Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000146
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63691/2024
LP/13451/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

TH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Renfrew, Counsel instructed by MTC Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a 38 year old Sri Lankan national of Sinhalese ethnicity. He came to the United Kingdom in 2010 having been granted limited leave to do so for the purpose of study. He did not leave when the United Kingdom when his permission to stay ended in December 2014 or make any application to extend his permission. In August 2022 he claimed asylum saying he had a fear of persecution by the state authorities in Sri Lanka because they believe he is a supporter of a separate Tamil state.

2. In interviews with Immigration Officers the appellant said that when he returned to visit Sri Lanka in January 2014 he was arrested, detained and tortured by soldiers who accused him of providing accommodation to a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2008. He said that after ten days he was released after his family paid a bribe and he was taken to the airport where he flew back to the United Kingdom. He said that since 2021 he has supported the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) from the United Kingdom, and that he would want to continue supporting them in the future.

3. The respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim in a decision dated 24 April 2024. The respondent did not believe the appellant’s account of events in Sri Lanka, neither did the respondent believe that the appellant is a genuine supporter of the TGTE or their cause. The respondent decided that the appellant’s removal to Sri Lanka would not be incompatible with the appellant’s right under Article 8(1) European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to respect for his private and family life, finding that he did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted leave to remain and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a grant of leave.

4. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal. Before his appeal was heard he raised the new matter of a relationship he had begun with a Sri Lankan who has been granted asylum in the United Kingdom, AB. As they could not continue their relationship in Sri Lanka he argued that his removal would be incompatible with his Article 8 right to respect for his family life with AB. The respondent considered this new matter in a review but was not satisfied the appellant and AB were in a genuine and subsisting relationship and accordingly found that the appellant’s removal would not be incompatible with his Article 8 rights.

5. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell (the Judge) on 30 October 2025. The appellant and AB gave evidence and submissions were made on behalf of the appellant and the respondent. The Judge provided his decision dismissing the appellants protection and human rights appeals in writing on 13 November 2025.

The Judge’s Decision

6. Having set out in considerable detail the history to the appeal, the evidence that was given at the hearing, the submissions that were made, and the legal framework, the Judge set out his findings from [69] of the decision onwards.

7. At [72] the Judge found the appellant’s account of supporting the TGTE not to be logical or credible and that the appellant appeared to have no knowledge of political developments in Sri Lanka. The Judge recorded the appellant’s evidence that he does not support an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka and found that to be inconsistent with his claimed support for the TGTE. At [73] the Judge concluded that the appellant is not a genuine supporter of the TGTE and that his claimed engagement with that party was an attempt to embellish his protection claim.

8. Within [73] the Judge began his consideration of photographs of the appellant’s attendance at TGTE events which the respondent argued were unreliable. The Judge continued that consideration at [74] of his decision in which he also briefly considered the appellants account of events in Sri Lanka in 2014. This paragraph is fundamental to the challenge to the Judge’s decision and so it is helpful to set it out in full:

74. The photographs are given very little weight as evidence which might support the claim by the appellant to be genuinely engaged and supportive of the TGTE in this country. On his own evidence the appellant was very clear that he had not started to attend events with the TGTE until 2021. The photographs have a caption of 2019. As Mr Williams pointed out, that either meant that the appellant had in fact been supporting the TGTE earlier than 2021, or particulars of the photographs and/or the captions were false. I agree with that view. Little weight is to be given to the photographs other than accepting that they show the appellant joined certain apparent demonstrations. That evidence is not found to reflect or support the genuineness of the views of the appellant with respect to the TGTE. I do not accept the appellant’s account that he participated in order to respond to what he stated he had suffered in 2014. If for any reason the appellant was then detained and mistreated, that was some 11 years ago, and the appellant has received no threats since 2013/14. I do not find that for what he stated he experienced he would now be on a watch or stop list in Sri Lanka. His account that he has been involved with the TGTE genuinely in this country lacks all credibility and is not found to be a true reflection of the genuine views of the appellant. Such would not therefore put him at risk on return to Sri Lanka.

9. At [75] the Judge records that the appellant did not make an asylum claim until eight years after re-entering the United Kingdom and says that when assessing the appellant’s credibility he has “give[n] weight” to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”). That provision states that a Tribunal considering an asylum or human rights claim shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility of a failure to make an asylum claim while in a safe country.

10. The Judge then sums up his conclusions about the appellant’s protection claim at [76] as follows:

76. The reality is that even if the appellant fears persecution on the basis that he would be seen as a supporter of a separate Tamil state, I do not find his account to be credible and, therefore, to the lower standard of proof I do not find that there would be a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would face persecution for a Geneva Convention reason on return to Sri Lanka. For the same reasons the appellant would not face a breach of his absolute rights with respect to Article 3 of the European Convention. The country conditions in Sri Lanka would also not give rise to an entitlement by the appellant to be granted leave by way of humanitarian protection on such a basis.

11. The Judge then considered the appellant’s Article 8 claim at [77] – [80] of his decision. At [77] the Judge noted that in 2024 AB had been successful in a protection appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in which she had not mentioned being in a relationship with the appellant.

12. At [78] the Judge decided that the appellant’s relationship with AB did not engage Article 8(1) ECHR. He explained that conclusion as follows:

78. The stated relationship is asserted, but virtually without any supporting evidence. Even the witness statements were said to have the wrong Croydon addresses. There are no accounts evidencing co-habitation to a degree which might justify a finding of a genuine and subsisting relationship. The stated partner of the appellant having been granted refugee status, it is accepted that she cannot be expected to return to Sri Lanka. However, although a consent under section 50 of the 2014 Act has been issued, that does not signify the acceptance of a genuine relationship by the respondent. It permits potentially the local authority to consider whether a marriage ceremony might lawfully be conducted. Further decisions would have to be made and those aspects, as at the date of the hearing of this appeal, had not been resolved. I am therefore not persuaded that at the date of the hearing Article 8(1) ECHR was engaged as between the appellant and his partner on family life grounds. As to private life grounds, engagement is found with reference to Article 8(1) ECHR.

13. At [79] the Judge found that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted leave to remain, concluded that he would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Sri Lanka, and found that he would not face unjustifiably harsh consequences if her were to return. At [80] the Judge said extraneously that if the appellant were to marry AB he could consider applying to return to the United Kingdom and if he did so the Judge’s findings ought not to count against the appellant.

14. The Judge then explained at [81] his ultimate conclusion that the appellant’s protection and human rights appeals failed, noting in relation to the Article 8 claim that considerable weight must be given to the public interest in maintaining an effective system of immigration control. The Judge then dismissed the appeal on all grounds.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

15. The appellant sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on four grounds. The first two grounds related to the appellants protection appeal and averred that: (1) the Judge failed to consider the risk to the appellant arising from his detention and escape in 2014, and (2) the Judge failed to apply the country guidance provided in the country guidance case KK and RS (sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka [2021] UKUT 0130 (‘KK and RS’) when considering the risk to the appellant as a result of his sur place activity in the United Kingdom. Another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal granted the appellant permission to appeal on these grounds.

16. The appellant’s third and fourth grounds of appeal related to his human rights appeal. They averred that: the Judge misdirected himself in law when considering whether Article 8(1) ECHR was engaged by failing to decide the issue himself, and the Judge failed to consider material matters when assessing whether the appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with AB. The second Judge of the First-tier Tribunal refused the appellant permission to appeal on these grounds.

17. The appellant renewed his application for permission to appeal on grounds three and four to the Upper Tribunal (renumbering them (4) and (5)) and added a further ground of appeal (numbered ground (3)) which averred that the Judge had failed to make an independent assessment of the appellant’s relationship with AB and failed to determine for himself whether it amounted to family life. That renewed application was not resolved prior to the hearing before me. At the outset of the hearing, after the representatives had indicated that they were ready to make submissions on all the grounds of appeal, I indicated that I would hear those submissions de bene esse and make decisions on (a) whether to grant permission in relation to grounds three and four and if permission was granted, (b) whether they disclosed a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.

18. In accordance with rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the applicant served a supplementary bundle of evidence that had not been before the Judge. That bundle consisted of evidence of the appellant’s marriage to AB in London on 23 January 2026. As this evidence was not before the Judge it was agreed by both Ms Everett and Ms Renfrew that it could not be relevant to whether the Judge made a material error of law. As such it was agreed that I would consider whether to admit this evidence only if an error of law was found, for the purpose of re-making the decision.

19. I heard helpful submissions from Ms Renfrew and Ms Everett. I intend no disrespect by not setting them out in detail here but will refer to them where necessary to explain my decision in the following paragraphs.

Analysis

20. I begin by reminding myself of Lord Hamblen’s reminder to appellate courts at [72] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22:

72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering
whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.

21. I also remind myself that there was a requirement on the Judge to consider the appellant’s protection claim with anxious scrutiny and that the duty to give reasoned decision is a requirement that adequate reasons are given to enable the losing party to understand why they were unsuccessful and an appellate court to scrutinise the decision - see [19] and [118] of the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 605.

Ground One

22. In her submissions Ms Renfrew argued that the Judge had failed to consider the risk to the appellant on return to Sri Lanka as a result his being detained in 2014 and being released following the payment of a bribe. Ms Renfrew submits that the Judge made no finding that the appellants account of events in 2014 was untrue, and avers that in the light of that account the Judge was required to engage with the country guidance to consider whether the appellant would be on a stop list or watch list as a result of the circumstances of his release from detention.

23. It was conceded by Ms Everett that the Judge does not record in his decision a clear finding about whether the appellant’s claim to have been detained and mistreated by the Sri Lankan authorities during a visit in 2014 was true. Ms Everett submitted that despite this, when the Judge’s decision is read as a whole it is clear that the Judge did not accept any part of the appellant’s account. This submission has some force because the Judge does make a number of adverse findings about the credibility of other parts of the appellant’s account and at [72] and [74] specifically rejects his claim that he supports the TGTE in response to events in 2014 as not credible. However the submission is undermined by what the Judge actually says at [74] about the appellant’s claim of detention and ill-treatment in 2014: “If for any reason the appellant was then detained and mistreated, that was some 11 years ago, and the appellant has received no threats since 2013/14”. I cannot accept that this statement is consistent with the Judge rejecting the appellant’s entire account. Instead, I find that this statement by the Judge indicates that he has taken the applicant’s claim of prior arrest and ill-treatment at its highest i.e. that despite the misgivings he had about the credibility of other aspects of the appellant’s claim, he has treated this part of the appellant’s claim as if it were true.

24. Having taken the appellant’s account of events in 2014 at its highest, the Judge goes on to immediately say that “I do not find that for what he stated he experienced he would now be on a watch or stop list”. It is clear from this that the Judge unquestionably did consider whether the appellant’s account of events in 2014 means that he would now be on a watch list or a stop list in Sri Lanka and made a finding that it did not.

25. At [430] of the relevant country guidance case KK and RS the tribunal found that the stop list only consists of those against whom there is an extant arrest warrant, while at [431] of KK and RS the tribunal found that the watch list comprises of people who are not on the stop list but who are nonetheless deemed to be of adverse interest as a result of information gathered about them following a “filtration process”. There can be no doubt that the Judge was aware of this binding authority as he makes reference to the case on more than one occasion within his decision (see [46] , [55], [56]). There is equally no reason to infer that having referenced the case the Judge then disregarded it or failed to take it into account when making his finding that the appellant would not be on a stop list or watch list (see the comments of Lord Hamblen at [72 (ii)] of HA (Iraq) quoted above).

26. I do not accept Renfrew’s submission that in order to demonstrate his consideration of KK and RS the Judge was required to explicitly “grapple with” the question of whether there is an arrest warrant or court order in respect of the appellant before finding that the appellant is not on the stop list. Instead I find it is implicit in the Judge’s finding that the appellant is not on a stop list and the Judge’s observation that there has been no threat to the appellant since 2013/14, that the Judge found there is no warrant or court order against him.

27. I agree with Ms Everett that that the Judge’s finding that the appellant would not be on a watch or stop list must be viewed in the context of all the circumstances the Judge found to exist. They included the finding that for more than a decade there has been no threatened repercussions following the appellant’s release after the payment of a bribe, the finding that the appellant has no genuine interest in Tamil separatism, the finding that the appellant has no knowledge or awareness of political developments in Sri Lanka over the last decade, the finding that photographs of the appellant at TGTE events were only taken to embellish his protection claim, and the fact the appellant is not Tamil but is of Sinhalese ethnicity. These were all highly pertinent findings to an assessment of whether the appellant would appear on a stop list or watch list held by the Sri Lankan authorities. These findings all serve to adequately explain the Judge’s stated conclusion that even taking the appellant’s account of events in 2014 at its highest, the appellant had not established that he would be of sufficient interest to the authorities in Sri Lanka to mean he is at risk on being on a stop list or watch list and consequently face persecution on his return.

28. The grounds of appeal refer to [25] of the Court of Appeal decision in RS (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1796 in which Floyd LJ analysed the evidence about whether the appellant in that case might appear on a stop list concluding that “it seems to me, based on those facts, to be inherently likely that the authorities would seek to recapture him and do so by issuing an arrest warrant”. As the part of Floyd LJ’s reasoning emphasised above indicates however, that was a conclusion reached on the facts of that case, it did not establish a precedent that where a person is released following a bribe it follows that an arrest warrant will have been issued. The facts in that case included RS being detained shortly after the end of the war, being of sufficient interest to the authorities that they held him and tortured him for 18 months, and RS escaping from custody with the help of a visiting contractor. They were a long way away from the appellant’s claim of events in 2014 even taking that claim at its highest (as the Judge did).

29. Overall therefore I am satisfied that the Judge adequately considered whether the appellant’s account of events in 2014 taken at its highest means he is at risk now because he is on a stop or watch list, and having done concluded that, for reasons he adequately explained when his decision is read as a whole, it did not. Ground one is therefore dismissed.

Ground two

30. Ground two also complains about the Judge’s assessment of the risk the appellant would face on return to Sri Lanka, focusing on the appellant’s sur place activity while in the United Kingdom. As identified above, the Judge unquestionably did consider the appellant’s activity in the United Kingdom at [72] – [74] of his decision, including the appellant’s claim to be an active supporter of the proscribed organisation the TGTE, before unequivocally concluding at the end of [74] of the decision that his involvement with the TGTE would not put the appellant at risk on return to Sri Lanka.

31. Ms Renfrew submits that when reaching this conclusion the Judge focused only on whether the appellant was genuinely supporting the TGTE. Referring to [494] of KK and RS which says that the Sri Lankan authorities will have little or no inclination to enquire into an individual’s motivations, Ms Renfrew submits that the Judge was required to and failed to, assess what the Sri Lankan authorities will know about the appellant’s activities with the TGTE and how they will perceive the appellant in the light of their knowledge of those activities.

32. Again however, I accept Mr Everett’s submission that the Judge’s decision must be read as a whole to determine whether there was an adequate assessment of whether the appellant would face a risk arising from his activities in the United Kingdom. Although it was highly significant to the assessment of risk, the Judge did not only find that the appellant’s involvement with the TGTE was not genuine and was simply an attempt to embellish a claim to stay in the United Kingdom. The Judge additionally specifically found that the appellant’s evidence of involvement with the TGTE was not credible. The Judge further found that the photographs the appellant adduced as evidence of his involvement with the TGTE were unreliable and consequently concluded that “little weight is to be given to the photographs other than accepting they show the appellant joined certain apparent demonstrations”. Elsewhere the Judge said those photographs had been taken by a colleague to show the appellant’s presence in order to embellish his claim.

33. The context for the Judge’s assessment of whether the appellant’s activity in the United Kingdom gave rise to a risk to the appellant in Sri Lanka was therefore oral evidence about that involvement which the Judge found not to be credible and photographic evidence about that involvement which the Judge found not to be reliable. The context for that assessment of risk also included the Judge’s identification of the appellant as Sinhalese and not from an area in Sri Lanka where those supporting Tamil separatism are concentrated (see [73]) as well as the Judge’s specific conclusion that the appellant’s activity in the United Kingdom was not in any way related to his history in Sri Lanka.

34. Although he does not refer to headnote 10 of KK and RS explicitly therefore it is clear in the context of those findings, that the Judge did consider the factors identified within that headnote. The Judge undoubtedly had regard to the extent, type and duration of the person’s activities in the United Kingdom, any relevant history in Sri Lanka and any relevant familial connections before reaching his conclusion that the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom would not put him at risk on return to Sri Lanka.

35. Overall therefore, whilst the Judge did not say so in terms, it is apparent from his decision as a whole and the findings of fact that he made, that the Judge did consider the factors identified in headnote 10 to KK and RS before concluding that the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom would not put him at risk in Sri Lanka. On this basis ground two is also dismissed.

Grounds three - five

36. These grounds relate to the Judge’s conclusions at [78] that there was no family life between the appellant and AB that engages Article 8(1) of the ECHR and that there is not a genuine and subsisting relationship between them. Ms Renfrew submitted that the Judge failed to assess these issues for himself but instead rejected family life on the premise that the respondent had not accepted the relationship as a marriage ceremony had not taken place. Ms Renfrew also submitted that the decision that there was not family life was either wrong or inadequately reasoned and that the Judge failed to take the entire history of the relationship into account.

37. Despite Ms Renfrew’s capable submissions I agree with the First-tier Tribunal Judge who refused permission to appeal on these grounds, that they are not arguable and in reality are a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence that was before him.

38. In relation to what became ground 5, the suggestion that the Judge did not consider the evidence of the appellant and AB about their relationship is not sustainable in the light of the Judge’s extensive recounting of that evidence at [14], [22], [26], [27], [28], [29], [31], [36], [38], [39], [40], [41] of his decision. The Judge was unarguably aware of the evidence that the two had met in January 2023 (see [26]) but contrary to what is said in the grounds of appeal, the Judge’s statement that the relationship developed only within the last 15 months was an accurate reflection of AB’s evidence that she had been in a relationship with the appellant since the previous August (see [36]). The complaint in the second part of ground 5 about the Judge’s assessment at [78] that “there are no accounts evidencing co-habitation to a degree which might justify a finding of genuine and subsisting relationship” is no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s evaluation of the evidence which the Judge painstakingly recorded.

39. Similarly, the complaint that became ground 4, that the Judge failed to direct himself about the appropriate threshold for a finding of family life engaging Article 8(1) is without foundation and amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s evaluation of the evidence. Whilst the appellant and AB said that they had been living together for fifteen months and planned to marry, the Judge also had regard to the fact that neither had mentioned each other in their immigration applications and claims until very recently, the absence of supporting evidence about their relationship and inaccuracies about addresses in the witness statements. It was following an analysis of all these factors that the Judge reached his conclusion that there was not a genuine and subsisting relationship and not a family life that engaged Article 8(1) of the ECHR. It is not arguable that the Judge’s reasons for that conclusion were inadequate or that when reaching this conclusion the specialist Judge mis-directed himself as to the law.

40. The last ground, numbered ground 3 in the renewed application for permission to appeal, in my judgement arises from a misunderstanding of what the Judge is saying at [78] of his decision. The Judge was unarguably right when saying in that paragraph that the question of whether the Local Authority would determine that a marriage between the appellant and AB could lawfully be conducted had not at that time been resolved. It does not follow however that the Judge’s conclusion that there was no family life between the appellant and AB was based upon that ambiguity. The Judge had earlier in the paragraph and in the preceding paragraph referred to all the factors which I have mentioned above, which undermined the evidence of the appellant and AB about their relationship. It was in the context of those factors that the Judge reached his conclusion that there was no genuine and subsisting relationship and no family life engaging Article 8(1) ECHR between the appellant and AB, and it is not arguable that he did so without independently assessing the evidence.

41. Permission to appeal on grounds 3-5 in the renewed grounds of appeal is accordingly refused because those grounds are not arguable.

Notice of Decision

The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 May 2026