UI-2026-000105 & UI-2026-000097
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000105
UI-2026-000097
First-tier Tribunal No:
EA/00980/2024
HU/00843/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4th of November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL
Between
MM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Radford of counsel, instructed by Turpin & Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Mr Deller, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 30 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a victim of modern slavery and is entitled by law to lifelong anonymity.
2. The outcome of this appeal is agreed between the parties and the decision shall be in correspondingly short form.
3. By a decision which was issued on 11 August 2025, Judge Gibbs dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme (“EUSS”) but allowed the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his human rights claim.
4. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal against the judge’s decision on the human rights ground of appeal. Permission to appeal was refused by Judge Gibbs and then by UTJ Ruddick. The application for permission to appeal was assigned separate reference numbers: UI-2026-00411 and UI-2026-00412.
5. The appellant sought permission to appeal against the judge’s decision on EUSS grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by the judge, and it is therefore only that issue which is before me.
6. It is agreed by the parties that the judge fell into error in dismissing the appeal on EUSS grounds. Mr Deller accepts that the judge erred in concluding that the appellant had not made an in-time decision under the EUSS. The application was made on 5 October 2022. Prior to 9 August 2023, there was no restriction contained within the EUSS upon making a late application after the deadline specified in Article 18(1)(d) of the Withdrawal Agreement and no requirement to demonstrate reasonable grounds as to why the application was being made late: R (Here for Good) v SSHD [2024] EWC 2817 (Admin); [2025] 1 WLR 1144, at [12]. No such timeliness or validity point was taken in the respondent’s decision and the sole ground of refusal was that there was a deportation order in force against the appellant.
7. Mr Deller accepts that that ground of refusal fell away when the judge concluded that the deportation order was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. He accepted that the appeal under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (“the CRA Regulations”) fell to be allowed on EUSS grounds, therefore. Mr Deller also accepted that the proper course for me to follow was to set aside the decision of the FtT on the EUSS ground of appeal and remake the decision on that appeal by allowing it, as the sole ground of refusal had been addressed by the appellant.
8. There followed some argument about the next steps which the respondent might or might not be permitted to take. Mr Deller maintained that the respondent could reconsider the appellant’s entitlement to leave under the residence scheme immigration rules and might be able to make another adverse decision, although he recognised that any such decision might be open to challenge on abuse of process grounds. For her part, Ms Radford did not accept that the Secretary of State was permitted to look again at the appellant’s entitlement to leave; she had made a decision which had been overturned on appeal and that result was binding on the Secretary of State.
9. Ultimately, however, the representatives agreed that it was not for me to resolve this question. They agreed that the appeal should be allowed on EUSS grounds and that it was then for the respondent to decide what to do. In the event that she took a further adverse decision, that might be subject to further proceedings in the Upper Tribunal or elsewhere and it will be for the judge in any such proceedings to determine the lawfulness of steps which are yet to be taken. It suffices for me to note that both parties reserved their position on that question.
10. I am grateful to Ms Radford and Mr Deller for their sensible and cooperative approach to resolving this appeal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal on the appeal under the CRA Regulations is set aside. I remake the decision on that appeal by allowing it.
Mark Blundell
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 October 2026