Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000127
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00918/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

DJAY EMERSON MARQUES
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Rashid of Counsel, instructed by Eliott and Singh Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 22 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 25 October 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of a human rights claim made in the context of deportation proceedings.

2. The appellant's grounds of appeal, for which permission was granted by the FtT in a decision dated 21 December 2025, are as follows: the FtT made findings without evidence (ground 1); the FtT failed properly to assess the impact of the appellant’s deportation on his daughter (ground 2a), and the FtT failed to give adequate reasons for finding that deportation would be proportionate (ground 2b).

The Hearing

3. A supplementary bundle of up-to-date evidence had been produced by the appellant. It was agreed that the FtT could not be criticised for failing to take into account materials not produced at the time, and that the supplementary bundle would only be relevant if the FtT decision were set aside to be remade.

4. Mr Rashid submitted that, not only was there no evidence to support the FtT’s finding at [28] that it was likely that the appellant’s mother and step-father still had friends and relatives in Angola, it was contrary to the evidence. He submitted that the FtT, having accepted that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with his daughter, had failed to give adequate reasons why deportation would not be unduly harsh on her. Finally, he submitted that the FtT had failed to give proper consideration to the factors listed in paragraph 23 of the grounds of appeal.

5. Mrs Arif submitted that ground one was little more than disagreement with findings open to the FtT. The appellant, his mother and his step-father were all Angolan nationals and it was open to the judge to reject their claims not to have contacts still in Angola. That was not in any event a determinative finding. Many other reasons were given why he did not face very significant obstacles to reintegration. No recording or transcript had been requested for the FtT hearing. She submitted that the FtT had taken into account the appellant's relationship with his daughter and the consequences of deportation, including the likelihood of lengthy separation. It had come to a permissible conclusion on the issue. She submitted that the FtT had undertaken an adequate balancing exercise including all of the matters in paragraph 23 of the grounds of appeal.

Consideration

Ground 1

6. The challenged finding can be found at [28], which in full reads:

‘28. The appellant is a 27-year-old man. He is fit and in good health. He has educational qualifications in the United Kingdom. It is likely that his mother and stepfather still have friends and relatives in Angola who might be able to assist the appellant on his return. The appellant has lived in a household with Angolans for most of his life. He will be aware of its customs.’

7. It is effectively repeated at [32], which again in full reads:

‘32. The appellant has the advantage that he speaks Portuguese. He a national of Angola and entitled to all the rights and benefits of his nationality. It is likely that he and his family will have relatives there who could assist him. It would be open to his mother and stepfather to travel to Angola with him to help him settle. They could live there with him if they chose to.’

8. The appellant’s mother and step-father in their joint supporting letter state that the appellant ‘has no family or ties in Angola’ ( first paragraph) and later that ‘he has no ties in Angola, no family support there’ (pre-penultimate paragraph). However, they did not attend for cross-examination, and the judge was entitled to place little weight on these claims.

9. The appellant says in his witness statement, ‘I know and have no one to return to in Angola’. The judge expressly noted this at [27] which says, ‘His argument is that he knows no one in Angola and is not aware of its customs.’ That statement does not in itself rule out the possibility that the appellant had family in Angola of whom he was unaware, such that the impugned findings were unreasonable.

10. As it is, the judge recorded the following at [52]:

‘52. The appellant will know few people in Angola. He gave evidence that his mother and stepfather have brothers and sisters there who might be expected to assist the appellant. He will know little of the country. He has however been brought up in an Angolan household and will be aware of its customs.’

11. No recording of transcript has been requested to gainsay this note of the evidence. Nor do the grounds challenge [52]. In the circumstances, the impugned finding was manifestly permissible.

12. In any event, the FtT gives between [28] and [33] a wealth of other reasons why he faces no very significant obstacles such that, even if the impugned finding had not been made, the conclusion would inevitably have been the same.

Ground 2(a)

13. It is argued that the FtT ‘failed to grapple with the significant [sic] and importance of the appellant’s relationship with his daughter’. A number of factors relevant to that issue are listed in paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19 and 21 of the grounds of appeal. These in essence were the daughter’s age at the date of hearing, her having lived with the appellant until she was three; his still seeing her regularly; their loving relationship; the daughter’s relationship with the appellant’s parents; her mother’s concern about the impact on her and the family of the appellant’s deportation; other family members’ evidence of the bond between mother and daughter; and the likelihood that deportation would permanently sever the relationship.

14. As recognized in the grounds, the FtT accepted that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with his daughter [39]. There is no proper basis to think that the FtT doubted they shared a bond. The FtT made express reference to her date of birth [35]; there is no basis therefore to find that it overlooked her age at the date of the hearing. The FtT expressly recorded that the appellant lived with her until she was three years old [37]. The FtT considered at [38] and [41] the regularity with which they see each other. It recorded at [38] the mother’s acceptance that her daughter is fond of the appellant and that she would miss him if he left the United Kingdom. Whilst the FtT does not expressly refer to the quality of the appellant’s daughter’s relationship with his parents, that is not a material oversight. They are not required to leave the country with the appellant (although the FtT does note at [32] that they could do so if they chose). The FtT found at [41] that the appellant’s deportation would ‘most certainly mean that [his daughter] will not see him until she is an adult unless her mother is prepared to allow her to travel to Angola.’

15. In short, the FtT took into account all of the matters raised under ground 2. It reminded itself at [41] of the correct test: whether deportation would be unduly harsh on the daughter. The appellant is left, therefore, with the argument that the FtT’s conclusion was perverse. However, that is a high bar, which the appellant’s case singularly fails to reach. On the contrary, in my judgment there was no evidence on which a properly directed FtT could have found the unduly harsh test to be met.

Ground 2(b)

16. The grounds argue that the FtT failed to take into account (or failed adequately to take into account) the following matters: the Appellant has lived in the UK most of his life; he has expressed remorse for his offending behaviour; he does not demonstrate the characteristics that would indicate further re-offending; his parents and siblings live in the United Kingdom and continue to support him; he has a British child in the UK with whom he has a loving relationship; and he has widespread support from his former partner, her family and his acquaintances.

17. The FtT’s analysis between [49] and [60] expressly takes into account the length of the appellant’s residence in the United Kingdom; his family living in the country, and the presence of and his relationship with a British child. The FtT noted at [15] the attendance of several members of the appellant’s family. The FtT also takes into account the appellant’s character and culpability (see [58] – [60]). It is clear from the FtT’s analysis that it did not think much of the appellant’s claims to be contrite and/or unlikely to reoffend. That was a view unarguably open to the FtT.

18. Mr Rashid submitted that the FtT had failed to take into account the fact that the appellant pleaded guilty, which in turn meant that he had overlooked demonstrable remorse. However, the FtT makes express reference at [22] to the sentences the appellant received and, more importantly, at [18] to the judge’s sentencing remarks. It is inconceivable that the FtT overlooked the appellant's plea.

19. Contrary to the grounds, the FtT undertook an appropriate proportionality assessment and reached a conclusion which was unarguably open (indeed inevitable, in my judgment).

20. For these reasons, the appeal fails and the FtT’s decision stands.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law, and stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 August 2026