Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000150

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00815/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Appellant
and

AG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Dr Ibisi, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Nawaz

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 24 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I shall refer to the appellant as ‘the respondent’ and to the respondent as ‘the appellant’ as they respectively appeared before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The appellant is a male citizen of Lithuania born on 17 April 2000. He has lived in the United Kingdom since 2008. The background to his appeal is summarised by the First-tier Tribunal judge at [2]:
On 18.06.2020, the Appellant applied for leave under the EU Settlement Scheme and on 01.10.2020 he was granted indefinite leave to remain
On 20.01.2025 at Liverpool Crown Court he was convicted of being concerned in the production of a controlled drug of Class B – Cannabis, for which he received a sentence of 12 months imprisonment.
As a result of his criminality, he was sent a Notice of Decision to make a deportation order letter on 19.02.2025. This was served on him on 20.02.2025. His short representations were dismissed by the Home Office.
He was served with a stage 2 notice on 24.04.2025. As he did not appeal within the 14 days, he became appeal right exhausted on 08.05.2025. He was transferred from HMP Risley to IRC Yarls Wood on 11.06.2025 with a view to removal to Lithuania on 13.06.2025.
The Appellant's representatives immediately made a late appeal on 09.06.2025. On 12.06.2025, Judge Burnett admitted a late appeal and removal was deferred. A combined bail and CMR hearing on 01.07.2025 resulted in his release.
The appellant’s appeal was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal by a decision promulgated on 14 November 2025. The Secretary of State now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
3. The public interest requires the deportation of a foreign criminal who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, unless Exception 1 or 2 apply (see s.117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as amended)):
Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
4. The Secretary of State asserts that the First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant’s deportation would result in unduly harsh circumstances for his partner and child. The Secretary of State notes in the grounds that the appellant had claimed on 17 January 2025 that ‘he did not want to be involved with his unborn baby and would continue to do his own thing.’ This statement is, the respondent submits, inconsistent with the judge’s finding that the appellant, his partner and the child are in a close and subsisting relationship.
5. The judge found at [29] :
Following the order of submissions made by Mr Nawaz in his skeleton argument, I accept the Appellant has a family life and is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with both his partner and child. Ms Jones and Amelia are subject to a child protection order. I accept that their departure from the UK to continue their family life overseas is not feasible due to her vulnerability and she continues to need a lot of support from social services. I accept the latest reports confirm that the Appellant is playing a positive role in the family. Indeed, at the recent meeting at the beginning of October, permission was given to the Appellant to return to the family home where he now is. I accept the submission that if the Appellant was required to leave and leave the family behind, the current reports from social services confirm this would have a devastating impact on Miss James and Amelia and this would meet the unduly harsh test.
6. Dr Ibisi, for the Secretary of State, submits that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant’s opinion changed. She also complains that the judge failed to explain why the child could not be cared for by the mother alone or to have regard to the extent which the local authority could assist her.
7. Mr Nawaz, for the appellant, submits that a single comment made by the appellant before the child was born need not be determinative of his state of mind at the hearing over a year later. The judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and his partner and her findings should, absent any obvious error, be respected. The respondent’s submissions regarding the local authority were wholly speculative. It was open to the judge to conclude that the child’s best interests would be met by her being cared for by both parents. The social services evidence as to the effect of separation on the child and mother was compelling and the judge was entitled to give it substantial weight.
8. I agree with Mr Nawaz. It is plainly open to the judge to find, on the evidence, that the appellant had changed his mind about parenthood, particularly given that his remarks in 2025 predated the child’s birth. The judge carefully examined the evidence of the appellant’s relationship with the partner and the child throughout the period since the child’s birth. She reached findings of fact available to her on the evidence. She was entitled to give weight to the evidence of social services, which confirms the likely ‘devastating’ effect of the deportation of the appellant on both his partner (who has mental health problems) and the child. I find that the Secretary of State’s challenge amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the reasoned findings of the judge.
9. The Secretary of State also argues that the judge (i) failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK; (ii) failed to recognise that integration can be “lost” through criminality and imprisonment (iii) gave inadequate reasons for finding very significant obstacles to integration in Lithuania.
10. I find that the analysis of the First-tier Tribunal judge is not flawed for the reasons advanced by the Secretary of State. The judge considered all relevant evidence, including the fact that the appellant had lived in the United Kingdom for more than half of his life. It was open to her, in assessing the appellant’s integration in the United Kingdom, to give that fact significant weight notwithstanding that the appellant had been involved in criminality and had been imprisoned. The Secretary of State complains that the judge failed to record that integration can be diminished by imprisonment (see Binbuga (Turkey) [2019] EWCA Civ 551) but I find that it is clear from the judge’s analysis of the evidence (in particular, the evidence of the appellant’s probation officer which firmly supported the finding of integration) that she was aware of the potential negative effect of the appellant’s imprisonment upon his integration. The Secretary of State position is that the appellant’s criminality should, in effect, have been given decisive weight but, in the context of all the evidence, I disagree. I find that the judge’s analysis was thorough, fair and even-handed. Another judge may have come to a different conclusion but that is not the point; the judge reached findings available to her on the evidence and supported those findings with cogent reasons. The Upper Tribunal should, in those circumstances, hesitate before interfering with the judge’s conclusions (see Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464).
11. I acknowledge that the judge’s analysis at [32] (very significant obstacles to integration in Lithuania) is weaker. The point already made regarding the appellant’s very long residence in the United Kingdom is referred to again by the judge and has legitimate weight in the context of the assessment very significant obstacles but I agree with Dr Ibisi that it is less clear why the an adult male in good health should struggle to establish himself in the country of his nationality only on account of a paucity of family contacts, poor language skills and an inability to access employment and housing, matters regarding which the judge had little evidence. I find, however, albeit by a narrow margin, that the judge’s analysis is adequate. In doing so, I am reminded that the judge had the benefit of hearing oral evidence which she was required to subject to a robust assessment. Again, I observe that the length of the appellant’s residence in the United Kingdom, whilst by no means decisive, was bound to carry significant weight. I find that the judge did not err in law by concluding that the appellant met the requirements of Exception 1.
12. In the circumstances, I find that the First-tier Tribunal did not err in law for the reasons advanced by the Secretary of State or at all. The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 10 May 2026