Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000081
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03782/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22nd April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

M.A. (Egypt)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr West, instructed by KMT Law
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant or his son, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. MA appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 17 October 2025, dismissing his appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chinweze on grounds 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7, which I detail below. Permission was refused on grounds 3 and 4.
The Appellant’s case, and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal
2. MA is a national of Egypt born in 1975. He made a protection claim on 4 April 2023. The Secretary of State refused the claim by a decision dated 25 September 2024.
3. MA’s case, as summarised by the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”), was that his charitable support to a mosque and other activities led to the authorities wrongly imputing to him support for the Muslim Brotherhood following events surrounding a demonstration in 2014. He relied, inter alia, on what he asserted were summonses, a conviction in absentia in 2017 with a 20-year sentence, and claimed there were travel restrictions affecting his family.
4. The Judge accepted at [31] aspects of MA’s account regarding MA owning a textile factory, helping at the mosque during its construction, providing money, food and materials to help families in need, providing electricity when needed to the mosque from his generator and having no involvement or association with the Muslim Brotherhood. At [32] the Judge said that it was plausible that MA was unaware of any association between the mosque and the Muslim Brotherhood, rejecting an argument from the Respondent that this was not plausible if he were truly so involved with the mosque as claimed.
5. At [33] the Judge summarised the core of the claim that, in September 2014 the Muslim Brotherhood were calling for demonstrations across Egypt; and that one led to him being of interest to the authorities happened in mid-September. The Judge observed that there was some confusion in the account of the circumstances that led to the demonstration, and where MA was when it happened. The Judge noted that ultimately MA claimed the demonstration followed Friday prayers and was led by an unknown person, that the demonstration was bigger than usual, but he, (MA), was not directly involved in it. The Judge noted MA described the lead demonstrator having a weapon, there being clashes with the security forces, with people running in all directions and some being injured and arrested.
6. At [34] the Judge accepted MA’s evidence that around this time he decided to make a visa application which he made because of the political turmoil in Egypt, problems with food and security, and the way the authorities were arresting opponents of the regime. The judge accepted that at the time MA made his application he had no knowledge that his name was on any list as a person of interest.
7. At [35] the Judge accepted MA’s evidence that there were demonstrations in Egypt in 2014 and there had been a specific demonstration in mid-September at which people had been injured and arrested, and accepted that MA was not directly involved in that demonstration.
8. At [36] the Judge noted that it was MA’s case that summonses were issued for him on 9 October 2014 and 11 November 2014, and that copies were provided of these along with what was claimed to be a copy of the court verdict from 2017 and travel ban documentation. The Judge accepted that if these documents were reliable they supported the claim of being of adverse interest to the authorities, and said that the issue of their reliability would be dealt with later on in the decision.
9. The Judge nevertheless rejected the claim overall on credibility grounds, stating at [37], “However, there are a number of difficulties and issues with MA’s account which undermine its veracity which I detail below”. The core reasoning for that conclusion is set out at [38] to [60] of the First-tier Tribunal decision. At [38] to [47] the Judge detailed nine separate evidential issues.
10. At [48] to [49] the Judge highlighted issues with the documentation about travel arrangements to come to the UK and the absence of evidence from MA’s wife and son. At [50] the Judge accepted that MA had given a plausible explanation about how, even if a convicted criminal with a 20-year prison sentence, he was able to renew the licence for his factory and have a tax card (i.e. giving a power of attorney to his wife and using legal assistance, and that the authorities were not really concerned provided the tax was paid).
11. At [51] the Judge accepted that MA’s brother had been arrested and had died in custody, reportedly caused by COVID, and that MA did not know why he was detained, but decided that this did not affect the core of the claim either way. The Judge considered the claim in the light of the country information evidence and accepted at [52] – [53] that MA’s account was externally consistent with it, but said that he found that MA had failed to establish he was of adverse interest to the Egyptian authorities as a consequence of events in 2014. The documentation was not accepted as reliable at [54]-[55]. At [59] considered that MA’s failure to make an asylum claim in France or Italy undermined his credibility.
12. At [60] the Judge found that MA was not credible, and at [61] that he had failed to prove his claim both on the applicable standard under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022; and under the lower standard applicable to humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR respectively (at [63] and [67]). The Judge also dismissed the claim under Article 8 ECHR.
The pleaded grounds
13. The pleaded grounds can be summarised as follows:
• Ground 1 asserted that the Judge approached credibility in a piecemeal way and placed weight on matters said to be minor or not truly inconsistent, without properly explaining why those matters outweighed the aspects of the account found plausible and consistent with country material.
• Ground 2 asserted that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for rejecting the documents and that the Judge’s approach was circular, because the documents were rejected by reference to the adverse credibility findings rather than being assessed in their own right.
• Ground 5 pleaded an error in the Article 8 assessment and in the conclusion that there were no very significant obstacles to integration.
• Ground 6 argued that the Judge failed to properly to apply the lower standard of proof.
• Ground 7 argued that the Judge failed to adequately to consider the best interests of the dependent child.
Permission to appeal
14. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chinweze on grounds 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7. Permission was refused on grounds 3 and 4.
15. The permission decision identified as arguable the contention that, having accepted several aspects of the account as plausible and consistent with external material, the Judge failed adequately to explain why discrepancies outweighed those features. Permission was also granted on the treatment of documents and the linked Article 8 grounds, however, at the error of law hearing Mr West confirmed that he relied upon grounds 1 and 2, and he confirmed that it was not necessary to trouble the Tribunal with ground 6. He accepted that grounds 5 and 7 fell away if MA did not succeed on grounds 1 or 2.
Preliminary matter at the error of law hearing
16. At the First-tier Tribunal hearing, the Judge recorded that MA’s son was a dependent on his father’s protection claim, although the son was not formally before the Tribunal as a separate appellant. Mr West asked for this to be reiterated at the error of law hearing. Mr Pugh confirmed that the Secretary of State’s internal case records treated the son as MA’s dependent and that, if MA were ultimately to succeed on his asylum claim, the son would be entitled to leave in line with the grant made to a refugee’s dependent.
Submissions
17. I summarise submissions only to the extent necessary to explain my conclusions. I have considered the parties’ submissions in full.
18. Mr West argued that the Judge’s favourable findings which included findings on plausibility and objective consistency should have led to acceptance of the core claim. It was submitted that the discrepancies (if they even were discrepancies) and other evidential shortcomings relied upon were at best minor. It was submitted that the approach to documents was circular and fell foul of the Mibanga heresy.
19. The Respondent submitted that the Judge’s credibility assessment was sustainable, that the issues identified were central to the core claim, and that the documents were considered lawfully in the round.
The law
20. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the FTJ failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTJ's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Discussion and conclusions
Ground 1: Did the Judge fall into material error in the credibility assessment?
21. As set out above, the Judge did make findings that some aspects of the Appellant’s case were accepted by the Tribunal, but in other places only went so far as to say that they were “plausible”. Plausibility is relevant to credibility but it is a limited concept. It means that an account is capable of being believed and sits within what might reasonably occur in the relevant country context. It does not automatically follow that the account is true. A narrative may be plausible because it is coherent, because it aligns with general background material, or because it reflects a pattern known to occur. It may still be untrue, exaggerated, or mistaken on the facts. Credibility is the broader evaluation. It concerns whether the decision-maker can safely rely upon the evidence as truthful and reliable, having regard to internal consistency, consistency with other evidence, whether there are any omissions or changes of account, and the quality and detail of the explanation given. A judge may therefore accept that parts of an account are plausible, yet conclude that the claimant has not established the material facts because other features of the evidence undermine overall reliability. A judge may accept that aspects of an account are plausible or consistent with general country information, but still reject the account overall where there are substantial credibility shortcomings.
22. The question for the Upper Tribunal is whether the credibility shortcomings identified were reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence, and whether adequate and rationally sustainable reasons were given for the conclusions reached on credibility and risk.
23. At Paragraph 38 the Judge’s “First” credibility concern was the timing of notification that MA was on a list. After accepting that reference to 12 October 2014 in interview was likely to be a mistake in the record, the Judge said, “However, I consider reference to several days after the demonstration in mid-September and 2 October 2014 to be an inconsistency in his account”. In MA’s witness statement in the supplementary bundle, at paragraph 9, he stated that “several days later” his lawyer informed him his name had appeared on a list. That statement also describes the demonstration as occurring in 2014. In the asylum interview dated 22 August 2024, MA had said that the demonstration was in mid‑September 2014. He then said that a solicitor friend rang him and told him his name was on the list and he needed to escape. In the same interview he is recorded as giving two different dates for that phone call, first “12th October” (at question 40, P.56 RB, which as set out above the Judge accepted was a mistake), and later “2nd October” (see question 48, P.57 RB). I accept that, viewed in isolation, the difference between describing the period mid‑September to 2 October 2014, or it being a period “several days later”, could be characterised as less striking than other matters also relied upon by the Judge. I accept that another judge might not have placed weight on it. However, in my judgement, it was not outside the range of permissible findings for the Judge to consider it as an inconsistency, and given that the timing was said to be the trigger for MA’s flight, it was reasonable to treat it as relevant.
24. In any event, the Judge did not decide the appeal on that point alone. The Judge expressly relied upon a series of credibility shortcomings. The “First” point falls to be assessed in the context of the “Second” matter set out at paragraphs 39 and 40, which was about the timing of the claimed flight, the father’s arrest, and when MA learned of it, (as well as the other matters the Judge set out). The Judge said:
“39. Second, the Appellant says that upon hearing he was on a list he fled to Alexandria on the same day. He says in his interview that his father was arrested a week after he fled and then held for two days. In his statement he says that his father was arrested on 2 October 2014 and held for two days. As noted above the Appellant said in oral evidence that he heard he was on the list on 2 October. When the inconsistency in the dates was put to him and specifically what was written in his statement he said he hadn’t said what was in his statement but rather that he fled on 2 October and called his wife two days later and she confirmed his father’s arrest. He was then asked specifically when his father was arrested he said he didn’t know but he called his wife a week after he fled and that she told him his father had been arrested and released after two days. When the inconsistency about whether he called his wife two days or a week after he fled, he said he hadn’t meant two days but a number of days and he couldn’t remember the exact number.
40. I do not consider the Appellant’s explanation to be persuasive. He adopted his witness statement at the start of his evidence and confirmed it was true and accurate. Although he made one amendment he did not make any correction in respect of what he said about his father’s arrest. I consider his account of when he fled, when his father was arrested and when he found out about it to be inconsistent. This undermines his credibility.”
25. In my judgement the Judge was rationally entitled to treat this as an internal inconsistency in MA’s evidence. There has been no argument to me (either pleaded or oral) that anything the Judge recorded MA as saying in his oral evidence was not actually said. MA’s oral evidence was therefore that he heard he was on the list on 2 October 2014 and fled to Alexandria that day. In MA’s witness statement in the supplementary bundle, he said, “When we fled to Alexandria, they came to my house and arrested my father for two days on October 2, 2014.” In the asylum interview dated 22 August 2024, at question 14, (p.51 RB) MA stated that after he fled to Alexandria, the authorities took his father for two days and then released him. In the same interview, when asked why he fled if innocent, MA said the authorities took his father and released him and that this was “a week after I left for Alexandria” (see question 54, p.59 RB). That would have put the father’s arrest at around 9 October, not 2 October, if that was when MA had fled on his oral evidence. In my judgement it was not unreasonable for the Judge to view this as an inconsistency. The Appellant was also not unreasonably held to have been internally inconsistent in his oral evidence over whether he had the call with his wife two days or a week after his flight to Alexandria. The First-tier Tribunal considered MA’s attempts to explain the sequencing in oral evidence and rejected those explanations. In my judgement this was a matter going to the claimed reaction of the authorities, and to the claimed issue of putting pressure upon MA through his family, which was part of core the claim. It was central to the narrative rather than peripheral. There is no reason to think that the Judge had no regard to the passage of time or interpreter issues, in my judgement. It was open to the First-tier Tribunal to treat these difficulties as materially damaging to credibility.
26. The “Third” factor relied upon by the Judge, at [41] was that MA’s oral evidence referred to both his father and his solicitor advising him to flee (again there has been no assertion that he did not say this in evidence, or any application for a listening appointment), whereas earlier accounts did not include the father’s advice and only referred to the solicitor’s advice to flee. In the asylum interview dated 29 July 2024, MA said that his lawyer told him about the arrest warrant and told him to run away. In the asylum interview dated 22 August 2024, he said that a solicitor friend rang him, told him his name was on the list, and that he fled. There was no mention in those interview answers of advice from the father. In my judgement it was open to the Judge to consider whether the introduction of the father’s advice at a late stage was an embellishment, and to give reasons for treating it as undermining credibility.
27. The “Fourth” factor relied upon by the Judge as undermining of credibility, was at [42] regarding the arrest of the father to pressure MA’s surrender and the new assertion that the son was arrested at the same time. The First-tier Tribunal found it implausible that arresting the father was to pressure MA to surrender at a time when, on the Judge’s findings, no summons had yet been issued. The Judge also found that MA had embellished his claim by asserting at the hearing for the first time that his son was arrested on the same day as his father, (when the son would have been a small child – which was also not considered plausible). The new assertion about the son being arrested at the same time as the father did not appear in any of the three interviews. In my judgement the First-tier Tribunal was rationally entitled to treat this as an embellishment, because the interviews contain a number of prompts and questions where such an assertion would naturally have been expected if such a dramatic and serious thing had genuinely happened to MA’s young child at that time. In both his screening interview on 3 May 2023 and in his 29 July 2024 interview, MA was expressly told that it was important to understand whether his child (who he was putting forward as his dependent) faced risks different to the main claimant. MA responded in general terms that the child faced the same risk. (see pages 17 and 33, RB). In the asylum interview dated 29 July 2024, MA was asked about his wife and children, whether they were in danger, and why they did not come to the UK. In answering those questions, he referred to his wife and son being stopped at the airport on attempts to travel (see question 12, page 36, RB). He did not say at that point that his son had previously been arrested in 2014 at the same time as his (MA’s) father. In the asylum interview dated 22 August 2024, MA was asked about connections with the authorities. (see question 14, page 51, RB). He stated that after he fled they took his father for two days and released him. He did not say that his son was taken at the same time. MA was also asked specific questions about his son in that same interview, (see questions 60-68, pages 60-62, RB), including questions about why the son had a warrant in his name, when the son was taken, and what was said to him. MA’s answers placed the son’s detention in November 2022 and did not contain any suggestion of detention in 2014. In my judgement the First-tier Tribunal was rationally entitled to attach weight to the absence of any such allegation in the interviews.
28. The “Fifth” factor relied upon by the Judge as undermining of credibility, was at [43] regarding how the documents MA wanted to rely upon were obtained. The First-tier Tribunal identified inconsistency between MA’s written evidence that his lawyer obtained the documents and oral evidence that they were delivered to his home address and that the lawyer did not get them. (Again there has been no contention that MA did not say in his oral evidence what has been imputed to him by the Judge). In MA’s witness statement in the supplementary bundle, he said that his lawyer “managed to secure copies” of the documents. In MA’s First-tier Tribunal bundle, (at page 31, AB), the lawyer’s declaration states that MA authorised the lawyer’s office to inquire about the case and that copies of the verdict, arrest warrants and travel ban order were obtained in that way. In my judgement it was rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal to treat an inconsistency about provenance of the documents as undermining of general credibility and that (see below) it was also relevant to the reliability of the documents. This was not a peripheral point, given the reliance placed upon documentary corroboration.
29. The “Sixth” factor relied upon by the Judge as undermining of credibility, was at [44] regarding what the Judge consider to be a failure of MA to provide the court verdict to the Respondent and failure to address it in MA’s witness statement. The First-tier Tribunal found it troubling that the court verdict was not provided to the Respondent before the refusal decision and that it was not addressed in the witness statement, despite MA describing the 20‑year sentence as a core reason why he could not return. The Home Office refusal letter and bundle list the documents considered. The list includes summonses, a travel ban notification, and summonses for MA’s son, but does not include the court verdict. The Judge was entitled to regard this as an evidential issue which was relevant to credibility, in my judgment. There was evidence before the Judge, which the Judge noted, that in his screening interview on 3 May 2023, MA asserted that there was a court order for imprisonment for 20 years. He also stated that he had a solicitor in Egypt who “might” have some documents (see page 24, RB). The purported lawyer’s letter, which bears the date of approximately three months prior to that screening interview, says that a copy of the verdict (as well as other documents) had been obtained. Leaving aside that it is remarkable that MA in his screening interview was so uncertain that his solicitor had such vitally important and life-changing documentation, the fact remains that, in MA’s supplementary witness statement, while he refers to a travel ban notification being issued in 2017 he did not detail the asserted conviction in absentia and sentence as a distinct element of his case. In my judgement it was also rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal to consider that omission to be significant, in circumstances where MA’s case was that the conviction and sentence were central to risk on return.
30. The “Seventh” factor relied upon by the Judge as undermining of credibility, was at [45] where it was found that MA’s explanations for why he did not stay and resolve matters were confusing and inconsistent. The explanation given in interview, the Judge said, was confusing, and not consistent with what he later said in his witness statement (regarding fearing being immediately detained and tortured and it became clear the authorities were fabricating a case against him), and his oral evidence (where he said it was because he was warned by his solicitor and his father).
31. It is correct that the Judge did not expressly detail the response in interview which was said to be confusing but in my judgment the Judge must have been referring to question 57 of the second main interview; where MA was asked, “But if those who had attended the demonstrations and had been inciting violence were released why did you someone who had never attended a demonstration or supported the Muslim brotherhood feel you had to flee?”. He is recorded as replying, “Part of my job as a charitable person we used to help in fasting people in Ramadan helping the Mosque. We received some collections and we put that to my father and we take the collection to the bucket in the Mosque and we put some donations myself and put that into the Mosque. So anybody that gave me money I had to provide them with receipt. Sometimes I help the Mosque so maintenance wise I would help them for free. Any volunteer who attend the mosque and do a job we would give them food.” In my judgement that could rationally be characterised as a confusing response because it did not appear to answer the question – and indeed the question was re-put: “I understand but my question was in regards to those who had been demonstrating and inciting violence had been released by the police so why would yourself someone who was innocent, had never attended any demonstrations and never supported the Muslim brotherhood decided to flee?” He is recorded as replying, “So because my role towards the mosque the government closed down the mosque. My role in the mosque but in of attention of the authority.” Again in my judgment that could rationally be characterised as confusing. The interviewing officer again pressed the point, “But if you were innocent and the government will of had no evidence to show you supported the Muslim brotherhood why would you flee?” MA is recorded as replying, “Because my name was on the list. Wanted papers and for my role taking collections and donations for the Mosque. Me and my father I used to provide them with paint and materials I would give them and put them in charge”. In my judgment that Judge was reasonably entitled to characterise this as lacking consistency with MA’s witness statement in the supplementary bundle (at paragraphs 12-14), regarding fearing being immediately detained and tortured and it became clear the authorities were fabricating a case against him. The asylum interview dated 22 August 2024 recorded repeated questioning on this issue. MA’s answers did not directly explain why an innocent person would need to flee beyond reiterating that his name was on a list and describing general matters about charity work and collections, or give the more coherent explanation only offered later in the statement. It was open to the First-tier Tribunal to conclude that those answers lacked clarity and did not satisfactorily address the point being explored. The Judge was entitled to treat that as a credibility concern.
32. The “Eighth” factor relied upon by the Judge as undermining of credibility, was at [46] where the First-tier Tribunal criticised MA for failing to mention his son’s arrest in November 2022 in earlier stages of the claim and for inconsistency about what was said to the son. In my judgement it was not unreasonable for the Judge to view this as harming MA’s credibility. The Judge was correct to state that there was no reference to the son actually being arrested in either the screening interview or first asylum interview (despite the express prompt that, if there were additional or differing reasons for the dependent’s claim, the Respondent needed to be told – see pages 17-18, RB). The screening interview record (at p.23 RB) contains MA’s assertion that the authorities “tried to catch my son” and that the son was brought to the United Kingdom by the wife and handed over to MA one month before the screening interview. In the asylum interview in July 2024, when asked whether his wife and children were in danger and why they did not come, MA referred to travel difficulties and being stopped at the airport. (see p.36 RB). He did not refer to his son having been detained in 2022. It was open to the First-tier Tribunal to treat these matters as damaging to credibility, given the significance of the claimed detention of the son and its claimed relevance to risk and continuing interest.
33. The “Ninth” factor relied upon by the Judge as undermining of credibility, was at [47] to [48], where the Judge found MA’s account of the wife and son’s travel difficulties confusing and lacking in detail. The Judge also found that the limited supporting communications did not demonstrate that the wife and son were refused permission to board. In the asylum interview dated 29 July 2024, MA described attempts by his wife and son to travel, said they were stopped twice, and said the son got through on the third attempt. In the asylum interview dated 22 August 2024, he stated that his son was retained once and his wife twice, and that a bribe of 1000 US dollars was used to allow the son to pass security and board. The supplementary bundle at page 31 of 34 included a UKVI response stating that if an airline refused boarding it should issue an official letter explaining the reason (which the Judge noted had not been provided in evidence). In my judgment it was reasonably open to the Judge to conclude that the travel narrative lacked sufficient clarity and detail and that the supporting communications did not establish an official refusal to board for the reasons given. That was a rational assessment on the evidence.
34. At [49] the Judge drew an adverse inference from the absence of evidence from the wife and son, in circumstances where their evidence was said to be relevant and reasonably available, and no adequate explanation was given for its absence. I accept that it would be wrong to imply that corroboration is necessary for a positive credibility finding: see for example ST (Corroboration - Kasolo) Ethiopia [2004] UKIAT 00119 where it was stated at [15]:
“The fact that corroboration is not required does not mean that an Adjudicator is required to leave out of account the absence of documentary evidence which might reasonably be expected. An appeal must be determined on the basis of the evidence produced but the weight to be attached to oral evidence may be affected by a failure to produce other evidence in support.”
This was also approved in TK (Burundi) [2009] EWCA Civ 40 (which the Judge cited). The Judge noted the son was a minor. In my judgment nothing in that paragraph, or elsewhere in the determination, discloses that the Judge treated corroboration as a sine qua non. In MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216 it was also noted at [86] that the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the Tribunal can give appropriate weight. It was common ground that the son was in the United Kingdom with MA. One criticism advanced at the error of law hearing was that it was not reasonable to expect evidence from a child. MA’s son was born in January 2008, according to the screening interview (and according to the letter from his school dated 17 July 2023). The hearing was in October 2025 when he would have been 17 years and 10 months old. It is right to note that Annex B to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: “Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance” states that a “child, vulnerable adult or sensitive witness will only be required to attend as a witness and give evidence at a hearing where the Tribunal determines that the evidence is necessary to enable the fair hearing of the case and their welfare would not be prejudiced by doing so”, but a statement could have been taken from him given his age even if he were not called to be cross-examined at the hearing. Similarly there was nothing stopping MA from obtaining a written statement or affidavit from his wife in Egypt. In any event I find that the Judge did not treat the absence of the son’s (and for that matter the wife’s) evidence as determinative in isolation. It was one factor amongst a series of credibility concerns. The Judge’s assessment was that evidence from the wife and son was reasonably available. That was a conclusion open to the Judge where MA relied upon events said to have occurred to both of them, including travel difficulties and the son’s detention, (and in circumstances where they were in contact and material was said to have been sent from Egypt). I do not accept that this aspect of the decision discloses legal error. The Judge was entitled to consider what evidence could reasonably have been produced and to take account of its absence in the overall assessment.
35. Stepping back and looking at the decision holistically, I find that the Judge accepted some of the Appellant’s background narrative and that parts of the account were plausible and, in general terms, consistent with objective evidence; and that the Judge then set out a series of credibility shortcomings which when looked in the round were not unreasonably characterised as serious and as going to the core of the claim; namely whether MA was of adverse interest to the Egyptian authorities. The Judge did not, in my judgement, adopt a piecemeal approach, nor did he stray beyond the bounds of what was rationally open to a First-tier Tribunal Judge. Ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2: Did the Judge fall into material error in his approach to the documentary evidence?
36. The First-tier Tribunal directed itself at [54] by reference to Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 and stated that it was for MA to prove reliability and for the Tribunal to decide what reliance should be placed on the documents after looking at all the evidence in the round.
37. The documents relied upon included summonses for MA dated 9 October 2014 and 11 November 2014, a travel ban notification dated 31 January 2017, and summonses for the son dated 3 January 2023 and 2 February 2023. MA’s First-tier Tribunal bundle also included the translated criminal court judgment material said to show conviction in absentia and sentence. MA’s bundle included a lawyer’s declaration stating that MA authorised the office to inquire about the case and that copies of the verdict, arrest warrants, and travel ban order were obtained for use in the proceedings.
38. The core of MA’s criticism was that the First-tier Tribunal rejected the documents only because it had already rejected the oral evidence.
39. I do not accept that ground 2 discloses a material error of law. As set out at [24] the Judge said that the evidence was considered in the round and the Judge at [54] and [55] reiterated this with regard to the assessment of the documents, and at [61] when making his overall assessment of credibility. The Judge did not state that documents were rejected simply because of disbelief in oral evidence. The Judge’s reasoning was that, although no obvious internal problems were identified on the face of the documents, the significant problems in MA’s evidence, (which, as set out above, included provenance issues and inconsistencies), meant that the Judge was not persuaded of their reliability when assessed in the round. I find that the Judge’s approach was consistent with Tanveer Ahmed which requires an assessment of reliability in light of the evidence as a whole. The Judge did not “put the cart before the horse” in the sense disapproved of in Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, in my judgement. A judge is not required to treat documents as determinative where the surrounding evidence gives rational reasons to doubt their reliability. I remind myself that in S v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1153 the Court of Appeal approved the comments in HH (Ethiopia) [2005] UKAIT 00164 that judicial fact-finders are not expected to operate in a form of “forensic straightjacket” and there is no rule of law as to the order in which they are to approach the evidential materials before them.
40. Here, the Judge’s reasons were brief in the section dealing directly with the documents, but in my judgement they were adequately supported by the detailed credibility analysis set out earlier. The Judge was entitled to incorporate that reasoning when explaining why little weight was attached to the documents. Ground 2 is not made out.
Grounds 5, 6 and 7
41. In light of the way the appeal was argued before me, and the conclusion that grounds 1 and 2 do not disclose a material error of law, grounds 5 and 7 do not arise for decision. Ground 6 was not pursued.
Overall conclusion
42. The First-tier Tribunal made some observations favourable to MA on plausibility and objective consistency. Those observations did not require the Judge to accept MA’s account overall. The adverse credibility findings were reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence. The Judge was rationally entitled to treat the shortcomings as serious, and as going to the core of whether MA was of adverse interest to the authorities.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Anonymity Direction
The anonymity direction made by the First-tier Tribunal is maintained.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15.4.26