Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000091
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/16425/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

26th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

WN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr L Singh, counsel instructed by JM Wilson Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 19 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. By way of a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his deportation appeal following a hearing which took place on 11 November 2025.
Anonymity
2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. I have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
3. The appellant is a national of Cameroon now aged in his mid-forties. He first entered the United Kingdom as a visitor in 2003 and overstayed his leave. He returned to Cameroon to marry in 2007 and was granted entry clearance as a spouse in 2008. The appellant was granted settlement in the United Kingdom in 2011. He went on to have three children, who are British citizens.
4. The appellant has been convicted of the rape of a 13-year-old child, sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment and required to sign the Sex Offenders Register for life.
5. The appellant applied for asylum on 6 February 2019 but withdrew this claim on 11 June 2019.
6. On 20 September 2019, the Secretary of State refused the appellant’s human rights claim after considering the outstanding claim he had made in respect of Article 8 ECHR. That claim was based on the appellant’s family life with his partner and their three children as well as his health conditions. The conclusion was that there were no very compelling circumstances. A deportation order was signed on the same date.
7. There has been some delay with the hearing of this appeal. A previous decision following a hearing which took place in the appellant’s absence on 30 October 2024 was set aside by the First-tier Tribunal because the appellant had not attended owing to ill health.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
8. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, it transpired that the appellant had attempted to raise a protection ground in his earlier appeal, based on a claim that he and his family were involved in the Anglophone movement in Cameroon. The respondent did not consent to the protection claim being considered by the Tribunal and therefore the sole matters considered related to the appellant’s Article 8 claim, albeit the judge accepted that aspects of the protection claim were relevant to this consideration.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
1) The FTT erred in finding that the protection claim was a new matter when the respondent had considered the factual basis of the protection claim.
2) A failure to consider factors relating to risk on return when considering section 117C(4)(c) of the 2002 Act.
3) Procedural unfairness in several respects.
4) Inadequacy of reasoning
5) Failure to conduct a proper proportionality assessment under section 117C(6).
6) Making a material mistake of fact.
10. Permission to appeal was granted on grounds one and two alone.
11. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 20 February 2026, in which the appeal was opposed, with detailed comments being made.
The error of law hearing
12. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
13. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Mr Singh despite his best endeavours struggled to speak to the grounds and the hearing was over in a few minutes. Ms Arif relied upon the cogent points made in the Rule 24 response.
14. At the end of the hearing, I informed the parties that I was satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained no material error of law.
Discussion
Ground one
15. The overarching contention made in ground one is that the judge erred in finding that the appellant’s protection claim was a new matter which required the respondent’s consent. This ground is misconceived. The appellant withdrew his protection claim shortly after making it in 2019. Therefore, there was no live protection claim at the time the appellant’s submissions addressing deportation were being considered. The decision letter understandably makes no mention of the Refugee Convention because there was no outstanding protection claim to be considered.
16. The appellant attempted to resurrect his protection claim, not by making an application for asylum to the Secretary of State but by making claims in a witness statement prepared for a previous appeal hearing. As Mr Singh recognised, a protection claim cannot be made in this manner. Therefore, it is obvious that the protection claim was a new matter which required the respondent’s consent. As recorded by the judge at [13] the Secretary of State declined to give her consent. There is no error in the judge’s approach here which was wholly consistent with Mahmud (S. 85 NIAA 2002 - 'new matters': Iran) [2017] UKUT 488 (IAC).
17. The grounds further contend that the judge wrongly excluded material evidence relevant to the Article 8 claim owing to not accepting jurisdiction on the protection matter. As can be seen from [26] of the decision, the judge heard submissions which related to protection aspects under the prism of very significant obstacles. Furthermore, at [30], the judge confirms that he has considered all the evidence before him and at [31] he invited submissions to address whether the Tribunal could consider the claimed factual matrix under Article 8 ECHR. In the following paragraphs, the judge grapples with these submissions along with the documentary evidence before reaching a conclusion.
18. At [39], the judge’s conclusion is that the appellant’s country evidence was considered by the respondent in reaching the decision under challenge and was therefore not a new matter. This was a somewhat generous conclusion which benefitted the appellant. Owing to this acceptance, the judge found that this evidence did not amount to a new matter requiring the respondent’s consent.
19. At [67-86] the judge proceeded to consider this country evidence in detail. The judge provided powerful and sustainable reasons for concluding that the appellant’s claim to have been involved in opposition politics in Cameroon, when considered on the balance of probabilities, was not credible and that his documents were not deserving of any real weight. These comprehensive findings were not even addressed let alone challenged in the grounds. It follows that ground one is not made out.
Ground two
20. This ground essentially reiterates what is said in ground one, in that it is argued that the judge failed to consider protection factors in his assessment of very significant obstacles. As indicated from the preceding paragraphs, the judge carried out a particularly full consideration of the protection factors. Those reasons are not subject to any challenge.
21. The grounds complain that the judge’s assessment was confined to credibility. Mr Singh did not even attempt to expand on this matter at the hearing. Clearly, if the judge found that this aspect of the appellant’s claim was an invention, it follows that there is no political profile to be considered in the very significant obstacles assessment. The judge did not end his consideration of very significant obstacles after concluding that the appellant had been untruthful. On the contrary, he considered all other aspects of his claim at [87-98] of the decision. There is rightly no challenge to the judge’s discrete findings.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 June 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email