
30. Whilst Ms Chaudhry refers to the expert report referring to customary marriage practices and that the claim about the Herero community marrying cousins is consistent with that ((see paragraph 14 of the expert report) that does not demonstrate that the FtTJ’s assessment of the appellant’s evidence on that issue was not open to the FtTJ to make and that they could properly be viewed as domestic incidents of violence. The expert had the interview record but no reference was made to those particular factual circumstances as described by the appellant nor the length of time between each of the assaults and that remorse and regret been expressed.
31. Furthermore, Ms Chaudhry submitted that the FtTJ was wrong to state that the appellant had not mentioned his membership of the Herero community in any asylum interview (referring to paragraph 13 of the FtTJ’s decision) but had done so questions 27 questions 41 of his interview. Both the responses at questions 27 and 41 are in the most general terms and he did not expressly refer to his membership of the Herero tribe as the causation of the harm. The respondent accepted that the FtTJ was a member of the Herero minority community, this was set out in the screening interview. It is the position that this was accepted by the FtTJ as recorded by him at paragraph 13, but that the judge had found that they were domestic incidents of violence carried out against a background of alcohol and remorse and regret rather than due to his membership of a PSG.
32. But in any event, paragraph 13 has to be read alongside the rest of that paragraph and in light of the findings made at paragraphs 14 – 15. The FtTJ assessed risk on return based on the matters raised by the expert in the report which would have included the issue of his membership of the Herero community and any customary marriages. The FtTJ expressly stated “I do not accept the risk on return as described by the country expert.” This is relevant to the ground 2 , paragraph 2 where it is asserted that the judge gave no lawful reasons for rejecting the expert report, both in the context of kinship structures and internal relocation. This is also set out at ground 6 by reference to internal relocation where it is submitted that the finding made by the FtTJ that the appellant could not easily be located was speculative and ignored expert evidence on nationwide Herero networks.
33. Thus, turning to the FtTJ’s assessment of risk and the assessment of the report, contrary to the grounds the FtTJ did address the country expert report. As set out at paragraph 13 the FtTJ expressly stated, “I do not accept the risk on return described by the country expert” and went on to give his reasons.
34. As set out above, the FtTJ was entitled to find that they were domestic incidents of violence in the light of the appellant’s description of his brother’s behaviour. However, even if those incidents were also set in the context of customary marriages, the FtTJ gave other reasons for concluding that the appellant was not a real risk on return to Botswana. The FtTJ made a finding that the appellant’s relationship with the girl had ended (see paragraph 13) and this finding is consistent with the appellant’s own evidence of this relationship ending in December 2021.
35. As relevant to the assessment of risk, the appellant’s evidence was that he believed that his half-brother had the capability to find him wherever he was in Botswana. When asked why he believed this to be the position in interview (question 43) he identified, “it was just an obsession”, and that he thought that his half-brother would continue to harm him (question 45) and that there was nowhere else in Botswana he could live. He confirmed in interview that there were nothing else that he was scared of in Botswana except “the obsession of his brother” (see question 53). In his evidence in the witness statement (paragraph 13) he claimed that returning to Botswana would place him at further violence and possibly death due to the determination of his half-brother to harm him therefore he could not live elsewhere in Botswana.
36. The country expert assessed risk at paragraph 13 and 13.3 . He began by setting out the response given by the appellant in interview question 42:
“I note that the Appellant states the following about the ability to relocate:
42. Question (required) Is there a reason why you could not relocate to a different part of Botswana? 42. Response (required) its small, I had moved to a different part of X. we met there, eh didn't go for me he went for a funeral and he saw me. he didn’t say much, he just told me Botswana is small and if I locate to a certain place he will always know where I am and he will find me. (SEF 42).
37. The expert in his assessment referred to the practical difficulties making relocation to an area where the appellant would not have any existing network very difficult and therefore an individual would go to an area where there was an existing network of family and friends. The expert said that the connection could be used by the appellant’s brother to locate him. He stated that this was especially the case since they share a kinship network as well as a broader Herero network. Reference is made to Botswana being a small country.
38. The country expert did not assess the plausibility of the appellant’s account as given at Q 42 and the circumstances of the funeral ( see paragraph 14 of the expert report). However, the FtTJ did address this in his factual findings at paragraph 15. The FtTJ found as a fact that the appellant’s half-brother came across the appellant “by chance” at a funeral. The FtTJ concluded on the evidence that this was a chance meeting at a funeral of an extended family member and was not an incident where the appellant’s half-brother had been stalking the appellant. Therefore, during the period of time where the appellant lived outside his home area of 3 to 4 months, the FtTJ found that the appellant lived there without any harm coming to him and there was no evidence of harm to him or being sought/located.
39. Furthermore, at paragraph 14, when addressing the risk of harm, the FtTJ rejected the appellant’s account that he had received a threatening email from his brother on 25 March 2024 finding it to be self-serving but also that there was no explanation why the email that come from his half-brother’s nephew and not from his half-brother himself given the appellant’s factual account.
40. Therefore, the FtTJ plainly addressed the risk on return as set out in the expert report but rejected it for the reasons which were adequately given and were evidence based.
41. Consequently, even if it could be said that the FtTJ did not refer to the assaults in the context of customary marriages between those of the Herero community, the FtTJ assessed the circumstances on return and the risk by reference to the expert evidence but rejected it for sound evidential reasons. Firstly, there were two isolated incidents with the last one on 21 December 2021. The FtTJ found that that the relationship with the girl had ended and no further assaults had occurred upon the appellant. He had moved to a different area where he resided for 3 to 4 months where his brother had not sought him out but had come across in a chance meeting and there was no evidence he was harmed by him. Therefore, from December 2021 which was the last assault until he left Botswana in September 2022 the FtTJ found there were no further incidents. The FtTJ rejected his evidence referring to the threatening message in 2024 and therefore by the date of the hearing in November 2025, the FtTJ was entitled to find there was no real risk of persecution or serious harm on return, even if the FtTJ had found there was a Convention reason
42. Ground 6 seeks to challenge the assessment of internal relocation. Ms Choudhary submitted that the assessment was based on speculation and disregarded the expert evidence as to the importance of Herero community and that the expert had assessed that the risk on return arose from the network of the Herero community. She submitted that the view of the expert was of key importance due to the Herero being a minority in Botswana. Thus, she submitted that internal relocation could not be where he could be located due to his membership of a minority tribe.
43. Mr Wain relied upon the findings made between paragraphs 13 and 15 taken together. He submitted that the expert report was premised upon the appellant’s half-brother finding him and being able to locate his whereabouts. He submitted that the finding made at paragraph 15 was not challenged in the grounds. The FtTJ did engage with the expert report but found on the facts that the appellant would be able to relocate to a different area in Botswana as he did before which was a place of safety and reasonable.
44. I am satisfied that there was no error in the assessment made of internal relocation and the factual findings made were consistent with the evidence. Whilst Ms Choudhary submitted that the judge failed to engage with the expert report, as set out above, paragraph 13.3 related to the risks of relocating, and that given the hardships he would not be able to relocate to an area where there was not an existing network of friends and family and therefore any connections could be used by his half-brother to find and locate him which included his kinship connection and tribal background. The factual findings made by the FtTJ at paragraph 15 are not challenged on the grounds, and the FtTJ gave evidence-based reasons for rejecting such a basis having found that the appellant had lived in a place of relocation for 3 to 4 months where he was not located by his half-brother and their only meeting was one of chance, and was not evidence of him being stalked. That answered the risk identified by the expert. Furthermore paragraph 14, was a further finding made which went to the issue of risk.
45. Therefore, when the FtTJ made a finding that the appellant could not be easily located, that was not a speculative finding as the grounds assert, nor did the FtTJ ignore the expert evidence on nationwide Herero networks but had made findings of fact on the evidence relating to the appellant’s own account. His finding that the appellant was able to live for a period of 3 to 4 months in another area without any interest in him demonstrated that he was not easily located.
46. The appellant’s evidence was that he lived with friends during that time. As the expert had identified, due to hardships in Botswana he would have to relocate to an area where he had a network of friends or family. The FtTJ made a finding that he had already done that before he left Botswana. That was sufficient for the FtTJ to find that it would be reasonable him to relocate and was consistent with the expert’s account of needing a place where he had an existing network so as to avoid hardship.
47. As a final point, the ASA raised as a reason for not being able to relocate as relating to the appellant’s mental health/vulnerabilities. Ms Choudhary did not address this but there was no evidence in support to demonstrate that the appellant had any mental health difficulties or vulnerabilities. The medical evidence addressed the scarring due to the assaults but made no assessment of any residual difficulties. It referred to the possibility of having a CT scan and this was in the report in 2024 however there was no evidence before the FtTJ that the appellant had any further diagnosis or any other medical evidence in support of any mental health problems or treatment.
48. Therefore, and in conclusion, the FtTJ addressed risk on return, and the safety and reasonableness of relocation taking into account the expert evidence but on the account given by the appellant was entitled to find that he would not be at risk on return to Botswana. For those reasons and having considered the decision of FtTJ in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, that was material to the outcome and therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.
7 May 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds