Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000100
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58645/2023
LP/00832/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

AS
Appellant
and

THE SECRFETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Revill of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This my remaking of the decision in this appeal.
Anonymity
2. I have considered whether to continue to grant the appellant anonymity. I have taken as my starting point the principle that open justice requires the identification of the parties to litigation. However, in some cases, the need to prevent harm to a party may outweigh the need to ensure openness and transparency. Given the nature of the protection claim made by this appellant, I have decided to maintain the anonymity direction set out above.
Background
3. The appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Iran, who has appealed the decision dated 11 October 2023 of the respondent to refuse him protection. He made his claim to the respondent on 3 July 2021 and thus his appeal is not one to which the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply.
4. His appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana on protection and human rights grounds. The appellant appealed to this Tribunal and was granted permission. I heard the submissions of the parties at an error of law hearing and in a decision dated 1 April 2026, which I have annexed to this decision, I found the First-tier Tribunal Judge (the “FTTJ”) did make a material error of law when assessing the risk faced by the appellant on return to Iran, particularly in connection to his activity while in the UK. Accordingly, I was satisfied that the decision of the FTTJ should be set aside and the decision be remade by this Tribunal.
5. However, I did not find made out any ground challenging the FTTJ’s findings on credibility and I directed that those findings were to be preserved for the remaking.
The remaking hearing
6. At the remaking hearing before me Ms Revill for the appellant said that it was her instructions that a new bundle for this hearing had been filed with the Tribunal and served on the respondent. However, I did not have such a bundle. I found no record of this Tribunal receiving such a bundle from the appellant and Ms Clewley for the respondent said that there had been no service of such a bundle on the respondent.
7. I did have a copy of the composite bundle served by the appellant for the previous error of law hearing whose contents Ms Revill indicated were similar to those of the new bundle and, with no objection from the parties, I decided I would work from the composite bundle. Ms Clewley indicated that she was content to work from the documents present before the First-tier Tribunal. No party sought an adjournment and the hearing proceeded.
8. The appellant attended the hearing but was not called to give any evidence. I heard submissions only from the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision.
The primary issue
9. I am grateful to Ms Revill and Ms Clewley for their assistance in identifying the primary issue for me to decide.
10. That primary issue is whether, taking into account the country guidance, the appellant demonstrates that he is at real risk of serious harm from the Iranian authorities on the basis of his opportunistic involvement in political activity in this country.
11. No article 8 issue was pursued by the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal or in the grounds of appeal to this Tribunal. No article 8 issue arises for me to consider when remaking the decision in this appeal.
My Findings
12. It is for the appellant to demonstrate on the lower standard that he qualifies for protection as a refugee or a person entitled to humanitarian protection or that there is a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
13. I have considered the evidence before me and the submissions made by the parties at the hearing. The appellant has not given any further oral evidence before me. In line with my error of law decision, I assess the facts before me on the basis of the credibility findings made by the FTTJ being preserved.
Key relevant findings of the FTTJ
14. One of the preserved findings of the FTTJ is that it is not credible that there was adverse interest by the Iranian authorities in the appellant for perceived political opinion at the time that he left Iran. The FTTJ concluded that the appellant did not possess any political commitment or affiliation with a cause while residing in Iran. His activities were focussed on the unlawful endeavour of smuggling as a “Kolbar”.
15. The FTTJ did not reject the appellant’s claimed activity in this country of attending some pro-Kurdish protest against the Iranian regime and making some pro- Kurdish/anti regime posts on social media.
16. Nonetheless, it was the FTTJ’s finding, which I apply in my decision making, that the appellant is not committed to any political cause and has opportunistically attended demonstrations in the UK in an attempt to lay a basis for his asylum claim.
The cases of the parties before me
17. The appellant relies on the activity of his attendance at protests in this country, notwithstanding it being opportunistic, triggering adverse interest in him by the Iranian authorities and putting him at real risk of serious harm from them for the reason of perceived political opinion.
18. In submissions Ms Revill expressly accepted that the appellant’s posts on social media would not of themselves trigger adverse interest in him by the Iranian authorities, although it was her case that if adverse interest was triggered by the appellant’s attendance at protests, the posting of social media could aggravate matters for the appellant.
19. The case of the respondent in summary is that, applying the country guidance, it is not demonstrated as a real likelihood that there is or would be adverse interest by the Iranian authorities in the appellant because of what he has done in this country including his attendance at the protests.
Applicable country guidance
20. The parties agree that there is relevant country guidance case law for me to apply in this appeal in the following:
• HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC),
• BA (Demonstrators in Britain) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC),
• XX (PJAK – Sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC),
• PS (Christian – risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and
• SSH & HR Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC).
21. As mentioned in the error of law decision, I note the country guidance of HB Iran at paragraph 98 which, among other matters, emphasizes the following factors:
• Kurds involved in Kurdish political groups or activity are at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse by the Iranian authorities. Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
• Involvement with any organised activity on behalf of or in support of Kurds can be perceived as political and thus involve a risk of adverse attention by the Iranian authorities with the consequent risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
• Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
• The Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.
22. I also take into account the guidance given in BA Iran at paragraphs 64 to 67 about sur place activity. In summary, this is:
• The backdrop is of an announced intention by the Iranian regime to proceed against Iranians abroad.
• The factors that bear on judgment can be placed under 4 main heads (i) the type of sur place activity involved (ii) the risk that a person will be identified as in engaging in it (iii) the factors triggering inquiry on return of the person and (iv) in the absence of a universal check on all entering Iran, the factors that would lead to identification at the airport on return or after entry. For each factor there is a spectrum of risk and the factors are not exhaustive and may overlap.
• The Tribunal in BA Iran goes on at paragraph 65 to comment on relevant questions to consider under these headings. (I shall address below the ones relied upon by the parties in this appeal.)
• The Iranian authorities attempt to identify persons participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London. The practice of filming demonstrations supports that. The evidence suggests that there may well have been persons in the crowd to assist in the process. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the regime has facial recognition technology in use in the UK, but it seems clear that the Iranian security apparatus attempts to match names to faces of demonstrators from photographs. The information gathered here is available in Iran.
• While it may well be that an appellant’s participation in demonstrations is opportunistic, the evidence suggests that this is not likely to be a major influence on the perception of the regime.
• Although, expressing dissent itself will be sufficient to result in a person having in the eyes of the regime a significant political profile, the nature of the level of the sur place activity will clearly heighten the determination of the Iranian authorities to identify the demonstrator while in Britain and to identify him on return. That, combined with the factors which might trigger enquiry would lead to an increased likelihood of questioning and of ill treatment on return.
• As regards identification of risk back in Iran, it would appear that the ability of the Iranian regime to identify all returnees who have attended demonstrations, particularly given the number of those who do, on return, remains limited by the lack of facial recognition technology and the haphazard nature of the checks at the airport.
• For the infrequent demonstrator who plays no particular role in demonstrations and whose participation is not highlighted in the media there is not a real risk of identification and therefore not a real risk of consequent ill-treatment, on return.
• There is no evidence to lead to the conclusion that merely having exited Iran illegally an appellant might be subjected to persecution. While returning from Britain is at present an increased risk factor, the mere fact that an appellant is returning from Britain does not lead to a risk of persecution.
23. Further, I note the guidance given in SSH Iran that an Iranian male in respect of whom no adverse interest has previously been manifested by the Iranian State does not face a real risk of persecution/breach of his Article 3 rights on return to Iran on account of having left Iran illegally and/or being a failed asylum seeker. No such risk exists at the time of questioning on return to Iran nor after the facts (i.e. of illegal exit and being a failed asylum seeker) have been established. In particular, there is not a real risk of prosecution leading to imprisonment.
The latest country bulletin from the respondent
24. As requested by the appellant, I also take into account paragraphs 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 and Paragraph 4.2.1 in the respondent’s May 2026 Country bulletin Iran: Kurds and Kurdish political groups that reports:
• In February 2026, several Kurdish opposition parties announced the formation of the Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan, stating objectives including regime change and Kurdish self‑determination.
• US President Donald Trump said on 5 March 2026 that he would support Kurdish forces conducting an offensive into Iran (although no offensive by Kurdish groups has taken place).
Evidence produced about the appellant’s attendance at protests
25. Before me the appellant relies on his witness statements dated 2 February 2024 and 24 July 2025, which he produced before the FTTJ.
26. In his first witness statement at paragraph 23 the appellant says simply that he has taken part in demonstrations. In his second witness statement at paragraph 6.3 the appellant only says that he has attended many protests in the UK without specifying the number, location or dates of these protests and without giving any detail about what has occurred at any of these protests.
27. In submissions Ms Revill acknowledged that the only evidence for the appellant’s attendance at specific protests and demonstrations between 2021 and today was that contained in the photographs produced in the appellant’s bundle before the FTTJ and now included in the composite bundle before me.
28. Ms Revill also accepted that before me there was no explanation of what was shown in the photographic evidence relied upon by the appellant beyond what can be seen in the photographs themselves or gleaned from any attached text.
29. I observe that in the skeleton argument of the appellant, prepared by those instructing Ms Revill, there is a list of protests and demonstrations attended by the appellant which number greater than the 4 or 5 identified in submissions by Ms Revill from the photographic evidence. However, there is no evidence from the appellant himself which advances the specific number of attendances, whether as set out in the skeleton argument or otherwise.
30. I turn to consider the photographic evidence in the composite bundle relied upon by the appellant. In submissions Ms Revill largely focussed upon the photographic evidence, sourced from the appellant’s Facebook account, that appeared in the appellant’s bundle dated 2 February 2024 and which was put before the First-tier Tribunal. I observe there is some overlap of content with the photographic evidence produced in the appellant’s bundle dated 24 July 2025 before the First-tier Tribunal which also appears in the composite bundle. There also appears to be material that appears in the 2025 bundle which is not present in the 2024 bundle.
31. I bear in mind the position of the appellant that the social media of the appellant including his Facebook page is not in its nature such as to trigger by itself the adverse interest of the Iranian authorities. Accordingly, I assess the photographic evidence that is sourced from social posts on what it can show about the appellant’s attendance at anti-regime protests in this country.
32. The photographic evidence is not always presented chronologically in the composite bundle but I have sought to set it out chronologically for my decision.
2021
33. A Facebook post dated 9 August 2021 on the appellant’s account with attached text untranslated into English (see p.44 of 547), shows two photographs of the appellant at an unidentified gathering at an unidentified location. In one photo the appellant is holding a placard, in the other he holds a moderately sized poster with untranslated text. It can be noted that a similar appearing poster appears being held by someone standing by the appellant in the placard photo; it is not clear whether that is the same poster being passed around or a different one to that held by the appellant. It is not explained how long the appellant attended the event shown or to what degree, if at all, he was prominent in protest on this occasion.
34. A Facebook post dated 13 September 2021 (see p.47/547 of the composite bundle) with no explanatory text shows the appellant outside what could be the Iranian Embassy holding with two others a moderately sized anti-regime poster. There is no explanation for the circumstances of the photo, such as whether this was at any specific event and whether the attendance was on or around 13 September 2021 or another date, such as the August 2021 date. It is not explained how long he attended the event shown, how prominent in protest he was throughout the event or for how long he held the poster.
35. A Facebook post dated 24 October 2021 with no explanatory text (see p.45/547) contains one photograph of the appellant holding a moderately sized anti-regime poster at an unspecified event and location. On the evidence before me, it is not explained how long he attended the event shown, how prominent in protest he was throughout the event or for how long he held the poster.
2022
36. A Facebook post dated 22 November 2022 (see p.60/547 of the composite bundle but also present at p.46/547), regarding an update of profile picture shows the appellant holding with another man a moderately sized anti-regime poster at an unspecified event and location. No date is provided for the event and whether this is an occasion distinct from all the others said to be shown or at an event shown elsewhere in the photographic evidence. On the evidence before me, it is also not explained how long the appellant attended the event shown, how prominent in protest he was throughout the event or for how long he held the poster.
2023
37. The heading on the appellant’s Facebook account (most clearly presented at p.63/547 of the composite bundle but also see p.32/547 of the bundle) shows two photographs. The large one shows the appellant with his back to the Iranian Embassy holding a Kurdish flag at an unspecified and undated event, the smaller one shows an excerpt of a photo of a group of men, including the appellant, holding a couple of moderate sized anti-regime posters and setting fire to them at an unidentified event.
38. The smaller “ignition” photograph shown at p.64 of the bundle also appears in a Facebook post dated 19 November 2023 (at p.49/547 of the composite bundle) with attached text that states “In front of the Embassy of the Islamic … “ and “My participation as an oppressed Kurdish individual in the demonstration against the Islamic republic of Iran …”. This appears to indicate that the update photograph that appears in the appellant’s Facebook heading shows the appellant at an event in or around 19 November 2023.
39. The larger “flag” photograph also appears in undated Facebook post at p.50/547 & p.69 of the composite bundle. There is also a photograph at p.67 of the composite bundle again in an undated post of a similarly dressed appellant holding the Kurdish flag with two others.
40. In any event, it is not explained in the evidence before me how long the appellant attended the event or events shown, how prominent in protest he was at the event or events, including for igniting the posters, or for how long in general he held any flag or poster.
41. A Facebook post dated 17 December 2023 (at p.48/547 of the composite bundle) shows two photographs in each of which the appellant, with his back to the Iranian Embassy, is holding a moderately sized anti-regime poster. The attached text speaks of “my participation as an oppressed Kurdish individual in the demonstration against the Islamic republic of Iran …”. On the evidence before me, it is not explained how long the appellant attended the event shown, how prominent in protest he was throughout the event or for how long he held the posters.
2024
42. A Facebook post (undated as presented at p.51/547 of the composite bundle but with the date 21 January 2024 at p.65/2024), with attached text that states “In front of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran“ and “My participation as an oppressed Kurdish individual in the demonstration against the Islamic republic of Iran …”, shows two photographs of the appellant in a yellow tabard holding a moderately sized poster.
43. It is not explained how long he attended the event shown, how prominent he was throughout the event or for how long in general he held the poster. Further, it is not explained why the appellant is wearing a tabard, for how long he wore a tabard and, if the tabard was connected to some role at the event shown, why he is not shown in any other piece of photographic evidence wearing a tabard because of his role at protests.
44. A Facebook post dated 1 April 2024, (see p.36/547 of the composite bundle, also contained in a post dated March 28th (no year) at p.38/547 of the composite bundle) has a photo showing the appellant on an unspecified occasion outside the Iranian Embassy. On the evidence before me, it is not explained how long he attended the event shown or to what degree, if at all, he was prominent in protest during the event.
45. A Facebook post dated 26 May 2024 (appearing both at p.39/547 and p.52/547 of the composite bundle) has two photographs showing the appellant outside the Iranian Embassy in London. The attached test speaks of “my participation as an oppressed Kurdish individual in the demonstration against the Islamic republic of Iran …”. One of the photos clearly shows the appellant, with his back to the embassy, holding a moderately sized anti-regime poster. However, on the evidence before me, it is not explained how long he attended the event shown, how prominent he was throughout the event or for how long he held the poster.
2025 and 2026
46. There is no photographic evidence dating from the second half of 2024, 2025 or 2026 up to the date of the hearing before me.
Analysis
Does the appellant’s attendance at protests in the UK demonstrate there is a real risk of him being identified and perceived by the Iranian authorities as involved in Kurdish political activity?
47. On the findings of fact as they stand, there has been no previous perception by the Iranian authorities of the appellant being politically opposed to the regime before he came to the UK. The appellant relies only on his attendance at protests or demonstrations in this country.
48. Given how the evidence of the appellant as regards attendance at demonstrations or protests has been presented, I can understand Ms Revill’s caution in submitting the photographic evidence shows at least 4 or 5 occasions when the appellant was at a protest in this country.
49. Being generous, the evidence before me covers attendance at up to 3 protests or demonstrations in 2021, one in 2022, up to three in 2023, up to three in 2024, none in 2025 and none in 2026.
50. The argument of the respondent is essentially that the evidence relied upon by the appellant is insufficient to demonstrate even on the lower standard that he is at real risk.
51. I accept Ms Revill’s submission that, on the country guidance case law, even if the appellant’s participation in protests and demonstrations has been opportunistic, what ultimately matters is the perception of the Iranian authorities rather than any actual political commitment on the part of the appellant.
52. Ms Revill submitted that the recent developments referred to in the Country Bulletin, which I have mentioned above, meant there would be even more heightened scrutiny of Kurdish returnees. However, it remains the case that both parties ask me ultimately to apply the country guidance in this appeal. The country guidance already stresses the Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights meaning that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme. Given the already low threshold for suspicion by the Iranian authorities because of the long standing concern about Kurdish political activism, I am not persuaded that the recent political developments mentioned in the Country Bulletin significantly alter the situation. I continue to apply the relevant country guidance as it stands.
53. It is in this context that I consider the issue of whether, given the type of monitoring by the Iranian government of protest in this country that takes place, there is a real likelihood an adverse interest in the appellant on the part of the Iranian authorities has already formed because of his actions, which would put the appellant at real risk on return to Iran.
54. When deciding this issue I refer to the non-exhaustive list of questions set out at paragraph 64 of BA Iran and the general analysis of the situation with the Iranian authorities given at paragraph 65 of BA Iran.
55. As regards the theme of the protests attended by the appellant, I can accept that they concern the advancement of Kurdish rights and criticism of the current Iranian regime. I accept that the Iranian authorities attempt to identify persons participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London. There is a practice of filming with persons in the crowd to assist the process although the evidence does not support that there is facial recognition technology in use in the UK. The Iranian authorities attempt to match name to faces of demonstrators from photographs, with information gathered in the UK being available in Iran.
56. I accept that if a person is identified from his behaviour when attending protests or demonstrations in the UK as expressing dissent that will be sufficient to result in a person having a significant enough profile to be at real risk of serious harm on return to Iran. Nevertheless, it is not the country guidance that any Kurd attending a protest in this country is consequently at real risk: see paragraph 66 of BA Iran. Nor is that the argument of the appellant. It is stressed at paragraph 65 of BA Iran that it is the nature of the level of the sur place activity that will clearly heighten the determination of the Iranian authorities to identify the demonstrator while in Britain and to identify him on return.
57. There is the one photograph showing one occasion when the appellant is wearing a high-visibility tabard as well as holding a moderately sized poster. However, it is not claimed in the evidence before me that the wearing of the tabard was because the appellant had a specific organisational role for any specific protest that could mark him out as more prominent than a mere attender at the protest. Nor is it claimed by the appellant that he wore the tabard for a significant time and/or in any prominent position at a protest. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied this is a matter that establishes or contributes to the risk of being noted and perceived by the Iranian authorities as expressing dissent against the regime.
58. Ms Revill in submissions, while being rightly careful not to suggest that the appellant is shown in any of the evidence as a leader or organiser, drew attention to the various occasions when it appears from the photographic evidence that the appellant is holding a poster critical of the Iranian government. However, as I have mentioned above, the general shortcomings of this evidence from the appellant, as it is presented before me, is that it is not explained how long the appellant attended the event shown, how prominent in protest he was throughout the event or for how long he held the any of the posters. This weighs against the real likelihood of the Iranian authorities noting and perceiving the appellant as a mobiliser or even simply an active member of any protest.
59. The same shortcomings in evidence apply to the occasion where the appellant is shown with a Kurdish flag. It is not explained how long the appellant attended the event shown, how prominent in protest he was throughout the event or for how long he held the flag. Again this weighs against the real likelihood of the Iranian authorities noting and perceiving the appellant as a mobiliser or even simply an active member of any protest.
60. Given all this, I am not satisfied these are matters that establish or contribute to the risk of being noted and perceived by the Iranian authorities as expressing dissent against the regime.
61. As the evidence stands, for 2021, 2023 and 2024 there are up to three attendances at protests by the appellant in each of those years but with only the one attendance in 2022. There is also no evidence before me of any attendance in 2025 and 2026. This irregularity in participation along with sizable periods of inactivity weighs against the appellant being noted and perceived as a persistent protester. As already commented above, there is also a lack of explanation about how long the appellant has stayed at the various events shown in the photographic evidence. I am not satisfied it is demonstrated that the appellant’s mere attendance, without more, at the protests evidenced is sufficient by itself to put him at real risk.
62. Weighing up the matters before me, both individually and in accumulation, and bearing in mind the low threshold for suspicion, I am not satisfied on the evidence in this appeal that the appellant demonstrates that his sur place activity, including his attendance at protests in this country, has currently put him at real risk of being identified and perceived by the Iranian authorities as being involved in Kurdish political activity.
Risk arising from questioning on return?
63. The alternative submission of Ms Revill is that, if the appellant while in this country has not already been identified and perceived by the Iranian authorities as involved in Kurdish political activity, there is a real risk of this occurring on return to Iran, particularly because of the real likelihood of the appellant being questioned upon return by the authorities.
64. The respondent disputes such a real risk of serious harm is demonstrated.
65. It is not disputed between the parties that, according to the country guidance in PS Iran, all returning failed asylum seekers are subject to questioning on arrival, and this will include questions about why they claimed asylum.
66. Given my findings above, I am not satisfied the appellant would be at real risk in any encounter with the Iranian authorities on return because he has already been identified and perceived while in the UK as involved in Kurdish political activity.
67. The appellant does not dispute that, in line with the country guidance, the factors of being Kurdish, a former kolbar and someone who has made an unsuccessful asylum claim in the UK, whether individually or in accumulation, are insufficient to put him at real risk.
68. In the appellant’s circumstances I consider that, when assessing the nature of any encounter with the Iranian authorities, including at a pinchpoint interrogation upon return to Iran, and the level of risk arising for the appellant, this should be assessed on the basis of him being a failed asylum seeker, which the country guidance in SSH & HR Iran identifies does not put him at real risk of serious harm.
69. I also consider that, applying the country guidance in XX Iran, with the appellant being found to have no genuine political commitment and to have been opportunistic in his activity in this country, it would be open to him to close his social media accounts prior to his return and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed account. This would contribute to reducing the level of risk faced by the appellant on return to Iran of being perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activity.
70. It was here that Ms Revill relied on the submission that there was a real risk of heightened scrutiny of the appellant, given the political developments identified in the Country Bulletin, leading to more probing questioning and intimidation of the appellant, which would result in him giving answers about his activity in the UK that could put him at real likelihood of the hair-trigger response.
71. However, as stated above at paragraph 50 of this decision, given the already low threshold for suspicion by the Iranian authorities because of their long standing concern about Kurdish political activism, I am not persuaded that the recent political developments mentioned in the Country Bulletin significantly alter what the country guidance says about the approach of the Iranian authorities to Kurdish returnees. I am not satisfied it is demonstrated that the appellant would be subjected to scrutiny over and above what is already identified as occurring for a Kurdish failed asylum seeker from this country.
72. I am not persuaded by the alternative submission of the appellant.
Conclusion
73. On the evidence before me I am not satisfied it is demonstrated that the appellant demonstrates that he is at real risk of serious harm from the Iranian authorities for perceived involvement in Kurdish political activity in this country.
74. Accordingly the appellant does not qualify for protection as a refugee or humanitarian protection.
75. For similar reasons, I am not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the appellant faces a real risk on return to Iran of ill treatment in breach of Article 3.

NOTICE OF DECISION
I dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds.
I dismiss the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.
I dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds.

TO THE RESPONDENT - FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 July 2026

ANNEX: THE ERROR OF LAW DECISION

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000100
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58645/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

AS
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Revill of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Iran. He appeals with permission against the decision dated 27 October 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
Anonymity
2. I have considered whether to grant the appellant anonymity. I have taken as my starting point the principle that open justice requires the identification of the parties to litigation. However, in some cases, the need to prevent harm to a party may outweigh the need to ensure openness and transparency. Given the nature of the protection claim made by this appellant, I have decided to make the anonymity direction set out above.
The appellant’s claim
3. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that, after being shot at by Iranian security forces while working as a “kolbar” smuggling goods into Iran, the Iranian authorities formed an adverse interest in him and have come to the family home to search for him. The appellant left Iran illegally and, since coming to the UK, has attended some political demonstrations and posted pro-Kurdish material on social media.
4. The respondent accepted that the appellant worked as a kolbar and had illegally exited Iran but disputed that the appellant’s claimed encounter with the authorities had taken place and that the appellant was a political activist in this country.
5. The FFTJ dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal. She found it was not credible that the appellant had come to the attention of the authorities as claimed before leaving Iran. She also found that the appellant was not genuinely politically committed and his activities in the UK were opportunistic; his activities in the UK did not put him at real risk from the Iranian authorities.
The Grounds of Appeal
6. The grounds granted permission are, in summary, that the FTTJ:
(i) failed to apply relevant country guidance and evidence on risk faced by Kurdish returnees and sur place activists
(ii) made a flawed assessment of credibility
(iii) failed to consider risk factors cumulatively
(iv) failed to give adequate reasons and consider relevant evidence for claimed sur place activity
(v) misapplied country guidance case law regarding illegal exit.
7. These grounds of appeal were drafted by the appellant’s legal representatives, Equality Immigration Lawyers Ltd, who are regulated by the Immigration Advice Authority.
8. At the hearing before me Counsel for the appellant, Ms Revill withdrew any reliance by the appellant on the following citations in the grounds on the basis she could not find them to exist:
• At Paragraph 2.2 of the grounds: Home Office CPIN: Iran - Kurds and Kurdish political groups, version 3.0, January 2024, paragraphs 2.4.5 and 6.2.1.

• At Paragraph 4.2 of the grounds: headnote [10] of XX (PJAK) and Paragraph 4.2 of the grounds: CPIN Iran: Opposition to the government, version 4.0, May 2024, paragraphs 7.1 – 7.4
9. Accordingly, I have made my decision taking into account those parts of the grounds of appeal which have not been withdrawn by the appellant.
10. I accept Ms Revill as Counsel has had nothing to do with the drafting of the grounds of appeal.
11. As both the High Court in R (Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) and this Tribunal in MS (Professional conduct; AI generated documents) Bangladesh [2025] UKUT 00305 (IAC) have explained, the consequences of using AI large language models in a way which results in false authorities being cited is likely to be a referral to the a professional regulator, as it is a lawyer’s professional responsibility to ensure that checks on the accuracy of citation of authority are carried out using reputable sources of legal information.
12. I have dealt with this matter separately prior to the writing of this decision, by issuing directions to Equality Immigration Lawyers Ltd to show cause.
13. I turn now to consider the grounds of appeal still pursued before me by the appellant.
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the FTTJ?
Ground 2
14. I begin with ground 2 as this concerns the FTTJ’s’s consideration of the claimed events in Iran which are said to have made the appellant flee his home in the first place and her rejection that the appellant had come to the adverse interest of the Iranian authorities before his flight.
15. This ground now contains two arguments. The first argument, set out in paragraph 2.1 of the grounds, is that generally the FTTJ placed disproportionate weight on minor discrepancies in the appellant’s account contrary to the required holistic evaluation of credibility in light of country contest, vulnerability and the standard of real risk. The appellant cites the authorities of Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11 and HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037.
16. I am not persuaded by this first argument. The FTTJ notes at paragraph 7 of her decision the respondent’s acceptance of relevant factors such as the appellant’s Kurdish ethnicity and his work as a Kolbar. She then goes on to find a number of inconsistencies and other matters damaging credibility about the appellant’s account of coming to the attention of the authorities, which she details at paragraphs 8 to 15. The FTTJ gives reasons for why these inconsistencies and other matters. I consider her findings go to the core of the appellant’s claim and are not simply about minor inconsistencies. Her approach in assessing credibility is in accordance with established case law.
17. The remaining argument of ground 2 is in paragraph 2.3 and deals with a specific finding of the FTTJ at paragraph 15 of her decision. It is submitted that the FTTJ’s finding that the Iranian authorities could not have identified the appellant so quickly is speculative and amounts to an unwarranted substitution of person opinion for objective assessment of risk, amounting to an error of fact and law. The appellant cites E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49. In submissions Ms Revill stressed there needed to be awareness that Iran was a different society to the UK when considering what could happen there, particularly given the oppressive nature of the Iranian regime.
18. I accept that a finding based on speculation and mere personal opinion without proper assessment of the personal and country background evidence relied upon by an appellant could amount to an error of law.
19. However, I consider that in this case it was open to the FTTJ to consider that on the oral and documentary evidence of the appellant there was a lack of explanation for how the authorities would be able to identify the appellant so as to allow them to act against him in the period of around 24 hours claimed. It is not said by the appellant that he or his associate KK were already known to the authorities. The appellant ran off after the encountering the authorities and was not detained. KK, who was shot and injured, was not arrested at the scene of the encounter but the following day: see q.47 of the appellant full asylum interview- thus he could not be the informant causing the actions of the authorities. The appellant has not suggested that, either in the skeleton argument or in submissions, there are any directly relevant passages in the country background evidence identified to the FTTJ that explains the situation which the FTTJ has failed to consider. I am not persuaded that the FTTJ was speculating or merely applying her own opinion; rather she was engaging with the evidence before her. I consider that the FTTJ has made a reasoned finding on this matter that was open to her to make.
20. Moreover, even if the FTTJ was in error in paragraph 15, I consider there remain in paragraphs 8 to 16 sufficient other reasoned findings provided by the FTTJ to justify rejecting the credibility of the appellant’s claim to have come to the adverse interest of the authorities before leaving Iran. Thus any such error would not be material.
21. I am not satisfied that ground 2 establishes there has been a material error of law by the FTTJ.
Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5
22. In her submissions before me, Ms Revill, put her argument on the basis that the points raised in grounds 3,4, and 5 could be subsumed under ground 1.
23. I observe that these grounds do not challenge the credibility findings made by the FTTJ about the appellant’s claimed activities while in the UK. These include the findings at paragraphs 20 and 21 of the decision that the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations in the UK has been opportunistic and that he does not have a genuine political interest.
24. Rather, the grounds concern how the undisputed matters as well as the findings made by the FTTJ were interpreted and assessed by her in paragraphs 17 to 28 of the decision when considering risk on return.
25. The respondent is correct to submit that the FTTJ refers to the relevant country guidance case law of BA Iran CG [2011] UKUT 00036 (IAC), XX Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), SB Iran CG [2009] UKAIT 00053 and HB Iran CG [2018 UKUT 00413.
26. Further, the respondent is able to point to the FTTJ’s direction to herself at the end of paragraph 20 of the decision that, even if the appellant has opportunistically attended demonstrations in the UK, she must still consider whether his attendance at demonstrations will bring him to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities.
27. Nevertheless, I do have concerns over the following matters.
28. I consider the appellant is right to submit that the FTTJ applies in her assessment of sur place activity a test of whether the appellant would be perceived as distinctively prominent in opposition to the Iranian regime:
At paragraph 18 – “… the appellant is not saying anything new which would elevate him to attract the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. Consequently, the appellant’s statements do not present a novel or particularly distinctive narrative that would set him apart and attract the focussed attention of the Iranian authorities”
At paragraph 22 – “Background information states that the Iranian authorities are interested in well-known political activists” … [The photographs produced by the appellant] do not show that the appellant is a well-known political activist against the Iranian authorities.”
At paragraph 24 – “Background evidence states that individuals who attended demonstrations as part of a crowd, without significant publicity or leadership roles are unlikely to come to the adverse attention of the authorities”
29. However, the country guidance of HB Iran at paragraph 98, among other matters, emphasizes the following factors:
• Kurds involved in Kurdish political groups or activity are at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse by the Iranian authorities. Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
• Involvement with any organised activity on behalf of or in support of Kurds can be perceived as political and thus involve a risk of adverse attention by the Iranian authorities with the consequent risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
• Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
• The Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.
30. The FTTJ does not direct herself about the hair-trigger approach and low threshold for suspicion.
31. Considering the decision as a whole, I am satisfied that that the assessment undertaken by the FTTJ is not in accordance with the country guidance concerning the hair-trigger approach of the Iranian authorities to even those perceived to be involved in support for Kurdish rights meaning the threshold for suspicion is low. This is an error of law.
32. The country guidance does not hold that mere attendance at a demonstration against the regime is simply enough to put someone at real risk on return to Iran. Yet the Upper Tribunal in BA Iran at paragraph 64(i) does comment that relevant risk factors may include whether a person attending is active or passive e.g. does he carry a banner as well as the amount of demonstrations attended. I accept that there are photographs of the appellant on occasion holding anti-regime pictures. It also appears that the FTTJ accepted that the appellant did attend the number of demonstrations claimed including those outside the Iranian embassy, even if not motivated by genuine political interest. These matters were not addressed adequately by the FTTJ. This is an error.
33. Moreover, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 65 of BA Iran comments
We are persuaded that the Iranian authorities attempt to identify persons participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London. The practice of filming demonstrations supports that. The evidence suggests that there may well have been persons in the crowd to assist in the process. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the regime has facial recognition technology in use in the UK, but it seems clear that the Iranian security apparatus attempts to match names to faces of demonstrators from photographs. We believe that the information gathered here is available in Iran. While it may well be that an appellant’s participation in demonstrations is opportunistic, the evidence suggests that this is not likely to be a major influence on the perception of the regime.
34. That this level of scrutiny can exist is not taken into account by the FTTJ when assessing the appellant’s case. Nor does the FTTJ direct herself in accordance with the country guidance case law that an appellant’s participation in demonstration being opportunistic is not likely to be a major influence on the perception of the regime. This is an error.
35. Finally, I consider there is weight to the submission of Ms Revill that the FTTJ may have addressed the various risk factors relating to the appellant individually in sequence but there was no assessment whether factors in accumulation could establish a real risk, even if individual factors did not.
36. I accept that running through the country guidance cases applicable to a Kurd facing return to Iran is the requirement that all relevant risk factors should be considered as a whole and not just individually.
37. Although the respondent can point to the FTTJ making a general reference in her conclusion at paragraph 29 to considering “all of the evidence as a whole”, I am not satisfied this is the same as providing a reasoned explanation about why risk factors relating to the appellant are not sufficient in accumulation to demonstrate a real risk. This is an error.
38. I consider that the errors I have identified above concern matters central to the assessment of risk in the appellant’s case. I am satisfied that, as argued under ground 1, the FTTJ does make material errors of law.
39. In the circumstances, I consider the points separately raised in grounds 3, 4 and 5 add little to what the appellant has already argued under ground 1 and simply reiterate the submission made about the need to consider the various applicable risk factors in accumulation.
Conclusion on error of law
40. Having found there are material errors of law as argued under Ground 1, I set aside the decision of the FTTJ.

Remaking
41. Normally, it is for this Tribunal to remake the decision. Both parties submitted that if ground 2 was not made out but any of the other grounds were, this appeal should be retained by this Tribunal for remaking. I agree. This appeal will be relisted on the first available date for remaking.
42. I have not found ground 2 made out and the other grounds do not challenge the adverse credibility findings of the FTTJ. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate for this Tribunal to preserve the credibility findings made by Judge Chana about the appellant.
43. It is likely that this Tribunal at rehearing will wish the parties to address particularly whether, taking into account the country guidance and in the context of the appellant’s opportunistic involvement in political activity in this country, there is a risk factor or accumulation of risk factors present in his case that demonstrate the appellant has a well founded fear of persecution from the Iranian state authorities for the Refugee Convention reason of imputed political opinion.
44. The appellant may wish to make submissions only at the rehearing but I consider fairness requires that it is open to him to give oral evidence, should he wish. Accordingly, the Tribunal will book a Kurdish (Sorani) interpreter for the appellant at the rehearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision dated 27 October 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana contains material errors of law and is set aside.
Directions
(1) This Tribunal will remake the decision for the appellant at a face to face oral hearing on the first available date, listed for 2 hours, with a Kurdish Sorani interpreter.
(2) The credibility findings of Judge Chana are preserved.
(3) Any party wishing to rely on further evidence or further written submissions will file it with the Tribunal and serve it on the other party by 5 working days before the date of the rehearing.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 April 2026