Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000142
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50999/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

ANJELANI MMUNGA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

AN ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Dr E Mynott, Legal Representative, RBC Immigration Consultancy
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 24 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dismissing her appeal against a decision to refuse her entry clearance under Appendix Child Staying with or Joining a Non-Parent Relative (‘Appendix CNP’).

Background

2. The appellant’s application was made on 3 October 2023 on the basis of her relationship with her stepfather, a refugee. Her previous applications are outlined at [4] to [10] of the Judge’s decision, and that chronology is not disputed. The respondent refused the application by a decision dated 14 December 2023.

3. In summary, the respondent erroneously considered the appellant’s mother to be her sponsor and so refused the application on eligibility grounds. She further did not consider that the appellant satisfied the accommodation and maintenance requirement and concluded there were no exceptional circumstances justifying a grant of leave. The appellant exercised her right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

4. The appeal came before the Judge sitting at the Manchester Piccadilly hearing centre on 3 November 2025. The appellant was represented by Dr Mynott as she was before us, and the respondent was represented by a Presenting Officer, Mr Royle. The Judge heard evidence from the sponsor, and submissions from both advocates. He reserved his decision at the end of the hearing.

5. By his reserved decision sent to the parties on 4 November 2025, the Judge dismissed the appeal. He found at [29] that the appellant’s stepfather was not a ‘non-parent’ as she had not shown her biological father was alive. At [30], the Judge considered the maintenance requirement and found the appellant had not shown the ‘sponsor’s entitlement to Universal Credit would not be increased’ as a result of her presence in the United Kingdom. The Judge proceeded to consider the issue of proportionality and dismissed the appeal.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

6. The appellant sought permission to appeal on four grounds. First, it was said the Judge had applied the incorrect test to the ‘adequate maintenance’ question. The Judge found the appellant had not shown her sponsor’s entitlement to Universal Credit would not be increased upon her arrival, instead of looking at whether she satisfied the threshold. Second, the Judge held against the appellant a matter which had effectively been conceded in the refusal decision, i.e. the level of the sponsor’s income. Third, the Judge erred in his finding that the appellant’s stepfather was not a ‘non-parent’, and finally the Judge failed to apply various legal principles throughout his consideration of the appeal.

7. The application for permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Burnett who observed grounds one and three were arguable. He made no comment on the remaining grounds but the grant of permission was not restricted. Subsequently, the appeal came before us, sitting together at Manchester Civil Justice Centre.

8. We were provided with a consolidated bundle. As we observed at the hearing, the absence of an electronic index made this bundle difficult to navigate. Before us, Dr Mynott amplified his written grounds of appeal. Mr Tan responded, relying on the respondent’s Rule 24 notice to which Dr Mynott responded briefly. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision which we now give with reasons.

Discussion

Ground One

9. This ground focuses on the Judge’s finding that the appellant did not satisfy the Immigration Rules in respect of the requirement that she could be adequately accommodated and maintained by her sponsor upon arrival in the United Kingdom. In the refusal decision, the respondent produced a table of the kind encouraged in Ahmed (benefits: proof of receipt; evidence) [2013] UKUT 00084. Dr Mynott did not dispute the accuracy of the figures provided in the refusal.

10. What was missing from the table, however, was evidence of the housing costs of the appellant’s family. There was no evidence provided with the application of the rent payments or the Council Tax for their property. The respondent therefore could not assess whether the family would, after housing costs had been deducted, have an income greater than or equal to the level of Income Support a British family of the same size would be entitled to.

11. In the bundle provided for the First-tier Tribunal hearing, a copy of the Council Tax bill for the year 2023/2024 was before the Judge. This established that the family’s Council Tax liability was an average of £26.14 a week. The appellant had also provided evidence of her sponsor’s rental payments from 28 October 2024 to 31 October 2025. As observed by the Judge at [30] of his decision, this evidence post-dated the application by more than a year.

12. It is clear in our view that the Judge did err in his assessment of whether the maintenance requirement because he failed to consider the right question. The Judge appeared, at [30] to conclude that the appellant had not shown that the sponsor’s entitlement to Universal Credit ‘would not be increased as a result of the appellant’s presence in the UK’. This appears to be a mistake of fact, because the income given in the table the respondent provided was assessed as if the appellant was already in the United Kingdom (the child benefit figure of £87.60 being the amount paid for four children). We also note that at the time of the decision, the ‘two child limit’ meant there would be no increase in entitlement to Universal Credit because of the appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom.

13. Whilst the Judge did undertake a flawed assessment of the issue, we remind ourselves that the Judge was without a necessary part of the evidence he needed to find the appellant satisfied the maintenance requirement. There was no evidence before the Judge of what the family’s rental payments were at the time the application was made. The sponsor’s witness statement does not include any detail of what their housing costs were at the time, nor does the witness statement of the appellant’s mother. Whilst there were some bank statements provided by the sponsor with the application, these statements ended in August 2022 and did not illustrate the rent paid in October 2023.

14. The only reference to the putative amount paid was within the Appeal Skeleton Argument, which is not evidence. In the circumstances, we find that although the Judge did not address the right question, that was immaterial where the appellant had not provided evidence to show that she satisfied the maintenance requirement. We do not find the Judge’s finding in respect of this issue was a material error of law.

15. The parties agreed that the appellant could only realistically succeed if this ground was made out. If we were to find the Judge did not materially err in his consideration of this issue, the appellant would not meet the Immigration Rules and our findings on the other grounds would not assist her. We will however, provide our observations on the remaining grounds.

Ground Two

16. This ground also focuses on the issue of the maintenance requirement. In summary, the respondent within the decision letter, when looking at the family’s income, included the following sources: the employment income of the appellant’s mother, Universal Credit, Child Benefit (for four children), and the employment income of the sponsor. No issue was taken by the respondent in respect of any of these income sources.

17. The Judge records at [30] that the sponsor’s income ‘is shown to come from public funds rather than from his employment’. It is unclear from reading the decision whether this was the submission made by Mr Royle below. If it was, it was contrary to the accepted income figure in the refusal decision, and contrary to the respondent’s own guidance. The respondent’s guidance, ‘Part 8 – Family Migration: Adequate maintenance and accommodation, version 5.0, December 2021’, when looking at income, states:

All legal income for the family unit can be included, such as:

• income from salaried or non-salaried employment
• income from self-employment or as a director of a specified limited company in the UK
• non-employment income, for example, income from property rental or dividends from shares
• income from Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, Child Benefit, income-related benefits, contributory benefits and benefits/pensions payable to Armed Forces veterans and their partner
• state (UK or foreign) or private pension
• cash savings held for at least 6 months prior to the date of application

18. The fact that the sponsor’s income included income-related benefits was not relevant to the question of adequate maintenance in the way that it was framed in the decision. As we have said however, this was only part of the calculation and therefore the overall findings made in respect of the lacuna of evidence of housing costs, and therefore whilst the Judge erred in his finding in relation to the sponsor’s income, this error was not material.

Ground Three

19. This ground moves away from the issue of the maintenance requirement to an issue of the appellant’s eligibility to apply under Appendix CNP. The respondent in her decision, mistakenly considered the appellant’s mother to be the sponsor for the application, and not her stepfather. This then led to the question of whether the appellant’s stepfather was a ‘non-parent relative’. The Judge considered the submission made by Dr Mynott at [29]. That submission was essentially a reference to the definition of a ‘parent’ within the Immigration Rules.

20. At the time of the application, the Rules gave this definition of a parent:

“Parent” includes:

(a) the stepfather of a child whose father is dead, and reference to stepfather includes a relationship arising through civil partnership…

21. The Judge treated this definition as imposing upon the appellant a requirement to show that her father was alive. Only then would her stepfather be considered a ‘non-parent’. We do not consider this the appropriate test. The evidence before the Judge was simply that the appellant’s father had abandoned her mother two months into her pregnancy with the appellant, and that there had been no contact since [4]. There was no suggestion that the appellant’s father was dead. The refusal simply noted that the appellant did not provide any evidence of her father’s circumstances. That is unsurprising, given she has never met him, and her mother has had no contact with him since 2006.

22. Where there was no evidence before the Judge that the appellant’s biological father was dead, there was no requirement for the appellant to show that he was in fact alive. It is unclear how this would have been established in the circumstances, and in our view, this would have imposed too high a burden on the appellant. The Judge’s task was to assess the evidence before him in the round, and to determine whether the appellant’s biological father was dead. The Judge erred in finding that the appellant’s stepfather was a parent, and the sponsor fell to be considered as a ‘non-parent’ relative. This error had no material bearing on the outcome of the appeal however, because the appellant did not satisfy other elements of Appendix CNP.

Ground Four

23. We found the final ground to be the least persuasive, and it amounted to no more than disagreement with the Judge’s findings. First, it is submitted the Judge erred in his application of Devaseelan (Second Appeals - ECHR - Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka * [2002] UKIAT 00702. There was before the Judge a decision of Designated Judge of the First-tier Tribunal McClure, sent to the parties on 13th March 2015. That appeal concerned the respondent’s refusal of entry clearance to the appellant’s mother and her three children, half-siblings of the appellant.

24. As we observed at the hearing, there were limited findings of Judge McClure pertaining to the appellant. At [11] of Judge McClure’s decision, he referred to the appellant’s mother having a child by a previous relationship, born in or around 2008. No application had been made at the time, and Judge McClure referred to the appellant living with her mother in a refugee camp in Tanzania. There is no other reference to the appellant in that decision.

25. Dr Mynott submitted the Judge ought to have taken Judge McClure’s finding, i.e. that he ‘would have allowed the appeal on Article 8 grounds’, as his own starting point when assessing the existence of family life. We note at [26] of the Judge’s decision he appeared to accept that there was family life between the appellant and her family members in this country.

26. The finding of the Judge was in this respect consistent with Judge McClure’s finding. We do not consider that simply because the sponsor gave evidence in both appeals, nearly a decade apart, that the Judge was required to take the findings of Judge McClure as his starting point where the issues in dispute were not identical. The Judge’s analysis at [25] was entirely proper and does not contain any error of law.

27. The appellant further criticises the Judge’s putative failure to consider Appendix Family Reunion (Sponsors with Protection), the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR handbook. We see no merit in this assertion. Within the decision, the Judge considered the arguments advanced before him on the relevance of these principles. At [23], the Judge provides reasons for rejecting the submission that he was required to consider the appellant’s entitlement to leave under an alternative provision of the Rules which was in any event, no longer operative at the time of the hearing before him.

28. Further, the Judge provides reasons at [24] for rejecting the argument that the Refugee Convention had a bearing upon the appeal. The appellant’s submissions to the contrary were rejected for reasons entirely open to the Judge.

29. It follows that whilst we have found the Judge did err in some respects pleaded by the appellant, the inability of the appellant to satisfy the Immigration Rules means any error in the ways we have identified would have made no difference to the outcome of the appeal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dismissing the appeal on human rights grounds, shall stand.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 May 2026