Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000082
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64945/2023
LP/01048/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 16th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

R A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr L Youssefian, counsel, instructed by Kamran & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parver, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is a decision remaking the decision of judge of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) S Khan, promulgated on 22 October 2025, dismissing an appeal against the respondent’s decision, dated 7 December 2023, refusing the appellant’s asylum and human rights claim. In an ‘error of law’ decision promulgated on 2 July 2026 I found a material error of law in the FtT decision in respect of the assessment of the availability to the appellant of the internal relocation alternative by reference to his mental health issues. The scope of the remaking hearing is therefore on a narrow issue, but includes as assessment of whether removal of the appellant would breach article 8 ECHR in respect of the appellant’s private life rights. Mr Youssefian, who has capably represented the appellant in the proceedings before the Upper Tribunal, realistically accepted that the article 8 ECHR aspect of the appellant’s claim, although a different legal test, “more or less” stood or fell with my assessment of the availability of internal relocation.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Pakistan and is Muslim. He had valid leave to remain in the UK from 2011 to 2015 as a student. Thereafter he has not had lawful leave to remain. His asylum claim was premised on his earlier relationship in the UK with a Sikh woman that lasted from 2011 to 2022 and the perception held by his family in Pakistan, having learned of the relationship, that the appellant has converted to Sikhism. The appellant’s family threatened to kill him if he returned to Pakistan based on the belief that he had besmirched the family’s honour.
3. The respondent accepted that the appellant had been threatened by his father for the reasons advanced by the appellant, but the respondent did not accept that the appellant had demonstrated that his family had sufficient influence, capacity or power to take action against the appellant, or that the Pakistani authorities were unable to provide a sufficiency of protection, or that the appellant could not internally relocate to Lahore, Karachi or Faisalabad. The respondent did not accept that the appellant’s article 8 ECHR human rights would be breached by his removal to Pakistan.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
4. The FtT considered oral evidence given by the appellant in addition to a bundle of documents that included a witness statement from the appellant dated 12 June 2025, a psychological assessment from a Chartered Psychologist, Dr Aisha Ali, dated 18 August 2025, a Cognitive Behavioural Psychotherapist report from Zabir Hussain dated 29 July 2025, a support letter from a key worker at Safe Haven Housing Ltd, the appellant’s GP medical records, and a country report by Mr Asad Ali Khan dated 22 August 2025 in respect of the country conditions in Pakistan. I have considered all of these documents, as well as the respondent’s decision letter and the records of the appellant’s interviews with the respondent.
5. The FtT accepted that the appellant suffered from Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Disorder (but not from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Generalised Anxiety Disorder, as detailed in the reports from Dr Ali and Mr Hussain). The FtT found there would be a real risk to appellant from his father if he returned to his home area. The FtT accepted that the Pakistani authorities would be unable to provide the appellant with a sufficiency of protection from the threat from the appellant’s family in his home area on account of his father’s status (as a prominent businessman). This has not been challenged by way of any cross-appeal.
6. The FtT however rejected the appellant’s assertion that his family had influence or links throughout Pakistan. The FtT rejected the appellant’s claim that his family had a sufficient level of influence to enable them to locate him if he relocated to, for example, Karachi or Faisalabad where he has no well-founded fear of persecution. The FtT also found that the appellant is supported by a friend in the UK who provides him with accommodation, food and who pays his legal bills and for the expert reports. These findings of fact have not been challenged by the appellant and are retained. For the reasons set out in my ‘error of law’ decision I concluded that the FtT erred in law when assessing the medical reports and when assessing the availability of internal relocation.
The remaking hearing
7. The issue under the appellant’s protection claim that falls for determination following the error of law hearing is whether it would be reasonable for the appellant, given his particular circumstances, to relocate to Karachi or Faisalabad where it has already been determined that he would not face any risk of ill-treatment by his family or their agents.
8. The appellant did not produce any further documentary evidence. Both parties were content for me to proceed in reliance on the documents that were before the FtT including the expert reports identified at [4] above, the appellant’s statement from June 2025, and the appellant’s medical records. Additionally, both parties relied on the Country Information Note - Pakistan: Healthcare and Medical Treatment (July 2024).
9. I heard oral evidence from the appellant via the Tribunal appointed Urdu interpreter. I indicated to the parties that I would treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 and the authority of AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123. The appellant adopted his statement and was asked some supplementary questions by way of examination-in-chief. Mr Parver undertook a detailed cross-examination that was nevertheless conducted in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note. There were no questions in re-examination and no questions from me by way of clarification.
10. I made a detailed note of the submissions made by both representatives. I will refer to those submissions and the evidence from the appellant and produced on his behalf to the extent that it is necessary for me to lawfully remake the decision.
Legal framework
11. The appellant made his protection claim prior to the commencement of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA) and the relevant provisions as to internal relocation are set out at paragraph 339O of the immigration rules. This reads:
(i) The Secretary of State will not make:
(a) a grant of refugee status if in part of the country of origin a person would not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted, and the person can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country; or
(b) a grant of humanitarian protection if in part of the country of return a person would not face a real risk of suffering serious harm, and the person can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country.
(ii) In examining whether a part of the country of origin or country of return meets the requirements in (i) the Secretary of State, when making a decision on whether to grant asylum or humanitarian protection, will have regard to the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country and to the personal circumstances of the person.
(iii) (i) applies notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of origin or country of return.
12. The appropriate approach to the issue of reasonableness is set out in Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2 AC 416, AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678 and SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15; [2022] 1 WLR 3190. In Januzi Lord Bingham gave guidance on the proper approach at [21]:
“The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so…there is…a spectrum of cases. The decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum the particular case falls … All must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant facts.”
13. In ASJ (Somalia) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 282. Lewis LJ said at [28]:
“There is a danger of overanalysing and over-refining the relevant test. As Lord Bingham observed in relation to questions of internal relocation in AH (Sudan) at paragraph 5, “the difficulty lies in applying the test, not in expressing it”. The decision-maker must decide whether it would be unduly harsh, and so unreasonable, to expect the person claiming protection to relocate internally within his country of origin. In answering that question, the decision-maker must have regard to all the relevant circumstances of the person claiming protection and his country of origin as explained in Januzi and AH (Sudan), see the quotations set out at paragraphs 11 and 12 above. That has been described as a “holistic assessment, encompassing all relevant considerations” (see per Underhill LJ in AS (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 873, [2019] 1 WLR 5345 at paragraph 68). Having considered all the circumstances, it must decide whether it would be unduly harsh, and so unreasonable, for the person to relocate internally within his country of origin.”
14. His Lordship went on at [41]:
“…as a matter of principle, consideration of internal relocation is an aspect of whether a person can establish that any fear of persecution is well-founded within Article 1A of the Refugee Convention (see the observations of Lord Bingham at paragraph 7 of his judgment in Januzi). If that is correct, then, strictly, the burden is on the appellant to show to a reasonable degree of likelihood that internal relocation would be unduly harsh and so unreasonable. In practice, however, decisions of internal relocation are unlikely to be determined or influenced by considerations of the burden of proof. The appropriate approach is that set out in Januzi, AH (Sudan), and SC (Jamaica). The question the decision-maker has to decide is whether it would be unduly harsh, and so unreasonable, for a person to relocate internally within his country of origin. That will involve the decision-maker considering all the relevant circumstances. In the light of the view that the decision-maker forms of the circumstances, the decision-maker will then decide whether internal relocation is unduly harsh, bearing in mind that that is a high threshold to cross.”
15. Applying the principles set out above the burden is on the appellant to show to the lower standard of proof that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that internal relocation to either Karachi or Faisalabad would be unduly harsh and so unreasonable, but the Upper Tribunal must ensure a holistic assessment of all relevant factors.
16. The appellant’s article 8 ECHR private life claim was determined by the respondent by reference to paragraph 276ADE (Appendix Private Life did not apply given the date of the appellant’s protection claim, but it would not have made any material difference). Under paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) the appellant must show that there would be “very significant obstacles” to his integration in Pakistan.
17. In SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 (“Kamara”) and AS v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1284 (“AS”) the Court of Appeal considered the concept of “integration” for the purposes of s.117C(4)(c). In Kamara Sales LJ, with whom Moore-Bick LJ agreed, stated at [14]:
“In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal's "integration" into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.”
18. At [58] and [59] of AS Moylan LJ rejected a submission that so-called ‘generic’ factors, such as intelligence, health, employability and general robustness of character, were irrelevant when assessing a person’s ability to integrate and held that such factors can be relevant to whether there are “very significant obstacles to integration” as they form part of the “broad evaluative judgment”. The Court of Appeal rejected a submission that whether someone is “enough of an insider” is to be determined by reference to their ties to the country of proposed removal. The appellant may still succeed in a human rights appeal even if he does not meet the requirements of the immigration rules if can show that the refusal of his human rights claim would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences such as to breach his right to private life under article 8 ECHR.
Findings of fact and assessment
19. At the remaking hearing the Presenting Officer cross-examined the appellant concerning his claim to have been neglected by his parents and to have been subjected to ill-treatment as a child in boarding school. It was these factors, compounded by the honour-based threats from his family, his relationship breakup, and the uncertainty surrounding his immigration status that were relied upon by Dr Ali in reaching her diagnoses. Whilst there is, on one view of the appellant’s asylum interview (question 20), a potential inconsistency in his description of his relationship with his family, I am ultimately content to accept the appellant’s claims concerning his relationship with his parents and that they showed him little care or comfort when he was young and that he was abused whilst at boarding school.
20. I was also invited by the Presenting Officer to attach limited weight to the psychological report as Dr Ali made only fleeting reference to the appellant’s medical records and failed to engage with or make any comments in respect of the fact that the GP medical notes only mentioned depression and anxiety and not that the appellant was thought to suffer from a Generalised Anxiety Disorder and PTSD. Whilst I would have expected Dr Ali to have engaged to a greater degree that she did with the GP records (applying HA (expert evidence, mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111), particularly in respect of the absence of any reference in the GP records to symptoms or suspicions that the appellant may be suffering PTSD, I am prepared to proceed on the basis of Dr Ali’s assessment that the appellant suffers from Major Depressive Disorder, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, and PTSD. I note these diagnoses were independently supported by the prior report by the Cognitive Behavioural Psychotherapist.
21. I have considered with care the psychological report by Dr Ali. I note the appellant’s symptoms as described by Dr Ali and his report to Dr Ali of his interactions with others. I note his difficulties with feeling irritable, persistent low mood and worry, hyperarousal and restlessness, demotivation, disturbed sleep, fatigue, feelings of hopelessness, flashbacks, intrusive memories, avoidance behaviours, impaired concentration, and social withdrawal. Although Dr Ali found that the appellant’s cognitive processing appeared slowed and that he demonstrated difficulties in concentration, there was no suggestion in the psychological report that the appellant was incapable of approaching medical and mental health providers, or that he would be unable to undertake employment in Pakistan. Moreover, Dr Ali’s opinion that the appellant’s removal from the UK would have a profound detrimental impact on his mental health and lead to a deterioration in his condition failed to take into account the finding that there would be no safety issues if the appellant internally relocated within Pakistan and that he would continue to have access to healthcare through the financial support of his friend in the UK. The only medication received by the appellant is Mirtazapine, which he said he took “for sleep”, and allergy medication. There was no suggestion that the appropriate medication was not available in Pakistan. To the extent that Dr Ali gave an opinion of the availability of healthcare and associated cultural stigma in Pakistan, this was clearly outside the scope of her stated expertise.
22. The appellant has been engaging in Cognitive Behavioural Psychotherapy with Mr Hussain since 12 September 2024, although Mr Hussain’s report of 29 July 2025 does not indicate the length or frequency of the sessions. At the hearing the appellant claimed that he previously saw Mr Hussain every week until January 2026, and that he now sees Mr Hussain every two weeks. In his oral evidence the appellant said his sessions with Mr Hussain were face-to-face. This appears to be a change from the way in which the sessions were previously conducted as Mr Hussain stated in his report that they were conducted via video conferencing. I find it surprising that the appellant did not produce any further evidence from Mr Hussain in support of his claimed frequency of therapeutic appointments. I am nevertheless prepared to accept that the appellant continues to receive therapy from Mr Hussain, but now at a reduced frequency. This suggests that the appellant has insight into his mental health conditions and that he has begun to make progress with his therapist. This is supported by the appellant’s oral evidence that the sessions were reduced in frequency as he is now able to talk more about himself.
23. The appellant’s overall pattern of responding suggests to Mr Hussain that the appellant has impaired emotional functioning, is psychologically vulnerable, and that he has a global sense of inferiority. Having applied several psychometric measures to the appellant Mr Hussain concludes that the appellant has severe depression, anxiety and PTSD, and that there is a significant impact on the appellant’s ‘daily living’, all of which was consistent with a Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder, and suggestive of PTSD. Although Mr Hussain describes the appellant as having poor concentration, that he has limited social interaction with others and that the appellant had reported having panic attacks in public places, Mr Hussain did not suggest the appellant was incapable of looking for or undertaking employment, or that he was unable to care for himself in respect of daily tasks.
24. As with the report by Dr Ali, there was no indication in Mr Hussain’s report that the appellant benefited from the financial support provided by his friend in the UK. The report was written without knowledge that there would be no safety issues if the appellant internally relocated within Pakistan and that he would continue to have access to healthcare through the continued financial support of his friend in the UK. To the extent that Mr Hussain gave an opinion of the nature and availability of healthcare and cultural stigma associated with mental health issues in Pakistan, this was clearly outwith the scope of his stated expertise.
25. Mr Asad Ali Khan’s country report is dated 22 August 2025. Mr Khan accepts that he is not a medical expert and, as a lawyer in Pakistan, the focus on his expertise appears to be the Pakistani legal system. I accept, in light of his qualifications and education, that he is ‘familiar with’ (his own choice of words) several other areas such as Pakistani culture, sociology, development and social anthropology but his report is primarily based on research he conducted in respect of the availability of mental health treatment and stigmatisation of those with mental health issues rather than person experience, expertise or knowledge. I accept Mr Khan’s evidence that care for the mentally ill is poor, that there are a limited number of psychiatrists (approximately 400 in a population of 2020 million, most of who are working in urban cities – I note Karachi and Faisalabad are both urban cities) and that in general access to treatment is dependent on a person’s financial circumstances and education (in this regard I note that the appellant has been educated to university level). This is consistent with the Country Information Note – Pakistan: Healthcare and medical treatment (July 2024), which also indicates at 12.1.5 that there are only 100 psychologists. It is apparent from the County Information Note that treatment for depression, anxiety and PTSD is available in Pakistan (12.1.2).
26. Mr Khan does not appear to have been made aware that the appellant’s friend in the UK has provided the appellant with accommodation and food and had paid his legal bills and funded all his expert reports. There is no reason why the appellant’s friend could not fund medical treatment for the appellant in Karachi or Faisalabad, both of which are large cities. Mr Youssefian submitted that it was unrealistic to expect the appellant’s friend to support him indefinitely but there was no evidence from the friend to support Mr Youssefian’s speculative submission.
27. There is nothing on the face of the evidence before me that would prevent the appellant from locating and accessing mental health support in Pakistan. The appellant’s friend in the UK, who has been supporting him all along and presumably paying for his therapy sessions, can continue to support him once the appellant has returned to Pakistan and, via remote communication, direct the appellant to the appropriate medical treatment. That private psychiatrists are available on Pakistan for consultations is apparent from Mr Khan’s report at paragraph 39. Alternatively, it is apparent from Mr Hussain’s report that his sessions with the appellant were conducted via video conferencing (4.1 of the report). Although Mr Hussain has written about the disruption to the appellant’s current therapy (paragraph 12.2) there is no apparent reason why the therapy sessions could not continue with Mr Hussain via video conferencing soon after the appellant has returned to Pakistan.
28. When assessing the issue of stigma attached to mental illness in Pakistan Mr Khan’s report does not differentiate between different mental illness diagnoses. It is a trite observation that mental illness can manifest in many ways. Mr Khan makes general reference to stigmatisation of those with mental illness, but he does not clarify what exhibited behaviour is likely to attract stigmatisation; nor does he refer to adequate background evidence to support his claim that the symptoms exhibited by this particular appellant are likely to attract stigmatisation. The evidence relied on by Mr Khan at paragraph 29 of his report that the regulatory frameworks designed to ensure the quality and ethical standards of mental health services is ineffectively implemented and compromised does support that proposition. Certainly, there was no suggestion in the legal submissions before me that any psychiatrist, psychologist or therapist the appellant may see in Pakistan would breach any duty of confidentiality. I additionally note that the appellant has insight into his mental health conditions, is educated to university level and is the recipient of financial support.
29. It is argued that the appellant would be socially isolated in Pakistan and that this would contribute to the unreasonableness of the internal relocation alternative, but he informed the psychologist that he has no social network or friends in the UK (paragraph 61 of the report), and the Cognitive Behavioural Psychotherapist referred to the appellant’s report that he has limited social interaction with others and is generally an isolated individual (paragraph 9.2). There may not therefore be any significant change in his social interactions were the appellant to be returned to Pakistan. Whilst he was last in Pakistan in 2012 the appellant will still be familiar with the culture, the way of life, and the languages (such as Urdu) having lived there for the first 20 years of his life. He appears to have made some progress in his sessions and, as I have found, there is no reason why he could not continue to have his sessions with Mr Hussain, and to maintain contact with his friend in the UK. It was noted in the expert reports that the ‘uncertainty’ surrounding the appellant’s immigration status has contributed to his anxiety disorder, but once he is returned to Pakistan this aspect of his anxiety would be resolved.
30. In light of the evidence before me, considered holistically, I find that any risk of the appellant being destabilised by his return to Pakistan can be countered by his accessibility to medical treatment and therapy through the continued financial support of his friend in the UK, and the appellant’s continued ability to remain in contact with his friend, albeit remotely. Even as a ‘generally isolated individual’ I find, for the reasons given above, that it would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to Karachi or Faisalabad.
Article 8 ECHR
31. In assessing whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Pakistan, and in whether the refusal of his human rights claim would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences such as to amount to a breach of article 8 ECHR, I have considered and applied my findings in respect of internal relocation above. The appellant’s evidence at the remaking hearing was that he was last in Pakistan in 2012, when he stayed for approximately 1 month. Although the appellant has not lived in Pakistan for 15 years since he arrived in the UK in January 2011 when he was 20 years old, he spent all his formative years in Pakistan and is undoubtedly familiar with the language, the culture and the way of life. I note the evidence considered above at [29] concerning the lack of friends and support network in the UK, and I note that he clearly has at least one friend in the UK who has been supporting the appellant to a significant degree. It is somewhat surprising then that his friend did not write a statement in support or give evidence.
32. In applying a broad evaluative judgment to the issue of this appellant’s integration in Pakistan I am satisfied, given his length of residence in Pakistan and his knowledge of Uru, coupled with his ability to either continue his therapy sessions or obtain new treatment in Pakistan (for the reasons set out above), that the appellant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in Pakistan is carried on and have the a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the his private life.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 September 2026