Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000159
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53098/2024
LH/06294/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

MUHAMMAD IMRAN UL HASSAN CHEEMA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms D Revill, Counsel instructed by Premium Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a 45 year old Pakistani citizen who says he has been residing in the United Kingdom since arriving as a student in 2010. He was served with a notice on 15 March 2022 informing him that he is an overstayer and that the respondent intended to remove him. He made an application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom which was refused on 3 July 2023 but he was not removed. He made another application for leave to remain on 24 July 2023. That application was refused by the respondent on 14 March 2024. The appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was heard on 1 October 2024 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Meyler (the Judge) who on 9 October 2024 issued a decision dismissing the appeal.
2. The appellant now appeals against the Judge’s decision asserting that it contains a material error of law, having been granted permission to do so by another Judge of the First-tier Tribunal.
The appellant’s case and the Judge’s decision
3. The appellant argued that the respondent’s refusal of his application for leave to remain amounted to a disproportionate interference with his right under Article 8(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) to respect for his private and family life. In particular he argued that the decision interfered with the private life he has established during his time in the United Kingdom and with the family life he shares with LS, a Cypriot national who is settled in the United Kingdom.
4. The appellant argued that interference with his family life with LS was disproportionate because he met the requirements of the respondent’s Immigration Rules (the Rules) for being granted leave to remain on the basis of such family life. He further argued that in any event the public interest in his removal was outweighed by the strength of the private and family life he has established in the United Kingdom.
5. The Judge found that the appellant has a private and family life in the United Kingdom that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention (see [30] of the decision).
6. It was agreed by the parties that the appellant would meet the requirements in the Rules for being granted leave to remain because of his relationship with LS if there were “insurmountable obstacles to family life with [LS] continuing outside the UK” (see [9] & [10]). The Judge found that whilst there would be insurmountable obstacles to family life between the two continuing in Pakistan ([11]), there would not be insurmountable obstacles to such family life in Cyprus ([26]). On that basis the Judge concluded that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Rules for being granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom.
7. Having reached that conclusion the Judge undertook a proportionality assessment in which she weighed factors in favour of the appellant’s removal (which were identified at [34] – [39]) against family and private life factors in the appellant's favour (which were identified at [40]). The Judge concluded that the factors in favour of the appellant did not outweigh the public interest in his removal ([41]), concluding that removal would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences ([42]).
The appeal to this Tribunal
8. The appellant brings his appeal to this tribunal on six grounds:
i. The Judge erred by directing herself that she was “mandated” to give little weight to the appellant’s relationship with LS in the proportionality assessment.
ii. The Judge erred by stating that LS could stay in Cyprus while the appellant makes an application return to the UK from Pakistan
iii. The Judge made a material mistake of fact when stating that LS’s Personal Independence Payments (PIP) would pay for her to have a carer in the absence of the appellant.
iv. The hearing was procedurally unfair because the Judge found that LS could be cared for in the United Kingdom by her daughter or a paid carer, without either of those propositions being put to LS
v. The Judge failed to take account of LS’s right of permanent residence in the United Kingdom under the Withdrawal Agreement when undertaking her proportionality assessment.
vi. The Judge erred when considering the obstacles to family life continuing in Cyprus
9. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes who considered the first ground of appeal to be arguable and granted permission on the other five grounds of appeal “for convenience”.
10. The respondent replied to the appellant’s grounds of appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules opposing the six grounds of appeal. The appellant served a reply to that response in accordance with rule 25 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules.
11. I heard detailed submissions from Ms Revill and Ms Everett in a hearing. I mean no disrespect to those helpful submissions by not listing them here however I will refer to them in my analysis below. At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision, which I now provide together with my reasons.
Legal Framework
12. Article 8(1) of the Convention provides that a person has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence and Article 8(2) provides that “there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”
13. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has provided guidance as to the factors to be taken into account when assessing when interference with a right held by virtue of Article 8(1) of the Convention is justified by Article 8(2) of the Convention. The ECtHR has acknowledged that the weight to be attached to the competing considerations, in striking a fair balance, falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. The authorities responsible for determining policy in relation to immigration within the limits of the national margin of appreciation are the Secretary of State for the Home Department and Parliament.
14. The Rules are set by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and indorsed by Parliament. They reflect the responsible Minister’s assessment, at a general level of the relative weight of the competing factors when striking a fair balance under Article 8. They must therefore be given considerable weight when assessing with interference with an Article 8(1) right, such that if the requirements of the Rules are met it would generally be disproportionate to interfere with an Article 8(1) right, but where the requirements of the Rules are not met exceptional circumstances, in the sense of a very compelling case, will be required to outweigh the public interest in removal – see the judgment of Lord Reed in R (Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11
15. Section 117A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) identifies considerations to which a court or tribunal must have regard to when answering the “public interest question” of whether an interference with a person's Article 8(1) right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2). Relevant to this appeal is Section 117B which sets out public interest considerations applicable in all cases and which includes the following:
(4) Little weight should be given to—

(a) a private life, or

(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,

that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.

(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
16. In Rhuppiah (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58 the Supreme Court considered the application of sections 117A and 117B of the 2002 Act and recognised at [49] of the judgment of Lord Wilson that the provisions of s.117B of the 2002 Act:
“cannot put decision-makers in a strait-jacket which constrains them to determine claims under article 8 inconsistently with the article itself. Inbuilt into the concept of “little weight” itself is a small degree of flexibility; but it is in particular section 117A(2)(a) which provides the limited degree of flexibility recognised to be necessary in para 36 above. Although this court today defines a precarious immigration status for the purpose of section 117B(5) with a width from which most applicants who rely on their private life under article 8 will be unable to escape, section 117A(2)(a) necessarily enables their applications occasionally to succeed. It is impossible to improve on how, in inevitably general terms, Sales LJ in his judgment described the effect of section 117A(2)(a) as follows:

“53. … Although a court or tribunal should have regard to the consideration that little weight should be given to private life established in [the specified] circumstances, it is possible without violence to the language to say that such generalised normative guidance may be overridden in an exceptional case by particularly strong features of the private life in question …”
Analysis
Ground (i)
17. The challenge in ground (i) is to the Judge’s statement at [38] of her decision that:
“I am also mandated by Statute to accord little weight to a relationship formed with a qualifying partner that was established by the appellant at a time when he was in the United Kingdom unlawfully”
18. Ms Revill submitted that this statement of the law does not reflect the correct legal position as identified in Rhuppiah. Ms Revill submitted that the Judge was required to consider whether there were particularly strong features of the appellant’s case which meant the usual requirement to have regard to the consideration that little weight should be given to the relationship, was overridden. Ms Revill’s submission is that the Judge erred in law by failing to do so. In her competing submissions Ms Everett pointed out that the Judge more accurately reflected the correct legal position in the preceding paragraph of her decision when repeating that “little weight should be given” (my emphasis) to private life that is established while the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully or precariously. Ms Everett says that the “also” in the first line [38] of the Judge’s decision (“I am also mandated by statute”) suggests that the Judge was in both private and family life considerations considering whether little weight should be given. In any event, Ms Everett submitted that the Judge made a number of adverse findings about the weight to be given to the family life which she was entitled to reach.
19. The Judge’s suggestion that she was “mandated by statute” to give little weight to the appellant’s family life with LS was plainly an inaccurate or incomplete statement of the law the light of the interpretation of sections 117A and 117B of the 2002 Act authoritatively provided in Rhuppiah. As that decision made clear, the 2002 Act cannot place decision makers in a strait-jacket by mandating a finding that is inconsistent with Article 8. The small degree of flexibility provided in s.117A and s.117B enabled the Judge to override the normative guidance that little weight should be given to family life established during an unlawful stay if she found this to be an exceptional case containing particularly strong features of the family life in question. To the extent to which it indicated that was not the case, the first line in [38] of the Judge’s decision was an error.
20. Considering the Judge’s decision as a whole however, I am satisfied that it is not the case that the Judge considered herself to be in a strait-jacket which constrained her to determine the case inconsistently with article 8. On the contrary, it is clear from a fair and holistic reading of the Judge’s decision, that the Judge was not persuaded that this was an exceptional case with particularly strong features which meant that the usual position whereby little weight is given to the family life established during unlawful residence should not apply.
21. I reach this conclusion because the Judge found that the relationship between the appellant and LS was one which could continue in Cyprus (where LS visits regularly and where LS has family including three children with whom she has regular contact and grandchildren). The Judge further found that the temporary separation of the appellant from LS would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for either of them. The Judge also found that the for the entire duration of the relationship, the appellant’s presence has been unlawful and noted that the appellant had not even tried to regularise his status for a period of ten years. I consider the challenges that are made to some of these findings in the following paragraphs, but in the light of these findings, it is in my judgment, impossible to conclude that the Judge viewed this as an exceptional case with particular strong features of family life that warranted the overriding of the normative, common sense provision, that says little weight should be given to a relationship established during unlawful residence.
22. In all the circumstances therefore I conclude that the error made by the Judge when stating that statute “mandated” the attribution of little weight to the relationship between the appellant and LS was not a material error because it is clear from her findings that the Judge would have attributed little weight to the relationship in any event.
Grounds ii and iii
23. I deal with these two grounds together because as Ms Revill acknowledged during the hearing that both asserted errors would need to be established for either to be material. Both grounds (ii) and (iii) relate to the Judge’s finding at [42] that “it would not give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant to seek entry clearance outside the United Kingdom.” That finding is explained by the Judge in the following two paragraphs of her decision. Ground (ii) concerns the Juge’s explanation at [44] that “I see no reason why [LS] could not go an stay with her daughter in Cyprus while they await entry clearance application” while ground (iii) concerns the Judge’s alternative suggestion at [43] that if necessary, LS’s PIP would ensure she is cared for by a paid carer while separated from the appellant.
24. Concerning ground (ii) Ms Revill submitted that the Judge’s conclusion that the LS could stay with her daughter while the outcome of an application for entry clearance by the appellant was awaited, failed to recognise that the Rules require that where such an application is made, the sponsor is present and settled in the United Kingdom. I consider however that this submission arises from a misunderstanding of the finding made by the Judge. That finding was that not that LS could go to Cyprus prior to the application being made and remain there until the application was resolved. The finding was that LS could stay with her daughter while (an outcome) to the application for entry clearance was awaited. I agree with Ms Everett that there is nothing in the finding made by the Judge to suggest that she was expecting LS would give up her settled status in the United Kingdom or that she would leave the United Kingdom for the entire duration from before the application being made until it is resolved. Instead the Judge was reaching the conclusion that the effect of temporary separation from the applicant on LS could be mitigated by her staying for a period of time with her daughter in Cyprus. This was an entirely rational conclusion especially where the evidence before the Judge was that LS frequently visits Cyprus to stay with her children there.
25. Concerning ground (iii) Ms Revill identified that the evidence before the Judge was that LS received £172.75 per week in PIP and submitted that this amount was self evidently not enough to enable LS to be cared for by a paid carer as the Judge suggests in [43]. Ms Everett by contrast submitted that the Judge was correct when stating that the state’s purpose in paying PIP to LS is to enable her needs to be met and that the Judge was entitled to have regard to the fact that LS is receiving a provision which has been assessed as being sufficient to meet her needs.
26. It is noteworthy that the evidence concerning the PIP paid to LS that was adduced before the Judge did not provide a complete picture of the assessment of LS’s needs that was undertaken to determine the amount that would be paid or a complete picture of the intended purpose for the payments being made. Instead only some of the pages of the PIP yearly update were adduced. There is nothing to suggest that the assessment that took place before the amount of the payment was decided took account of the appellant’s presence or support. In fact the opposite is suggested because it is apparent from the partial information that was adduced (at p418 of the bundle for this appeal) that part of the payments made to LS were to reflect her need for supervision or assistance when preparing a meal and to get in or out of a shower.
27. It is also significant that the Judge did not say at [43] that the PIP would pay for a full time carer for LS. That is not surprising because the limited evidence that was adduced did not suggest that a full time carer was required. In all the circumstances and on the limited evidence that was provided I am satisfied that the Judge did not err in law when stating at [43] that “[LS] is in receipt of the enhanced rates of both the mobility and the daily living component of Personal Independence Payment, precisely to pay for the additional costs of her daily living and mobility needs. That is what the state provides to ensure that she is adequately cared for by a paid carer if necessary.” Instead I find the Judge was stating a conclusion that she was entitled to reach on the evidence, namely that in the event she is separated from the appellant, LS would receive state support to ensure her living needs are met.
Ground (iv)
28. Ground (iv) is linked to grounds (ii) and (iii) because it involves a complaint about the Judge’s conclusion that LS’s separation from the appellant would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences. Ground (iv) however argues that the Judge followed a procedurally unfair process before concluding at [42] – [44] that the consequences would not be unjustifiably harsh because LS’s daughter could care for her or LS could pay for a carer. Ms Revill submitted that it was unfair for the Judge to reach these conclusions when neither proposition was put to the appellant or LS during the hearing. Ms Revill argued that LS was thereby deprived of an opportunity to explain why her daughter could not care for her and why she could not pay for a carer.
29. Pointing to the respondent’s decision and the respondent’s review, Mr Everett submitted in reply that the appellant knew that the respondent did not accept that there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences to separation and that this was something that would need to be established in evidence. Ms Everett further submitted that the Judge’s challenged findings about the LS’s daughter providing her care or LS paying for a carer were alternatives to the Judge’s conclusion that the state would meet LS’s needs and so any error made in the process by which those findings were made is immaterial.
30. What fairness requires is essentially an intuitive judgment which is dependant on the context of the decision and while it is possible to identify a number of general principles, they cannot be applied by rote identically in every situation. An overall judgment must be made in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case (see Abdi v Entry Clearance officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 at [29]).
31. In my judgment the process adopted by the Judge when considering whether the appellant’s separation from LS would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences was a fair one. The issue was raised in the decision and in the pre-hearing correspondence. There can be no doubt that the appellant was aware that this was a matter he had to establish by way of evidence at the hearing. It follows from the identification of this issue that the parties would have been aware that the Judge would need to consider not only what would be the consequences of separation but also how might any adverse consequences be mitigated. The hearing process enabled the appellant with a fair opportunity to advance evidence to demonstrate that the consequences of separation would be harsh and also that they could not be mitigated. Despite this, the evidence in the witness statements from the appellant and LS on the issue was very limited, though it included the fact that LS’s children currently visit and stay with her.
32. This is not a situation where evidence was given but was rejected without being challenged. Rather the situation is that, knowing the relevance it might have to a key issue in the appeal, the only evidence that the appellant and LS chose to give about support that LS might receive from her family, was the statement that her children visit her in London. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the Judge was not required to introduce further evidence by questioning the appellant or LS further and instead was entitled to remain silent, knowing the appellant was represented, and see how the case unfolded before making her findings on the evidence before her.
33. Likewise, although he knew the relevance that it might have to a key issue in the appeal, the appellant chose to rely on only partial extracts of the PIP correspondence as evidence of the support available to LS from the state. Again, in those circumstances, where the issue was identified, the appellant had been given the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his case and fairness did not require the Judge to give the appellant an opportunity to add to that evidence by further questioning. Instead the Judge was entitled to make her decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
34. The burden was on the appellant to establish that separation from LS would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences. The Judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant had failed to satisfy that burden. Fairness did not require that before she reach that conclusion, the Judge questioned the appellant or LS about ways in which adverse consequences might be mitigated. Instead she was entitled to remain silent and to reach her conclusions on the basis of the evidence the represented appellant advanced.
Ground (v)
35. Ground (v) complains that the Judge failed to take account of the fact that LS has settled status in the United Kingdom as a result of the Withdrawal Agreement when assessing the proportionality of interference with the family life she shared with the appellant. Ms Revill accepts that at [18] of her decision the Judge recognises this factor and said that she gave it “significant weight” but submits that this was only when considering whether there would be insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the United Kingdom and that the Judge failed to separately address the point in her proportionality assessment.
36. I cannot accept the submission that having earlier said in terms that she had attached significant weight to the fact LS was settled in the United Kingdom, the Judge erred by then failed to do so again when assessing proportionality of interference with family life. I do not accept the suggestion that the Judge was required to repeat herself and can see no reason to conclude that the Judge did anything other than what she expressly says at [18], namely gave significant weight to the fact LS is settled in the United Kingdom.
37. The grounds make reference to [23] of the judgment of Stuart-Smith LJ in Kaur v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1353 however that concerned a different issue. In that case Stuart-Smith LJ said “I cannot, however accept that the mere fact that the UTJ mentioned something in her review of the relevant evidence earlier in the judgment demonstrates that it was taken into account in the course of a proportionality assessment.” That is not the case here. The Judge did not merely mention evidence that LS had settled status in the United Kingdom within her judgment. Instead the Judge had engaged with the appellant’s assertion that this was a relevant factor and confirmed that having done so, it was a factor to which she gave “significant weight”. There is no reason to infer that the Judge subsequently forgot she had done so when she came to undertake her proportionality assessment.
Ground (vi)
38. The final ground of appeal complains that it was unfair for the Judge to reject LS’s evidence that the medication available to her in Cyprus makes her feel very ill, without that evidence being challenged in cross examination. I am not satisfied however that this complaint accurately reflects the finding that was made by the Judge.
39. At [15] the Judge quotes the evidence that LS gave in her witness statement including: “the medication that I receive for Parkinsons is a very specific make and a specific strength. This is not available even in Cyprus as the one in Cyprus is a different make and a very high strength which does not suit me and makes me very ill.” The Judge goes on however to say at [16]:
Ms Revill acknowledged that it may be that other brands/medications are just as good, but the fact remained that the treatment she is on was not available in Cyprus. Although it is true that the sponsor gave testimony to that effect, I find that this claim was unsatisfactorily substantiated by medical evidence. It is for the appellant to show insurmountable obstacles. No medical evidence was placed before me to show:

(i) the medication or combination of medications/brands of medications the appellant is on in the UK are not available in Cyprus;
(ii) the medications the appellant is on are unique and cannot be replaced by other brands that are just as effective, as claimed;
(iii) there are no other reasonable alternative medications to the appellant’s current brands of medications;
40. In my judgment, it is clear from a fair reading of [16] of the Judge’s decision, that rather than rejecting LS’s evidence or concluding that she is lying, the Judge is saying that the evidence of LS is simply inadequate to satisfy her to the required standard, of the propositions set out in the paragraph at (i)-(iii). This was unquestionably a conclusion that was available to the Judge on the limited evidence presented and it did not involve any unfairness.
41. As with ground (iv), central to the question of procedural fairness is the fact that the appellant was on notice that the assertion that appropriate medication was not available for LS in Cyprus, was not accepted. The appellant knew this was a matter in issue when preparing his case and making decisions about the service of evidence. It was in fact explicitly raised in the respondent’s review. The burden was on the appellant to establish as a fact that LS would not be able to obtain adequate medication if she moved to Cyprus. The only evidence the appellant adduced for that purpose was the extract of LS’s statement that the Judge quoted at [15]. The Judge did not find that LS was lying and she did not need to reach that conclusion in order to make the finding she did at [16]. Instead, the Judge was unarguably entitled to conclude that the evidence from LS was insufficient to satisfy her, in the absence of medical evidence, that there is no medication appropriate for LS available in Cyprus.
Conclusion
42. Despite the capable arguments advanced by Ms Revill I am satisfied that the decision of the Judge did not involve an error of law. Instead I am satisfied that the Judge reached conclusions that were reasonably open to her on the principle controversial issues of the appeal namely there would be no insurmountable obstacles to the appellant’s family life with LS continuing outside the United Kingdom and that in all the circumstances interference with that family life was justified in accordance with Article 8(2) of the convention.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Meyler did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 May 2026