Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000104
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65819/2024
LP/01776/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
28th July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

SJO
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Thrower, Broudie Jackson Canter
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at the Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 3 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 16 November 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection grounds.
3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant’s claim that his father had been killed by the Iranian authorities on account of his activities in support of Kurdish political causes. This caused the family to flee to Iraq where his brother pursued political activities against the Iranian regime. Since his arrival in the UK, the appellant claimed to have engaged in committed sur place political activity.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:
• Ground 1 - Failure to apply country guidance.
• Ground 2 - Failure to take account of material matters/failure to give adequate reasons/perversity.
• Ground 3 - Failure to give adequate reasons/take account of material evidence: the appellant’s brother’s activities.
• Ground 4 - Misdirection in law: approach to the appellant’s age
• Ground 5 - Unsafe findings regarding previous criminality
• Ground 6 - Failure to give adequate reasons: departure from Country guidance.
5. In a decision dated 9 January 2026, a judge of the FtT granted permission for all grounds to be argued.
6. In advance of the error of law hearing, the respondent filed a rule 24 notice conceding the appeal on the strength of all of the grounds of appeal. I indicated at the hearing that I was satisfied that the decision involved material errors of law and that I was minded to remit the matter to the FtT to be heard de novo.
Discussion
7. I am satisfied that the judge materially erred in law for the reasons set out in the grounds of appeal and that the respondent’s concession of the appeal was well-founded. There are several fundamental flaws in the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility. Firstly, at [13(iv)], it was found that the appellant attempted to conceal his antecedent criminal offending, committed in Germany before he travelled to the UK. Such concealment cannot be reconciled with the appellant’s witness statement where he expressly referred to these events. The appellant was, in fact, open and transparent about his background such that the finding of an attempt to mislead the judge is difficult to understand. Secondly, a further failure to engage and anxiously scrutinise the appellant’s express narrative evidence is to be seen in the finding at [13(vi)] where it was observed that no detail had been offered about his brother’s political activities in Iraq. Again, the appellant did offer details of his brother’s conduct. As is rightly observed in the grounds of appeal, it would be one thing to conclude that these details were lacking in granular detail, but it is quite another to suggest that “no details” were provided.
8. Thirdly, at [13(v)] the judge considered the appellant’s young age when the relevant events were said to have occurred: “[…] I note that the Appellant's representative had argued that the Appellant could not remember details because he was a child, but he was not a small child”. The following observations were made at [99] of KS (benefit of the doubt) [2014] UKUT 552 (IAC):
[…] a child-sensitive application of the lower standard of proof may still need to be given to persons if they are recounting relevant events that took place at a time when they were minor or were even younger minors.
It is difficult to regard the minimisation of the appellant’s young age as consistent with the care which needs to be taken before concluding that an appellant recalling relevant events from when they were a child is inconsistent or lacking in detail such that it is lacking in credibility.
9. Taking the above flaws in the credibility evaluation together with the conspicuous absence of a holistic risk assessment encompassing the appellant’s claimed residence in Iraq and his family’s political activities leads me to conclude that there are errors of judicial analysis which are plainly material to the overall outcome.
Disposal
10. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides: 
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:  
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or  
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal. 
11. When I ask myself what fairness demands and bear in mind the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I take into account that both parties were agreed that the appropriate course was a remittal to the FtT without preserving any findings of fact. Given the wide scope of the fact-finding exercise to be undertaken, this is the appropriate procedural remedy.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error of law. I set aside the decision. The appeal is to be remitted to the FtT to be decided de novo.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 July 2026