Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000080
First-tier Tribunal No: HU /00235/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

CB
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mohzam, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 2 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Jamaica. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 2 September 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.

3. The appeal arose in the context of deportation proceedings. The appellant relied on his claimed fears of criminal violence and his and his family’s human rights in resisting his removal to Jamaica following his conviction for a series of exceptionally serious offences involving possession of a firearm and the infliction of serious violence on a police officer. He was sentenced on 28 January 2020 to a period of imprisonment totalling 9 years and 4 months. Given the seriousness of his crimes and the condign strength of the public interest in his deportation, the appellant could only succeed in his Article 8 claim if he established the existence of very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory family and private life exceptions.

The Relevant Parts of the FTT Decision

4. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the FtT decision:

• The judge refused an application to adjourn for the following reasons, at [20]-[27]:

[20] Counsel said that he wished to seek an adjournment so that the appellant could obtain a report from an independent social worker on the effects of a deportation order on the appellant’s children. He said that the appellant’s previous solicitors had not prepared the case properly and his current solicitors had only been instructed in June 2025.

[21] The respondent objected to an adjournment.

[22] I considered the guidance in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness] [2014] UKUT 418. What I had to consider was whether the refusal of an adjournment would result in unfairness to the appellant.

[23] I did not consider that it would. These are the reasons for this.

[24] I could not see what a report from a social worker would achieve. It would no doubt say that the children love their father, were close to him, and would be badly affected by the separation. That seemed to me to be obvious. It did not require the opinion of a social worker to establish it.

[25] Notice of intention to make a deportation order was given on 9 March 2021. The appellant has had over two and half years to obtain any evidence he wished to obtain. Although he criticizes his former solicitor they had prepared a large and detailed bundle which contained all the relevant evidence. They had obtained statements from the various mothers and children involved and done so promptly. If they considered that a social work report was necessary they would have obtained one.

[26] Lastly this was late to make such an application. The current solicitors had been instructed since June. The start of the final hearing is late on any view to decide that additional evidence was required.

[27] There was no unfairness in refusing an adjournment. I decided that the hearing should proceed.

• The appellant was found not to have rebutted the statutory presumption that he continued to pose a danger to the community of the UK. As such, his protection claim was dismissed (see [45]-[54]).

• The appellant’s related Articles 2 and 3 human rights claims were dismissed largely on the strength of a range of adverse credibility findings (see [55]-[78]).

• The judge proceeded to consider the appellant’s Article 8 family life claim. It is necessary to set out this part of the judge’s assessment at length:

[79] The appellant has a partner SE. She is a British citizen. He lives with SE. They have three children. A son, DB, who was 18 years old at the date of hearing and an adult. A daughter, TB, who was 17 years old at the date of the hearing. A son, T, who was 12 years old at the date of hearing. There is another child who lives with them. This is A. He is 15 months old. He is the son of SE. The appellant is not the father of A. The child was conceived when he was in prison.

[80] There are three children from other relationships. A son, JD, who lives with his mother ST. He was 16 years old at the date of hearing.

[81] A daughter, S, who lives with her mother SP.

[82] A daughter, N. She was nine years old at the date of hearing. She lives with her mother NH.

[83] All the children are British citizens and are qualifying children.

The Welfare of the Children

[84] In any administrative decision involving the removal of a person from the United Kingdom the welfare of any child likely to be affected by that decision is a primary, although not the primary, nor a paramount, consideration.

[85] The appellant lives with the children of SE. It is said that he is involved with the other children who live with their mothers. I have no reason to doubt what he says. There are statements from the mothers and statements from some of the children.

[86] The welfare of all the children is best served by the appellant remaining in the United Kingdom.
• Next, the judge set out uncontroversial principles of law about the interpretation of the family life exception and the meaning of the unduly harsh threshold (at [87]-[89]) before continuing his analysis of the appellant’s factual Article 8 claim in the context of the statutory scheme.

[90] I accept that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with all the children. There is evidence that he was missed when he was in prison. There are no special health concerns for any of the children.

[91] For the three children who live with their mothers there is no question of them going to live in Jamaica with their father. They will stay with their mothers. They will be looked after by their mothers. They will be financially supported by their mothers or by state benefits.

[92] I do not underestimate the effects of deportation. The children lived apart from their father when he was in prison. A sentence of imprisonment is not the same as deportation. A prison sentence will come to an end eventually. If the appellant is deported it means that the children will have little more to do with him. They can visit him. They can contact him remotely. That does not in any way equate with the ability to see their father face-to-face.

[93] SE will have a choice to make. She can either remain in the United Kingdom with her children or she can go with her children to Jamaica so that they can live with their father. SE said that she does not wish to go to Jamaica.

[94] That is a choice that she will have to make as an adult. The option is available.

[95] If she remains in the United Kingdom she can work to support her children. She worked in well-paid jobs until her youngest child A was born last year. At the moment she is in receipt of state benefits. She has provided evidence of that. She has a total income from Universal Credit of £2,156.59 per month, ABl page 140. She will receive child benefit for the children. This is a signiﬁcant net income. The needs of the children would be met ﬁnancially and materially if the appellant is deported.

[96] Whilst I accept that the deportation of the appellant would be upsetting for all the children and for SE I do not ﬁnd that it would have unduly harsh consequences for any of them. The appellant does not meet the requirements of Exception 2.

Very Compelling Circumstances

[97] I accept that the appellant will have established a private life and a family life in the United Kingdom since he came here. The decision interferes with both. In assessing proportionality I adopt the balance sheet approach commended by Lord Thomas at paragraph 83 of Hesham Ali and SSHD [2016] UKSC 60.

[98] These matters weigh in the appellant’s favour.

[99] He has substantial family ties with British citizens. The welfare of all his children is best served by him remaining in the United Kingdom. Although he does not have indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom he has had limited leave to remain in recent years. He was lawfully present. He is not a British citizen but has lived in the United Kingdom for many years.

[100] He has not committed any further offences. This does not weigh greatly in his favour. He is expected to be of good behaviour.

[101] He cannot meet the requirements of Appendix Private life 5.1 (b) because he would not meet the suitability requirements. He argues that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Jamaica.

[102] He is a young man in good health. He is a national of Jamaica and lived there until he was an adult. He knows its customs. He is entitled to all the rights and benefits of his Jamaican nationality. He has some family members there and has friends there. They might be expected to give him some assistance on return. He can apply for assistance under the voluntary return schemes. He can work to support himself and his family if his family chooses to join him. I have found that he is not at risk there.

[103] There are no very significant obstacles to his integration into Jamaica. This weighs against him in assessing proportionality.

[104] I take into account those matters which I must have regard to by virtue of section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

[105] The appellant speaks English. This has a neutral effect.

[106] The appellant is not financially independent but is capable of being so. This does not weigh against him. It has a neutral effect.

[107] Any private life which the appellant has established in the United Kingdom has been established at a time when his immigration status was precarious. I put little weight on it for that reason.

[108] The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. The more serious the offence the greater is the public interest in the removal of a foreign criminal. This was an offence of an extremely serious nature. There was great violence. It caused serious injury to a police constable who was acting in the execution of his duty. It involved the use of a weapon which in the possession of the appellant could have no lawful purpose. Its only use is to shoot people.

[109] The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest. The public interest in removing people who behave as the appellant has behaved from the United Kingdom is immense. His deportation is necessary to recognize the seriousness of the offence, to discourage others, and to give the public confidence in the ability of His Majesty’s Government to manage its immigration policies, to maintain good order and governance; and to protect the public against violent criminals. All this weighs heavily against the appellant in assessing proportionality.

[110] Taking all these matters into account I find that the public interest in removing the appellant from the United Kingdom far outweighs any interference with his family or private life. He does not succeed on that ground.

• The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on five grounds. Only three of those grounds attracted permission:

• Ground 1 - Unfair refusal of adjournment

• Ground 4 - Material factual error and flawed unduly harsh assessment

• Ground 5 - Inadequate very compelling circumstances analysis

6. In a decision dated 9 February 2026, a judge of the Upper Tribunal granted permission for the above grounds to be argued. The following observations were made in granting permission:

[…]

Ground One challenges the FTT’s decision to refuse the appellant an adjournment for the purposes of obtaining a report from an Independent Social Worker about the potential impact of his deportation on his children. In considering this ground, I bear in mind Walbrook Trustee (Jersey) Ltd & Ors v Fattal & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 427 at [33], in which the Court of Appeal described it as “obvious” that “an appellate court should not interfere with case management decisions by a judge who has applied the correct principles and who has taken into account matters which should be taken into account and left out of account matters which are irrelevant, unless the court is satisfied that the decision is so plainly wrong that it must be regarded as outside the generous ambit of the discretion entrusted to the judge.”

The FTT directed itself to the guidance set out in Nwaigwe and to the centrality of the issue of fairness. It then considered what the ISW was likely to say, which was that “the children love their father, were close to him, and would be badly affected by the separation”. The grounds critique the FTT for here ”substitut[ing] judicial assumption for expert evidence”. However, this comment needs to be read in the context of the consideration of this issue as a whole, in which the FTT noted that it had before it “a large and detailed bundle which contained all the relevant evidence”, including “statements from the various mothers and children.” The FTT did not err by considering what an ISW report was likely to say, having already seen this evidence. The FTT also considered the amount of time the appellant had already had to prepare his evidence since the deportation order was made and since he had instructed his current solicitors. The grounds say this was unfair, because it blamed the appellant for the conduct of his previous solicitors. That is misconceived. The question of how much time the appellant had already had to prepare his evidence was a permissible consideration, when deciding whether fairness to the appellant required an adjournment. Moreover, the FTT did not fault the conduct of the previous solicitors. On the contrary, it found that they had prepared a large and detailed bundle. For these reasons, Ground One, on its own, would not merit a grant of permission to appeal. However, for the reasons set out immediately below, I consider that Ground Four is just arguable. For pragmatic reasons, I grant the appellant permission to argue all three grounds that relate to the best interests of his children, as there may be some overlap between them.

Ground Four raises two criticisms of the FTT’s unduly harsh assessment. The first is that the FTT made a significant mistake of fact about the income of the appellant’s partner, SE. It is submitted that the mistake meant that the FTT overestimated the household income by more than 25%. If this is correct, this is arguably capable of being material, because the FTT specifically found that the needs of the children in the household “would be met financially and materially if the appellant is deported.” Given the seriousness of the appellant’s offending and the length of his sentence, it may well be that any mistake about the financial impact of his deportation on SE and her children is unlikely to be material, but that is a question that can be considered at the error of law hearing, and in light of all of the relevant evidence that was before the FTT.

It is further argued that there was evidence before the FTT of the partner’s “anxiety and inability to cope” that was not taken into account. It will be for the appellant to show at the error of law hearing that this latter evidence was of significant strength and reliability that the FTT was required to deal with it.

Ground Five is to some extent parasitical on Ground Four, as it relies in part on the claimed mistake about the financial impact of the appellant’s deportation on SE and her children. Other complaints made under this ground are less persuasive, but given the link between Ground Four and Ground Five, I do not limit the grounds.

7. At the error of law hearing, I refused to admit further evidence for the purposes of the error of law proceedings because it was acknowledged that the fresh factual evidence could only have any purchase if the appellant’s appeal was allowed and a fresh decision was required on the merits. I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Discussion

8. The focus of both the written and oral submissions was on the first ground of appeal and the suggestion that the judge unlawfully and unfairly decided against adjourning the hearing. The adjournment was sought to enable the appellant to obtain the opinion of an independent social worker to comment on the effect his deportation would have on the minor children for whom he was a father figure. The essence of the complaint made against the judge’s analysis of this preliminary and procedural matter was that he had unlawfully indulged in speculation by asking himself what probative impact such a report might have on the proceedings.

9. I am not persuaded that the fairness of the proceedings was undermined by the judge asking himself what an independent social worker might say in any report. In assessing whether the proceedings would be unfair by proceeding without such evidence, the judge could not sensibly grapple with the point unless he addressed his mind to whether it might make a material difference. At the risk of labouring the point, a judicial refusal of an application to adjourn, founded on a concern that there is a gap in the available evidence, could only render the proceedings unfair if the missing evidence could potentially alter the overall outcome. In arguing that the judge arrived at the wrong judgement, the appellant’s representatives have themselves speculated about what such a report may say. At paragraph [10] of the grounds of appeal, it was argued that: “An independent social work report is capable of addressing concrete matters that are not obvious, including attachment dynamics, safeguarding issues, the functioning of multiple households, the feasibility and impact of contact arrangements, and any vulnerabilities”. Equally, any report might not have assisted the appellant in the way described. It appears to me that what the judge did was to effectively take the appellant’s case at its highest as to what an independent social worker might say and to use this as the platform on which to exercise his discretion as to whether it was fair and in the interests of justice to adjourn the hearing.

10. In exercising his discretion, the judge not only took the appellant’s case at its highest about what such a report might say, but he also properly had regard to the procedural background. He was more than entitled to consider the extensive period of time available to the appellant and his representatives to gather such evidence. By the time the judge heard this appeal on 28 August 2025, the proceedings had been in train for a year since the refusal of his claims in August 2024. Even if the appellant was right that he had not been well served by his former representatives, those who represented him since June 2026 had approximately 2 months to plug any gaps in the evidence before the day of the hearing. In any event, the notion that the appellant’s former representatives had somehow failed in their professional duty is not an allegation to be taken lightly. It was confirmed at the error of law hearing that the appellant had not waived privilege to enable his criticisms to be properly investigated and, while he had complained directly to the firm in question, he had not complained to the regulator.

11. I am entirely satisfied that the judge exercised his discretion lawfully and did not take into account any immaterial considerations. On the contrary, the factors he pointed to were highly material to the judgement he was required to exercise. Seen against the appropriate procedural backdrop and the necessary uncertainty of what an independent social worker might have opined, the appellant was not deprived of a fair hearing. I dismiss this ground of appeal.

12. Grounds four and five involve a considerable degree of overlap. Each involves the suggestion that the judge’s reasoning was deficient in law. In assessing challenges of this nature, it is essential to keep in mind first principles. It is to those first principles that I now turn.

13. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide the analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:

[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:

“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).

[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:

“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probably that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”

14. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (I have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  

[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
 
[…]
 
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  

(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  

(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  

15. A sub-strand of ground four was that the judge miscalculated the funds available to the appellant’s partner, SE. It was not contested by the Secretary of State that the judge had inflated the funds available to SE through Universal Credit because the calculation did not account for a deduction of £583.97 against the total of £2,156.59. While it is fair to say that the numerical difference between the two figures is not insignificant, it is necessary to consider the materiality of the error in the context of the substantive issue before the judge to decide. The judge was not assessing the hard-edged question of whether a minimum financial threshold was met. Instead, he was engaged in the more evaluative question of whether the appellant’s deportation would produce unduly harsh effects. The miscalculation is to be found at paragraph [95] of the judge’s reasons where he also found that SE had worked in “well-paid jobs” in the recent past and that the Universal Credit payment, taken together with child benefit, was a “significant net income”. On the strength of this consideration, it was observed that the financial needs of the children would be met. Even if the judge had relied on the correct figure accounting for the deductions, it is inconceivable that it would have been found that the children would not have been adequately provided for. It is also worth noting that this was merely one facet of a multi-faceted assessment of the facts going to the issue of whether the children would suffer unduly harsh effects as a result of deportation. I am not remotely persuaded that this narrow aspect of the overall fact-finding process had any material bearing on the overall assessment of the critical questions before the judge to decide.

16. A further strand of the appellant’s argument under grounds four and five was that the judge had not meaningfully assessed the likely implications for SE and the children on the ‘go scenario’. Again, I am not persuaded that the judge needed to say any more than he did. He was plainly focussed on the ‘stay scenario’ because this was the only realistic proposition given that SE had made it clear that she would not follow the appellant to Jamaica upon his removal. As the authorities cited above reveal, the judge was not required to engage in a line-by-line analysis of SE’s account about why she would not be minded to relocate to Jamaica. Instead, what was required was intelligible and lawfully adequate reasons to explain why the appeal did not succeed. The appellant can be in no doubt about why the judge concluded that there would not be unduly harsh effects on any of the qualifying children, or SE. The judge made it perfectly clear that the minor children would not enjoy the same quality of relationship with the appellant as they would if they lived together ([92]). He also alluded to the absence of any “special health concerns for any of the children” ([90]). The judge was entitled to find that, and adequately explained why, the emotional distress they would suffer fell short of the high threshold of being unduly harsh. This was all properly factored into the ultimate question which the judge had to determine, whether there would be very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions.

17. The most powerful factor in support of the appellant’s Article 8 appeal was the impact his deportation would be likely to have on his minor children. Having found, for lawful reasons, that these effects would not be unduly harsh, it is difficult to see how he could have possibly reached the conclusion that there were very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. This is even before the exceptional gravity of the criminal offending is considered and the very weighty public interest in the appellant’s deportation.

18. The appellant cannot be said to be in a state of uncertainty about why his appeal failed. In truth, it is perfectly clear from the judge’s reasons that his deportation would not bring about unduly harsh effects for any members of his family and, according to the judge’s findings of fact, there was nothing which could reach the elevated threshold of very compelling circumstances to outweigh the very substantial public interest in his removal.

19. Accordingly, I dismiss grounds four and five.

Notice of Decision

The FtT decision did not involve material errors of law. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal and the judge’s decision stands undisturbed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 June 2026